

system for checking and identifying workers. It is important that Congress and the administration understand the importance of funding the Transportation Worker's Identification Card in order to bring national uniformity to port worker identification. At this time, there are no required minimum standard security measures that the marine terminal operators must adhere to. Voluntary security is not security.

It is important to note that marine terminal operators must also act as an interface with the vessel and the federal agencies. For example, if Customs and Border Patrol wants to inspect a certain container they work through the terminal operator to make that container available. As a terminal operator, the management team and personnel are an intricate part of the overall security apparatus at the terminal. It is these personnel that will have an intimate role in the movement and scheduling of cargo.

To make a statement that the terminals do not play a role in the security checks and balances at the terminal is off-base. Therefore any change of management at a terminal facility brings with it the need to ensure that those directing and controlling the flow of cargo do not pose any risk to national security.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, here is the letter. They hired two security guards—that would be the Dubai people—and purchased the technology that will protect the terminal properties. They have control over who can enter and exit a facility. They have their own systems for checking and identifying workers.

Let me tell you that the terminal operators, according to the people who know best, are very much into the loop of security. As a matter of fact, they are deemed one of the main players. That is what they are called—main players in port security consisting of Customs, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, Immigration, Customs enforcement, and the terminal operators.

If anyone says to you it doesn't matter who loses the terminal, you just relate to them that we know better. When Senator STEVENS had the CCO of Dubai Ports World before our committee, I said to him: What do you think about the fact that this Dr. Kahn got all of these smuggled nuclear components through Port of Dubai?

Do you know what he said? This is the chief corporate officer of Dubai Ports World. He said, "We don't know anything about it. We never look at containers."

Can you imagine? So here it is. We have a chance to stop this Dubai Ports deal in its tracks. To do so is in the best interests of the people of this country. To do so would be reflective of what the House of Representatives did yesterday in their Appropriations Committee. To do so is our highest responsibility to the people of this country. To do so is common sense. To do so is to stand for the security of this country.

This deal is greased. The underlying bill that Senator SCHUMER attached this to, you and I, Mr. President, could live by the rules of this bill. And I intend to do it whether it is passed today, tomorrow, or next week. But we

have to stop this deal from going forward. Listen, that deal was greased. That deal was greased. The President is all for it. He said: I didn't know anything about it. But 50 seconds later he was all for it.

This is our only chance today, unless there is an agreement to have a stand-alone bill. I hope colleagues will fight for the right to vote for this important amendment. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.

EXTENSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that the period of morning business be extended until 2 p.m. with the time equally divided in the usual form, and the time between 1:30 and 2 p.m. be reserved for the proponents and opponents.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PORT SECURITY

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I want to speak a little bit about Iran and about the outrageous comments by the Iranians threatening the United States of America and continuing their perilous path to try to obtain nuclear weapons. But before I do that, I have to respond as I listened to the discussion about port security.

I am chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation. For 2 years we have been looking at the issue of port security. We have looked at the possibility of someone bringing a nuclear bomb into this country, or weapons in one of the over 11 million cargo containers that come in from the seas.

We have before us a situation and the prospect of UAE Dubai Ports World taking over a number of American ports on the east coast. It has raised a lot of concern, as it should. But some of the rhetoric is a little aboveboard.

When I say that, we need to do everything in our power to make sure that we are safe and secure. Ports are points of entry, and there are areas of vulnerability. This deal has raised very legitimate concerns.

First and foremost was the process. The process, while we look at foreign investment in the United States, as I would describe it, a pre-9/11 process and a post-9/11 world, about 1,500 of these have been done on a 30-day expedited basis.

When folks at the sub-Cabinet level looked at this—folks in Treasury, Homeland Security, other agencies of the administration looked at this—they saw that we were talking about taking control of ports, and, yes, by the UAE. It raises security issues. Under the law that calls for a 45-day review. It didn't happen. That was a mistake. That was the wrong thing. It was a violation of the law. It was a bad process and the process needs to be changed. But we have to tone down the rhetoric a little bit.

It is interesting. I have been, again, a major critic of the process. I signed a bipartisan letter with my colleague from New York, Senator SCHUMER, with Senator CLINTON from New York, and with both Senators from New Jersey. We signed a bipartisan letter that said we demand that this go back to the 45-day process; we demand that we take a close and serious look at it and we make sure we have looked at all the security concerns. Then, at the end of that 45-day process, we demanded that Congress have the right to review the conclusion. If the conclusion from our perspective did not appear to be in the best interests of our national security, we would then note our disapproval and the deal wouldn't go through. We had a bipartisan agreement to do that.

Today, clearly the American public is deeply concerned, as they should be. But instead of going through the process—by the way, we pride ourselves as being the greatest deliberative body in the world—instead of allowing the process to go through with Congress then being briefed, having the hearings—we have had to some degree, and we need more. We heard from the folks who made the decision in front of the Homeland Security Committee. They explained what happened. Then we went into private session. We went into the secure room in this building and had classified material. We had a review. We listened. We understand the review is ongoing. Nothing is going to change. There is no change in the status quo. Dubai is not going to be taking over any American port until the CFIUS process is done, not until the President has exercised his authority under law and until we in Congress have a review.

My colleagues are talking about this is our only chance to stop this deal, and we have to act now. This is policy-making by poll taking. Clearly, the American public has been concerned, as they should be.

We have put in place a process by which there is a 45-day time to review. We have called for and demanded congressional oversight of that and the opportunity to be heard, and we will get that. We need to be assured that we are going to get that.

But to somehow communicate to the American public that this is our only chance and terrible things are going to happen if we do not stand up and stop this today is really more about pandering to the fears of the moment than doing what we are supposed to do in this bill; that is, be deliberative and thoughtful.

I have some deep concerns about the history regarding UAE—deep concerns about the trafficking of nuclear materials by Dr. Kahn from Pakistan. I have concerns about the UAE when they recognized the Taliban, as they did, by the way, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

One of our strongest allies today in the war on terror is Pakistan. Are my colleagues presuming that somehow we

should be cutting off relations with Pakistan? I don't think so. They say there were concerns about what they did, but now they work with us.

I believe we have about 500 to 700 naval ships that are docked in the UAE on a regular basis. Our ability to fight the war on terror is dependent in part on the partnership we have with the UAE. They support us in the war in Afghanistan. We have a changed situation in the post-9/11 world. We have an ally whose policy I don't like when it comes to boycotting Israel. That is something that deeply troubles me, and it should be a factor that we look into. But the bottom line is you can't pick out all the negatives and not recognize in this post-9/11 world that we have a country that has been an ally, that does billions in trade with us. We put the safety of our sailors in their hands at their ports.

I think we have to look at the whole picture and allow the review to go forward with an understanding that nothing is going to happen within 45-days—no change of ownership and no increase in security problems.

Let me briefly try to address the overall issue of port security and container security. Some of us have been working on that before the issue became the issue de jour, the issue of the day. I have been to Hong Kong and looked at the operation. I have been at the Port of L.A. I have looked at the radiation portals, the radiation portal monitors that we have in various places throughout this country.

The reality is that today there are 11 million cargo containers coming into this country, and we actually closely look at perhaps 1 in 20—5 percent. That is what we look at. We have a system. It is not a random system. It is a targeted system. These are things that are based on the manufacturer, where the cargo came from, and a range of things—who the shipper is and who the receiving company is. We are looking at 1 in 20. We need to do better.

One of the things we should be doing—and I had a chance to review this when I was in Hong Kong. They have part of their operation in which they have put in place American technology. They are actually able to literally, almost like a moving CAT scan—as the trucks come from mainland China with the goods being sent to the United States, they don't stop. They just keep coming in. They go through two portals. You get a screening. You can see what is inside the vehicle. At the same time, right at the very end, there is a radiation portal monitor which gives us an indication of whether there is any nuclear material in that cargo.

At the same time, the operators—the folks who are watching this—have a manifest of what is in it. If the manifest says X-thousand DVDs and all of a sudden you see a big, solid kind of cylindrical object, you have a problem. You stop it and do further inspection. You take a look at it. They have an op-

portunity to screen 100 percent of that. That should be the standard we set.

I am introducing this morning a bill that will require the Department of Homeland Security to put in place a system to screen each and every one of the cargo containers that come into this country. That is the kind of security we need. In addition to that—and I believe the UAE deal represents a concern, even though security is being done, certainly, at home by the Coast Guard and Homeland Security, even though the reality is that cargo security starts at overseas ports, it is not when it comes into our waters—we have, I believe, 41 agreements called the "Container Security Initiative." We have the Department of Homeland Security sitting side by side in foreign countries with personnel who run their ports looking at every manifest that comes in, making some judgments about what is inspected and not inspected. At the same time, we have an agreement with private security, CT-PAT, Partnership Against Terrorism. We work, then, on the private side to have measures in place that will increase the measure of safety and security that we have regarding these containers coming in.

The bottom line is, I am concerned if we have a foreign entity that is owning or operating an American port, that they would have access, then, to our security procedures. That raises concerns.

The other reality is that 80 percent of the terminals in the United States are foreign owned—either foreign companies, or in some cases—by the way, I say to my colleague from California, there are four port operations on the west coast that are foreign owned by foreign countries—three by Singapore and one by China.

Do we feel any safer that China owns a major American port operation? The reality is there hasn't been a problem, by the way, until this deal. Now we hear there is a crisis. Now we have to hear we have to act today.

What is happening today is it is about politics. That is what is happening today. We had an understanding that we should have a 45-day review, that we should have access to then participate in that and look at the information as it comes in. And we should have a clear opportunity to make a judgment about that 45-day review.

We have something else today. But the bottom line, again, is that part of the bill that I will introduce today will require a separation of ownership, and we can't unravel 80 percent of the terminals that are foreign owned, foreign operations. Each of these operations should have an American company, folks who are operating these ports who understand the security procedures. They should be vetted. They should be cleared. We should know who they are.

If we can separate operations from ownership, if we can make sure we have in place a system whereby each

and every piece of cargo in a container that is coming into this country—the 11 million that come in by ship, and then if we can reform the CFIUS process so it is more transparent, so Congress has a chance to review these things before they happen, we will be much better served. That is the way this deliberative body should act rather than playing with the politics, to demand that we have to do something today when, in fact, we have a process, a review process. We should let it go forward and not allow anything to change until our will has been heard, then do the things that we have to do to check out each and every piece of material coming into this country, require Homeland Security do that, and, as I said before, separate the operation of ports, where we have folks we can vet, who we can check out, those who own it.

By the way, we have, I believe, about \$100 billion of foreign investment in this country. That is a good thing. It is called jobs for Americans, economic security, national security. Let us strengthen our national security when it comes to cargo container security, but let us not act on politics at the moment.

IRAN

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I want to move on to what I intended to talk about today, and that is Iran.

I will not speak that long.

I think it is important to respond to the outrageous comments made by the Government of Iran this week and this latest stunt by the despotic Iranian regime that said: The United States may have the power to cause harm and pain, but it is also susceptible to harm and pain. If the United States wishes to choose that path, let the ball roll.

First, there is a method to this madness. There is a method to this, with what this regime needs and is seeking to do. It needs crisis. It needs to raise the level of tension to justify its own increased militarization in the harsh security measures at home. That is what it is intending to do.

On the other hand, we have to take them at their threat, at their word. If they are threatening the United States, take them at their word. Hitler told us in "Mien Kampf" what he was going to do. We did not listen, and there was a terrible price to be paid.

The Iranian mullahs and the President are telling us they intend to destroy Israel. They are very clear that they are on a path to obtain nuclear weapons. We know it. Let's take them at their word. Let's say: Yes, this is what you want to do, we know it, and we will not let you do it.

When the President of Iran issued the first threat about the destruction of Israel, behind him was a huge banner, with good graphics. It was a big hourglass. The hourglass ball is dropping. That glass ball, which is very fragile, is Israel, about to be destroyed. But if