did not have to go to war against Iraq, certainly not when we did. There were other options; to rely on other policy tools, to delay attacking, or both. Iraq was thus fundamentally different from World War II or Korea or even the Persian Gulf War, all of which qualify as wars of necessity.'' Mr. Speaker, the significance of this analysis from a man who occupied so high a post in the Bush administration is great, and because of that, I ask that Mr. Haass's very thoughtful article be printed here.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2003]

WARS OF CHOICE

(By Richard N. Haass)

Any number of lessons can be learned from the handling of the aftermath of the war in Iraq, but none is more basic than this: Democracies, in particular American democracy, do not mix well with empire.

Empire is about control—the center over the periphery. Successful empire demands both an ability and a willingness to exert and maintain control. On occasion this requires an ability and a willingness to go to war, not just on behalf of vital national interests but on behalf of imperial concerns, which is another way of saying on behalf of lesser interests and preferences.

Iraq was such a war. The debate can and will go on as to whether attacking Iraq was a wise decision; but at its core it was a war of choice. We did not have to go to war against Iraq, certainly not when we did. There were other options: to rely on other policy tools, to delay attacking, or both.

Iraq was thus fundamentally different from World War II or Korea or even the Persian Gulf War, all of which qualify as wars of necessity. So, too, does the open-ended war against al Qaeda. What distinguishes wars of necessity is the requirement to respond to the use of military force by an aggressor and the fact that no option other than military force exists to reverse what has been done. In such circumstances, a consensus often materializes throughout the country that there is no alternative to fighting, a consensus that translates into a willingness to devote whatever it takes to prevail, regardless of the financial or human costs to ourselves.

Wars of choice, however, are fundamentally different. They are normally undertaken for reasons that do not involve obvious self-defense of the United States or an ally. Policy options other than military action exist; there is no domestic political consensus as to the correctness of the decision to use force. Vietnam was such a war, as was the war waged by the Clinton administration against Serbia over Kosovo.

Wars of choice vary in their cost and duration. Vietnam was long (lasting a decade and a half from the American perspective) and costly in terms of both blood (more than 58,000 lives) and treasure (hundreds of billions of dollars). By contrast, Kosovo took all of 78 days, claimed no American lives in combat and cost less than $3 billion.

What these experiences suggest is that the American people are prepared to wage wars of choice, so long as they prove to be relatively cheap and short. But the United States is not geared to sustain costly wars of choice.

We are seeing just this with Iraq. The American people are growing increasingly restless, and it is not hard to see why. We have been at war now in Iraq for some eight months. More than 400 Americans have lost their lives. Costs are in the range of $100 billion and mounting.

The Bush administration knows all this; hence the accelerated timetable to hand over increasing political responsibility for Iraq to Iraqis. Such a midcourse correction in U.S. policy reflects in part the political realities of Iraq, where enthusiasm for prolonged American occupation is understandably restrained; even more, though, the policy shift reflects political realities here at home. Domestic tolerance for costs—disrupted and lost lives above all—is not unlimited. As a result, the president is wise to reduce the scale of what we try to accomplish. Making Iraq ''good enough''—a functioning and fairly open society and economy if not quite a textbook model of democracy—is plenty ambitious.

None of this is meant to be an argument against all wars of choice. There may be good and sound reasons for going to war even if we do not have to, strictly speaking. Such reasons can range from protecting a defenseless population against ethnic cleansing or genocide to preventing the emergence of a threat that has the potential to cause damage on a large scale.

But wars of choice require special handling.

First, it is essential to line up domestic support. Congress and the American people need to be on board, not just in some formal legal way but also to the extent of being psychologically prepared for the possible costs. Better to warn of costs that never materialize than to be surprised by those that do.

Second, it is equally essential to line up international support. The United States needs partners: to facilitate the effort of fighting the war, to share the financial and human costs of war and its aftermath, to stand with us diplomatically should the going get tough. We possess the world's most powerful military and economy, but the United States is not immune from the consequences of being stretched too thin or going deeply into debt.

Third, no one should ever underestimate the potential costs of military action; no one should ever assume that a war of choice, or any war, will prove quick or easy. Here as elsewhere the great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz had it right: ''There is no human affair which stands so constantly and so generally in close connection with chance as war.''

PLEDGING CONTINUED UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR GEORGIA'S SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC REFORMS

HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 8, 2003

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze resigned on November 23, 2003. Mr. Shevardnadze's resignation caps a political career during which he has won my admiration, and that of freedom-loving people everywhere, for helping, as Soviet foreign minister under Mikhail Gorbachev, end the Cold War.

However, in spite of this remarkable accomplishment, during his 10 years as president, Georgians widely became disheartened with Mr. Shevardnadze for allowing corruption to infest the country, while most of its people fell into poverty and despair. These conditions fed the uprising against him, but it was triggered by the fraudulent parliamentary elections of November 2, 2003.

Opposition began daily protests that attracted thousands, demanding the elections be annulled or Mr. Shevardnadze's resignation, or both. Throughout nearly 3 weeks of protests, both sides remained mindful of Georgia's interest in peace and safety, and avoided provocations.

Mr. Speaker, his fall ended a political crisis astonishing for its speed and lack of violence in a blood-washed region. There was no blood. No killing.

Consequently, Mr. Speaker, this resolution congratulates both Eduard Shevardnadze and the leaders of the opposition, Nino Burdzhanadze, Mikhail Saakashvili, and Zurab Zhvaniva, for their courage and patriotism in dealing with the crisis bloodlessly.

Moreover, the resolution pledges support and help for the people of Georgia so as to consolidate the democratic process. Furthermore, it urges all political segments, as well as social sectors and institutions in Georgia, to strive, through dialogue, to achieve the national reconciliation for which both the Georgian people and the international community yearn.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly and wholeheartedly support Georgia's new leaders, while I also urge them to pursue stability, abide by their constitution and hold democratic elections.

And, I look forward to working with Interim President Nino Burdzhanadze in her effort to maintain the integrity of Georgia's democracy as she strives to ensure that this change in government follows the constitution.

I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

PAYING TRIBUTE TO EARL VANTASSEL

HON. SCOTT McINNIS

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, December 8, 2003

Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I rise before you with a heavy heart to pay tribute to a remarkable man from my district. Earl VanTassel of Craig, Colorado passed away recently at the age of 85. Earl contributed a great deal to the Craig community, and it is my honor today to rise and pay tribute to his life before this body of Congress and our nation.

Earl was born in Craig in 1918. He attended Craig High School, where he graduated in 1937. In 1943, Earl married Florence Prather, his wife of sixty years. Earl and Florence raised four wonderful children together.

Earl was an excellent and knowledgeable rancher who used his expertise for the betterment of his community. He was a mentor and leader for 4–H participants, and in that capacity, he passed along his knowledge of livestock and ranching to young people throughout the region. Earl was also a dedicated volunteer at the Moffat County Fair, numerous livestock sales, and local rodeos. He delighted in helping with the Craig Sale Barn for many years. In addition, Earl was an active member of the Colorado Cattlemen's Association, the Young Farmers Association and the 4–H Foundation.

Earl's contributions to his community went well beyond ranching. As a member of Colorado's first Conservation Board, Earl worked tirelessly on behalf of the environment. In addition, Earl served over forty years as a member of Craig's Rural Fire Protection District