The California Highway Patrol was Officer Romero's passion. He began his career with the California Highway Patrol at the Riverside Station near his home, and a year later he transferred to the Sante Fe Springs Station, near his childhood community. Romero served the remainder of his career in Santa Fe Springs, giving back to his community. He loved riding his motorcycle and combined this with his passion for law enforcement to become a very successful motorcycle officer. Officer Romero's colleagues shall always remember his infectious grin, practical jokes, and commitment to his job.

Officer Romero was a devoted family man. He is survived by his wife Sandra and children, Austin, Windsor, David, Victor, and Vanessa. When he was not on duty, Officer Romero enjoyed spending time with his family, riding dirt bikes, and coaching his children's sports teams. Officer David Marin Romero served the State of California honorably and conscientiously, and fulfilled his oath as an officer of the law. Officer Romero gave his life while assisting those in peril or distress. His character, integrity, loyalty, and dedication to law enforcement are greatly appreciated and will never be forgotten.

Officer David Marin Romero sacrificed his life doing what he loved to do—providing protection for the community in which he was raised. We shall always be grateful for Officer Romero's heroic service and the sacrifices he made while protecting the community he loved.●

IN HONOR OF THE MEMORY OF NICK BRONZAN

● Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise to honor the memory of the late Nick Bronzan, a tireless champion for young people and seniors in central California. Mr. Bronzan, a long-time Fresno resident, passed away in the peaceful company of his family and loved ones on December 4, 2005. He was 90 years old.

Nick Bronzan, the son of Yugoslavian immigrants, was a true son of California's Central Valley. He was born in Stockton and spent his formative years in Manteca. A gifted athlete, Nick excelled as a football player at Fresno State College. Admired by his coaches and teammates for his great leadership qualities, Nick served as the captain of the 1939 championship team.

Upon graduation, Nick taught mathematics and coached a number of sports at Kerman High School for 5 years. Nick and his wife Peggy were beloved for all they did in both school and community activities. He would further his passion for helping young people by working for the YMCA in Fresno, Tulare, and Culver City. In 1961, Nick became the general secretary of the Fresno YMCA, and 7 years later, he was appointed as the executive director of the Central Valley YMCA. Throughout his professional career, Nick demonstrated an unyielding commitment to positively impact the lives of young people.

In his retirement, Nick generously lent his leadership and passion for community service to a number of very worthy and empowering causes. As director of the Fresno Foster Grandparents Program, he spearheaded a volunteer program for seniors to work with children lacking parents and families. Nick also began a house-sharing organization to increase and enhance older companionship. A powerful and determined advocate for the senior community, Nick successfully convinced businesses to hire senior watchmen to work late shifts. In 1984, he was appointed by then-California Assembly Speaker Willie L. Brown, Jr., to the California Commission on Aging and Long-Term Care. Whereas some see their golden years as a time to fade into the background in public life, Nick embraced it as an opportunity to continue to lead, to motivate others, and to make good things happen.

Nick Bronzan devoted 70 of his 90 years to community service. Nick selflessly gave his boundless energy, genuine compassion, and precious humanity to uplifting and empowering those who are most often neglected in our society: the young and the old. Nick has left behind a legacy of service and the admiration of those whose lives he touched over the years. He will be dearly missed.

Nick is survived by his wife Peggy; two daughters, Mary Bronzan and Ann McDonald; son, Bruce; five grandchildren and seven great-grandchildren. On December 11, more than 200 members of his family and friends gathered in Fresno to honor a rich life, well lived.●

TRIBUTE TO LINWOOD CARTER

● Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to and recognize the contributions of an individual who has dedicated three decades of his life to serving the U.S. Congress.

Linwood B. Carter II began his career with the Congressional Research Service in 1975 and will be embarking on a well-earned retirement shortly after the New Year. As an information research specialist in U.S. military and international security affairs, Linwood has responded to literally thousands of congressional research requests over the years with a level of professionalism and skill I have seldom encountered. In carrying out our responsibilities as legislators, we in the Senate and our colleagues in the House confront a constant need for accurate and timely information; often it has been through the efforts of Linwood Carter that those responsibilities have been met. His mastery of the Library of Congress's resources and the informational nooks and crannies in the world of international security affairs has been unsurpassed.

Linwood's dedication to serving the needs of Congress is unparalleled. His quiet professional demeanor will be sorely missed by Members, the Congressional Research Service, and by the Library of Congress. I would like to extend our thanks to him for his efforts on our behalf for the last three decades and to wish him the best in the years to come.●

COMMENDING THE INDIANA WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM

● Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to commend the certification of the Indiana Civil Support Team and the support it will provide the people of Indiana in the event of an attack utilizing a weapon of mass destruction. During this holiday season, many prefer not to think of the horrors associated with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, but the 22 members of the 53rd WMD–CST don't have that luxury. It is their job to help protect Hoosiers should a WMD attack occur in Indiana.

On November 28, 2005, the Pentagon announced that the Indiana Civil Support Team was fully ready to assist civil authorities in responding to a domestic weapon of mass destruction incident. Stationed in Indianapolis, the team possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to make a difference in assisting first responders and local officials in the critical moments immediately following a nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological event. The CST is able to deploy rapidly, assist local first responders in determining the nature of the attack, provide medical and technical advice, and pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on State and Federal military response assets.

In March 2004, I was pleased to join with Governor Kernan and Senator BAYH to announce the creation of the WMD–CST in Indiana. The team is made up of highly skilled, full-time members of the Indiana National Guard and Reserve who have completed 20 months of intense training. The team is equipped with sophisticated detection, analytical, monitoring, communications and protective equipment and is under the command and control of Governor Mitch Daniels. This signifies another important step to ensuring that our country, the State of Indiana, and our local communities are prepared should we face terrorists armed with a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon.

Last week's announcement occurred with little fanfare and negligible public interest. This is unfortunate because the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the No. 1 national security threat facing our country.

Chemical weapons were introduced on the battlefields of World War I. Nuclear weapons ended World War II. Biological weapons were components of Cold War arsenals. The 20th century

witnessed the brutal use of these powerful weapons by superpowers and nation-states. Technological advancements and the proliferation of weapons, materials and know-how have made weapons of mass destruction accessible to a growing number of national and non-state entities.

Despite the threat of nuclear annihilation throughout the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was unfathomable that a religious sect could acquire the means to attack a major metropolitan subway system with biological weapons. Yet the Aum Shinrikyo dispersed anthrax in a Tokyo train station in March 1995. Who would have expected rebels from a remote region of the Caucasus to threaten the detonation of a radiological weapon in a Moscow park? Chechens did that in November 1995. Even more difficult to believe would have been the notion that the leader of a deadly terrorist organization would announce that it was the organization's mission to acquire a weapon of mass destruction and use it against the United States. Osama bin Laden did that in December 1998.

The use of a weapon of mass destruction in the United States could cripple our economy, lead to the fall of our Government, and threaten large segments of our population with disease and death. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had the resources and incentives to carefully guard and maintain these weapons and the scientific knowledge that produced them. But the political collapse of the Moscow government was accompanied by a broader economic collapse throughout the vast nation. Not only did Russia and the other successor states have few resources for maintaining the Soviet-era arsenal, they could not even afford to adequately pay members of the military and scientific community who had responsibility for safeguarding the weapons and related technology. The United States faced the grim possibility that weapons previously held in impenetrable Soviet facilities and technology previously restricted to the minds and computers of elite Soviet scientists could be stolen or sold to the highest bidder.

As a country, we must acknowledge that the weapons that haunted the Cold War are now available to irrational and undeterrable foes. While the threat of nuclear attack from the Soviet Union was awesome, it was certain, in that we knew who and where our enemy was and had the ability to hold them at equal peril. The post–Cold War security environment is anything but certain. Battles are no longer determined by armored divisions taking and holding large swaths of territory, nor is strategic competition marked by the building of the biggest bomb or the longest range missiles. A small group of fanatics with the right contacts and resources can obtain and utilize a weapon of mass destruction that could destroy or make unlivable large portions of Washington, DC, New York, or Chicago. Similarly, toxins introduced into our food supply and distribution systems could spread disease and panic.

There is no silver bullet to these threats. U.S. security will be secured by small numbers of American Government officials and contractors working with former enemies to eliminate the weapons that could threaten the future of our country. It will also depend on American allies working closely and effectively in detecting and interdicting these weapons and local police officers, medical personnel, and guardsmen preparing to respond to a WMD event.

Since the end of the Cold War, I have worked with colleagues here in Congress and the executive branch to defend the American people from these threats. I have often described the best strategy to deal with the WMD threat as ''defense in depth,'' layers of defensive efforts designed to stop a nuclear, chemical and biological weapon from reaching our shores.

The first line of defense is prevention and entails activities at the source to stop weapons, materials and know-how from leaving their current locations. The second is detection and interdiction and involves efforts to stem the flow of illicit trade in these weapons and materials at foreign and domestic borders. The third line of defense is crisis and consequence management and requires domestic preparedness should such threats turn into hostile acts. Individually, each of these lines of defense is insufficient; together, they help to form the policy fabric of an integrated defense-in-depth.

In 1991, I joined with Senator Sam Nunn and co-authored the Nunn-Lugar, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The program's goal is to address the threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons at their source. Over the program's first decade and a half it has focused on the threats emanating from the former Soviet Union. When the USSR crumbled, it had the largest nuclear, chemical, and biological arsenals in the world. The next day, four new independent countries emerged from the ashes with nuclear weapons. The totalitarian command and control system that secured the chemical and biological weapons arsenals and infrastructure disappeared. Divisions of ballistic missiles, wings of long-range bombers, and fleets of strategic missile submarines were left with a bankrupt, dysfunctional master and numerous individuals and organizations seeking to steal them.

The Nunn-Lugar Program has made excellent progress in eliminating these threats. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan emerged as the third, fourth and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world. Today all three are nuclear weapons free. More than 6,760 nuclear warheads, each capable of destroying an American city, have been deactivated. Nearly 2,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles fired from land-based silos, missile submarines, and bombers have been eliminated. Two-thirds of the Soviet Union's strategic bomber force and over half of its strategic submarine force have been destroyed.

The Soviet Union also left behind enormous quantities of chemical and biological weapons materials. Russia declared a chemical weapons stockpile of 40,000 metric tons stored under questionable. A public accounting of the Soviet biological weapons programs has never been made, but it is believed to be the largest and most advanced in the world. Tens of thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians had assisted in the development of the Soviet Union's weapons of mass destruction. With the economies of Russia and other republics in bad shape, many of these experts faced unemployment, and concerns existed that they might have an incentive to sell their skills to other countries and terrorist organizations. In each of these cases, Nunn-Lugar has responded with innovative dismantlement strategy for the chemical weapons stocks, elimination of biological weapons production capacity and security upgrades for pathogen collections, and partnering with the private sector to find long-term, peaceful employment for former weapons experts.

Nunn-Lugar has also taken on formerly top-secret missions to remove dangerous weapons and materials before they could fall into the wrong hands. In November 1994, the United States launched Project Sapphire to remove 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan and ship it to Oak Ridge, TN. More recently, Operation Auburn Endeavor was carried out in Georgia to remove HEU and transport it to Scotland. In Moldova, the United States removed fourteen MIG–29s capable of launching nuclear weapons because of efforts by a number of rogue states to acquire them.

Despite the progress we made in the former Soviet Union, the skills and capabilities of the Nunn-Lugar Program were confined to that geographical region. In 2004, Congress changed that by approving the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act which authorized the use of up to $50 million in Nunn-Lugar funds for activities outside the former Soviet Union. This authority will be used for the first time in Albania to destroy nearly 16 tons of chemical weapons and consideration is being given for the program to work in Libya and countries in Southeast Asia.

Earlier this year, I joined with Senator BARACK OBAMA to introduce legislation focused on improving the capabilities of other nations to detect and interdict weapons and materials of mass destruction and bolstering, expanding, and improving the second line of defense. The United States military and intelligence services cannot be everywhere. We need the cooperation and vigilance of like-minded nations if we are to successfully detect and interdict WMD threats before they can be used against their targets. The United

States has constructed the Proliferation Security Initiative, which enlisted the participation of other nations in the interdiction of WMD, but it lacks a coordinated effort to improve the capabilities of our foreign partners so that they can play a larger and more effective role.

The Lugar-Obama bill earmarks 25 percent of the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account to address the shortcomings in the State Department's response. If currently law, this would have amounted to $110 million this year. Our bill goes one step further by calling on the State Department to also commit 25 percent of annual foreign military financing amounts to nations for the purchase of equipment to improve their ability to detect and interdict WMD. This would represent a potent but flexible tool that could help build a network of WMD detection and interdiction capabilities world wide and contribute to U.S. national security.

Senator OBAMA and I recently wrote in the Washington Post that the United States cannot stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction alone. We need the vigilance of like-minded nations, but many of our potential partners lack the capability to detect hidden weapons and interdict shipments. We believe our legislation will address this gap.

If weapons or materials of mass destruction elude U.S. programmatic efforts at the source, at international borders, and our own borders, the next line of defense must take the form of help to local ''first responders''—the firemen, police, emergency management teams, and medical personnel who will be on the front lines.

In 1996, I joined my colleagues Sam Nunn and PETE DOMENICI in offering the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici ''Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction'' legislation. For the first time, it directed the professionals from the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Health and Human Services, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Environmental Protection Agency to join into a partnership with local emergency professionals in cities across the country, including Indianapolis and Fort Wayne.

The Pentagon developed plans to supply training and equipment to 120 cities across the country. In February 1998, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program visited Indianapolis and Marion County. Six hundred fifty first responders received training to respond to nuclear, chemical and biological incidents. In the years that followed, thousands of additional professionals received instruction through the program's train-the-trainer program. In 2000, Fort Wayne and Allen County received similar training under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Program.

The training proved its worth when Indianapolis was confronted with the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Planned Parenthood clinics in Indianapolis and New Albany and at St. Matthews Catholic Church and elsewhere received anthrax threats. We were relieved that the threats were determined to be false but proud to see the professional manner in which the city's first responders reacted to the threat and treated the potential victims.

Over the last 15 years, I have worked closely with both Bush administrations and President Clinton to safeguard the American people from the threats associated with weapons of mass destruction. We still have much work to do, but the certification of the Indiana WMD–CST makes the people of Indiana safer. I am thankful that in the event of a WMD incident, the people of Indiana will not be alone. Local first responders and the WMD–CST will be there to provide assistance and expertise.●

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Ms. Evans, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations and withdrawals which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

MEASURES PLACED ON THE CALENDAR

The following bills were read the second time, and placed on the calendar:

H.R. 4096. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend to 2006 the alternative minimum tax relief available in 2005 and to index such relief for inflation.

H.R. 4388. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend certain expiring provisions, and for other purposes.

H.R. 4440. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide tax benefits for the Gulf Opportunity Zone and certain areas affected by Hurricanes Rita and Wilma, and for other purposes.

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, and were referred as indicated:

EC–4769. A communication from the Special Assistant to the President and Director, Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President, transmitting, pursuant to law, the personnel report for personnel employed in the White House Office the Executive Residence at the White House, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of Policy Development (Domestic Policy Staff), and the Office of Administration; to the Committee on the Budget.

EC–4770. A communication from the Acting Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Department of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled ''Extraordinary Contractual Actions'' (DFARS Case 2003–D048) received on November 28, 2005; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–4771. A communication from the Acting Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Department of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled ''Subcontracting Policies and Procedures'' (DFARS Case 2003–D025) received on November 28, 2005; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–4772. A communication from the Acting Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Department of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled ''Update of Clauses for Telecommunications Services'' (DFARS Case 2003–D053) received on November 28, 2005; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–4773. A communication from the Acting Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Department of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled ''Acquisition of Telecommunications Services'' (DFARS Case 2003–D055) received on November 28, 2005; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–4774. A communication from the Acting Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Department of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled ''Contract Administration'' (DFARS Case 2003–D023) received on November 28, 2005; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–4775. A communication from the Acting Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Department of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled ''Information Technology Equipment—Screening of Government Inventory'' (DFARS Case 2003–D054) received on November 28, 2005; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–4776. A communication from the Acting Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Department of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled ''Contract Modifications'' (DFARS Case 2003–D024) received on November 28, 2005; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–4777. A communication from the White House Liaison, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a nomination for the position of General Counsel, received on November 28, 2005; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC–4778. A communication from the White House Liaison, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of the designation of an acting officer for the position of Assistant Secretary, received on November 28, 2005; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC–4779. A communication from the White House Liaison, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a vacancy in the position of Assistant Secretary, received on November 28, 2005; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC–4780. A communication from the Deputy Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled ''Benefits Payable in Terminated Single-Employer Plans; Allocation of Assets in Single-Employer Plans; Interest Assumptions for Valuing and Paying Benefits'' (29 CFR Parts 4022 and 4044) received on November 28, 2005;