

this vote, we are taking an important first step toward closing some of the most dangerous gaps.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there are no further amendments, the question is on the engrossment of the amendments and third reading of the bill.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read a third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall the bill pass?

The bill (H.R. 3338), as amended, was passed.

(The bill will be printed in a future edition of the RECORD.)

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, on the behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate insist on its amendment, request a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on the part of the Senate, with no intervening action or debate.

There being no objection, the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. INOUE, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. BYRD, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. REID, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. KOHL, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. SPENCER, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. BOND, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. GREGG, and Mrs. HUTCHISON conferees on the part of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Hawaii and congratulate him and his staff for doing such a marvelous job on a very complex bill in such a short period of time. It is a pleasure to work with him. I also include in that thanks to Steve Cortese, our chief of staff, and the staff working with him. It is a very complex bill. It is my hope we will bring this bill back to the Senate by early next week for final passage.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, this has been a long day. I wish to thank all of my colleagues for their patience and their cooperation. The measure that we have just adopted, I have been told, is the most expensive appropriations bill ever adopted by the U.S. Senate.

I wish to thank the staff, Mr. Charles Houy and his team. Without Mr. Houy and Mr. Steve Cortese, we would not be here at this moment. We thank them.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I want everyone to know, Senator DASCHLE said

we would finish the bill today, and we did it, with a minute's grace.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a period for morning business, with Senators allowed to speak therein for up to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### AMERICAN AGRICULTURE'S VULNERABILITY TO BIOTERRORISM

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to address the issue of detecting biological agents that could be used in malicious attacks against our Nation's agricultural industry.

Last month, I introduced S. 1560, the Biological Agent-Environmental Detection Act of 2001, which calls for the development of new technologies to detect disease agents that can be used as terrorist weapons against humans.

I am drafting legislation to address concerns about agricultural security that will complement the provisions in S. 1715, the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001, which I have cosponsored.

We have heard testimony in hearings before the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services illustrating the vulnerability of American agriculture to acts of biological terrorism directed against livestock and crops, commonly known as "agroterrorism."

Any agroterrorist attacks could have a profound effect on the overall American economy. The combined cash receipts for crops, livestock, and poultry in the United States reached nearly \$200 billion last year, or 2 percent of our gross domestic product. An agroterrorist attack would also create a ripple effect on businesses that rely on American agricultural products, especially grocery stores and restaurants.

For example, agroterrorist attacks could reach across the agricultural industry of Hawaii, which had \$521 million in revenues last year. Our livestock could be attacked with viral agents such as foot and mouth disease. In Hawaii, this would affect the price and availability of beef, pork, and dairy products. 51,000 cattle and 26,000 hogs were brought to market and slaughtered in Hawaii last year, while 90 million gallons of milk were produced by the Hawaiian dairy industry. Our \$100 million pineapple industry could be attacked with a nematode

pest that causes an estimated 40-percent loss of crop in the first year of infection, and 80- to 100-percent losses in subsequent crops. Hawaii's growing agricultural tourism industry was worth \$26 million in 2000, and any attacks on Hawaiian agriculture would also impact those revenues.

However, the impact of terrorist attacks against American agriculture would not be measured in economic terms alone. A significant loss of agricultural production would also affect the health and welfare of our nation's citizens, not to mention hundreds of millions of men, women, and children around the globe who depend on American agricultural production for some part of their daily meals.

My colleagues are aware of the recent completion of the Human Genome Project to map the basic genetic information contained in human chromosomes. This vast undertaking involved the sequencing of over three billion base pairs of genetic information.

The diseases that attack crops and livestock are caused primarily by bacteria, fungi, and viruses. Each of these microorganisms has its own miniature genome that can be sequenced with a fraction of the effort involved in the Human Genome Project. For example, only last month, scientists at the Department of Energy's Joint Genome Institute sequenced the genomes of 15 bacterial species, including plant and human pathogens.

In many cases, we still seek to understand the most rudimentary features of disease-causing microorganisms, regardless of whether they infect humans, livestock, or plants. By sequencing the DNA of select agricultural diseases agents, we can develop diagnostic tests to rapidly identify agricultural diseases; we gain fundamental information about how each disease is caused; and we learn how to mitigate or prevent the negative effects of diseases that infect crops and livestock.

By preparing to detect the intentional spread of disease through bioterrorist attacks on America's agriculture, we are also protecting American crops and livestock from the accidental or natural spread of diseases. With rapid diagnostic tests based on genomic information, we can avoid the spread of such diseases as the papaya ringspot virus, which is carried by aphids throughout infected orchards in Hawaii. However, Hawaii's agricultural system clearly is not the only industry that would benefit from pathogen detection systems. The fungal pathogen *Fusarium*, which infects many Hawaiian crops, including sugarcane, ginger, and banana, also attacks watermelons in Texas, potatoes in Idaho, and tomatoes in Ohio.

I commend my colleagues for their efforts to protect our urban areas from further bioterrorist attacks. However, let's not forget agricultural America. We must support the development of rapid detection methods that are based on genomic information from disease