by the year 2015 the nation's college campuses will be missing 250,000 African Americans and 550,000 Hispanic undergraduates, ''because we did not prepare them to do college-level work. (If) the economy continues to demand ever-higher skills for good jobs, minorities will have to run faster just to stay in place.''

Mr. Speaker, we know we cannot easily legislate away racism in the heart and minds of people. However, you can legislate and interpret in the courts, a road map that bypasses individual racism and institutionalizes opportunity and affirmative access, for all. Racism in America does not exist in isolation. It's systemic existence calls for affirmative action regarding race if we are to keep the doors open for those who were once summarily denied entrance to a chance to live better lives.

REGARDING LEGISLATION TO ESTABLISH THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTELLIGENCE ABOUT IRAQ

HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing legislation to establish the Independent Commission on Intelligence about Iraq. This Commission is necessary to restore the confidence of the American public and the international community regarding the Bush Administration's use of intelligence information about Iraq.

I am joined in introducing this bill by Representative MARTIN FROST, Representative RON KIND, and 20 other members who supported President Bush when he asked for congressional authorization to use force in Iraq. We were allies of the President when he wanted authority to go to war. And we are allies of the President today in the ongoing fight against terrorism.

For us, this issue is not about whether we were right to go to war in Iraq. We voted for the war resolution. And it is not about whether biological or chemical weapons will ultimately be found in Iraq. Instead, we are introducing this bill because it is now clear we had an inexcusable breakdown in our intelligence system prior to the Iraq war. We need to know how and why this happened, so that we can make sure it never happens again.

We need to know whether the breakdown was caused by problems within our intelligence agencies, and whether they failed to do their jobs competently and responsibly. If, as some in the Administration have hinted, essential information was withheld from the President, we need to discover who did that and hold them accountable.

If we find that the intelligence community did their job well, then we need to know whether Bush Administration officials either ignored or misused the intelligence information. At the end of the day, regardless of the consequences, we need to know what went wrong.

We can't avoid the responsibility. President Bush is leading us in a new doctrine of preemptive warfare. While there is obviously disagreement over the merits of this approach, there is unanimity that preemptive warfare's essential ingredient is accurate intelligence. It can't be founded on theory or suspicion—it needs fact. Without that, the world will be unable to distinguish preemptive warfare from ordinary aggression.

The House and Senate Intelligence Committees have already begun the process of assessing the intelligence community's performance, and the Independent Commission we would create here would supplement that valuable effort.

It appears, however, that the Intelligence Committees will not be assessing how the Bush Administration used the intelligence information it received. Representative PORTER GOSS, the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said, ''I'm not going into what the customer did with the intelligence.'' I disagree with that approach, and that review will also be an important part of the Independent Commission's responsibilities.

It is profoundly important that the President, the Vice President, and other senior Administration officials accurately portray intelligence information. There is no question more grave than whether our Nation should go to war. When the topic is whether to commit our armed forces to battle, Congress and the American public need to able to rely unquestioningly on the accuracy and veracity of the information from the President and other Administration officials.

Unfortunately, serious concerns have already been raised regarding how the Bush Administration handled intelligence information on threats posed by Iraq in the months leading up to the conflict. One of the main questions that has emerged is whether White House officials manipulated or deliberately ignored key intelligence on Iraq. The Administration's responses to date have been incomplete and inconsistent, and have raised a host of new questions.

For months, I have been asking a simple question: Why did the President cite forged evidence about Iraq's efforts to obtain nuclear materials from Africa in his State of the Union address?

Yet I have been unable to get an answer to this basic question. Instead, the Administration has provided only murky and conflicting explanations regarding the use of forged evidence by the President and other top Administration officials.

The first Administration explanation, as described in the Washington Post on March 8, 2003, was ''we fell for it.''

But we now know that wasn't true. Multiple press accounts have reported that CIA analysts doubted the validity of the evidence long before the President's State of the Union address and had communicated those doubts to the White House. Other press accounts have reported that State Department analysts also concluded in 2002 that the evidence was bogus.

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice then asserted that ''maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery.''

But this also doesn't appear accurate. According to a June 30, 2003, New Republic article entitled ''The Selling of the Iraq War: The First Casualty,'' Vice President Cheney's office had received the forged evidence from the British in 2002 and had provided it to the CIA; the CIA in turn had dispatched a former ambassador to Africa to check its validity; the ambassador determined the evidence was unreliable; and the CIA communicated this report to the Vice President's office.

Other accounts, such as those by Nicholas Kristof in the New York Times, reach the same conclusion. According to a June 13, 2003, Knight Ridder News Service report by Jonathan Landay: ''Three senior administration officials said Vice President DICK CHENEY and some officials on the National Security Council staff and at the Pentagon ignored the CIA's warning and argued that Bush and others should include the allegation in their case against Hussein.''

The White House has asserted that the President's State of the Union address was closely vetted by intelligence officials. But if this is so, what did these officials communicate to the President and his White House advisors and how did the White House respond? NPR has reported that early drafts of the President's State of the Union address that contained the forged evidence were reviewed by senior intelligence officials, who objected to the inclusion of the evidence. According to NPR, the White House ignored their objections. Instead, the White House response was to keep the forged evidence in the speech, but to change the wording so that the evidence was attributed to British sources.

Another question raised by the official White House account is why the White House hasn't taken disciplinary action against the CIA Director and other intelligence officials. If the White House was kept in the dark about something as fundamental as forged nuclear evidence—as Condoleezza Rice maintains—this would be an extraordinarily serious failure by the intelligence community. Shouldn't those responsible face equally serious consequences?

Other significant questions regarding the forged documents remain unanswered. For example, in some statements, the Administration has asserted that ''additional evidence'' supported the claim about Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium in Africa. Yet the only evidence the Administration provided to the IAEA to support its claims was the forged documents. And despite my repeated requests for this other evidence, the Administration has yet to provide it. What is the other evidence? And why didn't the President and other Administration officials cite to it instead of to the forgeries?

And then there is the question of the December 19 fact sheet by the State Department. This fact sheet—which received front-page coverage in the media—repeated the fake evidence that Iraq sought to import uranium from Africa. When I wrote the President about this, the State Department responded as follows: ''The December 19 fact sheet was a product developed jointly by the CIA and the State Department.''

But according to a senior intelligence official quoted in the Washington Post, the CIA objected to the inclusion of the fake evidence in the State Department fact sheet but the objection ''came too late' to prevent its publication.''

Both of these accounts can't be right.

A broad, independent investigation is necessary to answer questions like these. That is why we are proposing a nonpartisan Commission on Intelligence about Iraq. This Commission would examine the collection, evaluation, and use by the Administration of Intelligence

on threats posed by Iraq, and make recommendations to Congress and the President regarding steps to enhance the accuracy of intelligence and representations regarding intelligence. The Commission would have the ability to recommend that its findings be made public.

Unlike with congressional committees examining intelligence on Iraq, no political party would have an advantage on the Iraq Commission. Based on the model of the 9/11 Commission which was thoroughly vetted by Congress, the Commission on Intelligence about Iraq would be composed of five members appointed by Republicans and five appointed by Democrats.

Some have tried to deflect efforts to explore questions about the handling of intelligence on Iraq as ''revisionist history'' or equated such efforts with questioning the war in Iraq. This is misdirected criticism. The purpose of the Commission is simple: to understand the truth.

The Commission's effort should proceed regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the ultimate decision to wage war in Iraq, and regardless of whether biological or chemical weapons ultimately are found there. The credibility of our government will remain in jeopardy if we do not resolve doubts regarding the handling of classified information on Iraq.

COMMENDING THE SAN MATEO POLICE DEPARTMENT

HON. TOM LANTOS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to applaud the San Mateo Police Department, whose creative and effective policing strategies over the past decade merit recognition and praise by this body.

Law enforcement is one of the principal functions of responsible government, and the duties of a police department are as vital as they are numerous. I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the enormous strains police departments nationwide are currently experiencing, with their budgets shrinking even as their responsibilities multiply. New antiterrorism duties have been met in many cases not, Mr. Speaker, by additional funds, but by service and pay cuts, as the present Administration and Congressional leadership undermine our nation's Finest with their irresponsible theology of tax cuts.

Mr. Speaker, I ask that my colleagues join me in thanking the police departments of America for their selfless and courageous service in this most trying time for our nation, and in offering our sympathy as they work hard to make America safe.

The San Mateo Police Department stands out among police departments nationally as a paragon of public service and public sensitivity, and has worked creatively to forge partnerships with the community.

Mr. Speaker, the SMPD has made tremendous strides in recent years. During the period from 1997 to 2002, the overall crime rate in San Mateo plummeted 8 percent and there was not a single murder in the city of nearly 100,000 people. The SMPD's hard work has clearly paid off, and in addition to lower crime rates, it has yielded dividends that cannot be quantified.

Ten years ago, Mr. Speaker, the SMPD launched a Community Oriented Policing program, with the ambitious goal of improving the quality of life for every single person who lives and works in the City of San Mateo. The Department sought to accomplish this task by engaging the individuals, businesses, and local service organizations of San Mateo, as well as appropriate outside governmental agencies, and their approach has been enormously successful.

Indeed, Mr. Speaker, the San Mateo Police Department has been incredibly innovative in its efforts to reach out to the community. Among the more creative initiatives launched by the SMPD in recent years is the Citizen-Police Ride-Along Program, in which San Mateo residents accompany an officer in a police cruiser in order to get a sense of what a police patrol is like. In addition, Mr. Speaker, the SMPD has teamed up with San Mateo Parks & Recreation to form the Police Activities League (PAL), an organization with support from the State of California that helps promote trust and understanding between cops and kids. Six years into the program, the verdict is in and it is unambiguous: PAL has been an unqualified success and has contributed to a marked improvement in relations between youth and law enforcement.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to single out San Mateo Chief of Police Susan E. Manheimer for her leadership and her commitment to the principles of equality, professionalism, justice, and the highest standards of ethics. I have the utmost confidence that her commitment to a focused approach of Problem Oriented Policing will further reduce crime in the City of San Mateo and contribute generally to a better quality of life in the area, and I congratulate her on the Department's accomplishments under her stewardship.

And finally, Mr. Speaker, I would like to offer my sincerest and most heartfelt congratulations to police officers Bob Szelenyi and Fred Haney on their promotion to the rank of Sergeant in the San Mateo Police Department. I have known Bob personally since his infancy, and consider him a man of great character, industry, and integrity. In his decade and a half on the force, Mr. Speaker, Bob has established himself as a leader in mediation and negotiation, and is held in the highest regard for his involvement with San Mateo youth.

Officer Szelenyi has been awarded multiple public service awards for his work with kids, Mr. Speaker, and has earned the respect of his colleagues and many others in my district and the entire Bay Area for his successful negotiation of a gang truce several years ago. That truce prevented countless acts of violence and untold suffering, and we are all eternally indebted to him for his hard work on behalf of the lives and safety of the people of San Mateo.

While I did not have the privilege of watching Mr. Haney take his first steps, Mr. Speaker, I am familiar with his work because his remarkable contributions to the community of San Mateo are so well-known. I am proud that he is one of the top officers defending my community, and I believe his work in preventing gang violence, both as an individual officer and as a member of a special gang task force, contributed to the drop in crime my community has enjoyed over the past five years. Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend Mr. Haney on his work at the frontier of digital evidence and high-tech crimes. He is a model public servant, and I salute him.

Mr. Speaker, I offer my warmest congratulations to the San Mateo Police Department, Police Chief Manheimer, and Sergeants Szelenyi and Haney, and my unending thanks to them for their service to the people of San Mateo. I wish them Godspeed.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2004

SPEECH OF

HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 24, 2003

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the state of-the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2555) making appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes:

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill. This is the first appropriations bill for the new Department and there are few legislative issues that will have as great an impact on our nation.

As many of my colleagues are aware, I have continually expressed concern over inadequate funding available for first responders. I introduced legislation in both this, and the 107th Congress to remedy this funding shortfall. So, when I first reviewed this legislation, I was pleased to note that it provides $888 million more to first responders than the President requested. However, the CBO estimates that with price increases in the current fiscal year, this legislation, in real dollar terms, is about $150 million below current levels. The proposed legislation is clearly inadequate to provide the homeland security we need.

This is especially alarming given the fact that the states are suffering their worst fiscal crisis since World War II. The National Governors' Association reports that 46 states have significant revenue shortfalls, and that several have shortfalls in excess of $1 billion. Homeland Security is one of our most critical national priorities, and yet this Administration is determined to offer $350 billion in new tax breaks.

A number of critical security shortfalls are not addressed in this legislation. For instance, the U.S. Coast Guard estimates that to adequately secure our ports with cameras and other security measures will cost approximately $4.4 billion, yet this bill provides only $100 million for this initiative. In addition, there are no funds in this bill to improve methods of inspecting people and cargo entering this country through our ports. Nor are their any funds to increase the number of containers inspected. According to nearly every expert in the field of security, these areas have been severely neglected since 9/11.

With the budget deficit projected at more than $400 billion this year, a few billion more for homeland security won't matter very much. I urge my colleagues to carefully consider what a ''yes'' vote will mean for a number of Amendments that will be introduced later