

not think we should. Roger Noriega, with whom I do not always agree on Latin American issues, thinks it is wrong to link the economic support fund issues as well. So people who have strong credentials, if you will, in opposing the International Criminal Court believe that linking these issues in this region is not serving the interests of the United States well at all.

At an appropriate time, in consultation with the chairman of the committee and others, I would like to pursue this matter to see whether my colleagues might agree that we might delink these issues. With that, again, knowing there are other matters that can be dealt with, I won't belabor the point.

I have some further comments I will make, but I will wait for the appropriate time to do that so that my full statement can be read by those who may be interested in this particular proposal.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, let me respond briefly to the distinguished Senator from New York. The amendment that was offered by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, as I indicated before he was on the floor, we were prepared to accept. We presumed there was not Democratic Party opposition to that; there were not members of the committee on the floor. Senator DODD is a member of the committee, and, therefore, we acted in good faith, as we have to. We are trying very hard to proceed amendment by amendment, depending upon Senators to be on the floor, to be represented by their party officials and by their staffs. So I am hopeful the distinguished Senator from New York and the Senator from Connecticut may be able to agree on a course of action, but from our standpoint, we believe the amendment was offered and accepted legitimately and in due course.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LUGAR. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

The clerk will continue calling the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk continued with the call of the roll.

Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for morning business with Sen-

ators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each. I also ask unanimous consent that I be recognized for 20 minutes as the initial speaker.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.

THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS

Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I appreciate the courtesy of the Members who are in the Chamber and who are dealing with the State Department authorization bill and allowing me to proceed as in morning business as they address the issues surrounding that bill.

I wanted to raise an issue which I believe is of very high significance of how we deal with the threat of biological attacks. This has been an issue I have been involved in for a considerable amount of time, having authored the first bioshield bill as the chairman of the HELP Committee at the time.

Just weeks after September 11, anthrax attacks occurred in Florida, New York, and Washington. They killed five people, and they crippled the mail delivery system in several cities and required a cleanup that cost more than \$1 billion. For all that, the President's Commission which just reported on weapons of mass destruction says we were lucky.

We cannot really know whether we were exclusively lucky or whether this was the result of responsible effort to prepare ourselves for the next attack that we have not been attacked again or in a worse way, but the facts remain that the threat continues. The President's Commission makes obvious the finding that biological weapons are cheaper and easier to acquire than nuclear weapons, and they could be even more deadly.

There is no question that if terrorists are able to get their hands on a weaponized biological agent, whether it is anthrax, small pox, botulism, or ebola, they will use it in a place where Americans gather in their daily lives. Whether it is a subway system as occurred in Japan or a building as occurred in the Capitol, it is these types of attacks—biological, chemical, and dirty bombs—that pose the greatest threat to our Nation.

The President's Commission, which released its report last Thursday, exposed the stark reality that our intelligence community may have underestimated the progress of terrorists and others in developing biological weapons. For example, in Afghanistan, investigators found evidence that after the war, al-Qaida had the capability to produce a virulent biological weapon identified only as "agent X," which documents suggest was anthrax.

Much of the information we have on the development of biological weapons by terrorist groups and rogue nations is classified; however, it is no secret that Soviet scientists were working on engineering biological agents before

the fall of the Soviet Union, including smallpox engineered to be totally lethal, a hybrid plague that is more resistant to vaccine, and a strain of anthrax resistant to seven different antibodies. Unfortunately, we have no assurance that all of these products which they were trying to develop have been destroyed. We are aware of some rogue countries that developed delivery systems such as anthrax-laced cigarettes and botulism-contaminated beer.

While the President's Commission finds the threat deeply troubling today, they foretell that it will be more tomorrow, when genetics modification techniques will allow creation of even worse biological weapons. These findings underscore that the threat posed to our national security from biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons is truly real and significant.

Even before the anthrax attacks here, we as a Congress recognized the need to enhance three critical enterprises or sectors in our country to better protect our people from attacks by biological agents: No. 1 the research enterprise, led by NIH and private researchers; No. 2 the biotechnology development and manufacturing sector, particularly vaccines but also other countermeasures such as drugs and devices; and No. 3 the broader health care delivery system, including physicians, hospitals, and public health departments here and abroad.

The first substantial effort, started before the anthrax attacks and completed in 2002, was the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, which dramatically increased funding for the Strategic National Stockpile so that a national pool of countermeasures, including those to protect against smallpox, could be maintained. It also dramatically improved our border protection authorities, particularly for food imports; protected our water supply; dramatically increased oversight of research labs that handled agents that could potentially be used in an attack; and committed substantial new resources to our state public health systems and hospitals to ensure improved surveillance and surge capacity. Institutionally, it also created a number of new Federal authorities to identify and develop and coordinate our response to a threat.

In 2003 and 2004, following the President's call and leadership, we passed the bipartisan Project BioShield Act to confront weaknesses in our ability to have the research enterprise speed results to us and to have FDA speed products to potential victims. Notably, we pre-funded a \$5.6 billion account to assure the developers of countermeasures that if they delivered a product that protected this country from a biological attack then the Government would in fact have the resources to purchase that product and recognize their work.

Project BioShield recognized that we had very little on hand to address even