[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 156 (Thursday, December 2, 2010)] [Senate] [Pages S8359-S8362] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] NEW START TREATY Mrs. SHAHEEN. Madam President, a number of my colleagues and I are coming to the floor today to discuss a critical national security issue that Senator Kerry has already referenced in his remarks on the Senate floor. It is an issue that requires strong bipartisan action by the Senate; that is, the ratification of the New START treaty. As we enter into the last weeks of the 111th Congress, there is no doubt we have some significant work remaining on a number of important priorities. But we have come to the Senate floor today to say that national security and the threat posed by nuclear weapons also requires our urgent consideration this year. After more than 20 Senate hearings, more than 31 witnesses, 900 questions and answers, and nearly 8 months of thorough consideration-- including additional time during the August recess for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider the treaty--it is now time to vote on New START. The treaty is squarely in the national security interests of the United States. It reduces the number of nuclear weapons aimed at American cities and allows for the return of critical onsite inspections lost when the previous START treaty expired. Ratifying the treaty would reestablish American leadership on nuclear security and give the United States increased leverage to curb nuclear proliferation around the globe. This treaty in no way interferes with our ability to have a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal. In fact, in response to Senate concerns, the Obama administration has committed unprecedented amounts of money to ensure this modernization piece. Just yesterday, the three directors of America's nuclear labs wrote in a letter that they were ``very pleased'' with the administration's commitment and believe this commitment provides ``adequate support to sustain the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of America's nuclear deterrent.'' Another concern that has been raised is the effect the New START treaty may have on some of our closest NATO allies. As chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe, I am intensely focused on meeting our NATO security commitments and defending and protecting our allies in NATO and beyond. I agree we need to remain vigilant in support of our allies, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe that border Russia and have strong, legitimate security concerns. But a failure to ratify this treaty could result in deteriorating U.S.- Russian bilateral relations and adversely affect the security of our partners in Europe. I was pleased to see, just last week, at the NATO summit in Lisbon that all 28 NATO allies expressed their unanimous support for Senate ratification of the New START treaty. New START is in America's interests, and as our allies in Europe have stated clearly, New START is also in their interests. Finally, a failure to ratify this treaty could have serious negative effects on our ability to meet the nuclear challenge posed by Iran. The failure to ratify the START treaty would undercut America's ability to marshal international support and exert increasing pressure on Iran. As we heard Senator Kerry reference earlier this morning, just today in the Washington Post five former Secretaries of State of the past five Republican administrations made a compelling case linking this treaty and the threats posed by Iran and North Korea. The consensus is clear. New START is in our national security interests, and we should not wait any longer to ratify this treaty. Our military and our intelligence communities do not want us to wait. Our allies abroad and countless foreign policy experts, Republican and Democrat, across the political spectrum do not want the Senate to wait. The American people do not want us to wait. We should follow in the footsteps of the Senate's strong bipartisan arms control history and ratify the New START treaty this year. Madam President, I yield the floor to my colleague from Pennsylvania, Senator Casey. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania. Mr. CASEY. Madam President, I commend my colleague from New Hampshire, Senator Shaheen. I am proud to join my colleagues this morning in support of the New START accord. Next Sunday will mark 1 year since American inspectors were on the ground in Russia. We need to vote on the resolution of ratification for this important treaty because it will indeed make America safer. Without ratification of this treaty, we are less safe and less secure. We have to maintain what we have always maintained in this country as it relates to our arsenal: a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. This treaty is consistent with that goal. The agreement provides for predictability, transparency, and stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. [[Page S8360]] Former National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Linton Brooks put it best when he said: Transparency leads to predictability; predictability leads to stability. It is that stability that we seek. The opportunity to examine Russian nuclear forces helps to limit the surprises, mistrust, or miscalculation that could result from a lack of information. By building trust with regard to our respective nuclear arsenals, progress on other important issues such as the war in Afghanistan and our policy as it relates to Iran becomes more likely. Some have asked whether we have lost any valuable elements of the original START treaty's inspection regime. In June of this year, I chaired a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee that addressed this very issue. We examined the implementation of the treaty with respect to both inspection and verification and how the treaty would be executed in Russia and the United States. Critics point out that under the original START treaty, the United States was permitted 25 data update, reentry vehicles, and facility inspections a year, while under New START the United States can inspect 18 facilities annually not 25. However, in a previous hearing on the New START treaty, Admiral Mullen noted that when START entered into force there were 55 Russian facilities subject to inspection, but now there are only 35 Russian facilities subject to inspection. I would also assert that the inspection regime has also changed to reflect the current security environment, an enhanced relationship with the Russian Federation, and more than a decade of experience in conducting START inspections. The inspection regime is simpler and cheaper than what was conducted under the first START treaty. We conduct fewer inspections under this treaty because there are fewer sites to inspect. Yet, proportionally, the number of inspections concluded under this treaty has increased not decreased. During that same hearing, Dr. James Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy said: Inspections will help the United States verify that Russia is reporting the status of its strategic forces accurately and complying with the provisions of the New START Treaty. Inspections will not be shots in the dark. Using information provided by requiring data exchanges, notifications, past inspections, and national technical means, we can choose to inspect those facilities of greatest interest to us. Then, through short-notice on-site inspections, our inspectors can verify that what the Russians are reporting accurately reflects reality. So said the Under Secretary of Defense, Mr. Miller. After more than 20 hearings by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence, and comprehensive deliberation, it is time to vote on New START. We have examined all sides of the issue. We heard from Republican experts and Democratic experts alike. We have heard from former Secretaries of State and experts in international relations. The U.S. military leadership uniformly supports this treaty. More than 900 questions were submitted from the Senate to the administration on New START, and the administration answered every single question. I wish to close on a historical note. On October 1, 1992, the first START treaty was ratified by the Senate by a vote of 93 to 6. As the debate on the treaty wrapped in this room, the Senate majority leader at the time, George Mitchell, commended President Bush for his role in negotiating the agreement. He read a letter from Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger which encouraged ratification. This expression of bipartisanship at that time was made remarkable by the fact that the Senators assembled would soon return home to campaign in the 1992 election. That election was 1 month away and Democrats and Republicans came together and supported ratification. We all remember the contentious nature of that election, similar to the period we are living through now. Yet even within that environment, both parties came together to do the right thing for national security. We have to do this again. It is critically important that this treaty be ratified. With that, I yield the floor. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oregon. Mr. MERKLEY. Madam President, it is my privilege to rise to join with my colleagues from New Hampshire and Pennsylvania and Colorado in support of the New START treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. I bring a bit of a personal perspective, a bit of affection for this issue, for this reason: When I was in graduate school, I was studying to take on issues of world economic development, issues of international poverty. I had worked in Latin America. I had worked in India. I traveled through Central America. I spent some time in west Africa. I thought global poverty was a very important issue that could be worth investing my career in. But as I came out of graduate school, I had an opportunity to switch tracks and work on nuclear issues as a Presidential fellow for Caspar Weinberger in the Reagan administration. This was a complete change of direction and one I didn't anticipate. But I went through that door and worked on strategic issues because the greatest threat to our planet was the successful management of nuclear weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, an enormous threat that needed to be smartly managed. I felt that engaging in that discussion, being part of that effort, was a very valuable matter in which to put my energy. So I spent 2 years at the Pentagon working on strategic nuclear issues and then worked for Congress, the Congressional Budget Office, as a strategic nuclear policy analyst during the 1980s. It gave me a bit of a closeup view and a view particularly of the Reagan administration, working with Mikhail Gorbachev--Reagan and Gorbachev-- working on these issues. One related issue--though not a strategic issue, it certainly had strategic implications--was the theater nuclear arms negotiations that resulted in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Back then it was called the zero option. It created intrusive inspection regimes to ensure that both nations were complying with the treaty. That, of course, was the hallmark of Reagan's philosophy that we ``trust but verify.'' More than the specifics of that treaty, I wish to note that it passed 93 to 5. That treaty, similar to most strategic arms treaties, passed with wide bipartisan support. When it comes to the safety of our Nation, when it comes to minimizing the threat of nuclear devastation, we have set aside red and blue, we have set aside Republican and Democrat, and we have done what is right for our Nation. Certainly, the threat involving nuclear weapons is as serious today as it was in 1987 when President Reagan signed the INF treaty or when it was ratified in 1998. Now the Senate must decide whether to ratify the New START treaty. New START limits both the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, a significant reduction from the 2002 Moscow Treaty. It limits both parties to 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles. These reductions continue to reduce both nations' oversized nuclear arsenals, a dangerous legacy of the Cold War, while allowing the U.S. military to preserve a flexible strategic deterrent. The new treaty improves our strategic relationship with Russia. The new treaty reinforces the U.S. global leadership in nonproliferation. Verification is a key element in New START, consistent with President Reagan's philosophy of ``trust but verify.'' With the expiration of START a year ago, U.S. officials have been without their ability to conduct onsite inspections in Russia for the first time in a decade and a half, and that increases the nuclear threat. The new treaty allows both parties to verify compliance through data exchanges, through onsite inspections, and through reconnaissance satellites. Both countries must maintain a database listing the types of locations of all accountable warheads and delivery vehicles. Each delivery vehicle is assigned a unique identifier, which is used to track it from the moment of production through its various deployments and to its dismantlement. U.S. inspectors can verify using short notice, onsite inspections. This treaty is critical in safeguarding nuclear material and preventing proliferation of weapons and it is critical for our relationship with Russia and our authority on nuclear issues. [[Page S8361]] Let me quote one expert: The principal result of nonratification would be to throw the whole nuclear negotiating situation into a state of chaos. That quote comes from GEN Brent Scowcroft, who was the first President Bush's National Security Adviser, or let's listen to this expert: A rejection of [this treaty] would indicate that a new period of American policy had started that might rely largely on the unilateral reliance of its nuclear weapons, and would therefore create an element of uncertainty in the calculations of adversaries and allies. And therefore, I think it would have an unsettling impact on the international environment. That is Dr. Henry Kissinger. Today there is an article in the Washington Post: ``Why New START Deserves GOP Support.'' This is written by Dr. Kissinger, George Shultz, James Baker, III, Lawrence Eagleburger, and Colin Powell. These are Secretaries of State for the last five Republican Presidents joining together in a detailed analysis of the New START and why the Senate should ratify this treaty. There are some who may say it is not an issue of the substance but, rather, we just need more time to consider the provisions. Consider this: The treaty was signed on April 8 of this year. The treaty went through extensive and thorough hearings and briefings on the Foreign Relations Committee. The committee favorably reported it out with bipartisan support on September 16. In the 34 weeks since the treaty was signed and the 10 weeks since it was reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, every Member of our body has had an opportunity to read the testimony, to explore the content, to consult with the experts, to consult with the administration, and to reach a conclusion. In fact, we have had more opportunity to review this treaty than the 100th Congress did for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty under Ronald Reagan. Finally, I think it is useful to hear President Reagan's thoughts on nuclear weapons. In 1985, he said this: There is only one way safely and legitimately to reduce the cost of national security, and that is to reduce the need for it. And this we are trying to do in negotiations with the Soviet Union. We are not just discussing limits on a further increase of nuclear weapons. We seek, instead, to reduce their number. We seek total elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. Well, this treaty does not eliminate nuclear weapons, but it does reduce them and it does, in the eyes of expert after expert after expert--Democratic experts and Republican experts--make our Nation more secure. So there can be no better reason to ratify it as soon as possible. I thank the Chair. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Colorado. Mr. BENNET. Madam President, I rise to support timely ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, often called New START. New START accomplishes critical goals for our national security. It reduces Russia's deployed nuclear warhead stockpile by 30 percent. It reduces the number of deployed and nondeployed launchers to 800. It limits the number of deployed missiles and bombers to 700--fewer than half the number of the original START treaty. It also establishes a stronger system of onsite inspections, allowing us to physically count individual warheads. This is the safest way to ensure that we have an accurate understanding of Russia's nuclear weapons force. Nevertheless, the Senate has failed to take action on what should be noncontroversial--a treaty with bipartisan support that will make our country safer. Today, I wish to talk about the consequences if we fail to ratify New START. Right now, with no treaty in place, our country has virtually no ability to monitor Russia's nuclear weapons. The previous START treaty expired on December 5, 2009, almost a year ago today. Since that time, our inspectors have been shut out of Russia's facilities. We have been making national security decisions in the dark. By contrast, the comprehensive verification system proposed under New START allows our military to make better, safer decisions about our national security. Without these verification measures in place, we will lose track of Russia's nuclear arsenal. We will spend more money to obtain less reliable information. Delaying ratification makes no sense for our national security or for this Nation's wallet. Failure to ratify New START does not just undermined our short-term national security interests, it weakens our long-term relationship with Russia and countries all around the world. In a post-9/11 world, strong relationships and shared intelligence have never been more critical as we defend against emerging threats. We rely on Russia's support to help us contain one of the biggest threats to our national security and to the world's security: Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapon. In fact, earlier this year, the United States brokered an agreement with Russia and China that imposes new U.N. sanctions against Iran to limit its weapons production. Our failure to move forward on New START would make these efforts more difficult. The goal of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons requires a solid United States-Russia relationship, and that relationship begins with New START. We have had ample time to study the treaty: 20 formal hearings, countless briefings, 900 questions submitted for the record. All Senators have had time to express opinions and register concerns. The experts, both Republicans and Democrats, tell us it is time to ratify the treaty. In fact, LTG Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser for Presidents Ford and George H. W. Bush, has said: The principal result of nonratification would be to throw the whole nuclear negotiating situation into a state of chaos. He is not alone in this considered view. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the majority has expired. Mrs. SHAHEEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to extend our time until 10:20 and to then allow for 5 minutes for the Republicans at the other side of their time. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BENNET. Madam President, I will wrap up in the next couple of minutes. He is not alone in this considered view. Listen to the bipartisan wisdom calling on the Senate to ratify this treaty: former Secretaries of State George Shultz, James Baker, Henry Kissinger, Colin Powell, Madeleine Albright, and Warren Christopher; former Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger, William Cohen, William Perry, Frank Carlucci, and Harold Brown; former National Security Advisers Brent Scowcroft, Stephen Hadley, and Sandy Berger. Patriots all, committed public servants who take it as an article of faith that partisanship ends at our water's edge, as do most Coloradans and most Americans. When it comes to New START, I believe the Senate will as well. President Reagan began negotiating the first START treaty with the Soviet Union in 1982--right in the middle of the Cold War. Even today, all these years later, we remember Reagan's brilliant phrase ``trust but verify.'' Many believed the Cold War would never end. So much has changed since the fall of the Soviet Union: the rise of global terrorism, the growing threat of Iran, the integration of our global economy, and the realization that when one economy falls, all are in danger. As you know, I have just finished a long and tough campaign, and I can tell you that Coloradans are patriots before they are partisans. They are parents before they are Republicans and Democrats. And they are neighbors before they are foes. We need to respond, and the Senate should ratify New START now. I yield the floor. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Maryland is recognized. Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, I join my colleagues who have taken the floor this morning to urge a timely ratification of the START treaty. We have now been 1 year without a comprehensive verification regime to understand Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Since the end of the Cold War, we have had a verification system in place because we need to know what Russia is doing. We are at risk by not [[Page S8362]] having a comprehensive verification regime in place. The ratification of New START will allow us to have that verification system in place, and it is in our national security interest. We have had plenty of opportunity to understand exactly what is involved in the New START Treaty. For 7 months, the Senate has been considering the ratification. We have had over 20 hearings. I am honored to serve on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We have had numerous hearings and opportunities, both in closed sessions and open sessions, to understand exactly why this ratification is in the security interest of the United States. I point out that this is New START. We already had a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia that expired at the end of last year. That treaty was ratified by a prior vote of 93 to 6. So we have great interest. We know what is involved, and we have had strong, bipartisan support for the ratification of START. The United States needs transparency to know what Russia is doing and to provide confidence and stability. We need that confidence and stability to contribute to a safer world. The ratification of New START allows the United States to continue to be in the leadership internationally, not only to deal with arms reduction but also with nonproliferation issues. That is particularly important today as we get international support to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state. Russia has helped us in that regard. The ratification of this treaty is a continued movement toward isolating Iran's nuclear ambitions. As other colleagues have pointed out, military leadership and bipartisan political leadership has supported this ratification. I urge my colleagues to ratify New START. It is in our national security interest. I yield the floor. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized. ____________________