

was important: Because MBE/WBEs are more likely to be awarded subcontracts than prime contracts, MBEs/WBEs may appear to be underutilized when the focus remains on prime contractor data. Furthermore, although some studies did include calculations based on the number of contracts, all but two based their determination of disparities on only the dollar amounts of the contracts. Because MBEs/WBEs tend to be smaller than non-MBEs/WBEs, they often are unable to perform on larger contracts. Therefore, it would appear that they were awarded a disproportionately smaller amount of contract dollars. (p. 32) (see data on contracting awards on p. 51)

GAO's conclusion here is significant because the USDOT regulations measure utilization only in dollars, not contracts, and annual goals are set based on total dollars rather than on the DBE share of subcontracting dollars.

Finally GAO notes that although USDOT advised recipients that disparity studies should be "reliable," USDOT provided no guidance on what would be a reliable study. GAO concluded that: USDOT's guidance does not, for example, caution against using studies that contain the types of data and methodological problems that we identified above. Without explicit guidance on what makes a disparity study reliable, states and transit authorities risk using studies that may not provide accurate information in setting DBE goals. (p. 32)

GAO's finding about the unreliability of disparity studies is consistent with the findings of every court that has examined the merits of such studies after discovery and trial.

3. DISCONTINUING PROGRAMS

One of the arguments used in the TEA-21 debates and defendant's trial briefs is the assertion, often anecdotal, that without goals, DBE participation would decline precipitously. The difficulty with that assertion, even if true, is that the decline in DBE participation may be the result of previous overutilization caused by goals set too high or because when a program is struck down DBEs may have little incentive to seek or maintain certification.

But is the basic assertion true? It turned out that 10 of 12 recipients with discontinued programs did not know what the DBE participation result was. For instance, although Michigan was cited by DBE proponents in the TEA-21 debate as an example of DBE utilization decline after Michigan Road Builders Assn. v. Millikin (1987) struck down the state highway MBE program, GAO reports: Michigan could not provide us with minority and women owned business participation data in state highway contracting for the years immediately before and after it discontinued its program. Furthermore, Michigan officials stated that the analysis showing the decline that is often cited was a one-time-only analysis and that analysis is no longer available. Consequently we can not verify the number cited during the debate (p.37)

4. MISSING INFORMATION

Much of the above criticisms GAO cast in terms of a lack of information, but there were other key items missing as well. GAO had planned to survey all transit authorities receiving federal funds, but FTA does not have a complete list. (p. 74) When the 83 state and transit recipients were surveyed, only 40% or less of the respondents could report the gross revenues of the DBEs that won contracts. Less than 25% of the respondents could report the gross revenues of the DBEs that did not win contracts. (pp. 52-55) Only about a third of the agencies could report data on the personal net worth of DBE owners, although TEA-21 regulations require

that such owners net worth not exceed \$750,000.

Only a handful of respondents could report data on the gross revenues or owner net worth characteristics of non-DBE firms. (p. 64) While 79 respondents could report data about subcontracts awarded DBEs, only 28 respondents could report similar data for non-DBEs. That means that most respondents did not regard comparing DBE and non-DBE subcontractor utilization relevant in setting goals or in determining whether discrimination exists.

Nor are respondents acquiring relevant information: 98.8% have not conducted any study determining if awarding prime or sub contracts to DBEs affects contract costs; 67.5% no study on discrimination against DBE firms; 84.2% no study of discrimination against DBEs by financial credit, insurance or bond markets; 79.5% no study of factors making it difficult for DBEs to compete; and 92.8% no study on the impact of the DBE program on competition and the creation of jobs. (pp. 66-68). Only 26.5% of the respondents have developed and implemented use of a bidders list, although the regulations require such.

The DBE program has been continuously subject to litigation during its almost two decades of existence. Overall, the picture of the DBE program that emerges from the GAO report is one of essential information that is missing, or if available, does not support any finding of a national pattern of discrimination against DBEs.

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2001

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about hate crimes legislation I introduced with Senator KENNEDY in March of this year. The Local Law Enforcement Act of 2001 would add new categories to current hate crimes legislation sending a signal that violence of any kind is unacceptable in our society.

I would like to describe a terrible crime that occurred April 18, 1998 in New York City. A man who used anti-gay epithets allegedly slashed a gay man in the face with a knife. Eric Rodriguez, 22, was charged with attempted murder, assault, and criminal possession of a weapon.

I believe that government's first duty is to defend its citizens, to defend them against the harms that come out of hate. The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001 is now a symbol that can become substance. I believe that by passing this legislation, we can change hearts and minds as well.

RAILROAD CROSSING DELAY REDUCTION ACT

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, earlier this month I introduced the Railroad Crossing Delay Reduction Act, S. 1015, with my colleagues, Senators LEVIN and STABENOW.

This legislation would accelerate efforts at the U.S. Department of Transportation to address the issue of rail safety by requiring the Secretary of Transportation to issue specific regulations regarding trains that block automobile traffic at railroad crossings. Currently, there are no Federal limits

on how long trains can block crossings. The Railroad Crossing Delay Reduction Act would simply minimize automobile traffic delay caused by trains blocking traffic at railroad grade crossings.

In northeastern Illinois, there are frequent blockages at rail crossings. These blocked crossings prevent emergency vehicles, such as fire trucks, police cars, ambulances, and other related vehicles from getting to their destinations during the times of need. This is a serious problem and one I hope to address by passage of this important legislation.

Blocked rail crossings also delay drivers by preventing them from getting to their destinations. Motorists, knowing they will have to wait for a train to move at blocked crossings, sometimes try to beat the train or ignore signals completely. This is a threat to public safety, and one that must stop. Motorists must act responsibly, but we can reduce the temptation by reducing delays.

Trains stopped for long periods of time also tempt pedestrians to cross between the train cars. I've heard from local mayors in my State that children, in order to get home from school, cross between the rail cars. This is a terrible invitation to tragedy.

Trains blocking crossings cause traffic problems, congestion, and delay. These issues are very real. They are serious. And more importantly, they are a threat to public safety. To address these problems, I've introduced with my colleagues the Railroad Crossing Delay Reduction Act. I'm hopeful this legislation will provide for a safer Illinois and a safer Nation. I urge my colleagues to join the effort to reduce blocked rail-grade crossings by cosponsoring and supporting S. 1015.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Wednesday, June 27, 2001, the Federal debt stood at \$5,655,167,264,852.88, Five trillion, six hundred fifty-five billion, one hundred sixty-seven million, two hundred sixty-four thousand, eight hundred fifty-two dollars and eighty-eight cents.

One year ago, June 27, 2000, the Federal debt stood at \$5,650,720,000,000, Five trillion, six hundred fifty billion, seven hundred twenty million.

Five years ago, June 27, 1996, the Federal debt stood at \$5,118,104,000,000, Five trillion, one hundred eighteen billion, one hundred four million.

Ten years ago, June 27, 1991, the Federal debt stood at \$3,502,028,000,000, Three trillion, five hundred two billion, twenty-eight million.

Fifteen years ago, June 27, 1986, the Federal debt stood at \$2,040,977,000,000, Two trillion, forty billion, nine hundred seventy-seven million, which reflects a debt increase of more than \$3.5 trillion, \$3,614,190,264,852.88, Three trillion, six hundred fourteen billion, one hundred ninety million, two hundred