

the majority controlling the first half and the minority controlling the second half.

The Senator from Pennsylvania.

U.S. POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to comment about U.S. policy in Afghanistan. During the course of the August recess, and of course with my customary practice, I traveled to Pennsylvania's 67 counties to take the pulse of my constituents. While there are many problems, there was considerable concern about what our policy is going to be in Afghanistan. I note at this time, according to yesterday's New York Times, there have been 821 American servicemembers killed in Afghanistan, some \$189 billion has been appropriated for Afghanistan, and by the end of this year there will be 68,000 American military personnel and an additional 38,000 NATO troops from other countries in Afghanistan.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that an extensive floor statement be included in the text of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at the conclusion of my statement.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I intend now to summarize the substance of my concerns.

The approach on our policy has been outlined in testimony earlier this week by ADM Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in these two statements: Our policy

. . . [is] to deny sanctuary to al-Qaida and the Taliban now and to generate a stable and secure Afghanistan capable of denying al-Qaida return after withdrawal of our combat forces and while we sustain partnership and commitment to political and economic development in that nation.

Admiral Mullen told the committee:

A properly resourced counterinsurgency probably means more forces, without question more time and more commitment to the protection of the Afghan people and to the development of good governance.

While I think it is laudable to want to protect the Afghan people and to provide good governance there, it is my view that is not of sufficient national interest for the United States to put our troops at risk or to expend substantial additional sums there. The principal question, as I see it, is whether Afghanistan is indispensable to be secured to prevent al-Qaida from launching another attack against the United States. If that is the purpose, that is the necessity, then we must undertake anything, whatever it costs, to stop al-Qaida from again attacking the United States.

But I believe there is a series of questions which have to be answered before we can assess whether that is an indispensable part of U.S. policy. Toward that end, I have written to the Sec-

retary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on a series of questions which I think requires answers before we can make an informed judgment as to whether the expenditures in Afghanistan are in our specific and key national interests. These are the questions which I have posed for these leaders:

What are the prospects for military success in Afghanistan against al-Qaida and the Taliban? What will the requirements be in the next year as to additional U.S. troops and the cost of our involvement in Afghanistan? What may we reasonably expect NATO or other allies to contribute in troops and dollars to our efforts in Afghanistan? What other areas around the world are open to al-Qaida as potential bases for another attack on the United States? What will be done besides military action, such as nation building and stabilizing and developing Afghanistan, so that they will be prepared to handle their own problems so we can withdraw? What assistance can we reasonably expect from Pakistan in fighting al-Qaida and the Taliban and stopping both from seeking refuge by moving in and out of Pakistan? How does the questionable legitimacy of President Karzai's status as result of allegations of proof of election fraud impact on our ability to succeed in Afghanistan? How does the illegal drug trafficking and alleged involvement of high-ranking officials in the Karzai government in such drug trafficking impact on our efforts in Afghanistan? What does U.S. intelligence show as to any possible plans by al-Qaida to attack the United States or anyone else? What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether India poses a real threat to attack Pakistan? What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan poses a real threat to attack India? What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan could reasonably devote additional military force to assist us in the fight against the Taliban? What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the Government of Pakistan or influential officials in the Pakistani Government would consider negotiating with India for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building measures to diffuse the tension with India if actively encouraged to do so by the United States? What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the Government of India or some influential officials in the Indian Government would consider negotiating with Pakistan for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building measures to diffuse the tension with Pakistan if actively encouraged by the United States to do so?

We have learned a bitter lesson from Iraq—that we did not have answers to important questions in formulating our policy there. Had we known that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction, I think the United States would not have gone into Iraq.

These questions were posed by me when we had the debate on the resolution for authorizing the use of force. On October 7, 2002, I said the following:

What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control over weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the consequences in Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was toppled? What would happen in the region, the impact on the Arab world, and the impact on Israel?

The President, as Commander in Chief, as we all know, has primary responsibility to conduct war but the Constitution vests in the Congress the sole authority to declare war. Regrettably, the congressional authority and responsibility has been dissipated with what we have seen in Korea and in Vietnam and in the authorizations for the use of force in the two incursions into Iraq. We do not have the authority under separation of powers to delegate that authority. And had we asked the tough questions and had we gotten correct, honest, accurate answers, it would have been a great help to President George W. Bush in formulating a policy as to Iraq. I think now it would be a great help to President Barack Obama for the Congress to exercise our persistence in finding correct answers to these kinds of tough questions.

We have a situation with Pakistan today which gives great pause. The United States has advanced \$15.5 billion to Pakistan since 9/11. Some \$10.9 billion of that money has gone for security, and there is a real question as to whether we have gotten our monies worth. The comments from the New York Times on December 24, 2007 raised these issues:

Money has been diverted to help finance weapons systems designed to counter India, not al-Qaida or the Taliban . . . the United States has paid tens of millions of dollars in inflated Pakistani reimbursement claims for fuel, ammunition and other costs.

Dr. Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote on April 10 of this year:

Far too much of the military portion of the . . . past U.S. aid to Pakistan never was used to help fight the Taliban and al-Qaida or can't be accounted for. Future aid should clearly be tied to clearly defined goals for Pakistani action and full accounting for the money.

The New York Times, on August 30 of this year, pointed out:

The United States has accused Pakistan of illegally modifying American-made missiles to expand its capability to strike land targets, a potential threat to India.

The questions which have been posed in the series of letters which I have outlined go to the issue as to whether India poses a threat to Pakistan. It is hard for me to contemplate that is a serious problem, but we ought to be informed and we ought to be putting our efforts to seeing if we cannot broker a peace treaty between India and Pakistan, which would enable us to get substantial help from Pakistan in our fight against the Taliban.

In 1995, when I was chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Hank

Brown of Colorado and I visited India and Pakistan. When we were in India, we met with Prime Minister Rao, who brought up the subject of a potential nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan and said he would like to see the subcontinent nuclear free. He knew we were en route to Pakistan to see Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and he asked us to take up the subject with her, which we did. As a result, I wrote the following letter to President Clinton the day after we left India, and I think it is worth reading in full:

August 28, 1995.

Dear Mr. President: I think it important to call to your personal attention the substance of meetings which Senator Hank Brown and I have had in the last 2 days with Indian Prime Minister Rao and Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Prime Minister Rao stated that he would be very interested in negotiations which would lead to the elimination of any nuclear weapons on the subcontinent within 10 or 15 years, including renouncing first use of such weapons. His interest in such negotiations with Pakistan would cover bilateral talks, a regional conference which would include the United States, China, and Russia, in addition to India and Pakistan. When we asked Prime Minister Bhutto when she had last talked to Prime Minister Rao, she said she had had no conversations with him during her tenure as prime minister. Prime Minister Bhutto did say that she had initiated a contact through an intermediary but that was terminated when a new controversy arose between Pakistan and India. From our conversations with Prime Minister Rao and Prime Minister Bhutto, it is my sense that both would be very receptive to discussions initiated and brokered by the United States as to nuclear weapons and also delivery missile systems. I am dictating this letter to you by telephone from Damascus so that you will have it at the earliest moment. I am also telefaxing a copy of this letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

In my letter to Secretary of State Clinton, which I sent her last week, I asked her what efforts have been made to broker such a peace treaty between India and Pakistan.

I sent on to her a copy of a letter which I had written to President Clinton; if we could ease the tension between those two countries, if we could persuade Pakistan that India does not pose a threat so Pakistan would not have to marshal their forces along the Indian border but instead could aid the United States in our fight against the Taliban, it would be a very different proposition.

The suggestion has been made now to extend \$7.5 billion in additional funding to Pakistan. It seems to me that is not a good use of our money if it is to follow the same trail as the \$15.5 billion which we have expended in the immediate past. If we can get the assistance of Pakistan in fighting the Taliban, it would be one thing. If we could be assured that the money was being used for the intended purpose and not diverted for other purposes, as it appears the other \$15.5 billion was, it would be a very different picture.

In sum, it seems to me that before we ought to commit additional troops to

Afghanistan, it ought to be a matter of paramount importance, indispensable as a matter of stopping another attack by al-Qaida. But if al-Qaida can organize in some other spot, the issues raised by my questions, it would bear heavily on what our policy in Afghanistan should be.

In addition to the full text of my statement being printed in the RECORD, I ask unanimous consent that copies of my letters to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, CIA Director and the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, all be printed in the RECORD, and I yield the floor.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC, September 9, 2009.

Hon. ROBERT M. GATES,
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SECRETARY GATES: Congress will be called upon to make important decisions on the war in Afghanistan, whether there is a realistic prospect of succeeding there, and the importance of Afghanistan in stopping al Qaeda from again attacking the United States. In a related matter, in evaluating foreign aid to Pakistan, Congress needs to know whether Pakistan could be persuaded to aid us in fighting the Taliban. In retrospect, important judgments were made on Iraq without sufficient accurate, factual information. I write to you, the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the CIA (copies enclosed) on related issues within their purview.

Is U.S. success in Afghanistan critical in stopping al Qaeda from maintaining a base to plan and facilitate another attack on the United States?

What are the prospects for military success in Afghanistan against the Taliban?

What will the requirements be in the next year as to additional U.S. troops and the cost of our involvement in Afghanistan?

What may we reasonably expect NATO or other allies to contribute in troops and dollars to our efforts in Afghanistan?

What will be done besides military action, such as nation-building, in stabilizing and developing Afghanistan so that they will be prepared to handle their own problems so that we can withdraw?

What assistance can we reasonably expect from Pakistan in fighting the Taliban and stopping the Taliban from seeking refuge by moving in and out of Pakistan?

How does the questionable legitimacy of President Karzai's status as a result of allegations or proof of election fraud impact on our ability to succeed in Afghanistan?

How does the illegal drug trafficking and alleged involvement of high-ranking officials in the Karzai government in such drug trafficking impact on our efforts in Afghanistan?

Thank you for your consideration of this request. I am available to meet with you or your designee for a briefing on these questions.

Sincerely,

ARLEN SPECTER.

Enclosures.

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC, September 9, 2009.

Hon. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON,
Secretary of State,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SECRETARY CLINTON: Congress will be called upon to make important decisions on the war in Afghanistan, whether there is a

realistic prospect of succeeding there, and the importance of Afghanistan in stopping al Qaeda from again attacking the United States. In evaluating foreign aid to Pakistan, Congress needs to know whether Pakistan could be persuaded to aid us in fighting the Taliban. In retrospect, important judgments were made on Iraq without sufficient accurate, factual information.

I am writing to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence and Director of the CIA (copies enclosed) to obtain information principally on military and intelligence matters. My inquiries to you are principally on foreign relation issues involving Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

In August 1995, Senator Hank Brown and I were told by Prime Minister Rao in a visit to New Delhi that India was interested in negotiating with Pakistan to make their subcontinent free of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Rao asked Senator Brown and me to raise this issue with Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto which we did. I then wrote to President Clinton urging him to broker such negotiations. Those discussions are summarized in a letter which I sent to President Clinton:

AUGUST 28, 1995.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think it important to call to your personal attention the substance of meetings which Senator Hank Brown and I have had in the last two days with Indian Prime Minister Rao and Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

Prime Minister Rao stated that he would be very interested in negotiations which would lead to the elimination of any nuclear weapons on his subcontinent within ten or fifteen years including renouncing first use of such weapons. His interest in such negotiations with Pakistan would cover bilateral talks or a regional conference which would include the United States, China and Russia in addition to India and Pakistan.

When we asked Prime Minister Bhutto when she had last talked to Prime Minister Rao, she said that she had no conversations with him during her tenure as Prime Minister. Prime Minister Bhutto did say that she had initiated a contact through an intermediary but that was terminated when a new controversy arose between Pakistan and India.

From our conversations with Prime Minister Rao and Prime Minister Bhutto, it is my sense that both would be very receptive to discussions initiated and brokered by the United States as to nuclear weapons and also delivery missile systems.

I am dictating this letter to you by telephone from Damascus so that you will have it at the earliest moment. I am also telefaxing a copy of this letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

Sincerely,

ARLEN SPECTER.

After returning to the United States, I discussed such a presidential initiative with President Clinton, but my suggestion was not pursued.

If the current tensions and hostilities between India and Pakistan could be eliminated or reduced, Pakistan might be persuaded to increase its military forces to aid us in the fight against the Taliban. I urge you and your Department to undertake an initiative to broker a peace treaty between India and Pakistan if you are not already doing so.

I am also interested in your view as to whether India poses a realistic threat to Pakistan which warrants Pakistan devoting military force to that potential threat, which diverts a military contribution which could aid the U.S. in our fight against the Taliban?

I am also interested in your view of a proposal for the U.S. to grant substantial foreign aid to Pakistan. I raise this question in the context of Pakistan's failure during President Musharaf's tenure to fulfill its commitments on the \$10 billion aid granted by the U.S. from September 11, 2001 to 2007. When Representative Patrick Kennedy and I raised this subject with President Musharaf in a December 2007 meeting in Islamabad, he gave a very unsatisfactory answer.

I am available to meet with you or your designee on these subjects.

Sincerely,

ARLEN SPECTER.

Enclosures.

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC, September 9, 2009.

Hon. DENNIS C. BLAIR,
Director of National Intelligence,
Washington, DC.

DEAR DIRECTOR BLAIR: Congress will be called upon to make important decisions on the war in Afghanistan, whether there is a realistic prospect of succeeding there, and the importance of Afghanistan in stopping al Qaeda from again attacking the United States. In a related matter, in evaluating foreign aid to Pakistan, Congress needs to know whether Pakistan could be persuaded to aid us in fighting the Taliban. In retrospect, important judgments were made on Iraq without sufficient accurate, factual information. I write to you, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA (copies enclosed) to obtain that information.

How important is Afghanistan to al Qaeda as a base for another attack on the U.S.?

Does al Qaeda have other bases which would be sufficient for them to plan and facilitate another attack on the United States?

What other areas are open to al Qaeda as potential bases for another attack on the United States?

What does U.S. intelligence show as to any possible plans by al Qaeda to attack the United States or anyone else?

What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether India poses a real threat to attack Pakistan?

What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan poses a real threat to attack India?

What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan could reasonably devote additional military force to assisting us in the fight against the Taliban?

What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the government of Pakistan or some influential officials in the Pakistani government would consider negotiating with India for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building measures to defuse the tension with India if actively encouraged by the U.S. to do so?

What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the government of India or some influential officials in the Indian government would consider negotiating with Pakistan for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building measures to defuse the tension with Pakistan if actively encouraged by the U.S. to do so?

What does U.S. intelligence show on the allegations that President Karzai and his associates acted fraudulently in the recent presidential elections?

What does U.S. intelligence show on the allegations that President Karzai and his associates are involved in illegal narcotics activity?

What does U.S. intelligence show on the allegations that President Karzai and his associates acted fraudulently in the recent presidential elections?

I am writing an identical letter to Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Leon Panetta.

Thank you for your consideration of this request. I am available to meet with you or

your designee for a briefing on these questions.

Sincerely,

ARLEN SPECTER.

Enclosures.

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC, September 9, 2009.

Hon. LEON PANETTA,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC.

DEAR DIRECTOR PANETTA: Congress will be called upon to make important decisions on the war in Afghanistan, whether there is a realistic prospect of succeeding there, and the importance of Afghanistan in stopping al Qaeda from again attacking the United States. In a related matter, in evaluating foreign aid to Pakistan, Congress needs to know whether Pakistan could be persuaded to aid us in fighting the Taliban. In retrospect, important judgments were made on Iraq without sufficient accurate, factual information. I write to you, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence (copies enclosed) to obtain that information.

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I am writing an identical letter to Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair.

Thank you for your consideration of this request. I am available to meet with you or your designee for a briefing on these questions.

Sincerely,

ARLEN SPECTER.

Enclosure.

EXHIBIT 1

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER—
U.S. POLICY REGARDING AFGHANISTAN

Mr. President: I seek recognition today to discuss our military presence in Afghanistan. We went into Afghanistan in 2001 fol-

lowing the barbaric attacks of September 11, 2001. Our forces swiftly toppled the Taliban and denied Al Qaeda leadership the safe haven it had enjoyed in Afghanistan. Both Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership survived the attack and were able to take refuge and reconstitute in the mountainous regions across the border in Pakistan.

The cost of the war has already been high: 821 American servicemembers have died (New York Times—9/16/09) and, according to the Congressional Research Service, \$189 billion appropriated to the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Veterans Administration for medical costs stemming from the war in Afghanistan. By the end of this year, there will be 68,000 American military personnel and an additional 38,000 NATO troops from other countries in Afghanistan (Los Angeles Times—9/4/09).

Today, according to the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, the Taliban again poses a serious threat. U.S. military personnel casualties are mounting and the Pentagon is calling for a build-up of U.S. forces there. Before Congress, or at least this member, can take a position on more U.S. troops for Afghanistan, there is a need for answers to critical questions. To help gather information to allow me to make informed decisions, I sent letters last week to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, Director of the CIA Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen posing questions about the current situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, whether there is a realistic prospect of succeeding there, the importance of the mission in Afghanistan to stopping Al Qaeda from again attacking the United States, and U.S. efforts to engage other regional players such as India to ease tensions in the region [letters attached]. These questions are posed in the context that Congress did not get candid, direct answers to questions posed before the resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq. Had we known Saddam did not have weapons of mass destruction, the United States would not have gone into Iraq.

The paramount question is whether Afghanistan is indispensable for Al Qaeda as a base for organizing another attack against the United States? If so, the United States must do whatever it takes to stop that from happening, as there is no more important national security interest than protection of our citizens. Additional questions which need to be answered include:

What are the prospects for military success in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban?

What will the requirements be in the next year as to additional U.S. troops and the cost of our involvement in Afghanistan?

What may we reasonably expect NATO or other allies to contribute in troops and dollars to our efforts in Afghanistan?

What other areas around the world are open to Al Qaeda as potential bases for another attack on the United States?

What will be done besides military action, such as nation-building, in stabilizing and developing Afghanistan so that they will be prepared to handle their own problems so that we can withdraw?

What assistance can we reasonably expect from Pakistan in fighting the Al Qaeda and the Taliban and stopping both from seeking refuge by moving in and out of Pakistan?

How does the questionable legitimacy of President Karzai's status as a result of allegations or proof of election fraud impact on our ability to succeed in Afghanistan?

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What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the government of Pakistan or some influential officials in the Pakistani government would consider negotiating with India for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building measures to defuse the tension with India if actively encouraged by the U.S. to do so?

What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the government of India or some influential officials in the Indian government would consider negotiating with Pakistan for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building measures to defuse the tension with Pakistan if actively encouraged by the U.S. to do so?

In prepared testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 15, 2009, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan as:

“... to deny sanctuary to al Qaeda and the Taliban now, and to generate a stable and secure Afghanistan capable of denying al Qaeda return after the withdrawal of our combat forces, and while we sustain partnership and commitment to political and economic development in that nation.”

Admiral Mullen later told the Committee: “... a properly resourced counter-insurgency probably means more forces, without question, more time and more commitment to the protection of the Afghan people and to the development of good governance.”

While it would be desirable to protect the Afghan people and see Afghanistan develop good governance, that mission alone does not constitute, in my judgment, a vital national security interest that would warrant putting U.S. troops in harm's way. What has not yet been made clear to me is that a larger U.S. military presence in Afghanistan will further our efforts to deny Al Qaeda a base from which to organize and launch attacks against the U.S. Conversely, I worry that further growing our force in Afghanistan risks committing ourselves to a costly counter-insurgency mission focused on building Afghan governmental institutions—a mission that would require years if not decades to prosecute—when what is in our nation's best interest may be a much more streamlined counter-terrorism mission focused on pursuing Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

SECURING PAKISTAN'S COOPERATION

Understanding that the Taliban and Al Qaeda reside in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, any U.S. strategy in Afghanistan must account for conditions across the border in Pakistan, and Washington must effectively engage Islamabad as well as Kabul. Questions remain, however, about Pakistan's interest in pursuing a sustained campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda on its own soil.

Since 2001, the U.S. has given over \$15.5 billion in overt aid to Pakistan, according to the Congressional Research Service, of which \$10.9 billion has been security related. Where

has this money gone? According to a December 24, 2007 New York Times article:

“Money has been diverted to help finance weapons systems designed to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban, the officials said, adding that the United States has paid tens of millions of dollars in inflated Pakistani reimbursement claims for fuel, ammunition and other costs.”

I raised this question during a December 27, 2007 meeting in Islamabad with then-president Pervez Musharraf. I asked Musharraf about Pakistan's record following through on its commitments on the \$10 billion in aid granted by the U.S. between September 11, 2001 and 2007 and found his response wholly inadequate. There is a new regime governing in Islamabad now, and I think it crucial that Pakistan will participate fully in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban if the U.S. is to finance it.

Before the U.S. sends billions more in aid—both civil and military—to Pakistan, what assurances do we have that it will go to the intended recipients? Dr. Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote on April 10, 2009:

“Far too much of the military portion of the . . . past U.S. aid to Pakistan never was used to help fight the Taliban and al Qaeda or can't be accounted for. Future aid should be clearly tied to clearly defined goals for Pakistani action and full accounting for the money.”

Is it possible to get Pakistan to focus on the threat posed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban in its tribal regions when Islamabad perceives an existential threat to lie next door in India? Or, will Pakistan continue to divert U.S. aid to bolster defenses along its Indian border, as alleged in an August 30, 2009 New York Times article, which said:

“The United States has accused Pakistan of illegally modifying American-made missiles to expand its capability to strike land targets, a potential threat to India . . .”

I think we need to understand that any re-orientation of Islamabad's strategic calculus—specifically a change of perception that the existential threat lies to its west in the form of Al Qaeda and the Taliban rather than to the east in India—will have to emerge internally. No amount of money we give Islamabad is going to convince it otherwise. The current proposal by Senators Kerry and Lugar to spend \$7.5 billion over five years to strengthen Pakistan's civilian institutions is worth considering, but this alone would not guarantee Pakistan's cooperation in committing fully to the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. More important than giving money, I believe, is the U.S. undertaking to broker a lasting peace between India and Pakistan.

TOWARDS AN INDIA-PAKISTAN PEACE

In August 1995, Senator Hank Brown and I were told by Prime Minister Rao in a visit to New Delhi that India was interested in negotiating with Pakistan to make their subcontinent free of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Rao asked Senator BROWN and me to raise this issue with Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto which we did. I then wrote to President Clinton urging him to broker such negotiations. Those discussions are summarized in a letter which I sent to President Clinton:

AUGUST 28, 1995.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think it important to call to your personal attention the substance of meetings which Senator Hank Brown and I have had in the last two days with Indian Prime Minister Rao and Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

Prime Minister Rao stated that he would be very interested in negotiations which

would lead to the elimination of any nuclear weapons on his subcontinent within ten or fifteen years including renouncing first use of such weapons. His interest in such negotiations with Pakistan would cover bilateral talks or a regional conference which would include the United States, China and Russia in addition to India and Pakistan.

When we asked Prime Minister Bhutto when she had last talked to Prime Minister Rao, she said that she had no conversations with him during her tenure as Prime Minister. Prime Minister Bhutto did say that she had initiated a contact through an intermediary but that was terminated when a new controversy arose between Pakistan and India.

From our conversations with Prime Minister Rao and Prime Minister Bhutto, it is my sense that both would be very receptive to discussions initiated and brokered by the United States as to nuclear weapons and also delivery missile systems.

I am dictating this letter to you by telephone from Damascus so that you will have it at the earliest moment. I am also telefaxing a copy of this letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

Sincerely,

ARLEN SPECTER.

After returning to the United States, I discussed such a presidential initiative with President Clinton, but my suggestion was not pursued.

If the current tensions and hostilities between India and Pakistan could be eliminated or reduced, Pakistan might be persuaded to increase its military forces to aid us in the fight against the Taliban. On September 9, 2009, I wrote to Secretary Clinton to urge her to work to mediate dialogue between India and Pakistan in the hope of easing bilateral tensions to enable Pakistan to focus more intently on the problem posed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban along its western border.

CONCLUSION

Congress will be called upon to make important decision on the war in Afghanistan that will have consequences for years to come both in Southwestern Asia and here at home. As I said on the Senate floor on October 7, 2002, the authorization of the use of military force is a core duty of Congress which this institution must not delegate to the Executive Branch:

“... the doctrine of separation of powers precludes the Congress from delegating its core constitutional authority to the executive branch. . . . Congress may not delegate the authority to engage in war. If we authorize the President to use whatever force is necessary, that contemplates further action. While no one is going to go to court to challenge the President's authority, that is of some concern, at least to this Senator.”

Congress must ask the tough questions about what an expansion of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan would accomplish. On October 7, 2002, in the lead up to the authorization of the use of force in Iraq, I raised similar questions on the Senate floor:

“What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control over weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the consequence in Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was toppled? What would happen in the region, the impact on the Arab world, and the impact on Israel?”

In retrospect, Congress should have been more diligent and insistent on getting candid, accurate answers to such questions. It would have been a help to President George W. Bush to have had answers to these questions candidly and correctly in determining his policy. It would now be a help to President Obama to have congressional input on

posing relevant, tough questions and getting candid, correct answers. While the Constitution gives the President paramount authority as Commander-in-Chief, the Constitution gives the Congress the sole authority to declare war. That congressional authority and responsibility have not been appropriately exercised considering what has happened in Korea and Vietnam and in the resolutions authorizing the use of force in Iraq in 1991 and 2002, none of which constituted congressional declarations of war.

On the ultimate issue of increased U.S. forces: Congress should not, and this member will not, support a policy of increasing U.S. forces in Afghanistan until such policy is warranted by candid and correct factual information and preferable alternatives cannot achieve the desired objectives.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.

Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, could I inquire as to the regular order?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The minority has 30 minutes remaining in morning business.

Mr. INHOFE. I ask when the majority would then be recognized?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority has 12 minutes remaining.

Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, if the Senator controlling the remainder of the majority time would like to reserve his time, I will go ahead and start.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEFENSE

Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, as we speak, there is an announcement coming from the White House, it is my understanding, that they are going to cancel the Eastern European sites we have been working on for such a long period of time. I think it is appropriate to quote something I saw many years ago and was foreseen by President Reagan when he was President. He said:

Since the dawn of the atomic age, we have sought to reduce the risk of war by maintaining a strong deterrent and by seeking genuine arms control. Deterrence: Making sure the adversary who thinks about attacking the United States or our allies or our vital interests concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he understands that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression.

I wish people today would understand those words of Ronald Reagan quite some time ago and how prophetic they

were as we look right now and see the administration is talking about canceling this program.

I arranged to be in Afghanistan at the time Secretary of Defense Gates announced the budget, I believe last February, the Obama budget, so far as defense was concerned. I was very much concerned. I was concerned about what happened to the F-22. Initially, we were going to have the only fifth-generation fighter that this country has. We, initially, were going to have 750 of them. He terminated the program at 187.

I was concerned about the termination of the C-17 program. I was concerned about the termination of the Future Combat System. The Future Combat System is the only ground system that has gone through a major change in probably 50 or 60 years. So we will not have that improved ground capability for our young men and women who go into harm's way.

Also, I made the comment that I suspected at that time, when he suspended the radar site in the Czech Republic and the interception capability in Poland, that that was easing into terminating that program. I think we are finding out today he is terminating that program.

On February 3, 2009, Iran launched a satellite, on the 30th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. On July 9 of 2008, Iran tested nine missiles, including the Shahab-3, which has a range of 1,240 miles.

I recognize the threat to Western Europe—this wouldn't quite do it. It is 1,240 miles. I think the range in order to be able to get something to Italy would be about 2,000 miles.

On the other hand, we never guess these things right. I remember so well, in 1998, the Clinton administration made a statement in response to a question I asked on August 14, 1998: How long will it be until they have the multiple-stage capability in North Korea? The White House responded it was going to be between 10 and 15 years. Seven days later, on August 13, 1998, they fired it.

This is how far off we are in our intelligence. We don't know. I don't want to guess this thing too close. Riki Ellison from the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance said:

The Islamic Republic of Iran has just proved for the first time that it has the capability to place satellites in space by successfully launching a 3-stage liquid fueled rocket that has placed two objects in low-Earth orbit. . . Iran has demonstrated the key technologies of propulsion, staging, and guidance to deliver a weapon of mass destruction globally.

I am hoping the White House doesn't come out and say that is launching a satellite. It is the same technology, launching a nuclear warhead. This is getting very serious right now. The U.S. intelligence community has estimated Iran may have long-range ballistic missiles capable of threatening all of Western Europe and the United States by 2015.

Madam President, 2015, that sounds reminiscent of August of 1998, when they said it would be 10 to 15 years. Delaying this creates all kinds of problems for us. Our credibility in Eastern Europe is something that bothers me. I was recently in the Czech Republic. President Vaclav Klaus—they were cooperative in saying yes. The Parliament debated it and decided we could put a radar site there which would allow us to see something coming in; otherwise, we would not be able to do it. Then, next door in Poland, to have an interception capability—they agreed to do that. Parliament didn't want to do it. They were concerned about Russia's response and a lot of opposition that there might be. The thing I do not understand is why Western Europe is not lining up with us and saying we have to have those two sites. They are the ones who are naked now if we don't have that.

I am very much concerned about that. MG Vladimir Dvorkin, who is the head of the Center for Strategic Forces in Moscow, said: "Iran is actively working on a missile program," adding that Iran is "1 or 2 years" from having a nuclear weapon. This concerns me. We have those individuals we seem to be catering to, the Russians, in order to leave ourselves without a type of defensive system to protect Western Europe and the Eastern United States. It is troubling to me.

In April 2009, North Korea furthered their missile and nuclear development by a Taepodong-2 missile in the China Sea. That has a range of over 2,000—about 2,500 miles. That would reach Rome. That would reach Berlin. There has to be a concern that they have this capability, they have demonstrated this capability very clearly.

NATO leaders stated in December of 2008, last Christmas, that:

Ballistic missile proliferation poses increasing threat to allied forces, territory and populations. Missile defense forms a part of the broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognize the substantial contribution to the protection of allies from long range ballistic missiles to be provided by a planned development of the European-based United States missile defense assets.

That is what we are talking about. In Poland, the site in Poland would include up to 10 silo-based, long-range interceptors capable of shooting down hostile missiles from Iran in their mid-course. Let's put the chart up here.

A lot of people do not realize this is very sophisticated. Our missile defense system takes into consideration three courses. For the segment here, the boost phase, we don't have anything there yet. We are supposed to be working on it. I was disturbed that one of the things that was terminated by this administration is that effort.

The terminal defense segment is one we are working on right now. The airborne laser in the boost phase is one of the programs I believe the administration is canceling. The site in Poland would include up to 10 silo-based, long-range interceptors. The radar site in