

the funds under the Clean Air Act's section 105 grant program. (Nationally, that program will provide \$115 million in state and local clean air grants in 1999.) Yet our state represents more than 12% of the nation's population and pays more than 12% of total federal taxes. What's more, our state is home to the only "extreme" clean air designation in the country—the Los Angeles basin.

Today, I am introducing legislation to end this inequity, under which California generally, and Los Angeles specifically, are significantly underfunded by Clean Air Act air pollution planning formulas. The bill eliminates the 10% maximum level of funding for any one state under the section 105 state and local clean air grant program.

The bill does not authorize or compel more funds to be appropriated under the section 105 grant program. It simply states that California should be able to receive its fair share of those funds that Congress does choose to appropriate.

This legislation is supported by the South Coast Air Quality Management District, who recently came to Washington to speak to members of our state's delegation about the need to end this arbitrary statutory limit, which directly injures California.

CONGRATULATIONS TO KELLY
PHIPPS

HON. RALPH REGULA

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1999

Mr. REGULA. Mr. Speaker, the United States Institute of Peace held its twelfth annual National Peace Essay Contest and I am proud to announce that Ms. Kelly Phipps of my district won first place in Ohio. Ms. Phipps is a student at Jackson High School in Massillon, Ohio. Students are asked to write about the different measures that can be taken to prevent international conflicts.

The Peace Essay Contest is designed to encourage young people to think about international conflict management and resolution. Ms. Phipps wrote her essay on "Economics in Preventive Diplomacy: The Treaty of Versailles vs. The Marshall Plan."

I include a copy of her essay for my colleagues to review:

ECONOMICS IN PREVENTATIVE DIPLOMACY: THE
TREATY OF VERSAILLES VS. THE MARSHALL
PLAN

When desire for revenge clouds rational policy making, the results are disastrous. A comparison between the Treaty of Versailles and the Marshall Plan demonstrates effects of vengeance in foreign affairs and the need for nurturing economic policies to prevent conflict. After World War I, the harsh measures imposed upon Germany through the Treaty of Versailles not only failed to prevent future conflicts, but fueled the rise of the Third Reich. Under similar circumstances, the Marshall Plan created after World War II successfully rebuilt Western Europe, deterring threats on two fronts and proving that measures to strengthen economies are crucial to prevent hostility.

After an armistice was reached on November 11, 1918, Lloyd George of Great Britain,

Georges Clemenceau of France, and Woodrow Wilson of the United States led the Peace Conference in Paris ending World War I (A.A.I.R. 3, Goodspeed 269). Because of Germany's 1914 declarations of war on Russia and France, fear of further German aggression guided the conference (A.A.I.R. 3, Goodspeed 270). To prevent another widespread conflict, the conference produced the punitive Treaty of Versailles and created the League of Nations for enforcement.

The treaty signed on June 28, 1919, devastated the German Empire. Articles 118 and 119 stripped Germany of all overseas possessions, turning them over to the Allied and Associated Powers (A.A.I.R. 84). Based on declarations of war on France and Russia in 1914, Articles 231 and 232 held Germany independently accountable for the war and forced compensation for all damages in foreign territories (A.A.I.R. 123). The Treaty required Germany to pay 20 billion gold marks as an initial installment (Goodspeed 273). The total cost of reparations was 132 billion marks, to be paid over 35 years (Watt 503).

"It does much to intensify and nothing to heal the old and ugly dissensions between political nationalism and social democracy," warned the editors of the *New Republic*, claiming the Treaty was "bound to provoke the ultimate explosion of irreconcilable warfare ("Peace at Any Price" 184). As the value of the mark plummeted under austere economic penalties, desperation and resentment spread among the German people, setting the stage for the conflict between ultranationalists and democratic Western Europe. By 1923, the mark devalued to 5 million for every American dollar (Goodspeed 278-79). Devastating inflation consumed the saving of the German workers, creating disillusionment in Weimar Germany and a base of support for Nazism within the middle class (Pennock and Smith 562). A few months before the Treaty of Versailles was adopted, nationalistic parties accounted for a mere 15% of the German vote. By 1924, inflation had skyrocketed and nearly 39% of Germans were voting Nationalist (Pennock and Smith 567).

In 1924, the United States funded the Dawes Plan, offering limited loans to Germany (Goodspeed 286). The Dawes Plan both reduced the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles and eased Germany's nationalistic tendencies. After 1924, support for these parties decreased from 39% to 30%, illustrating the ties between economics and militant nationalism (Pennock and Smith 567). However, the withdrawal of German nationalism was only temporary; at the onslaught of the great Depression, the festering humiliation from the early 1920's resurged without restraint (Goodspeed 287).

The German elections of 1930 revealed increasing Nazi support. Party membership grew from 400,000 to 900,000, and Nazis claimed over a third of the seats in the Reichstag (Goodspeed 295). Nazi leaders such as Hitler used the humiliation and hardship caused by the Treaty of Versailles as a flash point for inciting German supremacy and desire for revenge among the German people (Goodspeed 273). The Nazi Secret Service offered employment to the nearly 6 million unemployed Germans who were turning to Nazism as a more secure alternative to the status quo (Goodspeed 295). Finally, the Enabling Act of 1933 passed in the Reichstag, giving Hitler absolute power for four years. With the entire nation under his whim, the Fuhrer could enact his dreams of a master race and German expansionism (Goodspeed 297).

While vengeance motivated the Treaty, moral concerns prevented the absolute destruction of Germany. Incidentally, it may have been this compromise that allowed Germany to reemerge as a global threat. As Machiavelli explains to Lorenzo De' Medici in *The Prince*, "Whoever becomes the master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it may expect to be destroyed himself . . . In republics there is more life, more hatred, a greater desire for revenge; the memory of their ancient liberty does not and cannot let them rest . . ." (48-49; ch. VI). The Treaty was enough to spark indignation in Germany, but not strong enough to prevent revenge. While annihilation of an enemy may be key to retaining power, reducing the humiliation of the enemy through reconstruction is morally superior and can ensure lasting peace.

After World War II, the Third Reich was disbanded, leaving the German in the hands of the Allies for the remainder of the year (Shirer 1139-40). The situation resembled the period following WWI, with the addition of threats of Communist aggression from the newly empowered Soviet Union. Reconstruction was necessary, but U.S. funds were scattered among the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Export-Import Bank and the United Nations. Two years and \$9 billion later, exports were still down 41 percent from 1938 levels (Hogan 29-30).

In 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall introduced a plan "directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos . . ." (Marshall 23). In his speech, Marshall explained that lasting peace required a cohesive aid program to solve the economic roots of conflict (Marshall 23-24). The Marshall Plan was intended to avoid another German nationalist backlash and to create a stable democratic Europe to deter Soviet expansion (Hogan 27). Both objectives were well-founded in history. First, as proven by the reduction of militarism in Germany after the Dawes Plan, economic stability checks the threat of militant nationalism. Also, just as German aggression in WWII occurred while Europe suffered from depression, economically weak nations are more likely to be attacked. Finally, Marshall aid would create confidence in capitalism, countering Soviet influence (Mee 248). With the intentions of Marshall Plan logically devised, economic success was all that was needed for the prevention of conflict.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 began U.S. action on Marshall's recommendations (Hogan 89). The Economic Endorsement Act made an international economic infrastructure a prerequisite for American aid; so the Committee for European Economic Cooperation was formed to develop a plan for European self-sufficiency (Hogan 124). Discussion in the 16-nation panel included the agriculture, mining, energy and transportation sectors of the economy, as well as recommendations for a more permanent regulatory body (Hogan 60-61). The resulting Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) included all Western European nations except Germany and directed the use of U.S. aid (Hogan 125-126).

Under OEEC, the United States poured aid dollars into Europe while increasing international trade through most-favored-nation agreements. The U.S. spent over \$13 billion on aid—1.2 percent of the U.S. GNP (Mee 258, Wexler 249). Efficient use of funds made economic improvements drastic and swift. Between 1947 and 1951, Western Europe's GNP increased by nearly \$40 billion, a 32 percent

increase, and industrial production grew 40 percent above 1938 levels (Wexler 250-51). With Western Europe fortified, aid could safely be extended to Germany (Mee 239).

In addition to combating nationalism, German reconstruction created a buffer to communist East Germany and added industrial resources to the European economy. Still scarred from past invasions, France refused to allow Germany to sign the OEEC protocol in April 1948. Later, with U.S. pressure, Germany has included in trade and was given funds, making German reintegration a common goal (Hogan 129-130). By the fall of 1948, many issues had been resolved and the Allies began to draft a framework for an independent, democratic West Germany. By 1964, Marshall aid increased foreign trade by 100 percent, boosted industrial production by 600% and reduced unemployment to a mere 0.4%. In Germany, the Marshall Plan had become more than just an aid package; it had jump-started production, preventing the conditions that spawned the Third Reich after W.W.I (Mee 256-57).

Today, American preventive action largely consists of sanctions to debilitate enemies or diluted aid policies that rely on handouts alone. The current situations of America's Cold War adversaries demonstrate the inadequacies of both policies. Like the Treaty of Versailles, America's continuing vendetta against Fidel Castro has produced decades of embargoes and hardship, but no signs of capitalist reform (Leeden 24). In the economically unstable Russia, current policies of IMF aid may seem similar to the Marshall Plan, but missing components will allow the ruble to continually devalue. Increased trade and regulatory body could permanently stimulate production, but dumping aid into a faulty infrastructure is temporary and wasteful ("Other Marshall Plan" 29).

While the iron first of the Treaty of Versailles dragged the world into a second World War, the Marshall Plan broke the cycle of German aggression. Additionally, the reconstructed nations created a power balance that helped keep the Cold War from igniting a full-blown conflict. While they may intimidate some countries, harsh economic measures punish innocent civilians and will always pose the risk of a backlash. Nourishing free-trade policies address the root causes of many conflicts, promoting more permanent peace. History demonstrates the need to remove vengeance from preventative diplomacy and address the world's problems with a more wholistic, stabilizing approach.

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PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. ROBERT W. NEY

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1999

Mr. NEY. Mr. Speaker, on June 8, 1999, the House voted on the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies FY 2000 Appropriations Act. More specifically, when the vote on the Chabot amendment (rollcall No. 174) took place, I was unavoidably detained. The Chabot amendment would have sought to prohibit funding for Market Access Program allocations. If I was present, I would have voted "no."

SUMTER, SOUTH CAROLINA ROTARY CLUB DEVELOPS "CART" FUND

HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR.

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1999

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, every day Alzheimer's disease claims more victims. Over four million Americans suffer from this dread disease, and scientists predict that unless cures are found, the number of victims will grow to fourteen million within the next twenty-five years. More people are also experiencing the tragedy second-hand as family members or friends of someone afflicted with Alzheimer's. They too feel helpless in the face of this awful illness. Options for treatment are limited, and care for the victim can be difficult and demanding. Family and friends become frustrated, not knowing what they can do.

The members of the Rotary Club in Sumter, South Carolina have found that there is something we can do. They have devised a technique to raise money for research, a technique so successful that I would like to share it with Congress and call attention to it, because what Rotarians have started in Sumter deserves to be copied across America.

There is hope on the horizon for Alzheimer's disease. Research teams are making progress in our understanding the disease. In 1995, scientists identified the gene believed to cause the most aggressive form of the disease. But no cause or cure has been found yet, and future research will require millions of dollars.

To help support the search for a cure, the Sumter Rotary Club developed what it calls the "CART" fund—Coins for Alzheimer's Research Trust. At each club meeting, Rotarians

are asked to empty their pockets of loose change—a small gesture that has generated large results. In a nine-month period, the 155 members of the Sumter Rotary Club raised over \$4,200 in this manner. Their success led them to share their idea with District 7770, which consists of 71 Rotary clubs with some 5,000 members. District 7770 adopted the project in 1996, and made Roger Ackerman Chairman and Dr. Jack Bevan and General Howard Davis (Retired) Co-Chairmen. District 7770 is driving forward with two major goals—awarding a \$100,000 grant to a medical institution on the cutting edge of Alzheimer's research and encouraging other Rotary districts to start a CART campaign. The other Rotary district in South Carolina, District 7750, plans to launch the project next month, and by next summer, the team hopes to add ten more districts. Their ultimate goal: to have Rotary International to adopt the project.

I am proud to represent these enterprising Rotarians. I commend them for spearheading this worthy project and encourage others across America to follow their example.

BRIGHTON HERITAGE MUSEUM

HON. JOHN SHIMKUS

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1999

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the residents of Brighton, IL as well as the Brighton Heritage Museum for the great strides they have taken to educate children about the past. "Maybe if people knew what happened before it would help them to decide some things in the future," June Wilderman, curator of the museum said. The museum displays numerous artifacts and stories from American history that have been donated by residents. There is even a piece of stone taken from the site of the Washington Monument when it was being built.

I am pleased to see the community coming together to help educate its young people and trying to create a deep sense of patriotism in their children and grandchildren. Educating our youth about the past is an essential part of creating a positive future.

HONORING THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NORTHWEST MICHIGAN HORTICULTURE RESEARCH STATION

HON. DEBBIE STABENOW

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1999

Ms. STABENOW. Mr. Speaker, Tuesday, July 6 marks the 20th anniversary of the Northwest Michigan Horticulture Research Station.

In 1979, cherry farmers, Michigan State University horticulture and Extension faculty, Michigan Department of Agriculture, USDA and fruit industry representatives banded together, sharing information and resources, to form a research station in the hopes of keeping themselves on the cutting edge of agriculture techniques.