

amount of the grant, contract, or cooperative agreement awarded by the Director, or \$500,000, whichever is the lesser amount. The Director shall waive the matching requirement for any institution or consortium with no endowment, or an endowment that has a current dollar value lower than \$50,000,000.

**SEC. 6. LIMITATIONS.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—An eligible institution that receives a grant, contract, or cooperative agreement under this Act that exceeds \$2,500,000, shall not be eligible to receive another grant, contract, or cooperative agreement under this Act until every other eligible institution that has applied for a grant, contract, or cooperative agreement under this Act has received such a grant, contract, or cooperative agreement.

(b) **AWARDS ADMINISTERED BY ELIGIBLE INSTITUTION.**—Each grant, contract, or cooperative agreement awarded under this Act shall be made to, and administered by, an eligible institution, even when it is awarded for the implementation of a consortium or joint project.

**SEC. 7. ANNUAL REPORT AND EVALUATION.**

(a) **ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED FROM RECIPIENTS.**—Each institution that receives a grant, contract, or cooperative agreement under this Act shall provide an annual report to the Director on its use of the grant, contract, or cooperative agreement.

(b) **EVALUATION BY DIRECTOR.**—The Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, shall—

(1) review the reports provided under subsection (a) each year; and

(2) evaluate the program authorized by section 3 on the basis of those reports every 2 years.

(c) **CONTENTS OF EVALUATION.**—The Director, in the evaluation, shall describe the activities undertaken by those institutions and shall assess the short-range and long-range impact of activities carried out under the grant, contract, or cooperative agreement on the students, faculty, and staff of the institutions.

(d) **REPORT TO CONGRESS.**—The Director shall submit a report to the Congress based on the evaluation. In the report, the Director shall include such recommendations, including recommendations concerning the continuing need for Federal support of the program, as may be appropriate.

**SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.**

In this Act:

(1) **ELIGIBLE INSTITUTION.**—The term “eligible institution” means an institution that is—

(A) a historically Black college or university that is a part B institution, as defined in section 322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061(2)), an institution described in section 326(e)(1)(A), (B), or (C) of that Act (20 U.S.C. 1063b(e)(1)(A), (B), or (C)), or a consortium of institutions described in this subparagraph;

(B) a Hispanic-serving institution, as defined in section 502(a)(5) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a(a)(5));

(C) a tribally controlled college or university, as defined in section 316(b)(3) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)(3));

(D) an Alaska Native-serving institution under section 317(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b));

(E) a Native Hawaiian-serving institution under section 317(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)); or

(F) an institution determined by the Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, to have enrolled a substantial number of minority, low-income students during the previous academic year who received assistance under subpart I of part A of

title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070a et seq.) for that year.

(2) **DIRECTOR.**—The term “Director” means the Director of the National Science Foundation.

(3) **MINORITY BUSINESS.**—The term “minority business” includes HUBZone small business concerns (as defined in section 3(p) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632(p))).

**SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

There are authorized to be appropriated to the Director of the National Science Foundation \$250,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2008 to carry out this Act.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER.** The majority leader.

RECESS

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate now stand in recess until 3 p.m. today.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 2:11 p.m., recessed until 3 p.m. and reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mrs. DOLE).

EXECUTIVE SESSION

NOMINATION OF PRISCILLA RICHMAN OWEN, OF TEXAS, TO BE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

The **PRESIDING OFFICER.** Under the previous order, the Senate will now go into executive session to resume consideration of Executive Calendar No. 86, which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Priscilla Richman Owen, of Texas, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER.** The Senator from Maryland.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, I wish to speak about the nomination of Priscilla Owen. I thank the Senator from North Dakota for allowing me to go first.

I rise in opposition to the nomination of Priscilla Owen to the U.S. Court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit. I know the President has the constitutional responsibility to appoint Federal judges. I respect that right. In fact, I have voted for President Bush's judicial nominations 97 percent of the time. Yet the Senate also has the constitutional responsibility to advise and consent. We cannot rubberstamp nominations. Our courts are charged with safeguarding the very principles on which our country was built: justice, equality, individual liberty, and the basic implicit right of privacy.

When I look at a nominee, I have three criteria: judicial competence, personal integrity, and a commitment to core constitutional principles.

I carefully reviewed Judge Owen's rulings and opinions. I read the dissenting opinions of other judges and the views of legal scholars. I have concluded that Judge Owen does not meet my criteria. Her decisions appear to be driven by ideology—not by law. She appears to be far outside the mainstream

of judicial thinking, and her extreme and ideological agenda would make her unsuitable to sit on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

What we are considering with an appellate nomination is a lifetime appointment for a court that is only one step below the Supreme Court. The decisions made by this court have a lasting impact on the lives of all Americans for generations to come. This court's decisions will affect America's fundamental protections involving civil rights, individual liberty, health, and safety, and the implicit right of privacy. We need to be very careful about what we do.

That is why President Bush and all Presidents should nominate competent, moderate judges who reflect broad American values. No President should try to place ideologues on the court. If they do, I am concerned that it will slow the pace of confirmations, backlog our courts, and deny justice for too many Americans. Yet in nominating Judge Owen, the President has chosen someone with an extreme ideological agenda on civil rights, individual rights, and the rights of privacy.

Judge Owen has pursued an extreme activist agenda. Can anyone be surprised that this nomination has so many flashing yellow lights?

When President Bush discussed what would be his criteria for nominating judges, he said his standard for judicial nominees would be that they “share a commitment to follow and apply the law, not to make law from the bench.”

We applaud that criteria from the President. But I must say when we look at Priscilla Owen, that is exactly what she does. She makes law and does not limit herself to interpreting law, and, therefore, fails the President's own criteria.

The Texas court-watching journal, *Juris Publici*, said that Owen is a “conservative judicial activist.” That means she has a consistent pattern of putting her ideology above the law and ignoring statutory language and substituting her own views.

She has offered over 16 significant activist opinions and joined 15 others. Even White House counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales, who served with Judge Owen on the Texas Supreme Court, once called her dissent in the case “unconscionable . . . judicial activist.”

In a different case, Judge Gonzales called a dissent by Judge Owen an attempt to “judicially amend” a Texas statute. A number of dissents she wrote or joined in would have effectively rewritten or disregarded the law usually to the detriment of ordinary citizens.

An example: Quantum Chemical Corp v. Toennies was a case concerning age discrimination based on a civil rights statute. The majority of the Texas Supreme Court found for the plaintiff. Owen's dissent stated that the plaintiff needed to show that discrimination was a motivating factor. Her dissent would have changed Texas law and