

us now than the completion of that bill and being able to send it on to the President. Certainly, it is not going to have everything in it that everybody wanted. That is not a new idea. This is a bill that has been on the floor for 5 weeks. But it does have some good things in it. It has some basic energy policy materials that we have not had for a very long time. It has some of the things the President and Vice President had put forth. Unfortunately, some of those it does not.

I was and am a supporter of ANWR. I think that could be done as a multiple-use project. I certainly agree with protecting the environment, as the Senator from Nevada was talking about, but I am also a great promoter of multiple use. Since 50 percent of my State belongs to the Federal Government, we have to be very certain that we have a chance to use it. So I hope we move forward with that.

Upon its completion, I hope we take a look at trade promotion authority. There is probably nothing more important to us in terms of our economy and us being part of world trade. Billions of dollars move around this world every day. Yet for a number of years we have not authorized the President to go ahead with negotiations and to bring those negotiations back to the Congress, which is what this trade authority bill provides.

We had a meeting this morning, and a press conference, talking about the agricultural aspect of foreign trade. Some are concerned about certain crops. But the bottom line is about more than a third, nearly 40 percent, of our agricultural production goes overseas. Our market here only consumes about 60 percent of what we produce, and that leaves 40 percent that has to go somewhere else, to new markets. To do that, we need a trade bill. That is where I think we really ought to go.

TAX DAY

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, recently we had a day called Tax Day. I think most of us thought a lot about taxes. We talked a lot about the process of filling in our tax forms and paying our taxes. I do not know about everyone else, but I came out of that with the renewed notion that we certainly need to take a look at making taxes more simple and that we need to simplify the Tax Code. The problem is, of course, that we are moving just exactly in the opposite way. We spent 7 or 8 years talking about simplification of the Tax Code, and every year it becomes less so. I hope we can address making the Tax Code simpler. The purpose of the Tax Code is to raise money in a fair way.

The definition of a tax is a charge of money imposed by authority upon persons or property for public purposes. You have to have taxes. No one argues with that. But it is not a voluntary act. It is an imposition of authority upon people, and the imposition—in

many cases, because of the process—is unreasonable.

I am persuaded that the current Tax Code remains overly complicated, burdensome, and frustrating to the American taxpayer. I believe we find ourselves often more in the business of trying to manage behavior through taxes than we are of fairly raising money. If we have something we want done, and if someone wants to wear a red shirt and part their hair in the middle, we say: We will give you a tax deduction for doing that. All of that makes it much more complicated than in the past. It is now inefficient. It is inefficient in the allocation of financial resources for communities. Certainly, we are not able to supervise it and audit it very easily because it is so complicated.

I am proud to have supported President Bush's tax relief bill last year. We made some effort to reduce the burden of taxes. Certainly, that doesn't help in terms of the complication that goes into filling out tax forms.

One hundred and four million individuals and families will receive a tax reduction of about \$1,000 from that action. That is good. Nearly 43 million married couples will receive an average deduction of \$1,700. That is very good. Thirty-eight million filers with children will receive an average deduction of about \$1,460.

However, we certainly have not finished our work. Obviously, there needs to be an effort made to make permanent the inheritance tax, or the death tax. That has to be done. I think we need to simplify the Tax Code. We need to continue to do that. I know that is easy to say and much more difficult to do. We need incentives to make that happen.

But the other side of that is that taxpayers spend, according to a report, over 6 billion hours filling out IRS forms. The estimated cost of compliance is close to \$200 billion annually. That is a drain on resources. That should not happen.

I hope we can take a basic look at where we want to be in terms of this issue. It is too complicated, it is too expensive, and it is hopeless to figure out how much we owe. That shouldn't have to be the case. We have worked on it and talked about it at least for a number of years, but we have not done much.

Another important area in which we need to make substantive changes is health care. We talk about cost and who is going to pay for it. We need to give more thought to how to make substantive changes. The same is true with taxes. We ought to go back to the basics: Here is the amount of money that has to be raised. What is the fair way to do it? We need to do it in a simple way, and we need to sit down in a reasonable time and do it.

Some have said Paul O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, said the tax laws are abominably full of absurdities. He is exactly right about that. We have

about 17,000 pages in the code. Most of it, of course, comes from the Congress. Each day practically, we try to do something more with taxes to affect behavior.

I think it is time we take a clean look at that and say the purpose of Tax Day is to support the necessary functions of government. It should be simpler for people to comply, and we ought to start with that premise and do it.

I hope we can move forward to do that. I appreciate the opportunity to speak.

I yield the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from California is recognized.

INTERVIEW WITH DENNIS ROSS

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, in reviewing my press clips this morning, I saw an interview between Brit Hume on "FOX News Sunday" and Dennis Ross, President Clinton's Middle East envoy. Many of us have followed closely the negotiations at Camp David, and also at Taba, but never before have we really heard Dennis Ross comment on these negotiations.

For the first time this past Sunday, we did. I was really quite surprised by these comments. I thought they were of such significance that I ask unanimous consent to have the entire interview printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TRANSCRIPT: DENNIS ROSS, FORMER U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Following is a transcribed excerpt from FOX News Sunday, April 21, 2002.

BRIT HUME (host). Former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross has worked to achieve Middle East peace throughout President Clinton's final days in office. In the months following Clinton's failed peace summit at Camp David, U.S. negotiators continued behind-the-scenes peace talks with the Palestinians and Israelis up until January 2001, and that followed Clinton's presentation of ideas at the end of December 2000.

Dennis Ross joins us now with more details on all that, and Fred Barnes joins the questioning.

So, Dennis, talk to us a little bit, if you can—I might note that we're proud to be able to say that you're a Fox News contributing analyst.

DENNIS ROSS (Fmr. U.S. special envoy to the Middle East). Thank you.

HUME. Talk to us about the sequence of events. The Camp David talks, there was an offer. That was rejected. Talks continued. You come now to December, and the president has a new set of ideas. What unfolded?

ROSS. Let me give you the sequence, because I think it puts all this in perspective.

Number one, at Camp David we did not put a comprehensive set of ideas on the table. We put ideas on the table that would have affected the borders and would have affected Jerusalem.

Arafat could not accept any of that. In fact, during the 15 days there, he never himself raised a single idea. His negotiators did, to be fair to them, but he didn't. The only new idea he raised at Camp David was that the temple didn't exist in Jerusalem, it existed in Nablus.

HUME. This is the temple where Ariel Sharon paid a visit, which was used as a kind of pre-text for the beginning of the new intifada, correct?

ROSS. This is the core of the Jewish faith. HUME. Right.

ROSS. So he was denying the core of the Jewish faith there. After the summit, he immediately came back to us and he said, "We need to have another summit," to which we said, "We just shot our wad. We got a no from you. You're prepared actually to do a deal before we go back to something like that."

He agreed to set up a private channel between his people and the Israelis, which I joined at the end of August. And there were serious discussions that went on, and we were poised to present out ideas the end of September, which is when the intifada erupted. He knew we were poised to present the ideas. His own people were telling him they looked good. And we asked him to intervene to ensure there wouldn't be violence after the Sharon visit, the day after. He said he would. He didn't lift a finger.

Now, eventually we were able to get back to a point where private channels between the two sides led each of them to again ask us to present the ideas. This was in early December. We brought the negotiators here.

HUME. Now, this was a request to the Clinton administration—

ROSS. Yes.

HUME [continuing]. To formulate a plan. Both sides wanted this?

ROSS. Absolutely.

HUME. All right.

ROSS. Both sides asked us to present these ideas.

HUME. All right. And they were?

ROSS. The ideas were presented on December 23 by the president, and they basically said the following: On borders, there would be about a 5 percent annexation in the West Bank for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So there would be a net 97 percent of the territory that would go to the Palestinians.

On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would become the capitol of the Palestinian state.

On the issue of refugees, there would be a right of return for the refugees to their own state, not to Israel, but there would also be a fund of \$30 billion internationally that would be put together for either compensation or to cover repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs.

And when it came to security, there would be an international presence, in place of the Israelis, in the Jordan Valley.

These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented, stretched very far, represented a culmination of an effort in our best judgment as to what each side could accept after thousands of hours of debate, discussion with each side.

BARNES. Now, Palestinian officials say to this day that Arafat said yes.

ROSS. Arafat came to the White House on January 2. Met with the president, and I was there in the Oval Office. He said yes, and then he added reservations that basically meant he rejected every single one of the things he was supposed to give.

HUME. What was he supposed to give?

ROSS. He was supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that there would be for the Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall, which would cover the areas that are of religious significance to Israel. He rejected that.

HUME. He rejected their being able to have that?

ROSS. He rejected that.

He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a whole new formula, as if what we had presented was non-existent.

He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even countenance the idea that the

Israelis would be able to operate in Palestinian airspace.

You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben Gurion. You fly in over the West Bank because you can't—there's no space through otherwise. He rejected that.

So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he rejected.

HUME. Now, let's take a look at the map. Now, this is what—how the Israelis had created a map based on the president's ideas. And—

ROSS. Right.

HUME. [continuing]. What can we—that situation shows that the territory at least is contiguous. What about Gaza on that map?

ROSS. The Israelis would have gotten completely out of Gaza. And what you see also in this line, they show an area of temporary Israeli control along the border.

HUME. Right.

ROSS. Now, that was an Israeli desire. That was not what we presented. But we presented something that did point out that it would take six years before the Israelis would be totally out of the Jordan Valley.

So that map there that you see, which shows a very narrow green space along the border, would become part of the orange. So the Palestinians would have in the West Bank an area that was contiguous. Those who say there were cantons, completely untrue. It was contiguous.

HUME. Cantons being ghettos, in effect—

ROSS. Right.

HUME [continuing]. That would be cut off from other parts of the Palestinian state.

ROSS. Completely untrue.

And to connect Gaza with the West Bank, there would have been an elevated highway, an elevated railroad, to ensure that there would be not just safe passage for the Palestinians, but free passage.

BARNES. I have two other questions. One, the Palestinians point out that this was never put on paper, this offer. Why not?

ROSS. We presented this to them so that they could record it. When the president presented it, he went over it at dictation speed. He then left the cabinet room. I stayed behind. I sat with them to be sure, and checked to be sure that every single word.

The reason we did it this way was to be sure they had it and they could record it. But we told the Palestinians and Israelis, if you cannot accept these ideas, this is the culmination of the effort, we withdraw them. We did not want to formalize it. We wanted them to understand we meant what we said. You don't accept it, it's not for negotiation, this is the end of it, we withdraw it.

So that's why they have it themselves recorded. And to this day, the Palestinians have not presented to their own people what was available.

BARNES. In other words, Arafat might use it as a basis for further negotiations so he'd get more?

ROSS. Well, exactly.

HUME. Which is what, in fact, he tried to do, according to your account.

ROSS. We treated it as not only a culmination. We wanted to be sure it couldn't be a floor for negotiations.

HUME. Right.

ROSS. It couldn't be a ceiling. It was the roof.

HUME. This was a final offer?

ROSS. Exactly. Exactly right.

HUME. This was the solution.

BARNES. Was Arafat alone in rejecting it? I mean, what about his negotiators?

ROSS. It's very clear to me that his negotiators understood this was the best they were ever going to get. They wanted him to accept it. He was not prepared to accept it.

HUME. Now, it is often said that this whole sequence of talks here sort of fell apart or

ended or broke down or whatever because of the intervention of the Israeli elections. What about that?

ROSS. The real issue you have to understand was not the Israeli elections. It was the end of the Clinton administration. The reason we would come with what was a culminating offer was because we were out of time.

They asked us to present the ideas, both sides. We were governed by the fact that the Clinton administration was going to end, and both sides said we understand this is the point of decision.

HUME. What, in your view, was the reason that Arafat, in effect, said no?

ROSS. Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the conflict. We had one critical clause in this agreement, and that clause was, this is the end of the conflict.

Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a cause. Everything he has done as leader of the Palestinians is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He was being asked here, you've got to close the door. For him to end the conflict is to end himself.

HUME. Might it not also have been true, though, Dennis, that, because the intifada had already begun—so you had the Camp David offer rejected, the violence begins anew, a new offer from the Clinton administration comes along, the Israelis agree to it, Barak agrees to it—

ROSS. Yes.

HUME [continuing]. Might he not have concluded that the violence was working?

ROSS. It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he thought he could do and get more with the violence. There's no doubt in my mind that he thought the violence would create pressure on the Israelis and on us and maybe the rest of the world.

And I think there's one other factor. You have to understand that Barak was able to reposition Israel internationally. Israel was seen as having demonstrated unmistakably it wanted peace, and the reason it wasn't available, achievable was because Arafat wouldn't accept it.

Arafat needed to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim, and unfortunately they are a victim, and we see it now in a terrible way.

HUME. Dennis Ross, thank you so much.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, on Camp David, let me quote Dennis Ross, President Clinton's Middle East envoy and a person who literally carried out thousands of hours of negotiation. He said:

Let me give you the sequence [of events], because I think it puts all this in perspective. Number one, at Camp David we did not put a comprehensive set of ideas on the table. We put ideas on the table that would have affected borders and would have affected Jerusalem.

Arafat could not accept any of that. In fact, during the 15 days there he never himself raised a single idea. His negotiators did, to be fair to them, but he didn't. The only new ideas he raised at Camp David was that the temple didn't exist in Jerusalem, it existed in Nablus . . . So he was denying the core of the Jewish faith there.

On the eruption of the Intifada:

After the summit, he immediately came back to us and he said, "We need to have another summit," to which we said, "We just shot our wad. We got a no from you. You're prepared actually to do a deal before we go back to something like that."

He agreed to set up a private channel between his people and the Israelis, which I joined at the end of August. And there were serious discussions that went on, and we

were poised to present our ideas the end of September, which is when the intifada erupted.

He knew we were poised to present the ideas. His own people were telling him they looked good. And we asked him to intervene to ensure there wouldn't be violence after the Sharon visit, the day after. He said he would. He didn't lift a finger.

On a final plan in December:

Now, eventually we were able to get back to a point where private channels between the two sides led each of them to again ask us to present the ideas. This was in early December. We brought the negotiators here.

The ideas were presented on December 23 by the President, and they basically said the following:

On borders, there would be about a 5 percent annexation in the West Bank for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So there would be a net 97 percent of the territory that would go to the Palestinians.

On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would become the capitol of the Palestinian state.

On the issue of refugees, there would be a right of return for the refugees to their own state, not to Israel, but there would also be a fund of \$30 billion internationally that would be put together for either compensation or to cover repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs.

And when it came to security, there would be an international presence, in place of the Israelis, in the Jordan Valley.

These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented, stretched very far, represented a culmination of an effort in our best judgment as to what each side could accept after thousands of hours of debate, discussion with each side.

Arafat came to the White House on January 2.

Mr. President, it was January 2, just before President Clinton left office.

Met with the president, and I was there—

“I” being Dennis Ross—

in the Oval Office. He said yes, and then he added reservations that basically meant he rejected every single one of the things he was supposed to give.

He [was] supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that there would be for the Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall, which would cover the areas that are of religious significance to Israel. He rejected that.

He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a whole new formula, as if what we had presented was non-existent.

He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even countenance the idea that the Israelis would be able to operate in Palestinian airspace.

This is commercial aviation.

You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben Gurion. You fly in over the West Bank because you can't—there's no space through otherwise. He rejected that.

So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he rejected.

Dennis Ross then went on to say:

It's very clear to me that his negotiators understood this was the best they were ever going to get. They wanted him to accept it. He was not prepared to accept it.

Then on why Arafat said no. Dennis Ross said:

Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the conflict. We had one critical clause in this agreement, and that clause was, this is the end of the conflict.

Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a cause. Everything he has done

as leader of the Palestinians is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He was being asked here, you've got to close the door. For him to end the conflict is to end himself.

Now, he was asked the question on whether Arafat believed he could get more through violence. This is how Dennis Ross responded. And I quote:

It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he thought he could do and get more with the violence. There's no doubt in my mind that he thought the violence would create pressure on the Israelis and on us and maybe the rest of the world.

And I think there's one other factor. You have to understand that Barak was able to reposition Israel internationally. Israel was seen as having demonstrated unmistakably it wanted peace, and the reason it wasn't available, achievable was because Arafat wouldn't accept it.

Arafat needed to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim, and unfortunately they are a victim, and we see it now in a terrible way.

Mr. REID. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I certainly will.

Mr. REID. I did not see this interview on television over the weekend, so I appreciate very much the Senator from California bringing it to my attention and the attention of the Senate and the American people.

But it appears to me that what he has said—“he,” meaning Dennis Ross—is that Yasser Arafat could not take yes for an answer. It appears that he and his people got everything they asked for, and that still was not good enough.

Is that how the Senator sees that?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I think that is exactly correct.

What Dennis Ross said, essentially, was the final negotiations, that had been gone over prior to this meeting in the White House, had been gone over with the negotiators—that the implication is, that there was an assent to it by the negotiators, and then when the meeting was held in the White House, Arafat said, yes, but then he presented so many reservations that that clearly countermanded the “yes.”

So the implication that is drawn from that, I say to the Senator, is that you are absolutely right. When push came to shove, Yasser Arafat said no.

Mr. REID. Well, I appreciate very much the Senator from California bringing this to our attention. And I have a clear picture that what has taken place in the Middle East since August a year ago is the direct result of the inability of Yasser Arafat to accept what he had asked for in the first place; that is, all the violence, all the deaths, all the destruction, I personally place at his footsteps.

I want the Senator from California to know how I personally feel, that this man, to whom I tried to give every benefit of the doubt, has none of my doubt any more. I think Yasser Arafat is responsible for the problems in the Middle East totally.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I say to Senator REID, thank you very much. I appreciate those comments. I think there

are many in the Senate who share those comments. What is so significant to me because I know Dennis Ross—and Dennis Ross was really an excellent Middle East envoy, an excellent negotiator, fully knowledgeable about all of the points of convention—and I thought if anybody had a chance of achieving a settlement, it really was Dennis Ross and President Clinton. And, clearly, that did not happen. I think on this “FOX News Sunday,” Dennis Ross clearly said why it did not happen.

So I appreciate those comments.

THE ARAFAT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, on Thursday, Senator MCCONNELL and I introduced legislation that had findings as well as bill language containing some sanctions. The title of the legislation is the Arafat Accountability Act. I do not want to argue that now, but I do want to point out, in a column in this morning's New York Times, Mr. William Safire, under the title “Democrats vs. Israel,” made a statement about this resolution, saying it has been blocked by Majority Leader TOM DASCHLE.

This is not true. Senator MCCONNELL and I presented the bill on Thursday. We indicated we were not pushing for its passage at the present time, that we wanted time to go out and achieve a number of cosponsors. That was the reason for any delay. So I would like the record to clearly reflect that.

EARTH DAY AND GLOBAL WARMING

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today is the 32nd anniversary of Earth Day. I think it is fitting, then, to say a few words about the world's No. 1 environmental problem; and that is clearly global warming. It is also fitting because last week the east coast of our country experienced its first April heat wave in more than a quarter of a century. Even more disturbing, in February, an iceberg, the size of Rhode Island, collapsed from the Antarctic ice shelf.

The Earth's average temperature has risen 1.3 degrees in the last 100 years. Computer models predict an increase of 2 to 6 degrees over the next century.

The 10 hottest years on record have all occurred since 1986. What does that mean? Today the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide—that is our No. 1 greenhouse gas—is 30 percent higher than preindustrial levels. This may seem to be a small change, but just a few upticks in temperature can produce catastrophic conditions in weather. So the window of time to do something to curb global warming is closing fast.

One of my disappointments with the energy bill is the fact that there is no substantive action taken to reduce our Nation's profligate carbon dioxide pollution.