

further ask consent that Senator LAUTENBERG be recognized to offer a second-degree amendment and there be up to 1 hour for debate equally divided in the usual form. I further ask consent that upon the use or yielding back of the time, the vote on the Lautenberg amendment be stacked for consideration later today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUNNING). Is there objection?

Mr. WELLSTONE. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I withdraw the request. Why, I don't understand, but I will withdraw the request because it is faster to do that than to find out what the reason is why we can't stack. I say, by way of explanation, if we stack the votes, we can move more expeditiously to dispose of the Senate's business. But I hear an objection to that.

I ask unanimous consent that after Senator HELMS is recognized for 9 minutes, that we proceed to Senator LAUTENBERG's second-degree amendment for 1 hour, equally divided, and that the Senate vote in relation to the Lautenberg second-degree amendment without intervening action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPECTER. Might I add, before proceeding to Senator HELMS' recognition, Senator HARKIN and I are in agreement, as are others managing the bill, to try to get time agreements for 30 minutes equally divided. If we are to move the bill, we need to do that. I think it is not inappropriate to say that we can get as much done in 30 minutes equally divided as we can with an hour equally divided. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HARKIN. I concur with the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from North Carolina is recognized for 9 minutes.

#### COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, as the Senate proceeds toward its still-scheduled debate on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, I am confident that the record will show most former senior U.S. government officials remain strongly opposed to Senate ratification of the CTBT.

The Senate—and the American people—will hear from many distinguished officials in the coming days, as they speak out against the CTBT. Of course, the Clinton Administration will try to counter that other well-known people support the CTBT, but those who support ratification of this proposed total nuclear test ban are a distinct minority.

In looking over the record, however, I found that many of the very people

the Clinton Administration claims now support such a permanent and total nuclear test ban treaty in fact explicitly rejected it when they served in the U.S. Senate and in uniform.

They argued at that time (a) that such a test ban was unverifiable, and (b) that the U.S. needs to preserve the ability to conduct nuclear tests if the American people are to be assured of the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons.

Make no mistake: These are all great Americans, whom I admire and respect, who served their country with distinction. In calling attention to their statements of the past for the record today, I certainly imply no disrespect.

To the contrary, I hope the record will reflect their judgements at that time because I believe that those judgements on a zero-yield test ban were right back then—and those judgements are still right today.

For example, as a U.S. Senator, our distinguished former colleague, Bill Cohen of Maine, was a leading light on defense issues in the U.S. Senate. Indeed, he vigorously objected to the termination of nuclear testing when he served here as a U.S. Senator. He objected, he said, because the termination of nuclear testing would undermine efforts to make U.S. weapons safer.

Throughout the months of August and September 1992, Senator Cohen vigorously fought efforts by Senators Mitchell, Exon, and Hatfield to kill the United States nuclear test program.

Here is a sample of Senator Cohen's 1992 views as expressed on the Senate floor on September 18 of that year seven years ago:

We have made, in fact, remarkable progress in negotiating substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals. While we have made substantial reductions, we are not yet on the verge of eliminating nuclear weapons from our inventories. We are going to have to live with nuclear weapons for some time to come, so we have to ask ourselves the question: Exactly what kinds of nuclear weapons do we want to have during that time?

Senator Bill Cohen declared further seven years ago:

... [W]hat remains relevant is the fact that many of these nuclear weapons which we intend to keep in our stockpile for the indefinite future are dangerously unsafe. Equally relevant is the fact that we can make these weapons much safer if limited testing is allowed to be conducted. So, when crafting our policy regarding nuclear testing, this should be our principal objective: To make the weapons we retain safe.

... The amendment that was adopted last week ... does not meet this test ... [because] it would not permit the Department of Energy to conduct the necessary testing to make our weapons safe.

Similarly, Vice President AL GORE likewise adamantly opposed a "zero-yield" test ban—i.e., one that would ban all nuclear tests—as a United States Senator, on the grounds that such a ban was unverifiable.

Indeed, on May 12, 1988, Senator GORE objected to an amendment (offered to

the 1989 defense bill) because it called for a test ban treaty and restricted all nuclear tests above 1 kiloton.

A 1 kiloton limit ban, Senator GORE said at that time, was unverifiable. At Senator GORE's insistence, the proposed amendment was modified to raise the limit for nuclear testing from a 1 kiloton limit to a 5 kiloton limit.

For the RECORD, here's what Senator GORE's position as taken on the Senate floor in 1988:

Mr. President, I want to express a lingering concern about the threshold contained in the amendment.

Without regard to the military usefulness of lack of usefulness of a 1 kiloton versus the 5 kiloton test, purely with regard to verification, I am concerned that a 1 kiloton test really pushes verification to the limit, even with extensive cooperative measures. . . . I express the desire that this threshold be changed from 1 to 5.

If Senator GORE argued on the Senate floor that a 1 kiloton test ban was unverifiable, surely the zero-yield—ban—i.e. a ban on all nuclear tests would be equally unverifiable.

President Clinton has argued that several former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly back his call for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty banning any and all nuclear tests.

It's interesting that their statements, when they were still in uniform, however, raise doubts about Administration's claims that they vigorously support the CTBT. Consider, for example, what General Colin Powell, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said on December 1, 1992:

With respect to a comprehensive test ban, that has always been a fundamental policy goal of ours, but as long as we have nuclear weapons, we have a responsibility for making sure that our stockpile remains safe. And to keep that stockpile safe, we have to conduct a limited number of nuclear tests to make sure that we know what a nuclear weapon will actually do and how it is aging and to find out a lot of other physical characteristics with respect to nuclear phenomenon. . . . As long as we have nuclear weapons, I think as good stewards of them, we have to conduct testing.

General Powell previously had made much the same declaration during a Senate hearing on September 20, 1991:

We need nuclear testing to ensure the safety, surety of our nuclear stockpile. As long as one has nuclear weapons, you have to know what it is they will do, and so I would recommend nuclear testing.

What General Powell said was as true back then as it is today.

Similarly, Admiral William Crowe also opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty while he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 5, 1986, he stated:

[A comprehensive test ban] would introduce elements of uncertainty that would be dangerous for all concerned.

He further declared:

I frankly do not understand why Congress would want to suspend testing on one of the most critical and sophisticated elements of our nuclear deterrent—namely the warhead.

General David Jones likewise stated, during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

I would have difficulty recommending a zero test ban for an extended period.

Among the General's reasons for opposition were, according to a May 29, 1978 press account, that the CTBT

is not verifiable, and that U.S. stockpile reliability could not be assured.

Numerous press accounts from 1994 and 1995 indicated that General John Shalikashvili maintained strong reservations regarding a zero yield test ban, and made clear that he favored maintenance of the ability to conduct low-yield testing under any negotiated treaty.

Indeed, these comments by these former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs—while in uniform—strongly echo the current views of other former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, such as Admiral Tom Moorer and General John Vessey, Jr., both of whom today strongly oppose the CTBT.

Again, I must emphasize that all of these men are distinguished Americans whom I greatly respect and admire.

Indeed, my point today is simply to show that the arguments of Senators Cohen and GORE, and Chairmen Powell, Crowe, Jones and Shalikashvili were right then—and they are still right today:

Nuclear testing is vital to maintaining the safety of our nuclear weapons and the reliability of our nuclear deterrent.

A "zero-yield"—i.e., a total and complete—nuclear test ban is unverifiable.

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that bars any and all nuclear testing is dangerous for the American people, and I am confident that the United States Senate will not ratify such a dangerous treaty.

DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR,  
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,  
AND EDUCATION, AND RELATED  
AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS  
ACT, 2000—Continued

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.

AMENDMENT NO. 2267 TO AMENDMENT NO. 1851

(Purpose: To reject indiscriminate across-the-board cuts and protect Social Security surpluses by closing special interest tax loopholes and using other appropriate offsets)

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative assistant read as follows:

The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. LAUTENBERG] proposes an amendment numbered 2267 to amendment No. 1851.

At the end of the amendment add the following:

**SEC. \_\_. PROTECTING SOCIAL SECURITY SURPLUSES.**

(a) FINDINGS.—The Senate finds the following:

(1) The Congressional Budget Office has projected that Congress is headed toward using at least \$19,000,000,000 of the social security surplus in fiscal year 2000.

(2) Amendment number 1851 calls for across-the-board cuts, which could result in a broad-based reduction of 10 percent, taking into consideration approved appropriations bills and other costs likely to be incurred in the future, such as relief for hurricane victims, Kosovo, and health care providers.

(3) These across-the-board cuts would sharply reduce military readiness and long-term defense modernization programs, cut emergency aid to farmers and hurricane victims, reduce the number of children served by Head Start, cut back aid to schools to help reduce the class size, severely limit the number of veterans served in VA hospitals, reduce the number of FBI and Border Patrol agents, restrict funding for important transportation investments, and limit funding for environmental cleanup sites.

(b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that instead of raiding social security surpluses or indiscriminately cutting defense, emergency relief, education, veterans' health care, law enforcement, transportation, environmental cleanup, and other discretionary appropriations across the board, Congress should fund fiscal year 2000 appropriations, without using budget scorekeeping gimmicks, by closing special-interest tax loopholes and using other appropriate offsets.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, obviously, I went in a slightly different direction as we introduced our second-degree amendment because I wanted the clerk to particularly read some of the implications of what it is we are facing if we adopt the Nickles amendment.

My amendment is a substitute for the Nickles amendment. It is very simple. It expresses the sense of the Senate that the Congress must not permit raiding Social Security surpluses nor indiscriminately cut defense, emergency relief, education, veterans' health care, law enforcement, transportation, environmental cleanup, and other discretionary appropriations across the board. Instead, we should fund fiscal year 2000 appropriations—I point out that the year began October 1—without using budgetary gimmicks by closing special interest tax loopholes and using other appropriate offsets.

In my view, this is a much more rational and appropriate way to approach the budget. Deep across-the-board cuts are a bad way to do business. They will prove extremely unpopular. Americans didn't send us to Washington to simply use a meat ax approach to governing. They want us to do it thoughtfully. They want us to go after waste and inefficiencies, to use our judgment and support essential programs such as education. The Nickles amendment, by contrast, puts the budget process on automatic pilot. It would cut indiscriminately.

I read from the text of the Nickles amendment where they say in the sense-of-the-Senate amendment that "Congress should ensure that the fiscal year 2000 appropriations measures do not result in an on-budget deficit"—that on-budget is excluding Social Security trust funds. They put parentheses around it—"by adopting"—this is the solution they offer—"an across-

the-board reduction in all discretionary appropriations sufficient to eliminate such deficit if necessary."

The language is quite clear. But to further clarify, it says cut these programs—the ones I talked about—cut veterans' health benefits, cut educational benefits, cut law enforcement, cut FBI, cut border guards even though our border is saturated by illegal immigration. And we ought to make an orderly process about that.

The Nickles amendment makes no distinction between critical priorities such as education, defense, and lower priorities such as corporate subsidies or pork barrel spending.

There is no need for a meat ax approach. The Republicans' own tax bill proposed to close various tax loopholes. Now that the bill has been vetoed, why not use some of the same loopholes to help protect Social Security, to prevent potentially painful cuts in education and other priorities?

Why not search for waste from other Government programs? How many of us have talked about that waste as we campaigned for office? Shouldn't we go after that before we take money away from our schools or our Armed Forces?

My amendment does not specify the offsets we should adopt, and it in no way endorses raising income taxes on ordinary families, but it does say we have to treat the budget candidly.

One of the things we should all be alerted to—the public in particular, but certainly we who are going to vote on this—it says: "GOP Using Two Sets of Books," in a commentary by the Wall Street Journal of July 27:

Republicans are double-counting a big part of next year's surplus, papering over the fact that their proposed tax cuts and spending bills already have exhausted available funds.

If it were up to me, as I said earlier, I would ask the tobacco industry to compensate the taxpayers for the damage they have caused and help pay for the tobacco-related diseases that cost us some \$20 billion a year. If we could get that \$20 billion a year, we wouldn't have to be faced with the prospect of cutting Social Security surpluses by some \$19 billion.

Once again, my amendment doesn't endorse that particular approach, or any specific provision. It just says: Let's be honest with the American people, and let's find real offsets.

I will tell you what I learned from the Congressional Budget Office in a letter to one of my staff people:

Our estimates of the outlays available to be cut is \$351.7 billion. Dividing the projected deficit by the available outlays results in an across-the-board cut of 5.5 percent.

Across-the-board cuts—that is all of those programs that we have discussed several times.

We shouldn't use gimmicks. We shouldn't use that kind of treatment, and not indiscriminate, across-the-board cuts which drastically slash funding for teachers, military personnel, veterans, and other priorities. In fact, we have an endorsement of