you for your efforts Jacob and this body appreciates your dedication to helping others in a time of need.

BREAKING THE ABM TREATY COULD SPARK A NEW ARMS RACE

HON. RUSH D. HOLT

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, December 20, 2001

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, It is with tremendous concern that I note the President's announcement that the United States will withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This is an ill-advised decision that could have dangerous repercussions in the long run.

The most troubling part of the President's decision today is the rationale supporters have used to justify backing out of the treaty: they claim it interferes with the United States' development of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. This is clearly a straw man argument.

The United States is nowhere near developing or fielding a working NMD system, after decades and billions of dollars of effort. To back out of the treaty at this time, a time when we are working closely with Russia and other allies in the international war on terror, is unneeded and simply off base. And to do so for such a technologically premature program is clearly folly.

Backing out of the ABM treaty is not without serious repercussions. For example, a senior Russian lawmaker predicted in response to today's news that Russia will pull out of the Start I and Start II arms reduction treaties. I fear that today's action will lead to a spiral of action and reactions, sparking a new arms race would not make us less, not more, secure.

SUPPORT FOR BAY AREA COUNCIL FOR JEWISH RESCUE AND RENEWAL

HON. TOM LANTOS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, December 20, 2001

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my support for the Bay Area Council for Jewish Rescue and Renewal (Bay Area Council), an exemplary organization which has been carrying out important work in the Russian Federation.

The Bay Area Council has designed and implemented a Climate of Trust program to enable Russian law enforcement officials to combat ethnic and religious intolerance and xenophobia in Russia by providing a sustained and supportive relationship between American and Russian communities, law enforcement professionals, city administrators, prosecutors, human rights activists, educators, and local media representatives. The goal is to promote tolerance and reduce incidents of hate-based violence in Russia through training, seminars, workshops, and symposiums.

The Climate of Trust program has brought in tangible results. Over the 2000–01 period, more than five hundred Russian officers, civil servants, community members, and media representatives have taken part in its activities. In the Russian city of Ryazan, which had been marked by anti-Semitic acts, the Climate of Trust program proposed several initiatives which were later enacted and are in the process of implementation. In 2002–03, the Bay Area Council plan is to continue their activities in Ryazan and expand them to several other Russian communities outside of Moscow. This is a worthy and important work that earned Bay Area Council a tribute in the 2001 State Department International Religious Freedom Report.

Not only our government has recognized the Climate of Trust program as effective and successful in training Russian law enforcement and other government officials in promoting tolerance. The government of the Russian Federation also identified the Climate of Trust program as a key component of its 2001–2005 national program for preventing extremism and promoting tolerance in Russian society. When Congress graduates Russia from Jackson-Vanik next session, the role of the Bay Area Council and other non-govemmental organization will become even more important in the human rights dialogue between our countries.

The Climate of Trust is exactly the kind of program we should be supporting in Russia. It is cost-effective and it works at the grass-roots level with communities throughout Russian Federation. The program is interactive and responsive to the needs of these communities, I am confident it has immediate and lasting effect on individuals and communities besieged by xenophobia. The Russian Democracy Act, legislation which I authored and which passed the House unanimously last week, earmarks at least $50 million for activities designed to support Russian civil society at all levels. I respectfully ask the Administration and the State Department to extend all possible support to the Bay Area Council so that the Council may expand and continue its grassroots efforts at combating xenophobia and promoting civil society in Russia.

TIME TO RATIFY THE CTB

HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, December 20, 2001

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my concern over recent reports that the administration is considering the development of so-called ''low-yield'' nuclear weapons. While these mini-nukes are allegedly being considered to promote a longstanding nonproliferation goal of destroying buried stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, testing these weapons would break a 9-year moratorium on nuclear testing and would have grave implications for nonproliferation. This action would continue to undermine the future of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is already under assault in this administration.

The CTBT is the culmination of a series of incremental efforts to stop the threat of nuclear war following the explosion of two nuclear weapons during World War II. The radioactive fallout from hundreds of test explosions in the 1950's and the near catastrophe of the Cuban Missile Crisis strengthened support for a cessation of nuclear explosions. These events led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibited all nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space, and under water. Next came the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which limited the explosive force of underground tests, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, which extended that limit to nuclear explosions for ''peaceful purposes''. These two treaties were ratified in 1990 but fell short of limiting all nuclear explosions.

The end of the Cold War and the thawing of U.S.-Russia relations reinvigorated efforts to seek a total ban of nuclear test explosions. In 1994, I cosponsored H. Con. Res. 235, which lauded the President for maintaining a moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and for being supportive of a comprehensive test ban. With strong international support, the CTBT was finally opened to signature in September 1996 and was promptly signed by the President. The ball then moved to the Senate's court. In September 1997, I cosponsored H. Res. 241, which urged the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the CTBT. Despite certification by the President that there were no safety or reliability concerns about the nuclear arsenal that required underground tests, consideration of the Treaty was held hostage by politics and, in 1999, was rejected by the Senate.

Now we come to the present day when 162 States have signed the treaty and 87 have ratified it. The Treaty has still not entered into force, however, and the United States is not among the ratifiers. The current administration has emphatically refused to consider a comprehensive test ban and did not even send a representative to the Conference.

The administration's rejection of the CTBT and withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty send the wrong message to the international community about our commitment to nonproliferation. Our whole nonproliferation stance is linked to the CTBT, since it signals our intention to meet the expectations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the NPT, nuclear weapons States pledged to work in good faith toward total disarmament in exchange for an agreement by non-nuclear weapons States to limit their use of nuclear technology to peaceful applications. Cessation of testing new weapons is a vital part of any serious disarmament plan. If the United States won't even agree to consider a test ban, and is clearly signaling its intention to go forward with development of nuclear missile defense, how can we possibly persuade other nations to forego their weapons programs?

In this age of heightened concern over terrorist threats we need the CTBT now more than ever. Much work remains to be done to reduce the threat of terrorists obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction. A ban on all nuclear explosions limits the ability of terrorists to develop their own nuclear weapons or to acquire them from hostile nonnuclear weapons States. The CTBT should be an integral part of our anti-terrorism efforts and I urge my colleagues to support its ratification. When the President comes to Congress to get the 1994 ban on the development of new nuclear weapons lifted I urge my colleagues to vote no to the President's request.