

priority. It is a powerful reflection of the value we place on military service. And it is an unmistakable message we send to all Americans that service to our country will forever be remembered.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1074

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Veterans' Burial Benefits Enhancement Act of 2003".

SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF ELIGIBILITY OF STATES FOR BURIAL PLOT ALLOWANCE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 2303(b) of title 38, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking "a burial allowance under such section 2302, or under such subsection, who was discharged from the active military, naval, or air service for a disability incurred or aggravated in line of duty, or who is a veteran of any war" and inserting "burial in a national cemetery under section 2402 of this title"; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking "(other than a veteran whose eligibility for benefits under this subsection is based on being a veteran of any war)" and inserting "is eligible for a burial allowance under section 2302 of this title or under subsection (a) of this section, or was discharged from the active military, naval, or air service for a disability incurred or aggravated in line of duty, and such veteran".

(b) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to the burial of persons dying on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. LEASE OF UNUTILIZED OR UNDERUTILIZED PROPERTY OR FACILITIES OF NATIONAL CEMETERY ADMINISTRATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 24 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2406 the following new section:

"§2406A. Lease of unutilized or underutilized land or facilities

"(a) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Secretary may lease to such lessee, and upon such terms and conditions as the Secretary considers will be in the public interest, any unutilized or underutilized land or facilities of the United States that are part of the National Cemetery Administration as the Secretary considers appropriate.

"(b) The term of any lease of land or facilities under subsection (a) may not exceed three years.

"(c)(1) A lease under subsection (a) to any public or nonprofit organization may be made without regard to the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5).

"(2) Notwithstanding section 1302 of title 40 or any other provision of law, a lease under subsection (a) to any public or nonprofit organization may provide for the maintenance, protection, or restoration by the lessee of the land or facilities covered by the lease as a part or all of the consideration for the lease.

"(3) Before entering into a lease of land or facilities under subsection (a) to a public or nonprofit organization, the Secretary shall publish in a newspaper of general circulation in the community in which such land or fa-

cilities are located appropriate public notice of the intention of the Secretary to enter into the lease.

"(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, proceeds from the lease of land or facilities under subsection (a) shall be deposited in the National Cemetery Administration account. Amounts so deposited shall be merged with amounts in such account, and shall be available for the same purposes, and subject to the same conditions and limitations, as the amounts with which merged."

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of that chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2406 the following new item:

"2406A. Lease of unutilized or underutilized land or facilities."

SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL CEMETERIES FOR GEOGRAPHICALLY UNDERSERVED POPULATIONS OF VETERANS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 24 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

"§2412. Establishment of national cemeteries: geographically underserved populations of veterans

"(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), the Secretary shall establish a national cemetery in each geographic area identified by the Secretary under subsection (b) in order to ensure that the veterans who reside in such geographic area reside not more than 50 miles from an open national cemetery.

"(b) The Secretary shall identify each geographic area in the United States in which—

"(1) the number of veterans who reside more than 50 miles from an open national cemetery or State cemetery for veterans exceeds 170,000 veterans; or

"(2) the number of veterans who reside more than 50 miles from an open national cemetery or State cemetery for veterans, when combined with the number of veterans who reside within 50 miles of a State cemetery for veterans but are ineligible for burial in such State cemetery due to residency requirements, exceeds 170,000 veterans.

"(c) If the Secretary determines that the expansion of one or more national cemeteries in a geographic area identified under subsection (b) is adequate and appropriate to meet the needs of veterans and their families in such geographic area, the Secretary shall expand such national cemetery or cemeteries in lieu of meeting the requirement for such geographic area under subsection (a).

"(d) A national cemetery established under this section shall be treated as a national cemetery of the National Cemetery Administration under this chapter.

"(e) In this section, the term 'open', with respect to a national cemetery or State cemetery for veterans, means that the national cemetery or State cemetery for veterans has the capacity for each of the following:

"(1) First interment, in-ground casket burials.

"(2) Burial or inurnment of cremated remains."

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of that chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

"2412. Establishment of national cemeteries: geographically underserved populations of veterans."

SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

SENATE RESOLUTION 144—EX-PRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DECLARE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF KOSOVA TO DETERMINE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE ONCE KOSOVA HAS MADE REQUISITE PROGRESS, AS DEFINED BY UNITED NATIONS BENCHMARKS, IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS

Mr. BIDEN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 144

Whereas paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a party, recognizes that all peoples have the right of self-determination;

Whereas Kosovo was constitutionally defined as an autonomous region in the First National Liberation Conference for Kosovo on January 2, 1944, this status was confirmed in the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia adopted in 1946, and the autonomous status of Kosovo was preserved in the amended Yugoslav Constitution adopted in 1974;

Whereas prior to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the autonomous region of Kosovo constituted a political and legal entity with its own distinct financial institutions, police force, municipal government, school system, judicial and legal system, hospitals, and other organizations;

Whereas, in 1987, Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in Yugoslavia on a platform of ultranationalism and anti-Albanian racism, advocating violence and hatred against all non-Slavic peoples and specifically targeting the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo;

Whereas Slobodan Milosevic subsequently stripped Kosovo of its political autonomy without the consent of the people of Kosovo;

Whereas the elected Assembly of Kosovo, faced with this illegal act, adopted a Declaration of Independence on July 2, 1990, proclaimed a Republic of Kosovo, and adopted a constitution on September 7, 1990, based on the internationally accepted principles of self-determination, equality, and sovereignty;

Whereas in recognition of the de facto dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, the European Community established principles for the recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

Whereas a popular referendum was held in Kosovo from September 26 to 30, 1991, in which 87 percent of all eligible voters cast ballots and 99.87 percent voted in favor of declaring Kosovo independent of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

Whereas, during the occupation of Kosovo, which began in 1989 and ended with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military action against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in 1999, the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo were subjected to brutal treatment by the occupying forces, and approximately 400,000 ethnic Albanians were forced to flee to Western Europe and the United States;

Whereas in the spring of 1999 almost 1,000,000 ethnic Albanians were driven out of Kosovo and at least 10,000 were murdered by Serbian paramilitary and military forces;

Whereas Slobodan Milosevic was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and extradited to The Hague in June 2001, to stand trial for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Kosova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia;

Whereas on June 10, 1999, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 mandated an international civil presence in Kosova, ending the decade-long Serbian occupation of Kosova and Milosevic's genocidal war there;

Whereas the people of Kosova, including ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Roma, Bosniaks, Goranis, and Ashkalis, held free and fair municipal elections in 2000 and 2002 and a general election in 2001 to elect a Parliament, which in turn selected a President and Prime Minister in 2002;

Whereas, with 50 percent of the population in Kosova being under the age of 25, and the unemployment rate currently being between 60 and 70 percent, there is an increasing likelihood of young people entering criminal networks, or working abroad in order to survive unless massive job creation is facilitated by guaranteeing the security of foreign investments through the establishment of the rule of law and functioning institutions in Kosova;

Whereas for the first time since the end of the conflict, refugees from ethnic minority communities in Kosova have started to return to their homes in substantial numbers, although those refugees are still a small fraction of the number of people that left in 1999;

Whereas most ethnic Albanian elected authorities in Kosova recognize that substantial efforts toward reconciliation with ethnic minorities are needed for the long-term security and participation in government institutions of all citizens of Kosova;

Whereas leaders of the Kosova Parliament have publicly committed to developing a western-style democracy in which all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, are granted full human and civil rights and are committed to the return of all refugees, whatever their ethnicity, who fled Kosova during and after the conflict;

Whereas Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic of Serbia called for the return of Serbian forces to Kosova and for talks on the status of the province;

Whereas, on February 25, 2003, representatives of a Serbian minority coalition in the Kosova Parliament called for the establishment of a Serbian Union in northern Kosova;

Whereas the international community has made clear that it will support neither monoethnic government institutions, nor the partition of Kosova;

Whereas the tragic assassination in Belgrade of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on March 12, 2003, underscored that criminal nationalist elements remain a destabilizing factor in the region and an obstacle to reform efforts;

Whereas the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General in Kosova has initiated a dialogue between the authorities in Belgrade and in Pristina on issues of practical concern;

Whereas the Serbian Government on April 17, 2003, declared as "unacceptable" the plan put forward by the Special Representative to devolve powers to the elected officials in Kosova;

Whereas following his address to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Permanent Council on May 8, 2003, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General stated that "Kosovo Albanians are being more assertive about competencies and status issues while at the same

time Kosovo Serbs are concentrating on developing monoethnic structures";

Whereas Deputy Prime Minister Covic on May 9, 2003, again dismissed the assessment that the time has come to begin to discuss the final status of Kosova;

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 stated that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence in Kosova include facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosova's future status and, in the final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosova's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; and

Whereas the only viable option for the future of Kosova is one that reflects both the needs and aspirations of its entire population: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United States should—

(1) recognize the danger that an unnecessary delay in the resolution of Kosova's final status would pose for the political and economic viability of Kosova and the stability of Southeast Europe;

(2) publicly support the goal of a democratic government in Kosova in which human rights, including the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, are respected;

(3) to achieve that goal, call for holding a referendum, under international supervision, on the future status of Kosova, once Kosova has made further progress in developing institutions of democratic self-government, establishing the rule of law, facilitating the return and reintegration of refugees into local communities, and protecting ethnic minorities, in accordance with the benchmarks established by the United Nations;

(4) work in conjunction with the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other international organizations to assist Kosova to meet the United Nations benchmarks that are the necessary conditions for holding a referendum on the future status of Kosova and to facilitate the implementation of the form of government determined by the people of Kosova; and

(5) continue to provide assistance, trade, and other programs to encourage the further development of democracy and a free market economic system in Kosova.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should declare its support for the right of the people of Kosova to determine their political future, once Kosova has made requisite progress, as defined by United Nations benchmarks, in developing democratic institutions and human rights protections.

In order to put my Resolution into the proper context, I would like briefly to discuss current conditions in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, an area which has consumed a great deal of my attention for the last decade.

Much progress has been made in this former region of conflict since the fall of Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic in 2001 and the subsequent final dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. Slovenia has been invited to join NATO, and last week this body unanimously ratified the accession to NATO of Slovenia and six other candidate countries. Slovenia has also

been invited to join the European Union next year.

Two other Yugoslav successor states—Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—have joined Albania in signing the U.S.-Adriatic Charter to cooperatively advance their candidacies for NATO membership. Both Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have also signed EU Stabilization and Association agreements.

In Macedonia, although tensions that threatened full-scale conflict just two years ago remain, the newly elected coalition government is working to implement fully the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, and the European Union assumed command of peacekeeping operations from NATO on March 31, 2003.

SFOR, the NATO-led international force, continues to maintain stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina in significantly smaller numbers than its original contingent. There is serious discussion about turning over command of the operation to the European Union, a move about which I have some reservations. The European Union Police Mission assumed international police monitoring duties in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the UN on January 1, 2003. The High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, continues to oversee reform efforts and has the rightly placed special emphasis on strengthening the rule of law.

Serbia and Montenegro, under pressure from the EU, agreed to a constitutional charter that would keep them loosely united for the next three years, formally ending the entity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and setting them on a long-term path toward EU membership. Nonetheless, last week Filip Vujanovic, an advocate of Montenegrin independence, won a sweeping victory in the presidential elections. The runner-up candidate also advocated independence, as does Montenegro's prime minister Milo Djukanovic.

Despite this considerable progress, as a distinguished task force assembled by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in its "Balkans 2010" report of December 2002, the goal of regional stability and the promises of democratic transition are not yet fulfilled.

"There is still a risk of backsliding in the region: the security situation in Macedonia remains tenuous; the coalition government in Serbia is irretrievably splintered; and in Kosovo all the political parties are organized around ethnic objectives and pander to nationalist sentiment. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, meanwhile, the elections in October 2002—which resulted in presidential victories for the three main nationalist parties at the expense of their moderate competitors—demonstrated that nationalist feelings remain potent. One reason for these trends is the increasing discontent of local populations whose embrace of the West has failed to bring immediate improvements in their standard of living

... Irredentist, criminal and anti-democratic forces will try to exploit people's frustration brought on by the difficulties inherent in transitions."

Following the tragic assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindic on March 12, 2003, the government of Serbia launched a major crackdown on criminal elements and initiated much-needed defense reforms to enhance civilian control over the military. Serbian officials took an important and overdue step by handing over to UN representative in Kosova the remains of 37 ethnic Albanians believed to have been killed during Milosevic's 1998-1999 campaign.

Serbia must continue to step up its cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY. The single most significant move the Serbian government could make to prove its commitment to joining the West is to arrest former Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic and send him to The Hague. But there are other important measures, such as opening archives and turning over requested documents to the prosecution, that Serbia must take in order to meet its international obligations.

Now, I would like to turn to Kosova, the subject of my resolution. Since the end of hostilities four years ago, the peace has been kept by KFOR, an international peacekeeping force in which United States forces play a kept role and have responsibility for the southeastern sector of the province.

Last year for the first time since the 1999 conflict, refugee returns outnumbered departures, with around 2,700 refugees returning to the province. UN officials predict that the numbers will increase in 2003, and the United States has committed more than \$14 million this fiscal year to that end. The Housing and Property Directorate has resolved nearly 2,000 property claims to date and estimates that it will have resolved 9,000 cases by the end of 2003—about one-third of all claims filed.

The Kosovo Protection Corps, the local gendarmerie, is gradually becoming more representative of the ethnic diversity in Kosova and more skillful in its policing operations. Crime, and particularly inter-ethnic crime, has been significantly reduced, and murders decreased in 2002 by 50 percent over the previous year. The province held elections three times in the past three years, twice for municipal seats and once to select assembly representatives, and in each case OSCE monitors deemed the elections generally free and fair.

Yet much remains to be done. The refugee returns of last year represent only a small fraction of the approximately 237,000 Kosova refugees currently in Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania. Moreover, there are 22,500 internally displaced persons within Kosova who, for various reasons, including loss of property, economic shortage, and fear of retribution or persecution, have been unable or unwilling to return to

their homes. Many who have returned also fear for their security, are unable to secure employment, and have little or no access to social and economic opportunities. Formal unemployment hovers around 50 percent. Without the ability to sustain themselves and provide for their families, many young Kosovars have turned to criminal activity. And Kosova continues to provide a haven for traffickers and other criminals active throughout the Balkans.

The head of the UN administration, UNMIK, an experienced German diplomat named Michael Steiner, has established "benchmarks" to focus the agenda of Kosova's elected officials pursuant to fulfilling the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 for progress toward self-administration. These benchmarks include: the existence of effective, representative, and functioning institutions; the enforcement of the rule of law; freedom of movement; respect for the right of all Kosovars to remain and return; the development of a sound basis for a market economy; clarity of property title; normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps in line with its mandate.

The UN policy of "standards before status" is conceptually sound. Of course, real progress requires resources, and, unfortunately, the international community has not met all of its pledge commitments, and private investment until now has been sparse.

Some argue that foreign capital is hesitant to invest in Kosova as long as its future political status remains undefined. This line, however, confuses cause and effect. The reason that Kosova's final status remains in limbo is because conditions on the ground there do not yet allow the international community to allow a final status to be chosen.

To be sure, there have been serious attempts to move the process along. Mr. Steiner has initiated a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade on technical issues and has begun the process of devolving many responsibilities onto Kosova's elected Assembly.

Sad to say, both ethnic Albanians and Serbs have undercut these efforts by focusing on final status, rather than on practical progress. Ethnic Albanian representatives in the Kosova Assembly have twice tried to pass a resolution calling for independence but were dissuaded by officials from the UN and the international community who rightly fear that such a move would only increase tensions in the region. Kosovar President Ibrahim Rugova has publicly ruled out any dialogue with Belgrade officials on future status.

The Serbs for their part, have been equally obdurate. Earlier this year, leading Serbian officials made aggressive statements regarding Kosova, including calling on the international community to take up the final status issue and demanding that Serb army

forces be allowed to return there. I scarcely need comment that the latter demand is a total non-starter.

The UN Secretary General's report of April 14, 2003, noted that Belgrade continues to support parallel administrative structures in virtually all of municipalities that have a considerable Serb population in direct violation of UN Security Council 1244. Following a meeting with Kosovar Serb leaders on April 16, 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Zivkovic and Deputy Prime Minister Covic issued a statement calling the UN plan to devolve considerable powers to the democratically elected officials in Kosova "unacceptable," and the government in Belgrade is reportedly setting up a Serbian state council to deal with administrative issues in the ethnic Serb communities in Kosova.

So what should we do? there are some who believe we should throw in the towel and declare support for one side or the other. I believe that those who would call for the United States to support either independence for Kosova, or reintegration of Kosova with Serbia, are prescribing a cure worse than the disease, however noble their intentions.

When in doubt it is always wise to fall back upon basic principles. In this case, the basic principle of democracy is self-determination. And self-determination can best be expressed through a referendum, but only after the local Kosova authorities, with the help of the international community, fulfill the United Nations benchmarks.

Let me be perfectly clear about the practical side of the issue. The demographics of Kosova, and the pro-independence stand of all the ethnic Albanian political leaders and parties there, make a future vote for independence nearly inevitable. If that is the will of the people of Kosova when conditions warrant their making a choice, then I will wholeheartedly support it.

But no rationale of catering to immediate economic expediency outweighs the damage a unilateral declaration of independence, or Congressional support thereof, would do to the international regime in Kosova—especially to the credibility of the United Nations Mission there—or to the promising, but fragile crackdown on criminal elements by the new Zivkovic government in Serbia.

The stakes of Balkan stability are simple too high to put the cart before the horse.

In order to meet the UN benchmarks, the leaders of Kosova from all ethnic communities must accelerate the process of building a fully functioning democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law. Agreeing to a process for settling the status issue will give them the political incentive and procedural basis to do so.

The Sense of the Senate resolution I have proposed recognizes the danger that an unnecessary delay in resolution of Kosova's final status would pose. But it also recognizes that the

precondition for resolving the final status issue through self-determination is a democratic government in Kosovo in which human rights, including the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, are respected.

Therefore, the Resolution calls for holding a referendum on final status, once requisite progress has been made toward meeting the UN benchmarks, endorses continued cooperation with other international organizations, and supports continued U.S. economic assistance to encourage further development.

Rebuilding a society shattered by a vicious war is a frustrating, time-consuming effort. There is an undeniable temptation to heed the siren song of a declaration of independence. But short-term gratification usually leads to more severe long-term problems, and the case of Kosovo is no exception. The international cooperative efforts of KFOR, the UN, the OSCE, and various other governmental and non-governmental bodies are making slow but steady progress. We should continue down this path, which is precisely what my Resolution advocates.

I hope other members will join me in supporting the people of Kosovo in their efforts, through concrete political and social progress, to advance a decision on their final political status.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED & PROPOSED

SA 623. Mr. ROCKEFELLER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 201 of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2004; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 624. Mr. BAUCUS proposed an amendment to amendment SA 555 proposed by Mr. GRASSLEY to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 625. Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. BREAUX, Mrs. LINCOLN, Mr. SMITH, and Mr. ALLARD) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 626. Mr. HATCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 627. Mr. HATCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 628. Mr. DORGAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 629. Mr. DORGAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 630. Mr. DORGAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 631. Mr. DORGAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 632. Mr. DORGAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 633. Mr. DORGAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 634. Mr. DURBIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 635. Mr. LEVIN (for himself and Mr. REID) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 636. Mr. EDWARDS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 637. Mrs. BOXER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 638. Mr. BUNNING submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 639. Mr. SESSIONS (for himself and Mr. ALLEN) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 640. Mr. KERRY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 641. Mr. KERRY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 642. Mr. KERRY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 643. Mr. KERRY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 644. Mr. BAUCUS (for himself and Mr. GRASSLEY) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 645. Mr. BAUCUS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 646. Mr. BUNNING submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 647. Mr. DURBIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 648. Mr. SANTORUM submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 649. Mr. GRAHAM of Florida submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 650. Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. FEINGOLD, and Mrs. FEINSTEIN) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 1298, to provide assistance to foreign countries to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 651. Mr. SCHUMER (for himself, Mr. DEWINE, and Ms. LANDRIEU) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 201 of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2004.

SA 652. Mrs. CLINTON (for herself and Mrs. BOXER) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 1298, to provide assistance to foreign countries to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and for other purposes.

SA 653. Mr. BAUCUS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 201 of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2004; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 654. Mr. BINGAMAN (for himself, Mr. ENZI, Mrs. LINCOLN, Mr. SMITH, and Mr. NELSON of Nebraska) submitted an amendment

intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 655. Mr. REID submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 656. Mr. DASCHLE proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 657. Mr. INOUE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 658. Mr. INOUE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 659. Mr. SCHUMER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 660. Mr. SCHUMER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 661. Mr. MCCAIN (for himself and Mr. BAUCUS) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 662. Mr. EDWARDS (for himself, Mr. MCCAIN, and Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 663. Mr. BREAUX proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 664. Mr. NICKLES (for himself, Mr. MILLER, Mr. KYL, Mr. LOTT, Mr. BUNNING, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. FRIST, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. ENSIGN, Mr. SMITH, Mr. THOMAS, Mr. DOMENICI, and Mr. ALLARD) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 665. Mr. REID (for himself and Mr. GRAHAM of Florida) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 666. Mr. DORGAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 667. Mrs. BOXER proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 668. Mr. DORGAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 669. Mr. DURBIN proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 670. Mr. SANTORUM (for himself and Mr. NELSON of Nebraska) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 671. Mr. LAUTENBERG (for himself, Mr. CORZINE, Mr. LEAHY, Mrs. MURRAY, and Mr. REID) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 1298, to provide assistance to foreign countries to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 672. Mr. REED (for himself, Mr. CORZINE, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. KERRY, Mr. ROCKEFELLER, Ms. LANDRIEU, and Mr. SARBANES) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1054, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 201 of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2004.

SA 673. Mr. DEWINE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1054, supra.

SA 674. Mr. FEINGOLD submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 1298, to provide assistance to foreign countries to combat HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 675. Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. JOHNSON, and Mr. LEAHY) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 1298, supra; which was ordered to lie on the table.