

the National Academy of Engineering to examine the policies and procedures for ensuring the oil and gas from federal lands is appropriately measured for the purposes of paying royalties.

The bill has two components. The first calls on the National Academy of Engineering to study specific ways to improve the accuracy of the collection of royalties on oil and natural gas from Federal and Tribal lands. The study is needed because current methods used in the United States for collecting, measuring, valuing, and storing oil and natural gas may not lead to royalty payments that are as accurate as they could be.

Lawsuits have been filed alleging that energy companies are underpaying billions of dollars in royalties because of these inaccuracies—or possibly because of outright manipulation—in the process for determining royalty payments.

Many of these lawsuits have been settled, and we're talking about a lot of money here:

In 2000 and 2001, major oil companies settled with the Justice Department for over half a billion dollars in two False Claims Act lawsuits over oil and royalty underpayments.

In 2004, Chevron paid out \$111 million to the State of Louisiana for underpayments.

In 2005, BP owned up to the tune of \$233 in a Colorado case.

And, in a case still pending, Exxon Mobil may owe up to \$3.6 billion or much more to the State of Alabama for underpayments in royalties there.

Certainly, for this kind of money, we can afford to ask the experts who understand the technical issues here to study the major underlying problems.

The second part of the bill is a review of royalty payments. It provides for a comparison of royalty payments made under federal oil and gas lease provisions to data supplied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. This is to determine whether such payments were adequate under the terms of the oil and gas leases. With completion of these studies, the Congress, Minerals Management Service, and the Bureau of Land Management will have a better understanding of changes that should be undertaken to make the process more accurate and transparent, and American taxpayers will have a better chance of getting all the oil and gas royalties that they are owed.

HONORING THE MODEL HIGH  
SCHOOL LADY DEVILS

**HON. PHIL GINGREY**

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, March 12, 2009*

Mr. GINGREY. Madam Speaker, I rise today to recognize a talented group of girls from Floyd County in Georgia's 11th Congressional District. As we move towards March Madness in college basketball, the Georgia High School Association's state basketball playoffs are already underway. The Model High School Girl's Basketball Team—or Lady Devils—have soared to a perfect 30–0 record and are poised for a trip to the Georgia High School Association's Final Four tonight.

The Lady Devils' road to the Final Four has led them through a Region 7AA Championship

and three rounds of State playoffs to send them to the semi-finals for the first time in over a decade.

Although many around Floyd County are riding high on the team's success, the girls of the No. 2–ranked and unbeaten Lady Devils are focused on getting back to work as they prepare for tonight's Final Four match-up against Henry County at the Macon Centreplex.

The Lady Devils are led by Coach Sally Echols, who actually played in Model High School's last trip to the Final Four in 1997. Echols has proved just as valuable as a head coach as she was on the court—leading the Lady Devils to four straight Region Championships. I ask that my colleagues join me in congratulating Coach Echols and the Model High School Lady Blue Devils for their success on the court as well as the hard work and determination that got them there. I wish them luck in the Final Four.

ON EL SALVADOR

**HON. GUS M. BILIRAKIS**

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, March 12, 2009*

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Madam Speaker, I rise today to express my grave concern about the upcoming elections in El Salvador this week.

Under its current and recent governments, El Salvador has served as a Forward Operating Location in the war on drugs and cooperates closely with the United States. However that may change if the opposition party, the FMLN, comes to power in Sunday's election.

The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) is a pro-terrorist party with direct ties to sponsors of terror like Cuba, Iran, and FARC, the narcoguerrilla terrorist organization in Colombia. Based on its relationships, the FMLN clearly is not a reliable partner in the fight on drug trafficking and money laundering.

If the FMLN were to enter government in El Salvador, the Department of the Treasury would be forced to use its legal authority to monitor, control, delay, or terminate the movement of nearly \$4 billion in remittances and other money transfers to El Salvador.

The United States must be prepared to apply, on an urgent basis, the full array of legal instruments available should circumstances after the Salvadoran election require the urgent termination of the flow of remittances to that country.

The government of El Salvador has shown itself to be a reliable and trustworthy counterpart regarding U.S. national security. For the sake of the Salvadorans and the United States, I pray that the FMLN is defeated, so that the United States can maintain its special relationship with the government of El Salvador.

On Election Day, El Salvador will be choosing between remaining a close U.S. ally, or realigning itself with countries hostile to the U.S. Let's hope they choose freedom, security, and good neighborliness with the U.S.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT ON  
H.R. 1463

**HON. JANE HARMAN**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, March 12, 2009*

Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, one of the most important challenges confronting the intelligence community is learning the nature of and damage done by the worldwide network in nuclear centrifuge technology, bomb components and training run for almost two decades by A. Q. Khan—the revered “father” of his country's nuclear program. Considered a pariah abroad but a hero at home, that task got a lot tougher when Pakistan's High Court ordered Khan released from house arrest last month.

At the recent Wehrkunde Security Conference in Munich, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi astonished delegates, telling us that his government had not decided whether to challenge the court decision but that Pakistan would continue to monitor Khan.

For those who stay awake at night worrying about Iran's increasing mastery of centrifuge technology and the ability of terror groups to access nuclear components, Pakistan's action is distressing.

When Khan “confessed” in 2004 to his illegal nuclear dealings, he was promptly placed under “house arrest” and pardoned by then President Pervez Musharraf. The U.S. government was denied access to him, and was never able to question him about what he did and what else he knew.

Today, we introduce legislation to condition future military aid to Pakistan on two things: that the Pakistani Government make A.Q. Khan available for questioning and that it monitor Khan's activities.

This much we do know. As a university student in Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Khan earned degrees in metallurgical engineering from institutions in Holland and Belgium. In 1972, he began working for the Dutch partner of a uranium enrichment consortium and almost immediately raised eyebrows for repeated visits to a facility he was not cleared to see and for inquiries made about technical data unrelated to his own assignments.

Dutch intelligence quietly began to monitor him. In 1974, following India's first nuclear test, Khan offered his expertise to Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Later that year, Khan's company assigned him to work on Dutch translations of advanced, German-designed centrifuges—data to which he had unsupervised access for 16 days.

By 1975, the damage appears to have been done. Pakistan began to purchase components for its domestic uranium enrichment program from European suppliers, and Khan was transferred away from enrichment work due to concern about his activities.

In December, he abruptly returned to Pakistan with blueprints for centrifuges and other components and detailed lists of suppliers.

Convicted in absentia by the Dutch government for nuclear espionage, beginning in the mid-1980s, Khan is widely believed to have provided nuclear weapons technology to Iran, North Korea, Libya and possibly Syria and Iraq. His network involved front companies