

or Iraq will give up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons if only the United States signs the CTBT.

Our efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction not only deserve but are receiving the highest national security priority. It is clear to any fair-minded observer that the United States has substantially reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. The U.S. also has made or committed to dramatic reductions in the level of deployed nuclear forces. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the United States must continue to rely on nuclear weapons to contribute to the deterrence of certain kinds of attacks on the United States, its friends, and allies. In addition, several countries depend on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for their security. A lack of confidence in that deterrent might itself result in the spread of nuclear weapons.

As a consequence, the United States must continue to ensure that its nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable. But the fact is that the scientific case simply has not been made that, over the long term, the United States can ensure the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. The United States is seeking to ensure the integrity of its nuclear deterrent through an ambitious effort called the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program attempts to maintain adequate knowledge of nuclear weapons physics indirectly by computer modeling, simulation, and other experiments. We support this kind of scientific and analytic effort. But even with adequate funding—which is far from assured—the Stockpile Stewardship Program is not sufficiently mature to evaluate the extent to which it can be a suitable alternative to testing.

Given the absence of any pressing reason for early ratification, it is unwise to take actions now that constrain this or future Presidents' choices about how best to pursue our non-proliferation and other national security goals while maintaining the effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, we urge you to reach an understanding with the President to suspend action on the CTBT, at least for the duration of the 106th Congress.

Sincerely,

BRENT SCOWCROFT.
HENRY A. KISSINGER.
JOHN DEUTCH.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent the Senate now proceed to a period of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today I attended an event in the White House at which 31 Nobel laureates, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, four previous chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, among many others, supported the ratification by the Senate of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The point was made in those presentations that this treaty is not about politics. It is not about political par-

ties. It is about the issue of the proliferation or spread of nuclear weapons and whether the United States of America should ratify a treaty signed by the President and sent to the Senate over 700 days ago that calls for a ban on all further testing of nuclear weapons all around the world.

For some months, I have been coming to the floor of the Senate suggesting that after nearly 2 years we ought to be debating the question of whether this country should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

I have exhibited charts that have shown the Senate what has happened with respect to other treaties that have been sent to the Senate by various Presidents, how long it has taken for them to be considered, the conditions under which they were considered, and I have made the point that this treaty alone has languished for over 2 years without hearings and without discussion. Why? Because there are some in the Senate who oppose it and don't want it to be debated or voted upon.

There are small issues and big issues in the course of events in the Senate. We spent many hours over a period of days debating whether to change the name of Washington's National Airport. What a debate that was—whether to change the name of Washington National Airport. That was a small issue. It was proposed that former President Reagan's name be put on that airport. Some agreed, some disagreed. We had a vote, after a debate over a number of days. The naming of an airport, in my judgment, is a small issue.

An example of a big issue is whether we are going to do something as a country to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Now a big issue comes to the floor of the Senate in the form of a request for ratification of a treaty called the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is not a new idea, not a new issue. It started with President Dwight Eisenhower believing we ought to exhibit the leadership to see if we could stop all the testing of nuclear weapons around the rest of the world. It has taken over 40 years. Actually, 7 years ago this country took unilateral action and said: We are going to stop testing. We, the United States, will no longer test nuclear weapons. So we took the lead, and we decided 7 years ago we would not any longer test nuclear weapons.

The treaty that is now before the Senate, that was negotiated with many other countries around the world in the last 5 years and sent to the Senate over 2 years ago, is a treaty that answers the question: Will other countries do what we have done? Will we be able to persuade other countries to decide not to test nuclear weapons?

Why is that important? Because no country that has nuclear weapons can acquire more advanced weaponry without testing. And no country that does not now have nuclear weapons can ac-

quire nuclear weapons with any assurance they have nuclear weapons that work without testing. Prohibit testing, stop the testing of nuclear weapons, and you take a step in the direction of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons around this world.

We have some 30,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of Russia and the United States. We have other countries that possess nuclear weapons. We have still other countries that want to possess nuclear weapons. We have a world that is a dangerous world with respect to the potential spread of nuclear weapons. The question is, what shall we do about that? What kind of behavior, what kind of response in this country, is appropriate to deal with that question?

Some say the response is to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I believe that. I believe that very strongly. Others say this treaty will weaken our country, that this treaty is not good for our country, this treaty will sacrifice our security. Nothing could be further from the truth. Nothing. Some say that—not all—have never supported any arms control agreements, never liked them. I understand that, despite the fact those people have been wrong.

Arms control agreements have worked. Actually, agreements that we have reached through the ratification of treaties have resulted in the reduction of nuclear warheads, the reduction of delivery vehicles. Some arms control treaties have worked. However, there are some who have not supported any of those treaties. I guess they are content to believe it is their job to oppose treaties. There are others who have supported previous treaties who somehow believe this treaty is inappropriate. Perhaps they read a newspaper article last week that said there are new appraisals or new assessments by the CIA that suggest it would be difficult for us to monitor low-level nuclear tests. That article was wrong. The article in the newspaper that said the CIA has a new assessment or a new report is wrong. The CIA has no new assessment. The CIA has no new reports. I have talked to the Director of the CIA. No such report and no such assessment exists.

Do we have difficulty detecting low-level nuclear explosions, very low-level nuclear explosions? The answer is yes. But then, the answer is also: Yes; so what? Will the ability to detect those kinds of small explosions—explosions which, by the way, don't give anyone any enhanced capability in nuclear power or nuclear weaponry—will we be able to better detect those and better monitor those if we pass this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? The answer to that is an unqualified yes.

I have a chart to demonstrate what I mean. This chart shows the current monitoring network by which we attempt to monitor where nuclear tests may have occurred in the world. This bottom chart shows current monitoring. The top chart shows monitoring