

the Chair. She is our newest Member and an excellent Member, and we appreciate her leadership.

DISPENSING WITH CALENDAR
WEDNESDAY BUSINESS ON
WEDNESDAY NEXT

Mr. HOYER. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in order under the calendar Wednesday rule be dispensed with on Wednesday next.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Maryland?

There was no objection.

NOTICE OF INTENTION TO OFFER
RESOLUTION RAISING A QUES-
TION OF THE PRIVILEGES OF
THE HOUSE

Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, pursuant to clause 2, rule IX, I hereby give notice of my intention to raise a question of the privileges of the House. The form of the resolution is as follows:

AN ARTICLE OF IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT
GEORGE W. BUSH

Resolved, that President George W. Bush be impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the following Article of Impeachment be exhibited to the United States Senate:

An Article of Impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives of the United States of America in the name of itself and the people of the United States of America, in maintenance and support of its impeachment against President George W. Bush for high crimes and misdemeanors.

ARTICLE ONE—DECEIVING CONGRESS WITH FAB-
RICATED THREATS OF IRAQ WMDs TO FRAUDU-
LENTLY OBTAIN SUPPORT FOR AN AUTHORIZA-
TION OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST
IRAQ

In his conduct while President of the United States, George W. Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath to faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty under article II, section 3 of the Constitution "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," deceived Congress with fabricated threats of Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction to fraudulently obtain support for an authorization for the use of force against Iraq and used that fraudulently obtained authorization, then acting in his capacity under article II, section 2 of the Constitution as Commander in Chief, to commit U.S. troops to combat in Iraq.

To gain congressional support for the passage of the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, the President made the following material representations to the Congress in S.J. Res. 45:

1. That Iraq was "continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability. . . ."

2. That Iraq was "actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability. . . ."

3. That Iraq was "continuing to threaten the national security interests of the United States and international peace and security."

4. That Iraq has demonstrated a "willingness to attack, the United States. . . ."

5. That "members of al Qaeda, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the

United States, its citizens and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq. . . ."

6. The "attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat that Iraq will transfer weapons of mass destruction to international terrorist organizations. . . ."

7. That Iraq "will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so. . . ."

8. That an "extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack. . . ."

9. That the aforementioned threats "justify action by the United States to defend itself. . . ."

10. The enactment clause of section 2 of S.J. Res. 45, the Authorization of the Use of the United States Armed Forces authorizes the President to "defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq. . . ."

Each consequential representation made by the President to the Congress in S.J. Res. 45 in subsequent iterations and the final version was unsupported by evidence which was in the control of the White House.

To wit:

1. Iraq was not "continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability. . . ."

"A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare agents, precursors, munitions and production equipment were destroyed between 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm and United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) actions. There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or will establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities."

The source of this information is the Defense Intelligence Agency, a report called, "Iraq—Key WMD Facilities—An Operational Support Study," September 2002.

"Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq's chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community's uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing."

The source of this information is the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a report entitled "Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq By U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated By Intelligence Information." June 5, 2008.

"In April and early May 2003, military forces found mobile trailers in Iraq. Although intelligence experts disputed the purpose of the trailers, administration officials repeatedly asserted that they were mobile biological weapons laboratories. In total, President Bush, Vice President CHENEY, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice made 34 misleading statements about the trailers in 27 separate public appearances. Shortly after the mobile trailers were found, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency issued an unclassified white paper evaluating the trailers. The white paper was released without coordination with other members of the intelligence community, however. It was later disclosed that engineers from the Defense Intelligence Agency who examined the trailers concluded that they were most likely used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons. A former senior intelligence official reported that 'only one of 15 intelligence analysts assembled from three agencies to discuss the issue in June endorsed the white paper conclusion.'"

The source of this information is the House Committee on Government Reform, minority staff, "Iraq on the Record: Bush Administration's Public Statements about Chemical and Biological Weapons." March 16, 2004.

Former chief of CIA covert operations in Europe, Tyler Drumheller, has said that the CIA had credible sources discounting weapons of mass destruction claims, including the primary source of biological weapons claims, an informant who the Germans code-named "Curveball" whom the Germans had informed the Bush administration was a likely fabricator of information including that concerning the Niger yellowcake forgery. Two other former CIA officers confirmed Drumheller's account to Sidney Blumenthal who reported the story at Salon.com on September 6, 2007, which in fact is the media source of this information.

"In practical terms, with the destruction of the al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain advanced biological weapons quickly. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new biological weapons program or was conducting biological weapons-specific work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, despite evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of discussion or even interest in biological weapons at the Presidential level. In spite of exhaustive investigation, the Iraq Survey Group found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing, biological weapon agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons. The Iraq Survey Group harbors severe doubts about the source's credibility in regards to the breakout program." That's a direct quote from the "Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's WMD," commonly known as the Duelfer report by Charles Duelfer.

"While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, the Iraq Survey Group judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy the Iraq Survey Group attributes to Baghdad's desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered."

The source of this information, the "Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's WMD," Charles Duelfer.

2. Iraq was not "actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability."

The key finding of the Iraq Survey Group's report to the Director of Central Intelligence found that "Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date. Saddam Husayn (sic) ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf War. Iraq Survey Group found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the program."

The source of this information, the "Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's WMD," Charles Duelfer.

Claims that Iraq was purchasing uranium from Niger were not supported by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002.

The CIA had warned the British Government not to claim Iraq was purchasing uranium from Niger prior to the British statement that was later cited by President Bush, this according to George Tenet of the Central Intelligence Agency on July 11, 2003.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,