

meet the growing need of the United States for the generation of reliable and affordable electricity.

S. 127

At the request of Mr. MCCAIN, the name of the Senator from California (Mrs. BOXER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 127, a bill to give American companies, American workers, and American ports the opportunity to compete in the United States cruise market.

S. 148

At the request of Mr. CRAIG, the name of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. COCHRAN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 148, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand the adoption credit, and for other purposes.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for up to 15 minutes notwithstanding the previous order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MOVING FROM POLITICS TO POLICY: THE PRESIDENT'S CHALLENGE ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, last weekend the nation inaugurated a new President, President George W. Bush. With the change of power now complete, the President and Congress must now get down to the hard business of governing.

After eight years of Democratic leadership, it is obvious that a Bush Administration will propose policy changes on several fronts. One of the most important and complex issues for President Bush will be how to implement his national missile defense policy in a manner that contributes to our national security, rather than putting it at risk.

For six solid years, Republicans have used national missile defense as a "big stick"—a stick employed not against America's enemies, but against those who thought we did not need a national missile defense. Republicans repeatedly criticized the Clinton administration for its approach to national missile defense, and in the last two presidential campaigns, the promise of a "robust" national missile defense figured prominently in the Republican Party's platform and foreign policy speeches.

Although it is always difficult to get into the minds of the American people, it does appear that, for the most part, the public has ignored this debate. The missile defense issue has commanded the attention of only a tiny minority of the American people. In a recent survey by the Pew Charitable Trust of priorities for the new administration, Americans rated missile defense in eighteenth place among twenty issues.

Whether missile defense was on voters' minds or not, however, George W.

Bush is now our President. He and his team are committed to a national missile defense that will be, in the President's words, "effective," "based on the best available options," deployed "at the earliest possible date" and "designed to protect all 50 states and our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas from missile attacks by rogue nations, or accidental launches."

That mantra will suffice for a campaign, but not for policy. Presidential campaigns bear little relation to actually being President, and campaign slogans are but the shadows of flesh and blood policy somewhat related to it, but lacking in both detail and substance.

In short, the real test of President Bush on national missile defense is just beginning. It is to take those campaign slogans and turn them into coherent policies and strategies.

The challenge for the President and his team is this: to pursue their dream of a "robust" national missile defense with:

Full attention to the technological challenges;

Full attention to the potential consequences for arms control;

Full attention to the potential impact on strategic stability; and

Full attention to its possible effect on America's relations with our allies.

As our former colleague and Armed Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn said recently, "I would hope the new administration would approach this subject as a technology, not a theology."

Let me outline some of the key questions that I believe the Administration must consider.

A national missile defense policy for the new administration will specify system objectives. Whom shall the system protect, against what level of attack, and with what level of success—or, on the other hand, allowing what rate of failure?

As I noted earlier, then-Governor Bush set his initial objectives last May: "to protect all 50 states and our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas from missile attacks by rogue nations, or accidental launches."

That's a very tall order, Mr. President. Can current technology support its achievement any time soon, or at an affordable cost? I have my doubts.

Taken literally, protection "from . . . accidental launches" requires an ability to intercept at least a small number of advanced Russian warheads, rather than just simple warheads from the so-called "rogue states" of North Korea, Iran or Iraq. And protecting "our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas" would require either multiple defenses against ICBM's or else a world-wide system like the space-based laser of Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars."

A serious national missile defense policy will give careful attention to possible Russian reactions to our actions. It is not enough to say, as Presi-

dent Bush did during the campaign, that "I will offer Russia the necessary amendments to the ABM Treaty" and that, "if Russia refuses the changes we propose, I will give prompt notice" of our intent to withdraw from the Treaty.

What will happen if the President does what he proposed during the campaign? Will Russia suspend its compliance with other arms control agreements, such as the START Treaty and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty? Will future arms reductions occur without agreed means of verification? Indeed, will Russia try to rebuild its nuclear forces, instead of reducing them?

Will Russia ally itself more closely with China or—worse yet—with anti-American "rogue states" that seek weapons of mass destruction? Will our allies question America's leadership? Will our allies lose faith in the nuclear non-proliferation regime that we put in place?

A serious national missile defense policy cannot wish away these risks. Rather, it must consider them and include a strategy for dealing with them.

Let us suppose, however, that Russia agrees to work out an accommodation with the United States—which is another possible outcome. What sort of agreement should the President propose?

Is there an agreement that would permit the sort of defense that the President seeks, while still being reliably limited? Would it be verifiable by Russia? How would it safeguard Russia against a U.S. "breakout" from its limitations?

How shall a "robust" national missile defense be fielded at the same time that Russia and the United States are substantially reducing their nuclear forces, which is another stated goal of the new administration? Missile defense advocates argue that Russia has nothing to fear from a limited defense, because it has so many strategic warheads.

But what happens as those numbers go down? How can mutual deterrence of full-scale war be maintained? How can Russia accept a system that undermines that deterrence?

Does it make sense to establish a combined limit on offensive and defensive systems, as some experts have proposed both here and in Russia? Is it possible, at very low numbers of strategic forces or by adopting sweeping "de-alerting" measures as well, to deny either side the ability to mount a disabling first strike? If so, would each side then have to target its remaining missiles on the other side's cities—as China does today—in order to maintain a residual capability to cause unacceptable damage to a country?

How would a U.S.-Russian agreement allowing a "robust" national missile defense affect U.S.-Russian strategic stability across the whole range of possible conflicts? If a system were good enough to guard against accidental Russian launches, then it could also

combat such purposeful acts as a so-called “demonstration” attack using a small number of warheads. In effect, it would “raise the bar” for initiating a strategic nuclear war; that’s why it would frustrate “rogue states” with very small strategic forces.

Would this extra “firebreak” against strategic nuclear war make tactical nuclear weapons more usable? If so, is that a problem? Would it also set a “floor” on strategic arms reductions, so that the United States (and Russia) could still deter “the old-fashioned way” any third-country attack that would overcome the missile defense?

What about the START II ban on MIRV’ed ICBM’s? Would an agreement with Russia require relaxation of that ban?

What would the consequences be of allowing a given number of MIRV’s? Would they be small if the number of MIRV’s per missile were limited to 2 or 3, or if MIRV’s were restricted to mobile launchers? How verifiable would such limitations be, if the MIRV’s were on a missile that had both mobile and silo-based variants?

Were all these issues solved, and if a U.S.-Russian agreement were to be reached, how would a U.S. national missile defense affect China’s strategic force structure and its relations with the United States? Would a geographically limited national missile defense—such as a boost-phase intercept system deployed only near “countries of concern”—permit China to maintain its nuclear deterrence at low force levels?

With a numerically limited defense, could we accept China increasing its strategic forces from 18 warheads to 200 or more? Would that prompt an arms race between China and India (and then Pakistan), or even with Russia?

Or would a “robust” national missile defense—whether deployed with Russian assent or without it—be so large as to simply strip away China’s deterrent capability? If that were the case,

what risk would we run of China deciding to attack Taiwan before that date arrived? How would we prepare for that possibility?

These are serious and complex questions that I have not heard debated or sufficiently discussed. That does not mean that they cannot be solved. It does underlie my own feeling, however, that the world may not be ready yet for the missile defense system that President Bush would like to build, even if the technology were available.

If the President seeks substantial world agreement on this course, then the ground must be prepared—not only in Alaska, but in world capitals from London and Paris to Tokyo, and from Moscow to Beijing. If he seriously intends to proceed in the face of world objection, then we—and, whether they like it or not, the rest of the world—must prepare for all the complications that may result.

It would be unfair to expect President Bush and his team to have answered all these questions already. They have argued the case for a “robust” national missile defense only as a political issue, not as the carefully crafted policy of a government in power. That is understandable.

But now they are the Executive Branch of government. They are in power. Now theirs is the burden of putting real flesh on the mere bones of a policy that sufficed while they were the opposition.

What shall we say to those who take on that burden? On the one hand, we must wish them well. Nobody doubts the sincerity or morality of a belief in a national missile defense, only its practicality.

On the other hand, we must also say: Do not go blindly crashing into this new venture.

Remember Alexander Pope’s line that “fools rush in, where angels fear to tread.” Remember also that the system you may wish to build does not yet

exist. Neither has its feasibility or cost-effectiveness yet been adequately demonstrated.

The complexity of the issues raised by a national missile defense—and the lack of a proven design for even a limited missile defense, let alone a “robust” one—lead me to the following respectful suggestions to the President and his national security team:

(1) fold these issues into the “Nuclear Posture Review” mandated by the Congress last year;

(2) instruct our military experts to examine in that review the full range of interrelated offensive and defensive issues;

(3) give them time to analyze those issues fully and thoughtfully; and

(4) delay your decisions regarding missile defense architecture and deployment until that review has been completed and absorbed.

If President Bush and his team proceed with caution and with fully articulated policies and strategies, perhaps they will transform the world. For that is, indeed, their goal, and it is a laudable goal.

If they proceed rashly, however, the world is likely to be an unforgiving master. If they cannot develop a fully articulated policy, then perhaps a “robust” national missile defense is really an expression of the desire to be done with worldly cares, and not a truly rational approach to world leadership in the 21st century.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY,
JANUARY 29, 2001

Mr. BIDEN. If there be no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 12:38 p.m., adjourned until Monday, January 29, 2001, at 12 noon.