Brian Buck, John Childress, Robert Kilcourse, Kody McMichael, Marisa Peters, Matthew Raively, Deborah Robinson, Karen Sabater, Donald Smith, Richard Smith, Marcus Smith, Ayana Thomas, Jessica Welch, George Williams, and Nylan Wolcott.

## PERSONAL EXPLANATION

### HON. PATRICK J. KENNEDY

OF RHODE ISLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, July 27, 1999*

Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Speaker, last week I was not able to be present for rollcall votes 308–334. Had I been present, I would have voted the following way: 308—''yea''; 309—''yea''; 310—''yea''; 311—''yea''; 312—''yea''; 313—''no''; 314—''no''; 315—''no''; 316—''yea''; 317—''yea''; 318—''yea''; 319—''yea''; 320—''no''; 321—''yea''; 322—''yea''; 323—''yea''; 324—''no''; 325—''yea''; 326—''yea''; 327—''yea''; 328—''yea''; 329—''yea''; 330—''no''; 331—''yea''; 332—''yea''; 333—''no''; 334—''yea.''

## RECOGNIZING BISHOP MACRAM MAX GASSIS

### HON. FRANK R. WOLF

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, July 27, 1999*

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, I am submitting for the RECORD an article from the recent Washington Watch by the Family Research Council about Bishop Macram Max Gassis, a Roman Catholic bishop from Sudan. Over the years, Bishop Macram has tirelessly fought for justice for his people—the people of Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains who have suffered and died in great numbers during the war that has plagued the country for the past fifteen years.

Over 2 million people have died in Sudan—more than in Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia and Bosnia combined. They often feel they are forgotten by the world.

Bishop Macram reminds us that these men, women and children must not be forgotten. He reminds us of their brave spirit, their hope in the midst of suffering and their quest for justice. He reminds us of our responsibility to speak out, take action and do what we can to help the people of Sudan.

I have been privileged to know Bishop Macram over the years.

A GENTLE GIANT OF FAITH

(By Bill Saunders)

In Sudan, just south of Egypt, where the church traces its roots to Apostolic times, a radical Islamic government is waging war on its own citizens—torturing and murdering Christians. In this war, the government regularly bombs innocent civilians, destroys their food supplies, poisons their only sources of clean water, desecrates their churches, supports the taking of their children as slaves, and forces non-Arab, non-Muslim people into refugee camps where they must convert to Islam or starve.

For years, the world has done little to help. The U.N. has allowed the Sudanese government to dictate where it can provide relief (thus, the most needy people starve). Until recently, the U.S. focused little diplomatic effort on the problem, despite Sudan's strategic position as a bridge between black Africa and the Middle East, and despite the Sudanese government's avowed aim of exporting radical Islam throughout the world. Only recently, the House of Representatives passed a stinging resolution, finally and fairly condemning these practices by the Sudanese government. Senator Sam Brownback has introduced a similar resolution in the Senate but it remains to be seen whether the House will vote to take substantive action.

In the midst of this man-made hell on earth, one man stands out as he fights for justice. That man is Catholic Bishop Macram Max Gassis. Born in Sudan of ethnically mixed parents and educated in England, Italy, and the United States, the Bishop is an articulate modern-day prophet. The only Sudanese bishop born in the northern (Arab) part of the country, he is fluent in the Arabic language and understands those in the North who see all blacks as ''slaves'' and all Christians as ''infidels''.

Unlike so many others, he refuses to pretend the horror does not exist. He has spoken out before the European Parliament, the U.S. Congress, and the United Nations Human Rights Commission. He travels regularly to the West, particularly to the United States, to expose the evil in his country. His witness has inspired many, from Senator Brownbeck to Congressman Frank Wolf. He, like St. Paul, has spoken the truth to kings and governors.

In Sudan, the people revere Bishop Gassis for his courage. The government, angry that he has called it to account, has branded him a criminal. Whenever he travels back to his country, he risks being captured and possibly executed.

Undaunted, he returns to his diocese because his people need him. His presence inspires them. Every time he returns, he smuggles desperately needed supplies through enemy lines. In many areas, he is the only one providing assistance.

Despite his tribulations, the Bishop remains a gentle man, firmly committed to Christ. He has a special affection for children, particularly those children who were formerly enslaved, and is raising several hundred of them, orphaned by the raiders who abducted them. These children need food, clothing, shelter, education, and counseling, and he provides it. Because of this expression of Christian love, the children are joyful and, like Bishop Gassis, full of hope.

Christianity in Sudan, its ancestral home, is alive and growing. The church, through heroes like Bishop Gassis, refuses to be silenced. As he says, ''though we in Sudan are being crucified, after every crucifixion, there comes a resurrection.''

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2000

SPEECH OF

### HON. JACK KINGSTON

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, July 22, 1999*

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2561) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000, and for other purposes:

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, the House Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for FY00 provides an extremely important allocation of resources in a serious effort to improve critical shortcomings affecting the readiness of our armed forces. This bill meets the budget authority and outlay limits set in the Committee's 302(b) allocation, provides a critical $15.5 billion increase over appropriations in FY99, and provides $2.8 billion above the President's request. This legislation goes a long way to address critical readiness, recruitment, retention, operational maintenance, and quality of life needs that are so important for our military. However, I am concerned about one aspect of the legislation's strategy, cutting programmed funding for the initial production of the Air Force's number one development priority, the F–22, Raptor.

We expect our military to remain the world's best, head and shoulders above any potential aggressor. We demand that our armed forces reign supreme in personnel, training, professionalism, and equipment. We do not want parity with our enemies, we demand superiority. We do not want to win conflicts by attrition but by overwhelming our foes. A most critical aspect of our superiority is our ability to achieve and maintain air superiority in any conflict. Furthermore, today Americans have grown to expect to win conflicts with minimal or even no casualties. The best trained pilots in the most advanced aircraft are the great enabler in any conflict whether to protect our Navy, or to allow the introduction and free maneuver of our ground forces. Air superiority is vital. Experience in modern warfare has continued to reflect the importance of this from success in World War II to operations during Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force.

The F–22 aircraft is being produced to replace the F–15 fighter and to accomplish its air superiority mission beginning in 2005. The F–15 currently represents 1960's technology and the aging fleet will average 26 years old when the F–22 is scheduled to be operational. Today's F–15's have served our country well, but in the future our pilots will be at risk. Its capabilities today are at parity with the Russian SU–27, MIG–29 and by 2005 will be at a disadvantage facing the Russian SU–35 or the French Rafael, and the European Fighter 2000 aircraft that will be available on the world market. Additionally, the surface to air missile threat continues to advance world wide. Today the SA–10 and SA–12 missile availability pose a threat to the F–15. Proliferation of SA–10 and SA–12 capability has increased from four countries in 1985 to fourteen in 1995 and an estimated 22 by 2005. The F–22 will have the capability to counter the surface to air missile threat through stealth technology, supercruise capability that will significantly reduce missile engagement opportunity, maneuverability and unequaled pilot awareness.

The F–22 aircraft does bear costs, $19 billion has been invested to date, but the cost and advanced technology provide significant efficiencies and long term savings. The F–22 will reduce by half the number of maintenance personnel for each aircraft. It is expected to have 30 percent reduction in direct operations and sustainment costs per squadron per year when compared to the F–15. A quicker combat turnaround time will allow higher sortie rates during a conflict. The F–22 program costs are under control and are within the Congressionally mandated cost caps for both development and production. This plane utilizes cutting edge technology to ensure our Air Force continues to maintain our nation's superiority in air combat.

Based upon the status of the current F–22 program, a pause in funding the F–22 procurement requested for FY00 would put the entire program at serious risk. Contract obligations would be breached if aircraft procurement is not funded. This would result in at least a three year delay in the program, would increase costs by $6–8 billion, and exceed the caps set by Congress. The production delay could seriously affect numerous suppliers that could not afford to stop and restart production causing significant erosion of the program's industrial base. Such a pause would seriously disrupt an intricate supply system established in all but a few states.

A pause or end of the F–22 program would have a very negative impact on the future of an important complementary aircraft, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF also under development is being designed as a multi-role aircraft for three services to replace the capabilities of the F–16 and A–10 fleet, with fielding goals in FY10. It is being developed to perform as an air-to ground combat aircraft to complement the air-to-air combat role of the F–22. The characteristics of these planes will differ greatly. If the F–22 program is killed, the U.S. will have a void in the capabilities required by the F–22, the action could cause great changes to JSF, or require development of a whole new kind of aircraft all of which would delay the fielding of the JSF. Additionally, the JSF leverages certain technologies from the F–22, including avionics and engines that use the F–22 as a stepping stone for advancements. Setback of the F–22 program will degrade progress on the JSF. Ultimately, this action could place our air supremacy capability in extreme danger.

Finally, as the F–22 harnesses and employs superb, advanced technology, the development and testing of the aircraft does the same. Flight testing of two test aircraft has proceeded well. Avionics testing has been ongoing through three bench labs and one flying test bed, a 757 aircraft with all avionics including a full cockpit from an F–22. Advanced computer models have also enhanced the ability to hone the technical aspects of the plane. Nine aircraft are funded in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of this program. All nine aircraft will be delivered by FY01. Production aircraft that have been requested by the Air Force to be funded in FY00 will not complete production until FY03. This low rate initial production is necessary to efficiently utilize the open delivery line. Testing will be 90% complete and initial operational testing and evaluation will complete in mid-year 2003. This program minimizes risks and employs efficiency and responsible costing to meet delivery milestones. When compared with previous aircraft production such as the F–15 and F–16, the F–22 minimizes, by a large degree, the number of production aircraft during the EMD phase.

In closing, the House Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for FY00 is a good bill that will provide relief for many aspects of our services needs. It goes far to take care of the men and women who serve in America's Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. I will vote in favor of this legislation, but with apprehension that this bill does an injustice to the number one Air Force development priority and a critical Department of Defense program that has vital implications on how we remain the undisputed air superiority and air supremacy power in the world.

AMENDMENT TO THE FISCAL YEAR 2000 DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL OFFERED BY MR. KINGSTON

In the ''AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE'' account (beginning at page 29, line 11 of the committee print), increase the pending amount by $630,297,000, representing an increase of $1,852,075,000 in the F–22 aircraft program and a decrease of $1,221,778,000 in other programs.

In the ''AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY'' account (beginning at page 25, line 3 of the committee print), reduce the pending amount by $387,897,000.

In the ''RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, AIR FORCE'' account (beginning at page 35, line 14 of the committee print), reduce the pending amount by $242,400,000.

And amend the committee report accordingly.

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DETAILED AMENDMENTS FOR THE COMMITTEE REPORT

CHANGE: INCREASE THE FOLLOWING LINES AS SPECIFIED

Aircraft, Procurement, Air Force. (Report page 173).

Tactical Forces (in thousands of dollars);
F–22 Raptor: $1,574,981.
F–22 Raptor (AP–CY): $277,094.
Total: $1,852,075.

OFFSETS: REDUCE THE FOLLOWING LINES AS SPECIFIED

*Title III Procurement*

Air Force Procurement (in thousands of dollars)

Combat Aircraft (Report page 173).
Tactical Forces:
F–15: $440,000.
F–16 C/D (MYP): $98.000.
F–16 C/D (MYP) ADV PROC: $24,000.
Mission Support Aircraft:
Operational Support Aircraft: $63,000.
E–8C: $188,200.
Predator UAV: $20,000.
Modification of Inservice Aircraft:
B–1B: $16,650.
A–10: $5,000.
F–15: $58,328.
F–16: $46,000.
C–135: $137,800.
DARP: $124,800.

Aircraft Procurement, Navy

Other Aircraft (Report Page 148).
KC–130J: $281,897.
Modification of Aircraft:
EA–6 Series: $66,000.
AH–1 W Series: $3,000.
H–1 Series: $10,000.
EP–3 Series: $17,000.
P–3 Series: $10,000.

*Title IV, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation*

RDT&E, Air Force (Rpt page 248)

Demonstration & Validation (In thousands of dollars):
Joint Strike Fighter: $100,000.
Engineering & Manufacturing Development (In thousands of dollars):
B–2 Advanced Technology Bomber: $142,400.

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WHY WE NEED THE F–22

THREAT

Need F–22 to counter future and current surface-to-air missile (SA 10/12) threats. The F–15 cannot operate in this environment by itself.

21 countries expected to posses SA 10/12's (advanced SAMS) by 2005.

237 of world's 267 nations have surface to air missiles.

There will be a five fold increase in the number of countries with radar guided air to air missiles.

As many as 700 MIG–21's may be upgraded between 1995 and 2000.

F–15 began service in early 1970's (almost 25 years ago).

When F–22 becomes operational in FY06, the F–15 will average 26 years old.

When JSF becomes operational in FY10, the F–16 will be 24 years old.

30–40 year old F–15's put our pilots at risk.

Today the F–15 is just at parity with the SU–27 and MIG–29.

By 2005 the F–15 will be disadvantage to the SU–35 and the export versions of the Rafale and European Fighter 2000.

Air to air missiles are proliferating and becoming more capable.

IMPACT OF SLIPPING PROGRAM

3 year delay in program, voids contracts, and kills program.

This is not a pause, it kills the production program.

Increase in costs breaks the contract price and the Congressional costs caps.

Increases Air Force costs by $6.5 billion.

Set back for Army's number one priority the Commanche helicopter since they have some common systems).

$16 billion already invested to date.

Loss of industrial base to support F–22 program.

Upgrading the F–15 would cost about $26 million per plane.

F–22

F–22 replaces the F–15 for all weather superiority and deep attack.

Increased capabilities: stealth, supercruise, maneuverability, avionics, weapons playload.

First look, first shot, first kill against multiple targets.

Flight tests have gone well.

Cost are controlled, costs are within funding caps set by Congress.

The F–22 will reduce by half the number of maintenance personnel for each aircraft.

F–22 will cost $500 million less to operate and support over 20 years than an F–15 squadron.

F–15 afterburner operations are limited to 5–7 minutes, F–22 can operate at supercruise for a significant period of time without afterburners.

20% lower combat turnaround time for the F–22/higher sorties rate.

Lower deployment requirements (14 C–17s to deploy F–15 vs. 4C–17s for F–22).

JSF

JSF leverages technologies from the F–22 (avionics, engines).

JSF is a multi-role air to ground fighter to complement (not replace) the air-to-air role of F–22.

JSF replaces the F–16 and A–10 and meets requirements for other military services.

Without the F–22, the requirements for JSF change and will delay JSF by several years.

For more information contact Cong. Kingston (5–5831) or Cong. Chambliss (5–6531).

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POINT PAPER ON HAC–D TO F–22 PROCUREMENT

BACKGROUND—WHY THE USAF NEEDS THE F–22

*The 21st Century Force Structure*

The Air Force's modernization strategy is built on the proper mix of ''High'' capability F–22s and ''Low'' cost Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) to achieve the dominant capability and operations tempo to support Joint Vision 2010s goal of full spectrum dominance.

F–22 is the high-capability force enabler designed to accomplish the most demanding missions of air superiority and attack of high-value, highly defended targets.

A combination of stealth, supercruise, integrated avionics, and larger internal air-to-

air weapons payload are its primary attributes.

The JSF is the low-cost majority of the force—balance of affordability and capability allows procurement of greater numbers to perform a variety of missions and sustain the required high tempo of modern warfare.

*JSF Will Rely on the F–22 for Air Superiority*

JSF will modernize the largest part of our fleet providing an affordable replacement for the F–16 and A–10.

JSF is dependent upon F–22 technologies and will complement the F–22 in the future as the F–16 complements the F–15 today.

*The Need for the F–22*

Joint Vision 2010 requires the Air Force to achieve Air Dominance—the ability to completely control adversary's vertical battlespace.

The current air superiority fighter, the F–15, is at parity today with the SU–27 and MIG–29; by IOC for F–22 in 2005, the F–15 will be at a disadvantage with the fielding of the SU–35 and export versions of the Rafale and Typhoon, and the proliferation of advanced air-to-missiles such as the AA–11, AA–X–12, and MICA.

The development and proliferation of advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as the SA–10 and SA–12 result in a sanctuary for the enemy because the F–15 will be unable to operate in this environment without a protracted, asset intensive, defense suppression campaign.

F—22's attributes of stealth, supercruise, and integrated avionics will allow it to operate in the presence of the total threat—emerging threat aircraft, advanced SAMs, and advanced air-to-missiles.

Provides American forces the freedom from attack, freedom to maneuver and freedom to attack.

*The Time is Now*

The current Air Force fighter modernization program is an affordable and effective solution demanded by the increasing age of our current fighter force structure.

By F–22 IOC in 2005, the average age of the F–15 will be 26 years old.

By JSF IOC in 2010, the average age of the F–16 will be 24 years old.

F–22 is an essential investment to achieve air dominance—the key enabler for 21st Century Combat Operations.

DISCUSSION—IMPACT OF THE HAC–D REDUCTION ON THE CURRENT F–22 PROGRAM

The proposed reduction of the F–22 funding has a net impact of terminating the current production program and increases total Air Force costs by $6.5 Billion (does *not* include costs for Service Life Extension of F–15 to accommodate 2 year slip to F–22 Initial Operational Capability).

*Termination of the Current Production Program*

The current F–22 production strategy to procure all 339 aircraft within the Congressional Cost cap of $39.8B Key elements of this strategy are: Fixed price options for the PRTV and Lot 1; Target Price Curve (TPC) for Lots 2–5; and Multi-year contracts for lots 5–12.

Impact: Termination of the Lot 1 buy voids the fixed price agreement for the PRTV/Lot 1 buy and contractually requires termination of the PRTV aircraft buy. This in turn breaks the TPC and results in a production cost increase over the Congressional cost caps. A new production strategy initiated in FY02 with an 8 aircraft buy (requires Advance Buy in FY01) and a new production profile (8, 10, 16, 24, 36) results in a production cost increase of $5.3B, which breaks the Congressionally mandated production cost cap of $39.8B.

*Extension of the EMD Program by 15 Months*

The cancellation of the PRTV aircraft drives the requirement to retrofit the EMD aircraft to a production configuration for dedicated initial operational test and evaluation, which would have been accomplished by the PRTVs.

An additional $500M is required for EMD to fund for Out-of-Production parts associated with these aircraft due to the lack of an active production program.

Impact: With the EMD stretchout and above considerations the total cost impact to the EMD program is $1.2B, which breaks Congressionally mandated EMD cost cap of $18.8B.

*Delay to Initial Operating Capability (IOC)*

F–22 IOC is currently scheduled for December 2005, the change to the production profile would delay IOC (stand up of the first F–22 squadron) to Dec 2007.

Delay in IOC would force the Air Force to execute an F–15 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) on one Fighter Wing (72 aircraft).