

trade barriers that distorted trade and thwarted our exporters' access to markets throughout the entire developing world.

That beneficial program—GSP—has been around a while and accomplished a lot of good, but it has lapsed; it lapsed a few months ago, in June. So our managers' amendment would propose its renewal.

The managers' amendment will also renew our Trade Adjustment Assistance programs. As my colleagues know, I am a strong supporter of free and fair trade. But I have, at the same time, consistently taken the view that those who benefit from expanding trade must look out for those who may be injured by the process of economic adjustment that trade brings.

The Trade Adjustment Assistance programs are one part of that commitment. They offer assistance to both workers and firms that have faced a significant increase in import competition as they adjust to these new economic conditions. They have been on the books since the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. And the committee has made every effort to ensure that they are renewed to fulfill the bargain on trade policy originally struck with U.S. firms and U.S. workers over 30 years ago. So what we do with this reauthorization is keep our contract with these industries, and if trade unfairly affects them, we will be able to help them in a transition period. That is something we should do. It has worked well and we propose to continue it.

There is, however, a real urgency to their renewal at this time. As I have said, they have lapsed and, unless they are renewed promptly, they will fall out of the budget baseline and will, in the future, need a revenue offset.

In the context of the current debate over trade and trade policy, I view these programs as a minimum downpayment on reestablishing a bipartisan consensus on trade matters. And so I urge our colleagues to support the motion to proceed to the bill in order to renew these essential programs.

Having discussed the intent behind each of the measures I intend to move as a part of the Senate substitute, I want to add one last point. We have before us in this legislation an opportunity to reestablish a strong measure of bipartisan support for what we in the Finance Committee view as an important trade and foreign policy initiative. So let us take this step and let us move forward in a way that will benefit Africa and the Caribbean—a way that will benefit much of the rest of the developing world—and a way that will serve our own national interests as well.

And we propose this legislation with the U.S. national interest in mind, because we are cognizant of the fact that if we in the Congress do not look out for the interests of the American worker, we can't expect anybody else to do it. But when we can have the benefits of protecting our workers and creating

jobs and expanding our economy and still help the rest of the world through these policies—and we have done that—we should continue to do that because, as President Kennedy said, "Trade, not aid."

For an American populace that doesn't like foreign aid, I hope that they will join us in the Congress behind these bipartisan efforts to promote our national interests and strengthen our world leadership through these trade policies that help us, as well as helping these developing nations.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROWBACK. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BROWBACK. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EMERGENCY MONEY FOR AMERICA'S FARMERS

Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, I would like to say a few words about the \$69 billion annual U.S. Department of Agriculture appropriations bill that happens to contain \$8.7 billion in emergency money for American farmers.

This legislation was sent from Capitol Hill to the President's desk last Wednesday, October 13. Every day the President delays signing this bill is one more day relief money is not in the farmers' pockets at this time of the lowest prices in 25 years.

Naturally, I know the White House is entitled to a few days to review the document for signature by the President. But that process does not and should not take 8 days that the bill has been sitting on the President's desk, particularly considering the emergency economic crisis in American agriculture.

Since September 30, President Clinton has been engaged in a strategy to confuse the public and to try to get Congress to accept tax and spending increases. The only conclusion I can draw is that the President has decided to use the agricultural relief bill for leverage in the political game we have seen with the budget this year. If that is true—and I hope it is not true, based on some comments made by Secretary Glickman; but the fact remains, the President has not signed the bill containing emergency relief for farmers—then, of course, it is unforgivable on the part of

the President, given the terrible situation our farmers face.

Again, prices remain at 25-year lows. The package we moved through Congress is critical to helping farmers' cash-flow. President Clinton has given speeches about helping farmers. Why isn't he taking, then, affirmative action and putting pen to paper to help the farmers who he knows have tremendous needs at a time of prices being at 25-year lows?

Last year, an election year, the President immediately signed the supplemental spending bill that contained more than \$5 billion, when this crisis in agriculture started 12 months ago. The U.S. Department of Agriculture had those funds in the mail to farmers within 10 days. The President has already lost 7 days in that process. This year, of course, is a sharp contrast with getting the bill signed and getting the money to the farmers. Every day that President Clinton delays is one more day that farmers don't have the assistance Congress passed and they desperately need.

I happen to know that the President understands American agriculture, being the Governor of the State of Arkansas for as long as he was. I know that one time, in his first couple years in office, he looked me in the eye at a meeting at the Blair House and he said, "I understand farming more than any other President of the United States ever has." I believe that, but he doesn't show an understanding of the crisis in agriculture at this particular time, as he has waited now too many days to sign this bill.

I urge the President this very evening to sign this bill so that the farmers who are in crisis—which he has even given speeches on, recognizing farming is in crisis—can have the help of the \$2.7 billion provided for in this legislation.

I yield the floor.

NOMINATION OF JUSTICE RONNIE WHITE

Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, for many months I had been calling for a fair vote on the nomination of Justice Ronnie White to the federal court. Instead, the country witnessed a party line vote as all 54 Republican members of the Senate present that day voted against confirming this highly qualified African-American jurist to the federal bench. I believe that vote to have been unprecedented—the only party line vote to defeat a judicial nomination I can find in our history.

There was brief debate on this nomination and two others the night before the vote. At that time, I attempted, as best I could through questions in the limited opportunity allotted, to clarify the record of this outstanding judge with respect to capital punishment appeals and to outline his background and qualifications.

I noted that Justice White had, in fact, voted to uphold the imposition of

the death penalty 41 times. I observed that other members of the Missouri Supreme Court, including members of the Court appointed by Republican governors, had similar voting records and more often than not agreed with Justice White, both when he voted to uphold the death penalty and when he joined with a majority of that Court to reverse and remand such cases for resentencing or a new trial. Of the 59 capital punishment cases that Justice White has reviewed, he voted with the majority of that Court 51 times—41 times to uphold the death penalty and 10 times to reverse for serious legal error.

As best I can determine, in only six of these 59 cases did Justice White dissent from the imposition of a death penalty, and in only three did he do so with a dissent that was not joined by other members of the court. That is hardly the record that the Senate was told about Monday and Tuesday of the first week in October, when it was told that Justice White was an anti-death penalty judge, someone who was "procriminal and activist with a slant toward criminals," someone with "a serious bias against a willingness to impose the death penalty," someone who seeks "at every turn" to provide opportunities for the guilty to "escape punishment," and someone "with a tremendous bent toward criminal activity."

The opposition to Justice White presented a distorted view by concentrating on two lone dissents out of 59 capital punishment cases. Making matters worse, the legal issues involved in those cases were not even discussed. Instead, the opposition was concentrated on the gruesome facts of the crimes.

I believe it was another member of the Missouri Supreme Court, one of those appointed by a Republican governor of Missouri, who wrote in his own sole dissent in a gruesome case of kidnapping, rape, and murder of a teenage girl:

Occasionally, the heinousness of a crime, the seeming certainty of the same result if the case is remanded and the delay occasioned by a second remand tempt one to wink at procedural defects. Nevertheless, the cornerstone of any civilized system of justice is that the rules are applied evenly to everyone no matter how despicable the crime.—*State v. Nunley*, 923 S.W.2d 911, 927 (Mo. 1996) (Holstein, J., dissenting).

Indeed, in his dissent in *State v. Johnson*, Justice White makes a similar point when he notes:

This is a very hard case. If Mr. Johnson was in control of his faculties when he went on this murderous rampage, then he assuredly deserves the death sentence he was given. But the question of what Mr. Johnson's mental status was on that night is not susceptible of easy answers. . . . This is an excellent example of why hard cases make bad law. While I share the majority's horror at this carnage, I cannot uphold this as an acceptable standard of representation for a defendant accused of capital murder.—*State v. Johnson*, 968 S.W.2d 123, 138 (Mo. 1998).

Although you would never know the legal issue involved in this case from

the discussion before the Senate, the appellate decision did not turn on the grizzly facts or abhorrence of the crimes, but difficult legal questions concerning the standard by which an appellate court should evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Justice White sought to apply the standard set by the United States Supreme Court in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and reiterated in *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). Thus, the dispute between Justice White and the majority was whether an appellant may succeed if he shows that there was a "reasonable probability" of a different result, or whether he is required to show that the counsel's unprofessional conduct was outcome-determinative and thus the "most likely" reason why his defense was unsuccessful. Indeed, the case turns on an issue similar to that being currently considered by the United States Supreme Court this term. Far from creating a "new ground" for appeal or urging a "lower legal standard" of review, Justice White's dissent sought to apply what he understood to be the current legal standard to the gruesome facts of a difficult case.

Likewise troubling was the use by those who opposed the nomination of Justice White's dissent in the *Kinder* case, a 1996 decision. *State v. Kinder*, 942 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1996). That case also arose from brutal crimes, which were, or course, detailed for the Senate. What is troubling is the characterization of the legal issue on appeal by Justice White's detractors. Justice White did not say that the case was "contaminated by racial bias" because the trial judge "had indicated that he opposed affirmative action and had switched parties based on that." The dissent did not turn on the political affiliation of the judge or his opposition to affirmative action. In fact, Justice White expressly stated that the trial judge's position on affirmative action was "irrelevant to the issue of bias."

Rather, the point of the dissent was that the majority opinion was changing the law of Missouri by reinterpreting state law precedent and restricting it in an artificially truncated way to avoid the recusal of the trial judge, which Missouri law at that time required.

The case led to long and complicated opinions by the majority and dissent. The opposition to Justice White chose to characterize the case as if the trial judge was accused of racial bias merely for not favoring affirmative action policies. In fact, the trial judge was facing an election and had issued a press release less than a week before the defendant's trial. The defendant was an indigent, unemployed African-American man. The judge's statement read, in pertinent part:

The truth is that I have noticed in recent years that the Democrat party places too much emphasis on representing minorities such as homosexuals, people who don't want to work, and people with a skin that's any

color but white. . . . While minorities need to be represented, or [sic] course, I believe the time has come for us to place much more emphasis and concern on the hardworking taxpayers in this country.—*Kinder*, 942 S.W.2d at 321.

As Justice White's dissent correctly points out, the holding of the case rewrote Missouri Supreme Court precedent instead of following it. Without regard to the principles of *stare decisis*, following precedent, and avoiding judicial activism, the majority reversed Missouri law (without acknowledging that fact) to achieve a desired result. The majority opinion rests on the narrow proposition that only "judicial statements" that raise a doubt as to the judge's willingness to follow the law provide a basis for disqualification, and "distinguished" this case from controlling precedent because the evidence of racial bias was contained in what the majority characterized as a "political statement." Justice Limbaugh, who had dissented from the earlier Missouri Supreme Court decision on which Justice White relied, wrote the majority opinion in *Kinder*, which stated:

To the extent the comments can be read to disparage minorities, there is little point in defending them, even as the political act they were intended to be. But they are a political act, not a judicial one, and as such, they do not necessarily have any bearing on the judge's in-court treatment of minorities.—*Id.* The majority opinion created a rule that consciously disregards political statements of a judge evidencing racial bias.

In his dissent, Justice White, quoting from the earlier Missouri Supreme Court decision, wrote: "[F]undamental fairness requires that the trial judge be free of the appearance of prejudice against the defendant as an individual and against the racial group on which the defendant is a member." He noted that "conduct suggesting racial bias 'undermines the credibility of the judicial system and opens the integrity of the judicial system to question.'" *Kinder*, 942 S.W.2d at 341, citing *State v. Smulls*, 935 S.W.2d 9, 25-27 (Mo. 1986).

I believe that fairminded people who read and consider Justice White's dissent in *Kinder* will appreciate the strength of his legal reasoning. Certainly that was the reaction of Stuart Taylor, Jr. in his article in the October 16 National Journal and of Benjamin Wittes in his October 13 column in the Washington Post. Through the *Kinder* decision, the Missouri Supreme Court has created new law that provides very narrow restrictions on judges' conduct. Indeed, a Missouri criminal trial judge could now apparently lead a KKK rally one night and spout racial hatred, epithets and calls for racial conflict, and preside over the criminal trial of an African-American defendant the next morning—so long as he did not say anything offensive as a "judicial statement" in connection with the trial.

Fairness and credibility are important values for all government actions, and especially important to the guarantee of due process that makes our

justice system the best in the world. Those same qualities of fairness, credibility, and integrity are essential to the Senate confirmation process.

It is worth noting that many of the same critics of Justice White's opinion in the Kinder case adopt the opposite posture and a different standard when it comes to evaluating Judge Richard Paez, a nominee who has been held up without a vote for 44 months. Judge Paez is roundly criticized for a reference in a speech he gave in which he commented on the early stages of an initiative effort that later became Proposition 209 in California. Those who led the Republican fight against Justice White reverse themselves when it comes to opposing the Hispanic nominee from California and criticize him for much more circumspect comments predicting the likely reaction to that initiative in the Hispanic community. These critics would not only disqualify Judge Paez from hearing a case involving Proposition 209, but would disqualify him from confirmation as a federal appellate judge.

Justice White's detractors contend that they oppose "judicial activism," which they define as a judge substituting his personal will for that of the legislature. However, in none of the cases on which they rely is a statute implicated. Instead, in each of these cases Justice White appears to be following controlling precedent. In the Kinder case, it is the majority that changed the law of Missouri. Likewise in the Johnson case, it was the majority that reached out to distinguish that case and alter the way in which the governing legal standard for review was to be applied.

Finally, the third case on which the opposition to Justice White relies, *State v. Damask*, 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1996), is not concerned with legislative action either. In this case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of law enforcement checkpoints without warrants or reasonable suspicion. The majority reached out to distinguish the case from governing precedent, changed the rules under which it viewed the governing facts, and challenged the factual basis on which the lower courts had based their conclusions.

In his dissent in *Damask*, Justice White relied on the authority of the United States Supreme Court in *Delaware v. Prouse*, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See also *Galberth v. U.S.*, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. App. 1991). His ruling expressly recognizes the importance of combating drug trafficking and, relying on the record of the cases, concludes that the checkpoints were the types of discretionary investigatory stops forbidden by governing precedent. Justice White worried that these operations had not been approved by politically accountable public officials and that the courts should not substitute their judgment for law enforcement authorities and public officials who were responsible and accountable for designing such op-

erations. See *State v. Canton*, 775 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. App. 1989); *State v. Welch*, 755 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. App. 1988); Note, "The Constitutionality of Drug Enforcement Checkpoints in Missouri," 63 Mo. L. Rev. 263 (1998). I wonder how we all might feel if instead of seizing marijuana, the armed men in camouflage fatigues shining flashlights into the faces of motorists in an isolated area late at night were seizing firearms.

Another decision that has not been mentioned in the course of this debate on Justice White's nomination is the decision of the people of Missouri to retain Justice White as a member of their Supreme Court. Although initially appointed, pursuant to Missouri law Justice White went before the voters of Missouri in a retention election in 1996. I am informed that he received over 1.1 million votes and a favorable vote of 64.7 percent.

All of the cases on which the opposition to Justice White relied were decided before his hearing and before he was twice reported favorably by a bipartisan majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee in May 1998 and July 1999. Although Justice White was first nominated to the federal bench in 1997, the Judiciary Committee did not receive negative comments about him until quite recently. No law enforcement opposition of any kind was received by the Committee of the Senate in 1997 or 1998.

This year, Justice White was renominated with significant fanfare in January and major newspapers in the state reported on the status on the nomination. I began repeated calls for his consideration by February. The Committee finally proceeded to reconsider and report his nomination, again, in July 1999. Still, the Judiciary Committee received no opposition from Missouri law enforcement.

The first contact the Judiciary Committee received from Missouri law enforcement was a strong letter of support and endorsement from the Chief of Police of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department. I thank Colonel Henderson for contacting the Committee and sharing his views with us. I have recently read that the Missouri Police Chiefs Association, representing 465 members across the state, does not get involved in judicial nominations. I understand that policy because it is shared by many law enforcement organizations that I know. I also appreciate that when asked by a reporter recently, the president of the Missouri Police Chiefs Association described Justice White as "an upright, fine individual" and that he knew Justice White personally and really had "a hard time seeing that he's against law enforcement" and never thought of him as "procriminal."

The Missouri State Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police has indicated on behalf of its 4,500 dedicated law enforcement officer members in Missouri, that they view Justice White's record as "one of a jurist whose record on the

death penalty has been far more supportive of the rights of victims than of the rights of criminals." They see his record as having voted to reverse the death penalty "in far fewer instances than the other Justices on the Court" and note that he "also voted to affirm the death penalty in 41 cases." The Missouri Fraternal Order of Police expresses its regret for "the needless injury which has been inflicted on the reputation of Justice White" and concludes that "our nation has been deprived of an individual who surely would have proven to be an asset to the Federal Judiciary." I thank President Thomas W. Mayer and all the FOP members in Missouri for speaking out on behalf of this fine judge and sharing their perspective with us.

I certainly understand and appreciate Sheriff Kenny Jones deciding to write to fellow sheriffs about this nomination. Sheriff Jones' wife was killed in the brutal rampage of James Johnson, from whose conviction and sentence Justice White dissented on legal grounds concerning the lack of competent representation the defendant received during the trial. All Senators give their respect and sympathy to Sheriff Jones and his family.

I also understand the petition sent by the Missouri Sheriffs Association to the Judiciary Committee as a result of Sheriff Jones' letter to other Missouri sheriffs. In early October, the Judiciary Committee received that petition along with a copy of Justice White's dissent in the Johnson case with a cover letter dated September 27. It is a statement of support for Sheriff Jones and shows remarkable restraint. The 63 Missouri county sheriffs and 9 others who signed the petition "respectfully request that consideration be given to [Justice White's dissenting opinion in Johnson] as a factor in the appointment to fill this position of U.S. District Judge."

I want to assure the Missouri Sheriffs Association and all Senators that I took their concern seriously and reconsidered the dissent in that case to see whether I saw in it anything disqualifying or anything that would lead me to believe that Justice White would not support enforcement of the law. I respect them for having contacted us and for the way in which they did so. It is terribly hard to continue to honor those we have loved and lost by respecting the rule of law that guarantees constitutional rights to those accused, tried, and convicted of killing innocent members of our dedicated law enforcement community.

Whether the nomination of Justice White or consideration of the legal issues considered in his opinions "sparked strong concerns" among Missouri law enforcement officers, or whether controversy about this nomination was otherwise generated, I am not in position to know. I do know this: I respect and consider seriously the views of law enforcement officers. As a former State's Attorney and former

Vice President of the National District Attorneys Association, I hear often from local prosecutors, police and sheriffs, both in Vermont and around the country. I work closely with local law enforcement and national law enforcement organizations on a wide variety of issues. I know from my days in local law enforcement that there are often disagreements between police and prosecutors and with judges about cases. I respect that difference and understand it.

With respect to the views expressed by law enforcement representatives on Justice Ronnie White's nomination, both for and against, I say the following: I have considered each of the letters produced during the course of the Senate debate and reconsidered the cases to which they refer. I respectfully disagree that those decisions present a basis to vote against the confirmation of Justice Ronnie White to the federal court. Far from presenting a pattern of "procriminal jurisprudence" or "tremendous bent toward criminal activity," they are dissents well within the legal mainstream and well supported by precedent and legal authority. Further, if considered in the context of his body of work, achievements, and qualifications, they present no basis for voting against this highly qualified and widely respected nominee. I conclude, as did the Missouri State Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police, that "our nation has been deprived of an individual who surely would have proven to be an asset to the Federal Judiciary."

With all due respect, I do not believe that any constituency or interest group, even one as important as local law enforcement, is entitled to a Senate veto over a judicial nomination. Each Senator is elected to vote his or her conscience on these judicial appointments, not any special interest or party line. When Senators do not vote their conscience, they risk the debacle that we witnessed on October 5th, when a partisan political caucus vote resulted in a fine man and highly qualified nominee being rejected by all Republican Senators on a party line vote.

It is too late for the Senate to undo the harm done to Justice White. What the Senate can do now is to make sure that partisan error is not repeated. The Senate should ensure that other minority and women candidates receive a fair vote. We can start with the nominations of Judge Richard Paez and Marsha Berzon, which have been held up far too long without Senate action. It is past time for the Senate to do the just thing, the honorable thing, and vote to confirm each of these highly qualified nominees. Let us start the healing process. Let us vote to confirm Judge Richard Paez and Marsha Berzon before this session ends.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the October 21, 1999 letter from the Missouri State Fraternal Order of Police be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,
MISSOURI STATE LODGE,
October 21, 1999.

Sheriff PHILIP H. MCKELVEY,
President, National Sheriff's Association,
Alexandria, VA.

DEAR SHERIFF MCKELVEY: I am writing on behalf of the more than 4,500 members of the Missouri State Fraternal Order of Police to express my great consternation at your organization's recent opposition to the confirmation of Justice Ronnie White to the Federal bench, an opposition which I sincerely hope was not simply politically motivated.

The record of Justice White is one of a jurist whose record on the death penalty has been far more supportive of the rights of victims than of the rights of criminals. While in fact voting 17 times for death penalty reversals, he has voted to do so in far fewer instances than the other Justices on the Court. In addition, Justice White has also voted to affirm the death penalty in 41 cases.

The Fraternal Order of Police is no stranger to fighting to see that justice is served for slain law enforcement officers and their families. Our organization has been at the forefront of bringing to justice Munia Abujamal, establishing a nationwide boycott of individuals and organizations which financially support the efforts of this convicted cop killer. In addition, the FOP led the fight against President Clinton's clemency of 16 convicted Puerto Rican terrorists responsible for a wave of bombing attacks on U.S. soil and the wounding of three New York City police officers.

Unfortunately however, nothing can undo the needless injury which has been inflicted on the reputation of Justice White, and our nation has been deprived of an individual who surely would have proven to be an asset to the Federal Judiciary.

On behalf of the membership of the Fraternal Order of Police, I would encourage you to exercise greater judgment in future battles of this sort. It is a great disservice to the members of your organization, and the nation as a whole, to choose to do otherwise.

Sincerely,

THOMAS W. MAYER,
President, Missouri State FOP.

COMMERCE—JUSTICE—STATE AP- PROPRIATIONS CONFERENCE RE- PORT

Mr. JEFFORDS, I rise today to express my profound disappointment that the Conference Report to the Fiscal Year 2000 Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary Appropriations bill removed language that was in the Senate passed bill to expand Federal jurisdiction in investigating hate crimes.

The language inserted in the Senate passed bill would expand Federal jurisdiction in investigating hate crimes by removing the requirement in Federal hate crime law that only allows federal prosecution if the perpetrator is interfering with a victim's federally protected right like voting or attending school. It would also extend the protection of current hate crime law to those who are victimized because of their gender, sexual orientation, or disability.

Any crime hurts our society, but crimes motivated by hate are especially harmful. Many states, including my state of Vermont, have already passed strong hate crimes laws, and I applaud them in this endeavor. An im-

portant principle of the amendment that was in the Senate-passed bill was that it allowed for Federal prosecution of hate crimes without impeding the rights of states to prosecute these crimes.

The adoption of this amendment by the Senate was an important step forward in ensuring that the perpetrators of these harmful crimes are brought to justice. The American public knows that Congress should pass this legislation, and it is unfortunate that the conferees did not retain this important language.

Congress should pass this legislation, and I will work to ensure that this legislation is enacted into law in the very near future.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Madam President, at the close of business yesterday, Wednesday, October 20, 1999, the Federal debt stood at \$5,669,462,199,918.75 (Five trillion, six hundred sixty-nine billion, four hundred sixty-two million, one hundred ninety-nine thousand, nine hundred eighteen dollars and seventy-five cents).

One year ago, October 20, 1998, the Federal debt stood at \$5,543,686,000,000 (Five trillion, five hundred forty-three billion, six hundred eighty-six million).

Five years ago, October 20, 1994, the Federal debt stood at \$4,709,361,000,000 (Four trillion, seven hundred nine billion, three hundred sixty-one million).

Ten years ago, October 20, 1989, the Federal debt stood at \$2,876,433,000,000 (Two trillion, eight hundred seventy-six billion, four hundred thirty-three million) which reflects a doubling of the debt—an increase of almost \$3 trillion—\$2,793,029,199,918.75 (Two trillion, seven hundred ninety-three billion, twenty-nine million, one hundred ninety-nine thousand, nine hundred eighty-eight dollars and seventy-five cents) during the past 10 years.

NOMINATIONS

Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, as my colleagues know, I have been urging the Majority Leader to schedule Senate debate and votes on two nominees for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—Marsha Berzon and Richard Paez. Judge Paez was first nominated 45 months ago. Ms. Berzon's nomination has been pending for almost 2 years.

I know that the Majority Leader supports the nomination of Glenn McCullough to the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

I have no objection to voting on Mr. McCullough. I voted him favorably out of the Environment and Public Works Committee this week.

What I do object to is keeping the nominations of Judge Paez and Marsha Berzon from the Senate floor long after they have been voted out of committee.

So I have no problem with Senator LOTT's nominee, who has been waiting