

consideration of campaign finance reform legislation. I objected to the request and I want to explain to my colleagues why I did so.

There is no more important work for this institution than passing campaign finance reform. Despite our good efforts in 1974, following the debacle of Watergate, to limit the influence of money in our political system, we are currently operating without effective limits. We have a law that sets out reasonable limits at \$1,000 for individuals, \$5,000 for PACs, and \$25,000 to a national party. But those limits are easily evaded by the unlimited contributions of soft money. We have, in effect, no limits today.

The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act has, in effect, been repealed. To return our elections to issues and people and away from money, we must pass campaign finance reform. Since the time agreement is critical to determining how and when we take up campaign finance reform, and perhaps its ultimate success, I wanted to be sure that I understood what the agreement contained. I objected initially on the basis of needing time to review the agreement. Having read the agreement, I do continue my objection to the original unanimous consent proposal, because I believe the agreement is inadequate for the necessary consideration of campaign finance reform.

I am well aware of the opponents' desire to filibuster the McCain-Feingold bill, a bill which is supported by a majority of the Members of the Senate. The opponents have every right to do that, and I respect that right. But supporters of campaign finance reform have every right not to back down in the face of a filibuster.

The unanimous consent agreement proposed that each of us agree that the McCain-Feingold proposal be withdrawn if we do not get 60 votes on the first try to close off a filibuster. But as long as we have a majority of the Members of the Senate supporting passage of campaign finance reform, we should be able to defeat efforts to withdraw the McCain-Feingold bill from Senate consideration. Opponents can filibuster, but supporters don't have to agree in advance to withdraw in the face of that filibuster.

The unanimous consent agreement, however, would require supporters to agree to withdraw if we don't achieve, on the first try, the 60 votes necessary to close off the filibuster.

The unanimous consent agreement said that not sooner than the third calendar day of consideration a cloture motion may be filed on the McCain-Feingold bill, and if cloture is not invoked, the bill will be placed back on the calendar. It then said that it will not be in order during the remainder of the first session of the 106th Congress for the Senate to consider issues relevant to campaign reform. This agree-

ment would lock the Senate into relying on the one cloture vote to determine whether the fight for campaign finance reform, this year, lives or dies.

I cannot agree with that proposal. If we can't at first get 60 votes to close off the filibuster, I can't agree to putting the McCain-Feingold bill back on the calendar and just calling it quits for the year. The proposed time agreement would have us do that.

If it takes an all-out battle to keep campaign finance reform on the front burner of this Congress, I believe we should be prepared to wage such a battle. Opponents say they are prepared to wage such a battle in opposition. Supporters surely feel just as passionately in support of this bill as opponents do in opposition.

Another term of the agreement with respect to the consideration of amendments is also unacceptable to me. The proposed agreement says:

If an amendment is not tabled, it will be in order to lay aside such amendment for two calendar days.

The unusual provision allowing an amendment which the Senate has failed to table to be laid aside for 2 days puts in question whether such amendments will be voted on after they are not tabled prior to the cloture vote. I am afraid this provision would cause more mischief than facilitate serious consideration of key campaign finance issues.

I objected—and do object—to the unanimous consent agreement which was proposed yesterday. But I am, of course, willing to work with colleagues to try to address the concerns that I have.

Again, I want to emphasize that I am speaking as one Senator who was asked to participate in a unanimous consent agreement. The proponents, the sponsors of the bill, of course, with the leadership, have every right to work out any arrangement they see fit.

But to ask unanimous consent from this Senator to agree to proceeding in this form is something to which I objected, and do object, as a Senator.

I thank the Chair.

I note the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000—Continued

AMENDMENTS NOS. 1266 AND 1267 TO AMENDMENT NO. 1258, EN BLOC

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I send two amendments to the desk—one on behalf of myself for Senator SHELBY, and the other for Senator FEINSTEIN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative assistant read as follows:

The Senator from Nebraska (Mr. KERREY) for Mr. SHELBY and Mrs. FEINSTEIN, proposes amendments numbered 1266 and 1267 to Amendment No. 1258, en bloc.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendments be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendments en bloc are as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 1266 TO AMENDMENT NO. 1258

Following section (213)(t) add the following new subsection to section 213 as added by the Kyl amendment:

“(u) The Secretary shall be responsible for developing and promulgating Departmental security, counterintelligence and intelligence policies, and may use his immediate staff to assist him in developing and promulgating such policies. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship is responsible for implementation of all security, counterintelligence and intelligence policies within the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship may establish agency-specific policies unless disapproved by the Secretary.”.

AMENDMENT NO. 1267 TO AMENDMENT NO. 1258

On page 6, line 13 following the word “report” insert: “, consistent with their contractual obligations.”.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, these two amendments have been agreed to on both sides.

The first one was the agreed-upon amendment between Senator LEVIN and Senator KYL. We took my language and the language of Senator SHELBY and merged them. There is agreement on both sides. I think this and the reporting requirements of Senator FEINSTEIN are excellent additions to the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I concur with Senator KERREY.

I commend Senators LEVIN, KYL, DOMENICI, MURKOWSKI, and others who brought about the progress on the bill.

I urge adoption of the amendments en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments are agreed to en bloc.

The amendments (Nos. 1266 and 1267) were agreed to.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. KERREY. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I extend my appreciation to the managers, the good Senators, who have worked very hard to adopt this language.

This implements the heart of the amendment which I previously offered. I want to read it so that people who are following this debate—it is very