

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VIII OF HR 2673: THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, yesterday during my floor remarks on the final passage of H.R. 2673, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, I requested unanimous consent that a section by section analysis and discussion of Title VIII, the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, which I authored, be included in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as part of the official legislative history of those provisions of H.R. 2673. That unanimous consent request was granted, but due to a clerical error, this essential legislative history was not printed in yesterday's CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

It is my understanding that this document will appear in yesterday's CONGRESSIONAL RECORD when the historical volume is compiled. However, in order to provide guidance in the legal interpretation of these provisions of Title VIII of H.R. 2673 before that volume is issued, I ask unanimous consent that the same document be printed in today's CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and be treated as legislative history for Title VIII, offered by the sponsor of these provisions, as if it had been printed yesterday.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE CORPORATE AND CRIMINAL FRAUD ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (TITLE VIII OF H.R. 2673)

Title VIII has three major components that will enhance corporate accountability. Its terms track almost exactly the provisions of S. 2010, introduced by Senator Leahy and reported unanimously from the Committee on the Judiciary. Following is a brief section by section and a legal analysis regarding its provisions.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

*Section 801.—Title. "Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act."*

*Section 802. Criminal penalties for altering documents*

This section provides two new criminal statutes which would clarify and plug holes in the current criminal laws relating to the destruction or fabrication of evidence and the preservation of financial and audit records.

First, this section would create a new 20-year felony which could be effectively used in a wide array of cases where a person destroys or creates evidence with the intent to obstruct an investigation or matter that is, as a factual matter, within the jurisdiction of any federal agency or any bankruptcy. It also covers acts either in contemplation of or in relation to such matters.

Second, the section creates a new 10-year felony which applies specifically to the willful failure to preserve audit papers of companies that issue securities. Section (a) of the statute has two sections which apply to accountants who conduct audits under the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Subsection (a)(1) is an independent criminal prohibition on the destruction of audit or review work papers for five years, as that term is widely understood by regulators and in the accounting industry. Subsection (a)(2) requires the SEC to promulgate reasonable and necessary regulations within 180

days, after the opportunity for public comment, regarding the retention of categories of electronic and non-electronic audit records which contain opinions, conclusions, analysis or financial data, in addition to the actual work papers. Willful violation of such regulations would be a crime. Neither the statute nor any regulations promulgated under it would relieve any person of any independent legal obligation under state or federal law to maintain or refrain from destroying such records. In Conference language was added that further clarified that the rulemaking called for under the (b) provision was mandatory, and gave the SEC authority to amend and supplement such rules in the future, after proper notice and comment.

*Section 803.—Debts nondischargeable if incurred in violation of securities fraud laws*

This provision would amend the federal bankruptcy code to make judgments and settlements arising from state and federal securities law violations brought by state or federal regulators and private individuals nondischargeable. Current bankruptcy law may permit wrongdoers to discharge their obligations under court judgments or settlements based on securities fraud and securities law violations. The section, by its terms, applies to both regulatory and more traditional fraud matters, so long as they arise under the securities laws, whether federal, state, or local.

This provision is meant to prevent wrongdoers from using the bankruptcy laws as a shield and to allow defrauded investors to recover as much as possible. To the maximum extent possible, this provision should be applied to existing bankruptcies. The provision applies to all judgments and settlements arising from state and federal securities laws violations entered in the future regardless of when the case was filed.

*Section 804.—Statute of limitations*

This section would set the statute of limitations in private securities fraud cases to the earlier of two years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation or five years after such violation. The current statute of limitations for most private securities fraud cases is the earlier of three years from the date of the fraud or one year from the date of discovery. This provision states that it is not meant to create any new private cause of action, but only to govern all the already existing private causes of action under the various federal securities laws that have been held to support private causes of action. This provision is intended to lengthen any statute of limitations under federal securities law, and to shorten none. The section, by its plain terms, applies to any and all cases filed after the effective date of the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred.

*Section 805.—Review and enhancement of criminal sentences in cases of fraud and evidence destruction*

This section would require the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") to review and consider enhancing, as appropriate, criminal penalties in cases involving obstruction of justice and in serious fraud cases. The Commission is also directed to generally review the U.S.S.G. Chapter 8 guidelines relating to sentencing organizations for criminal misconduct, to ensure that such guidelines are sufficient to punish and deter criminal misconduct by corporations. The Commission is asked to perform such reviews and make such enhancements as soon as practicable, but within 180 days at the most.

Subsection 1 requires that the Commission generally review all the base offense level

and sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. §2J1.2. Subsection 2 specifically directs the Commission to consider including enhancements or specific offense characteristics for cases based on various factors including the destruction, alteration, or fabrication of physical evidence, the amount of evidence destroyed, the number of participants, or otherwise extensive nature of the destruction, the selection of evidence that is particularly probative or essential to the investigation, and whether the offense involved more than minimal planning or the abuse of a special skill or position of trust. Subsection 3 requires the Commission to establish appropriate punishments for the new obstruction of justice offenses created in this Act.

Subsections 4 and former subsection 5 of the Senate passed bill, which was moved to Title 11 in Conference, require the Commission to review guideline offense levels and enhancements under U.S.S.G. §2B1.1, relating to fraud. Specifically, the Commission is requested to review the fraud guidelines and consider enhancements for cases involving significantly greater than 50 victims and cases in which the solvency or financial security of a substantial number of victims is endangered. New Subsection 5 requires a comprehensive review of Chapter 8 guidelines relating to sentencing organizations. It is specifically intended that the Commission's review of Section 8 be comprehensive, and cover areas in addition to monetary penalties, additional punishments such as supervision, compliance programs, probation and administrative action, which are often extremely important in deterring corporate misconduct.

*Section 806.—Whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded companies*

This section would provide whistleblower protection to employees of publicly traded companies. It specifically protects them when they take lawful acts to disclose information or otherwise assist criminal investigators, federal regulators, Congress, supervisors (or other proper people within a corporation), or parties in a judicial proceeding in detecting and stopping fraud. If the employer does take illegal action in retaliation for lawful and protected conduct, subsection (b) allows the employee to file a complaint with the Department of Labor, to be governed by the same procedures and burdens of proof now applicable in the whistleblower law in the aviation industry. The employee can bring the matter to federal court only if the Department of Labor does not resolve the matter in 180 days (and there is no showing that such delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant) as a normal case in law or equity, with no amount in controversy requirement. Subsection (c) governs remedies and provides for the reinstatement of the whistleblower, backpay, and compensatory damages to make a victim whole, including reasonable attorney fees and costs, as remedies if the claimant prevails. A 90 day statute of limitations for the bringing of the initial administrative action before the Department of Labor is also included.

*Section 807.—Criminal penalties for securities fraud*

This provision would create a new 10-year felony for defrauding shareholders of publicly traded companies. The provision would supplement the patchwork of existing technical securities law violations with a more general and less technical provision, with elements and intent requirements comparable to current bank fraud and health care fraud statutes. It is meant to cover any scheme or artifice to defraud any person in connection with a publicly traded company. The acts terms are not intended to encompass technical definition in the securities

laws, but rather are intended to provide a flexible tool to allow prosecutors to address the wide array of potential fraud and misconduct which can occur in companies that are publicly traded. Attempted frauds are also specifically included.

#### DISCUSSION

Following is a discussion and analysis of the Act's Title 8 provisions.

Section 802 creates two new felonies to clarify and close loopholes in the existing criminal laws relating to the destruction or fabrication of evidence and the preservation of financial and audit records. First, it creates a new general anti shredding provision, 18 U.S.C. §1519, with a 10-year maximum prison sentence. Currently, provisions governing the destruction or fabrication of evidence are a patchwork that have been interpreted, often very narrowly, by federal courts. For instance, certain current provisions make it a crime to persuade another person to destroy documents, but not a crime to actually destroy the same documents yourself. Other provisions, such as 18 U.S.C. §1503, have been narrowly interpreted by courts, including the Supreme Court in *United States v. Aguillar*, 115 S. Ct. 593 (1995), to apply only to situations where the obstruction of justice can be closely tied to a pending judicial proceeding. Still other statutes have been interpreted to draw distinctions between what type of government function is obstructed. Still other provisions, such as sections 152(8), 1517 and 1518 apply to obstruction in certain limited types of cases, such as bankruptcy fraud, examinations of financial institutions, and healthcare fraud. In short, the current laws regarding destruction of evidence are full of ambiguities and technical limitations that should be corrected. This provision is meant to accomplish those ends.

Section 1519 is meant to apply broadly to any acts to destroy or fabricate physical evidence so long as they are done with the intent to obstruct, impede or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter, and such matter is within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States, or such acts done either in relation to or in contemplation of such a matter or investigation. The fact that a matter is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency is intended to be a jurisdictional matter, and not in any way linked to the intent of the defendant. Rather, the intent required is the intent to obstruct, not some level of knowledge about the agency processes of the precise nature of the agency of court's jurisdiction. This statute is specifically meant not to include any technical requirement, which some courts have read into other obstruction of justice statutes, to tie the obstructive conduct to a pending or imminent proceeding or matter by intent or otherwise. It is also sufficient that the act is done "in contemplation" of or in relation to a matter or investigation. It is also meant to do away with the distinctions, which some courts have read into obstruction statutes, between court proceedings, investigations, regulatory or administrative proceedings (whether formal or not), and less formal government inquiries, regardless of their title. Destroying or falsifying documents to obstruct any of these types of matters or investigations, which in fact are proved to be within the jurisdiction of any federal agency are covered by this statute. Questions of criminal intent are, as in all cases, appropriately decided by a jury on a case-by-cases basis. It also extends to acts done in contemplation of such federal matters, so that the timing of the act in relation to the beginning of the matter or investigation is also not a bar to prosecution. The intent of the provision is simple; people should not be destroying, altering, or falsifying doc-

uments to obstruct any government function. Finally, this section could also be used to prosecute a person who actually destroys the records himself in addition to one who persuades another to do so, ending yet another technical distinction which burdens successful prosecution of wrongdoers.<sup>16</sup>

Second, Section 802 also creates a 10 year felony, 18 U.S.C. §1520, to punish the willful failure to preserve financial audit papers of companies that issue securities as defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The new statute, in subsection (a)(1), would independently require that accountants preserve audit work papers for five years from the conclusion of the audit. Subsection (b) would make it a felony to knowingly and willfully violate the five-year audit retention period in (1)(a) or any of the rules that the SEC must issue under (1)(b). The materials covered in subsection (1)(b), which contains a mandatory requirement for the SEC to issue reasonable rules and regulations, are intended to include additional records which contain conclusions, opinions, analysis, and financial data relevant to an audit or review. Specifically included in such materials are electronic communications such as emails and other electronic records. The Conference added the ability of the SEC to update its rules to specifically allow it to capture additional types of records that could become important in the future as technologies and practices of the accounting industry change. The regulations are intended to cover the retention of all such substantive material, whether or not the conclusions, opinions, analyses or data in such records support the final conclusions reached by the auditor or expressed in the final audit or review so that state and federal law enforcement officials and regulators and victims can conduct more effective inquiries into the decisions and determinations made by accountants in auditing public corporations. Non-substantive materials, however, such as administrative records, which are not relevant to the conclusions or opinions expressed (or not expressed), need not be included in such retention regulations. The language of the provision is clear. The SEC "shall" and "is required" to promulgate regulations relating to the retention of the categories of items which are specifically enumerated in the statutory provision. "Reviews," as well as audits are also recovered by both (a) and (b). When a publicly traded company is involved, the precise name which the auditor chooses to give to an engagement is not important. Documents pertinent to the substance of such financial audits or review should be preserved. Willful violation of these regulations will also be a crime under this section.

In light of the apparent massive document destruction by Andersen, and the company's apparently misleading document retention policy, even in light of its prior SEC violations, it is intended that the SEC promulgate rules and regulations that require the retention of such substantive material, including material which casts doubt on the views expressed in the audit of review, for such a period as is reasonable and necessary for effective enforcement of the securities laws and the criminal laws, most of which have a five-year statute of limitations. It should also be noted that criminal tax violations, which many of these documents relate to, have a six-year statute of limitations and the regulatory portion of the Act requires a 7 year retention period. By granting the SEC the power to issue such regulations, it is not intended that the SEC be prohibited from consulting with other government agencies, such as the Department of Justice, which has primary authority regarding enforcement of federal criminal law or pertinent state regulatory agencies. Nor is it the in-

tention of this provision that the general public, private or institutional investors, or other investor or consumer protection groups be excluded from the SEC rulemaking process. These views of these groups, who often represent the victims of fraud, should be considered at least on an equal footing with "industry experts" and others who participate in the rulemaking process at the SEC.

This section not only penalizes the willful failure to maintain specified audit records, but also will result in clear and reasonable rules that will require accountants to put strong safeguards in place to ensure that such corporate audit records are retained. Had such clear requirements and policies been established at the time Andersen was considering what to do with its audit documents, countless documents might have been saved from the shredder. The idea behind the statute is not only to provide for prosecution of those who obstruct justice, but to ensure that important financial evidence is retained so that law enforcement officials, regulators, and victims can assess whether the law was broken to begin with and, if so, whether or not such was done intentionally, or with or without the knowledge or assistance of an auditor.

Section 803 amends the Bankruptcy Code to make judgments and settlements based upon securities law violations non-dischargeable, protecting victims' ability to recover their losses. Current bankruptcy law may permit such wrongdoers to discharge their obligations under court judgments or settlements based on securities fraud and other securities violations. This loophole in the law should be closed to help defrauded investors recoup their losses and to hold accountable those who violate securities laws after a government unit or private suit results in a judgment or settlement against the wrongdoer. This provision is meant to prevent wrongdoers from using the bankruptcy laws as a shield and to allow defrauded investors to recover as much as possible. To the maximum extent possible, this provision should be applied to existing bankruptcies. The provision applies to all judgments and settlements arising from state and federal securities laws violations entered in the future regardless of when the case was filed.

State securities regulators have indicated their strong support for this change in the bankruptcy law. Under current laws, state regulators are often forced to "reprove" their fraud cases in bankruptcy court to prevent discharge because remedial statutes often have different technical elements than the analogous common law causes of action. Moreover, settlements may not have the same collateral estoppel effect as judgments obtained through fully litigated legal proceedings. In short, with their resources already stretched to the breaking point, state regulators must plow the same ground twice in securities fraud cases. By ensuring securities law judgments and settlements in state cases are non-dischargeable, precious state enforcement resources will be preserved and directed at preventing fraud in the first place.

Section 804 protects victims by extending the statute of limitations in private securities fraud cases. It would set the statute of limitations in private securities fraud cases to the earlier of five years after the date of the fraud or two years after the fraud was discovered. The current statute of limitations for most such fraud cases is three years from the date of the fraud or one year after discovery, which can unfairly limit recovery for defrauded investors in some cases. It applies to all private securities fraud actions for which private causes of actions are permitted and applies to any case filed after the

date of enactment, no matter when the conduct occurred. As Attorney General Gregoire testified at the Committee hearing, in the Enron state pension fund litigation the current short statute of limitations has forced some states to forgo claims against Enron based on alleged securities fraud in 1997 and 1998. In Washington state alone, the short statute of limitations may cost hard-working state employees, firefighters and police officers nearly \$50 million in lost Enron investments which they can never recover.

Especially in complex securities fraud cases, the current short statute of limitations may insulate the worst offenders from accountability. As Justices O'Connor and Kennedy said in their dissent in *Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis, & Petigrow v. Gilbertson*, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991), the 5-4 decision upholding this short statute of limitations in most securities fraud cases, the current "one and three" limitations period makes securities fraud actions "all but a dead letter for injured investors who by no conceivable standard of fairness or practicality can be expected to file suit within three years after the violation occurred." The Consumers Union and Consumer Federation of America, along with the AFL-CIO and other institutional investors, strongly support the bill, and views this section in particular as a needed measure to protect investors.

The experts agree with that view. In fact, the last two SEC Chairmen supported extending the statute of limitations in securities fraud cases. Former Chairman Arthur Levitt testified before a Senate Subcommittee in 1995 that "extending the statute of limitations is warranted because many securities frauds are inherently complex, and the law should not reward the perpetrator of a fraud, who successfully conceals its existence for more than three years." Before Chairman Levitt, in the last Bush administration, then SEC Chairman Richard Breeden also testified before Congress in favor of extending the statute of limitations in securities fraud cases. Reacting to the *Lampf* opinion, Breeden stated in 1991 that "[e]vents only come to light years after the original distribution of securities, and the *Lampf* cases could well mean that by the time investors discover they have a case, they are already barred from the courthouse." Both the FDIC and the State securities regulators joined the SEC in calling for a legislative reversal of the *Lampf* decisions at that time.

In fraud cases the short limitations period under current law is an invitation to take sophisticated steps to conceal the deceit. The experts have long agreed on that point, but unfortunately they have been proven right again. As recent experience shows, it only takes a few seconds to warm up the shredder, but unfortunately it will take years for victims to put this complex case back together again. It is time that the law is changed to give victims the time they need to prove their fraud cases.

Section 805 of the Act ensures that those who destroy evidence or perpetrate fraud are appropriately punished. It would require the Commission to consider enhancing criminal penalties in cases involving obstruction of justice and serious fraud cases where a large number of victims are injured or when the victims face financial ruin.

The Act is not intended as criticism of the current guidelines, which were based on the hard work of the Commission to conform with the goals of prior existing law. Rather, it is intended to join the provisions of the Act which substantially raise current statutory maximums in the law as a policy expression that the former penalties were insufficient to deter financial misconduct and to request the Commission to review and en-

hance its penalties as appropriate in that light.

Currently, the U.S.S.G. recognize that a wide variety of conduct falls under the offense of "obstruction of justice." For obstruction cases involving the murder of a witness or another crime, the U.S.S.G. allow, by cross reference, significant enhancements based on the underlying crimes, such as murder or attempted murder. For cases when obstruction is the only offense, however, they provide little guidance on differentiating between different types of obstruction. This provision requests that the Commission consider raising the penalties for obstruction where no cross reference is available and defining meaningful specific enhancements and adjustments for cases where evidence and records are actually destroyed or fabricated (and for more serious cases even within that category of case) so as to thwart investigators, a serious form of obstruction.

This provision and Title 11, also require that the Commission consider enhancing the penalties in fraud cases which are particularly extensive or serious, even in addition to the recent amendments to the Chapter 2 guidelines for fraud cases. The current fraud guidelines require that the sentencing judge take the number of victims into account, but only to a very limited degree in small and medium-sized cases. Specifically, once there are more than 50 victims, the guidelines do not require any further enhancement of the sentence. A case with 51 victims, therefore, may be treated the same as a case with 5,000 victims. As the Enron matter demonstrates, serious frauds, especially in cases where publicly traded securities are involved, can affect thousands of victims.

In addition, current guidelines allow only very limited consideration of the extent of devastation that a fraud offense causes its victims. Judges may only consider whether a fraud endangers the "solvency or financial security" of a victim to impose an upward departure from the recommended sentencing range. This is not a factor in establishing the range itself unless the victim is a financial institution. Subsection (5) requires the Commission to consider requiring judges to consider the extent of such devastation in setting the actual recommended sentencing range in cases such as the Enron matter, when many private victims, including individual investors, have lost their life savings. Finally this provision requires a complete review of the Chapter 8 corporate misconduct guidelines, which should include not only monetary penalties but other actions designed to deter organizational crime, such as probation and compliance enforcement schemes.

Section 806 of the Act would provide whistleblower protection to employees of publicly traded companies who report acts of fraud to federal officials with the authority to remedy the wrongdoing or to supervisors or appropriate individuals within their company. Although current law protects many government employees who act in the public interest by reporting wrongdoing, there is no similar protection for employees of publicly traded companies who blow the whistle on fraud and protect investors. With an unprecedented portion of the American public investing in these companies and depending upon their honesty, this distinction does not serve the public good.

In addition, corporate employees who report fraud are subject to the patchwork and vagaries of current state laws, even though most publicly traded companies do business nationwide. Thus, a whistleblowing employee in one state (e.g., Texas, see *supra*) may be far more vulnerable to retaliation than a fellow employee in another state who takes the same actions. Unfortunately, com-

panies with a corporate culture that punishes whistleblowers for being "disloyal" and "litigation risks" often transcend state lines, and most corporate employers, with help from their lawyers, know exactly what they can do to a whistleblowing employee under the law. U.S. laws need to encourage and protect those who report fraudulent activity that can damage innocent investors in publicly traded companies. The Act is supported by groups such as the National Whistleblower Center, the Government Accountability Project, and Taxpayers Against Fraud, all of whom have written a letter placed in the Committee record calling this bill "the single most effective measure possible to prevent recurrences of the Enron debacle and similar threats to the nation's financial markets."

This provision would create a new provision protecting employees when they take lawful acts to disclose information or otherwise assist criminal investigators, federal regulators, Congress, their supervisors (or other proper people within a corporation), or parties in a judicial proceeding in detecting and stopping actions which they reasonably believe to be fraudulent. Since the only acts protected are "lawful" ones, the provision would not protect illegal actions, such as the improper public disclosure of trade secret information. In addition, a reasonableness test is also provided under the subsection (a)(1), which is intended to impose the normal reasonable person standard used and interpreted in a wide variety of legal contexts (See generally *Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. Department of Labor*, 992 F. 2d 474, 478). Certainly, although not exclusively, any type of corporate or agency action taken based on the information, or the information constituting admissible evidence at any later proceeding would be strong indicia that it could support such a reasonable belief. The threshold is intended to include all good faith and reasonable reporting of fraud, and there should be no presumption that reporting is otherwise, absent specific evidence.

Under new protections provided by the Act, if the employer does take illegal action in retaliation for such lawful and protected conduct, subsection (b) allows the employee to elect to file an administrative complaint at the Department of Labor, as is the case for employees who provide assistance in aviation safety. Only if there is not final agency decision within 180 days of the complaint (and such delay is not shown to be due to the bad faith of the claimant) may he or she may bring a *de novo* case in federal court with a jury trial available (See United States Constitution, Amendment VII; Title 42 United States Code, Section 1983). Should such a case be brought in federal court, it is intended that the same burdens of proof which would have governed in the Department of Labor will continue to govern the action. Subsection (c) of this section requires both reinstatement of the whistleblower, backpay, and all compensatory damages needed to make a victim whole should the claimant prevail. The Act does not supplant or replace state law, but sets a national floor for employee protections in the context of publicly traded companies.

Section 807 creates a new 25 year felony under Title 18 for defrauding shareholders of publicly traded companies. Currently, unlike bank fraud or health care fraud, there is no generally accessible statute that deals with the specific problem of securities fraud. In these cases, federal investigators and prosecutors are forced either to resort to a patchwork of technical Title 15 offenses and regulations, which may criminalize particular violations of securities law, or to treat the cases as generic mail or wire fraud cases and to meet the technical elements of

those statutes, with their five year maximum penalties.

This bill, then, would create a new 25 year felony for securities fraud—a more general and less technical provision comparable to the bank fraud and health care fraud statutes in Title 18. It adds a provision to Chapter 63 of Title 18 at section 1348 which would criminalize the execution or attempted execution of any scheme or artifice to defraud persons in connection with securities of publicly traded companies or obtain their money or property. The provision should not be read to require proof of technical elements from the securities laws, and is intended to provide needed enforcement flexibility in the context of publicly traded companies to protect shareholders and prospective shareholders against all the types schemes and frauds which inventive criminals may devise in the future. The intent requirements are to be applied consistently with those found in 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1343, 1344, 1347.

By covering all “schemes and artifices to defraud” (see 18 U.S.C. §§1344, 1341, 1343, 1347), new §1348 will be more accessible to investigators and prosecutors and will provide needed enforcement flexibility and, in the context of publicly traded companies, protection against all the types schemes and frauds which inventive criminals may devise in the future.

#### VOTE EXPLANATION

Mr. BIDEN: Mr. President, I arrived in Washington this morning after the vote to invoke cloture on the nomination of Julia Smith Gibbons, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit.

It was my intention to be here in time to vote in favor of this cloture motion.

Unfortunately, the catenary wire providing power for Amtrak was knocked down in Elkton, MD. This delayed the train on which I was traveling and regrettably prevented me from being present to vote.

#### THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I also take this opportunity today to right a wrong. Over the past 2 years, members of The Federalist Society have been much maligned by some of my Democrat colleagues, no doubt because they see political advantage in doing so. The Federalist Society has even been presented as an ‘evil cabal’ of conservative lawyers. Its members have been subjected to questions which remind one of the McCarthy hearings of the early 1950’s. Detractors have painted a picture which is surreal, twisted and untrue.

The truth is that liberal orthodoxies reign rampant and often unchecked in a majority of this country’s law schools and in the legal profession, and that the left is shocked that an association of constitutionalist lawyers would exist, much less include the notable legal minds it does.

During the mid-1990’s, Professor James Lindgren of Northwestern University Law School conducted a survey

of law school professors and came to the following conclusion. At the faculties of the top 100 law schools 80 percent of law professors were Democrats, or leaned left, and only 13 percent were Republicans, or leaned right. These liberal professors promulgate their ideology in and outside the classroom.

Anyone associated with America’s campuses or law schools knows that nonliberal views are regularly stifled and those espousing those views are often publicly shunned and ridiculed. It was this environment of hostility to freedom of expression and the exchange of ideas in universities that set the stage for the formation of the Federalist Society. And given my Democrat colleagues’ reaction to the Society, it appears to be fighting against liberal narrow-mindedness still.

In 1982, the Federalist Society was organized, not to foster any political agenda, but to encourage debate and public discourse on social and legal issues. Over the past 20 years the Federalist Society has accomplished just that. It has served to open the channels of discourse and debate in many of America’s law schools.

The Federalist Society espouses no official dogma. Its members share acceptance of three universal ideas: 1. that government’s essential purpose is the preservation of freedom; 2. that our Constitution embraces and requires separation of governmental powers; and 3. that judges should interpret the law, not write it.

For the vast majority of Americans, these are not controversial issues. Rather, they are basic Constitutional assertions that are essential to the survival of our republic. They are truths that have united Americans for more than two centuries. Recently we have seen the emergence of some groups that seek to undermine the third of these ideas—that judges should not write laws. These groups have attempted to use the judiciary to circumvent the democratic process and impose their minority views on the American people.

This judicial activism is a nefarious practice that seeks to undermine the principle of democratic rule. It results in an unelected oligarchy, government by a small elite. Judicial activism imposes the will of a small group of politicized lawyers upon the American people and undermines the work of the people’s representatives.

Indeed, if the radical left is successful, if we continue to appoint judges that are committed to writing law and not interpreting it, than all of us can just go home. We can resign ourselves to live under the oligarchical rule of lawyers. I happen to know a few lawyers, and please trust me when I say, this is not a good idea.

Beyond acceptance to its three key ideas, freedom, separation of powers, and that judges should not write laws, it is challenging, if not impossible, to find consensus among Federalist Society members. Its members hold a wide

array of differing views. They are so diverse that it is impossible to describe a Federalist Society philosophy.

The assertion that members are ideological carbon copies of each other is ludicrous. The Society revels in open, thoughtful, and rigorous debate on all issues. It rests on the premise that public policy and social issues should not be accepted as part of a party-line but rather warrant much thought and dialogue. Any organization that sponsors debate on issues of public importance, as opposed to self-serving indoctrination, is healthy for us all.

Now, how does the Federalist Society accomplish its goal? Not by lobbying Congress, writing amicus briefs, or issuing press releases. The Federalist Society seeks only to sponsor fair, serious, and open debate about the need to enhance individual freedom and the role of the courts in saying what the law is rather than what it should be. The Society believes that debate is the best way to ensure that legal principles that have not been the subject of sufficient attention for the past several decades receive a fair hearing.

The Federalist Society’s commitment to fair and open debate can be seen by a small sampling of some participants in its meetings and symposiums. They have included scores of liberals like Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Bryer, Michael Dukakis, Barney Frank, Abner Mikva, Alan Dershowitz, Laurence Tribe, Steve Shapiro, Christopher Hitchens and Ralph Nader, just to name a few.

I would like to include for the RECORD a list of 60 participants in Federalist Society events that demonstrates the remarkable diversity of thought of Federalist Society events. One of them is Nadine Strossen, President of the ACLU, who has participated in Federalist Society functions regularly and constantly since its founding. She has praised its fundamental principle of individual liberty, its high-profile on law school campuses, and its intellectual diversity, noting that there is frequently strenuous disagreement among members about the role of the courts. Strossen has even said that she cannot draw any firm conclusion about a potential judicial nominee’s views based on the fact that he is a Federalist Society member.

It seems to me that an organization that includes such a wide array of opinion serves this nation well and does not deserve the vilification it gets from the usual suspects.

There are many notable conservatives that also affiliate with the Federalist Society. But as the members of the Senate demonstrate, even amongst those that are often labeled “conservatives” there is a much disagreement on most social and political issues. Some often portray the Federalist Society as a tightly-knit, well-organized coalition of conservative lawyers who are united by their right-wing ideology. This is far from true. Allow me to illustrate further.