oversee and possibly censure the content of news reports and other information programs in Russia. This is a frightening prospect for all news organizations, particularly for privately owned independent media—who could lose their freedom to report news as they see it. This censorship effort could be particularly destructive during periods of increased political activity, such as national election campaigns.

Mr. Speaker, the situation today in Russia is especially precarious given President Yeltsin’s fragile health and the absence of strong leadership at the national level. This has been clearly demonstrated by the fact that President Yeltsin has dismissed three Prime Ministers in the past two years. With the upcoming parliamentary elections in December 1999 and presidential elections in June 2000, the situation is expected to become even more politically charged and volatile.

It would appear, Mr. Speaker, that the newly launched effort to control and/or censure the media in Russia is in large part explained by these upcoming elections. With the beginning of serious political activity over the next year in connection with the parliamentary and presidential elections, Kremlin authorities have accelerated their offensive against NTV and other independent news outlets. One of the clearest indications of this struggle is the fact that the state-owned television network ORT is using its news programs to undermine privately-owned rival television network.

Mr. Speaker, I have consistently supported U.S. policy to keep Russia from crossing the threshold of aggressive use of one’s nuclear potential. Thus, it is Islamabad that was the first to cross the threshold of aggressive use of one’s own nuclear potential.

Mr. Speaker, with the critical parliamentary and presidential elections coming up in Russia during the next twelve months, the Russian government must do everything in its power to insures free and fair reporting of all political events. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press are absolutely essential for any democratic nation. Russia’s international reputation and its position among the community of nations depend on how it deals with this most serious threat to its democracy.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES
OF OHIO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, July 29, 1999

Mrs. JONES of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, due to official business, I was unable to record my vote on the following measures that were considered in the House of Representatives today. Had I been present I would have voted "yea" on rollover vote 344. Mr. Speaker, had I been present for rolloff vote 344 I would have voted "no." Mr. Speaker, had I been present for rolloff vote 345, I would have voted "aye." Mr. Speaker, had I been present for rolloff vote 346, I would have voted "yea." Mr. Speaker, had I been present for rolloff vote 347, I would have voted "nay."

AFTER KARGIL—WHAT?

HON. BILL MCCOLLUM
OF FLORIDA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, July 29, 1999

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my concern over an important foreign policy decision. If left unpunished, the Pakistani conduct during the recent Kargil crisis—particularly in view of the Clinton Administration’s handling of the situation—sets a dangerous precedent for would-be aggressors and rogue nations. Failing to address the Pakistani precedent swiftly and decisively is therefore detrimental to the national security and well being of the United States.

Three aspects of the Pakistani behavior during the crisis should worry us:

1. Intentional reliance on nuclear capabilities in order to shield one’s own aggression. A policy advocated by radical Islamists since 1993, the current Pakistani nuclear doctrine constitutes a profound deviation from the post-VW norm of using nuclear weaponry—an ultimate deterrent in the form of weapons of last resort in case of aggression against one’s own state and/or most vital interests. The Pakistani intentional and unilateral ultimatum—repeated warnings to escalate the Kargil crisis into a nuclear war in case India’s reaction to the Pakistani aggression threatened to deprive Pakistan of any achievement—exceeds even the most aggressive use of the nuclear card by the USSR at the height of the Cold War (when Moscow reiterated its commitment to use nuclear weapons solely at time of a major world war). In contrast, the Pakistani nuclear ultimatum is identical to the nuclear blackmail doctrine of the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—a doctrine based on brinkmanship and blackmail which both states tinkered with but are yet to have implemented despite repeated crises. Thus, it is Islamabad that was the first to cross the threshold of aggressive use of one’s own nuclear potential.

2. Concealing the use of one’s own national military forces as deniable “militants.” In so doing, Islamabad demonstrated unwillingness to face responsibility for actions that amount to an act of war. This is a blatant break of the international order stipulating that sovereign governments acknowledge their own actions—thus opening up to United Nations intervention as well as other forms of crime management and containment by the international community. While such international intervention may not be welcome in Islamabad, or elsewhere for that matter, this is the way the modern world works: The acknowledged responsibility and accountability of sovereign governments are the cornerstones of international relations and are thus the key to preventing all out chaos in an already volatile world. Indeed, governments that internationally break away from this posture are labeled rogue and are shunned by the international community.

3. Using Pakistan-controlled Islamist terrorist networks in a war-by-proxy against India, presently waged mainly in Kashmir. The kind of terrorism Pakistan is blatantly using against India in pursuit of primary and principal interests of the state has long been considered unacceptable and illegal by the international community. The Kargil crisis and the ensuing marked intensification of Islamist terrorism throughout Kashmir constitute an unprecedented escalation of Islamabad’s continued sponsorship of, and reliance on, terrorism to further national strategic objectives. Even in the aftermath of the Kargil crisis, Islamabad is yet to demonstrate any inclination to stop its war-by-proxy against India.

By making the imperative for a “face saving” exit for Nawaz Sharif, the Clinton Administration in effect went along with Islamabad’s lies—thus covering up Islamabad’s rogue-state actions. The Clinton Administration in essence rewarded Pakistan for its aggression and nuclear blackmail, as well as blatant violation of previously signed international agreements (most notably the 1972 Simla Agreement). Together, the “solution” to the Kargil crisis forwarded by the Clinton Administration and the definition of the “Kashmir problem” remain now complex to resolve, and could make a mockery of the most basic norms of international relations and crisis resolution dynamics. As such, the Clinton Administration effectively encourages other rogues and would-be aggressors to pursue their objectives through brinkmanship, blackmail, aggression, and terrorism.

Instead, Pakistan should be recognized as the rogue and terrorism sponsoring state that it now is. Pakistan should be treated accordingly and, given the cynical use of war-by-proxy as a means of accumulating weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems capable of hitting the heart of the United States, as well as sponsoring high-quality terrorists capable of conducting spectacular strikes at the heart of the United States, it is imperative for Washington to ensure that none would dare to use these instruments against the United States, its allies and interests. The Clinton Administration’s “understanding” of, and support for, Islamabad’s rogue state behavior and blatant aggression send the opposite message—encouraging rogues and would-be aggressors to dare the United States and harm its interests with impunity.

In contrast, India should be rewarded for the responsibility and self-restraint practiced by New Delhi. Under the extreme pressure of a foreign invasion—albeit of a limited scope—on the eve of bitterly contested national elections, the Indian government rose to the challenge and placed the national interest ahead of political expediency. In so doing, New Delhi behaved like the major democratic power India