

flooding recedes. Wilmington has received over 18 inches of rain in the last approximately 48 hours, and other areas of eastern North Carolina have received enormous amounts of rain during the same period of time.

We have also had enormous problems with crop damage and injury and damage to our farms, particularly in eastern North Carolina. These farmers are already struggling and suffering and having a difficult time making ends meet. Now they have received a blow, which may very well be a death blow, to the crops they still have in the fields. As I said, these are people who are already teetering on the edge. Now these farmers and their families must deal with the damage that Hurricane Floyd has caused their farms.

We have also had roads washed out in eastern North Carolina. We know we have power outages all over eastern North Carolina, and we have and will continue to have enormous problems with increased erosion as a result of this hurricane hitting the coast of North Carolina.

Let me say, first, that I have been in regular contact with Governor Jim Hunt, the Governor of North Carolina, since this hurricane began to approach the southeastern coast of the United States in order to help prepare for what we knew was inevitable—that this would do great damage for our State. In addition, I have been in constant contact with mayors from eastern North Carolina whose counties have been hit the hardest by this hurricane. Yesterday afternoon, I spent some time at the FEMA headquarters with James Lee Witt looking at the FEMA operation—looking at what they were doing to prepare for the onslaught of this hurricane and their preparations for going in after the hurricane and dealing with destruction created by the hurricane.

I have to say, first of all, it was an incredibly impressive operation. James Lee Witt has done an extraordinary job of turning FEMA around. They are well prepared and well organized. I strongly suspect they will respond quickly and efficiently to the destruction this particular storm creates.

In addition to that, I talked to the Secretary of Transportation, Mr. Slater, about the problems with roads and roads being washed out, keeping in mind that North Carolina has just recently been hit with Hurricane Dennis, which washed out Highway 12 up on the Outer Banks of North Carolina, and now it has been hit again by a larger, more serious hurricane. We are going to have enormous problems with our roads in eastern North Carolina.

I have also spoken with Secretary Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture, because of our concern for the farmers in North Carolina. The tobacco farmers and the farmers of all kinds in eastern North Carolina are going to suffer

enormous crop damage as a result of the devastation created by this hurricane.

As I mentioned earlier, these are folks who are already struggling, already suffering, and already under enormous financial stress. And now here comes Hurricane Floyd putting what for many of them, I am afraid, will be the final nail in the coffin. These folks are going to need our help.

The bottom line is that while this hurricane has now moved out of North Carolina, it has created enormous damage. I think the devastation will be extraordinary once we have had a chance to go in and assess exactly what the damage has been.

As we go through the process of passing these various appropriations bills that the Senate is working very diligently on, I have asked my colleagues to keep in mind that the people of North Carolina, including the farmers of North Carolina, are desperately going to need help. They need help quickly, and they need that help getting to them in time to respond to the devastation that Hurricane Floyd has created.

I ask my colleagues in the Senate to keep that in mind. We will be in regular touch with the folks involved in appropriations in order to make them aware of the specific problems that we have in North Carolina.

I also add that this injury and this damage is not limited to North Carolina. I am absolutely certain there is damage in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina. As the storm moves north through Virginia and Maryland, I anticipate there will also be damage in those States.

I ask my colleagues not only from those States but all of my colleagues in the Senate to be prepared to respond and respond quickly to a devastating blow that has been dealt to my State of North Carolina and to the surrounding States that have been hit by Hurricane Floyd.

Finally, I would like to say just a word about the people of North Carolina and their response to this hurricane.

The people of North Carolina, fortunately, are very experienced in dealing with hurricanes. They have been hit time and time again. I have to say we have gotten way more than our fair share of hurricanes and hurricane damage. The response of folks in eastern North Carolina has been heroic. It was absolutely extraordinary to watch their discipline and preparation when they saw the storm coming, their organized and coordinated effort to evacuate the coast when those evacuations were necessary, and their preparation for what they knew was inevitable, which was that Hurricane Floyd was going to come through eastern North Carolina and wreak havoc and devastation.

I am so proud of the people of North Carolina who have responded so heroically and in such a well-organized way to what they knew was coming, and I expect that response will continue over the next weeks and months as we begin the efforts of cleaning up the devastation that has been created by Hurricane Floyd.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 20 minutes as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: LESSONS RELEARNED

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, over the course of the next several months, countless "lessons learned" studies assessed Operation Allied Force will be conducted by NATO authorities as well as by our armed services, our own Committees here in Congress, and their counterparts found among our NATO allies.

What I wish to do today is to approach this matter of "lessons learned" from the vantage point of one who regards the NATO Alliance to be a vital interest of the United States. I want to ensure that NATO's experience in Kosovo contributes to an Alliance that is better prepared for the challenges it will face in the next millennium.

The conflict over Kosovo was NATO's first war, and the Alliance did win. Operation Allied Force forced the regime of Serbian Prime Minister Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo. It thereby ended the systematic brutality that regime exercised against the province's Albanian population.

It was in many ways a military campaign of unprecedented success. Not a single NATO airman lost his or her life to enemy fire in the course of over 35,000 sorties. Despite a few tragic errors, the bombing campaign featured unmatched accuracy and precision.

However, while Operation Allied Force did attain victory, the accomplishment of its goals did not yield a shared sense of triumph and finality. This absence of triumph is the product of how NATO exercised its power in this war in light of the tremendous military advantages it had over its opponent, the forces of the Milosevic regime.

Among NATO's first and foremost objectives in this war was to stop the atrocities then being committed against Kosovar Albanians. Yet, in the course of Operation Allied Force, Milosevic accelerated and expanded his campaign of terror. Before the war was over, nearly 90% of Kosovar Albanians were driven from their homes by Serbian para-military and military forces.

Nearly one half were actually expelled from Kosovo.

Moreover, no less than 10,000 Albanians were executed by Milosevic's henchmen during the course of the NATO campaign. As we learn daily from the grim excavations of body-filled wells and mass graves, the actual figure is probably much, much higher. And then there were the countless rapes of Albanian women, which for cultural reasons will unfortunately never be fully reported—all occurring during the course of Operation Allied Force.

When assessing the lessons learned from the Kosovo war, we must not forget that the primary purpose of NATO's threats and then its bombing campaign was to prevent these tragedies from occurring.

Then there are the facts concern the balance of power between NATO and Serbia. It took the Alliance 78 days to force Milosevic from Kosovo, a region that size of Los Angeles County whose population was 90% Albanian—a population that wanted NATO's support and that would have warmly welcomed Alliance ground forces as was done when Operation Joint Guardian commenced.

That this campaign took 78 days is especially disturbing when one takes into account that, according to a Washington Post report, NATO was a standing force some 37 times larger than that fielded by Slobodan Milosevic and a combined economy that is 696 times larger than that of Serbia. These statistics do not come close to capturing the vast technological advantages NATO forces have over the Serbian military.

That NATO won the war is obvious. That in the course of Operation Allied Force, NATO demonstrated its awesome capabilities is indisputable. But, when assessing the lessons learned from this war, one cannot avoid the haunting fact that its results included an acute and brutal increase in the suffering of the Kosovar population, that an Alliance of such power and magnitude took over two months to defeat an exponentially far weaker foe, and that in the aftermath of Operation Allied Force, the regime that created this crisis remains not only in place, but belligerent.

So what are the key lessons and issues raised by NATO's first war, a war that brought NATO victory yet, denied it triumph?

The first and foremost lesson concerns the Alliance's political cohesion. Many have stated that NATO's greatest success in this conflict was that its 19 members hung together.

There can be no doubt that this cohesion was rooted in the common values and interests that bind the 19 Allies. But in recognizing this, one must not overlook a central fact: The first lesson from Operation Allied Force is that the trust among Allied military personnel

promoted by NATO is an invaluable reinforcer of the political cohesion binding NATO Allies. Allied unity in this war was never a given. Several allies floated proposals to temporarily halt the bombing campaign. Others publicly denied the use of their territory for forced entry into Kosovo or Serbia proper. NATO's political cohesion was vulnerable in an often very visible manner.

The trust and unity fostered among allied militaries through fifty years of joint planning, training, command and operations significantly buttressed the durability of Alliance cohesion during the conflict. Unfortunately, I fear that the significance of this military bond may never be fully appreciated. I am disturbed that French Defense Minister Alain Richard recently asserted that the experience of Operation Allied Force has only further legitimized Paris' inclination to remain outside of NATO's Integrated Military Command.

Quite the contrary, the war over Kosovo underscored the need for all Allies to become full members of that integrated command structure. It is an institution that facilitates and orchestrates more effective military operations by the NATO coalition. Its day-to-day operation is a cornerstone of trust and credibility that in times of crisis and war not only maximizes NATO's military effectiveness, but also its political unity.

As I just stated, numerous studies assessing the strategy behind Operation Allied Force are underway. Much attention will be directed, as it should, toward the factors that contributed to Milosevic's capitulation. These, of course, include that regime's intensified international isolation, the actual damage done to its military and civilian infrastructure, the role of the KLA, and the influence of slowly increasing NATO ground force deployments around Kosovo, among others.

We also need to ensure a fair and objective assessment of the Alliance's decision to tailor the bombing campaign around a strategy of gradual escalation. And, there has to be a thorough review of the decision to preclude the use of NATO ground forces for a forced entry into Kosovo. An important question will be whether a more severe and overwhelming application of force would have more effectively prevented the suffering that occurred in Kosovo over those 78 days.

Because so much attention will be directed toward these issues and others related to what went right and wrong in Kosovo, we must, however, avoid the mistake of making Kosovo a singular template for NATO's planning and preparations for future conflicts. As a matter of prudence, we have to assume that the future will present contingencies that are more demanding than that which we encountered over Kosovo.

Hence, the central focus of our assessments must be the following issue: Did Operation Allied Force demonstrate that NATO benefits from a force structure that can deploy on suitably short notice, be sustained over long distances, and readily provide Alliance leaders the option of swiftly delivering overwhelming force, be it from the sea, from the air, or from the ground?

These are not new standards. The Alliance's Strategic Concept of 1991, which was updated in the course of the Washington Summit last April, postulated a NATO force featuring "enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary." That same doctrine also called upon the Alliance to have available "appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and discriminately." With this in mind, NATO established in 1991 its "Rapid Reaction Forces."

So after eight years, just how rapid and overwhelming are NATO's forces?

Operation Allied Force yielded a very mixed answer to this question. And, it generates concern on my part about the overall readiness of Allied forces, including those of our own country, and, thus, the overall health of the Alliance.

First, it is clear that the Alliance's ability to deliver devastating firepower from the air emerges almost solely from the United States. The U.S. provided 70% of the aircraft flown in Operation Allied Force. And, an overwhelming majority of the precision guided missions launched in the conflict were American.

While Allied Force demonstrated the awesome capacities of American air power, it also highlighted glaring shortfalls in European inventories, including: fighter-bombers; electronic jamming aircraft; advanced command, control, and communications capacities; intelligence capacities; and, precision-guided munitions.

Instead of becoming a symbol of NATO power, Operation Allied Force emerged as a symbol of the imbalance that exists between the military capabilities of the United States and its Allies. While it is true that our allies are bearing their share of responsibility in Operation Just Cause, we cannot ignore the unequal capabilities the Allies bring to the forward edge of NATO's sword.

The Alliance's singular dependence upon the United States is neither conducive to transatlantic unity nor is it the best way to provide an Alliance capability that is robust in the fullest sense of the term. An Alliance is simply not healthy if it is solely dependent upon the capabilities of but one member.

It is, thus, especially disturbing that both France and Germany announced

planned cuts in their defense budgets just weeks after the end of Operation Allied Force. It raises questions as to how seriously they take this matter.

Second, the Kosovo war highlighted great gaps in inter-operability that divide Allied forces. No military commander has dedicated more time and focus on this urgent concern than General Klaus Naumann, who stepped down in April as Chairman of NATO's military Committee. He has repeatedly warned that "the growing gap of capabilities which we see inside NATO... will lead to an inter-operability problem."

Operation Allied Force showed that this inter-operability problem is not a matter of military theory, but that it is matter of real and urgent concern. As we all know, Serbian forces were given advance warning of Allied attacks, including specific targets, when Allied aircraft were forced to communicate over open and insecure radio channels because they did not benefit from suitably compatible and secure communications systems. This, needless to say, undercut the effectiveness of the bombing campaign. More importantly, it subjected Allied pilots to unnecessarily greater danger.

Third, the Kosovo war highlighted the limited mobility of Allied forces. In April, I was disturbed to hear our nation's premier military experts assert that it would take months for the Alliance to deploy a ground force in the Balkans suitable for a forced entry into Kosovo or Serbia. Considering the relative size and capability of Serbia's armed forces to that of NATO and the proximity of Kosovo to available staging grounds for such a forced entry, this assertion does not reflect well on the mobility of NATO military capacities.

This is a matter relevant not only to our European Allies, but also to the United States as well. As the Kosovo War demonstrated, not every conflict of the future will be like that of Operation Desert Storm where the United States was able to use literally months to build-up the offensive force necessary to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. In 1991, NATO established its Rapid Reaction Corps. I repeat in 1991! Where was this corps and its rapidly deployable assets when NATO found itself confronted by a regime that was exponentially weaker and situated in its backyard, if not on its doorstep?

These are not new issues nor new conclusions. Burden-sharing has always been an acute thorn in the side of Alliance unity. For several years, numerous European and American commanders, in addition to General Naumann, have been warning of the growing technology gap between the armed forces of the United States and Europe. And, NATO's own Strategic Concepts have been urging the Alliance to field forces that are rapidly

deployable and assets that can sustain these forces over long distances and long periods of time. What is disturbing is that after nearly a decade, the need for such forces has been so loudly reaffirmed by the Kosovo war.

Considering what can happen in war, Operation Allied Force provides a not-so-gentle reminder of the need to more seriously address these challenges. If one believes, as I do, that one has to assume that NATO will in the future face contingencies more challenging than that presented in Kosovo, it is imperative that NATO do more than study these issues. Alliance members must dedicate the resources necessary to overcome these shortcomings. To quote General Naumann again, what "we require [is] action, and not just more paper declarations."

In addition to reviewing and studying the insights provided by Operation Allied Force upon Allied military strategy and capabilities, we have to remember that NATO is first and foremost a political Alliance. The conduct and procedures used in the course of the Kosovo war by NATO's political authorities must also be reviewed and critiqued.

It was discomfiting, to say the least, to observe inter-Alliance disputes over target lists emerge on the public scene. NATO stumbled in the first phase of the campaign when individual NATO heads of state were personally reviewing and squabbling over daily targets lists.

These disputes, which concerned how to achieve ends through the use of force, raise a number of questions that must be addressed over the coming months. These include the following:

Was Operation Allied Force an example of coalition warfare or a "war by committee?"

Should the Alliance establish procedures that will further separate the political and diplomatic decisions defining the objectives of war as well as the decision to go to war from those military decisions through which the war is executed?

In the course of Operation Allied Force, did the SACEUR benefit from the flexibility and freedom of action his office requires in the conduct of war? Are there alternative arrangements between the SACEUR and the NAC that the Alliance should consider?

Does the SACEUR have sufficient command and control over his subordinate commanders?

With regard to the last question, it has been widely reported that in the course of the NATO-Russia showdown over the Pristina airport, British Commander General Robertson refused an order from SACEUR General Clark to seize that airport prior to the arrival of the Russian battalion. General Robertson balked at the order and successfully appealed to his British senior political authorities to have that order

rescinded. This example demonstrated the inherently political nature of NATO's multi-national command structures, one that warrants close examination.

The questions I have raised constitute the core issues of coalition warfare. They are central to the Alliance's ability to sustain unity in times of crisis and conflict. They are also core issues of civilian control over the military, a cornerstone of democracy.

While it is widely known that many NATO officers were not totally enamored of the political constraints they were dealt in Operation Allied Force, the evidence currently available indicates that they accepted and respected these constraints. They fully respected the authorities of their civilian leaders. That is another overlooked NATO success story in Operation Allied Force.

In posing the aforementioned questions, the intention is not necessarily to yield structural change, but to ensure a fuller understanding of what to expect and demand of our Alliance's political and military leadership in times of conflict. In doing so we may be better able, and I quote again General Naumann, "to find a way to reconcile the conditions of a coalition war with the principles of military operations such as surprise and the use of overwhelming force." That sustaining Allied unity was one of the success stories of Operations Allied Force is a fact that shows how NATO manages war is as important a matter as the capacities NATO brings to war.

The Kosovo war also yielded lessons about another issue of great importance to the Alliance, the relationship between NATO and Russia. Over the last decade the alliance has made great efforts to transform that relationship into one of partnership. Toward that end, it invited Russia to join its Partnership to Peace Program, and in 1997 the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed establishing a unique consultative relationship between Brussels and Moscow. This effort to build a genuine partnership must be continued, but it also must be pursued with greater realism.

The Kosovo war was the first major test of the progress made in relations between the Alliance and Russia since the end of the Cold War. Moscow's conduct in the course of this conflict and its immediate aftermath demonstrated that while Russia may not be the protagonist it was in the Cold War, it is certainly not a partner, at least not today. To paraphrase Russia analyst Tom Graham, Russia is more often than not, sometimes purposely and sometimes inadvertently, a troublesome problem.

A brief review of Russia's role in the Kosovo conflict underscores this point. First, remember that Russia still calls for NATO's dissolution. Second, from

the very start of Operation Allied Force, Moscow harshly condemned the bombing campaign and sided with Slobodan Milosevic. Russia continued oil transfers to Serbia despite a request by nearly all other European democracies to impose an embargo. So-called "Russian volunteers" operated with Milosevic's forces in Kosovo and Serbia and with the blessing of Moscow authorities. Third, Russia's successful dash to Pristina and its airport required a great deal of coordination with Serbian authorities. Moreover, let us not forget that Russian and Serbian soldiers jointly manned roadblocks in Kosovo that impeded the movement of Allied units in the initial days of Operation Just Cause.

Russia's conduct in the course of Operation Allied Force and its self-invited role in Operation Just Cause demonstrated the volatility that still characterizes Russia's foreign policy, particularly its approach to NATO. Russian participation in NATO diplomatic and military operations is a double-edged sword, and has to be treated as such, particularly when sensitive Alliance operations are at stake.

Engaging Russia should remain a significant priority of the Alliance. Introducing greater realism to this effort does not mean isolating Russia. It does involve recognizing the difficult challenge of simultaneously promoting cooperation and mutual accommodation while avoiding propitiating risk-taking behavior by Moscow, such as that which occurred in Pristina.

The lesson from Kosovo is that while we must engage Russia with the goal of creating partnership, greater realism and caution in this endeavor is more likely to yield more stable and enduring cooperation.

The Kosovo war demonstrated the continued centrality of NATO to transatlantic security. It has demonstrated the awesome power that emanates from allied unity. It underscored the profound political and military pay-off that comes from fifty years of intensive military consultation, cooperation, coordination, joint planning, joint training, and all the day-to-day activities the Allied militaries conduct to protect and defend our common values and interests and peace.

The war over Kosovo tangibly reminded us of the military and political challenges NATO will likely face in the future. It was a firm reminder of the need for the Alliance's force structure to become more mobile and more capable of rapid deployment. It was an urgent call for improvements in the inter-operability of Allied forces and in the balance of transatlantic military capabilities. And it provided the first test of NATO's ability to manage war in the post-Cold War era.

As Operation Allied Force was NATO's first war, it is essential that we ensure that it is comprehensively

reviewed. In objectively assessing what went right and wrong, we must keep our eyes upon NATO's future. We must also work to ensure that the lessons learned and relearned from Operation Allied Force will not just reside in dusty reports but actually prompt decisions and actions that improve NATO's ability to decisively manage the political and military levels of war.

Mr. President, I have quoted General Klaus Naumann several times and wish to share with my colleagues the transcript of his farewell remarks of May 4, 1999, the last day of his tenure as Chairman of NATO's Military Committee. They provide sage advice concerning NATO's future from an experienced military commander, and I urge my colleagues to take the time necessary to review them. I ask unanimous consent they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE

(By General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of the Military Committee)

GENERAL NAUMANN. Ladies and Gentlemen, first of all thank you very much for coming. I thought I should not hand over my Chairmanship of the Military Committee after three and a quarter years without having addressed you once again and giving you a little bit of I should say an up-date. Where do we stand at this point in time, after three and a quarter years which presumably will go down in history as the most turbulent years in NATO's 50 years of history, years in which the Alliance changed more profoundly than ever before.

I think it is best expressed by two political data which marked my tour. It started more or less with the Berlin Foreign Ministers meeting in June 1996 when the Alliance set sail to give itself a new set of missions, and it ended more or less with the Washington Summit a couple of days ago, where we published a number of documents in which all this progress which we made I think is really enshrined.

Of course you may be focused, as I am these days, on Kosovo. But I think we should not forget the bigger picture as well and I think I would like to bring to your attention a few points which belong to the bigger picture. When I assumed office as Chairman of the Military Committee, I had 14 nations sitting around the table—14. Then France joined, then Iceland, after 49 years, joined the Military Committee. And now we have three new members at the table. It is a clear indication that NATO maintains and has strengthened cohesion and achieved improvements.

One of the improvements which I would like to mention is the new command structure which hopefully over time will lead to marked improvements, particularly in the southern region of NATO, and I dare to say no Chairman of the Military Committee before me has invested so much time and devoted so much attention to the problems of the southern region, and in particular of southeastern Europe. And as a matter of fact we have made big progress in this area and we planted seeds which hopefully will produce over time a really big and powerful tree.

We also began to work in these three years in the EAPMC format. We got partners to contribute and to engage in a dialogue. This has been for me the most fascinating experience. We should never forget most of these partners were just 10 years ago in the camp of NATO's enemy, and now we are working together. And we got them in this new format of the EAPMC to contribute, to engage in dialogue, and I believe this instrument of the EAPMC has the biggest gross potential for crisis management and conflict prevention in Europe if we handle it properly. So this is something we should dwell on in the future.

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QUESTION. General, that was the first confirmation we have heard that the two planes lost by NATO were shot down. Can you reconfirm that they were shot down?

GENERAL NAUMANN. I think that we have said in previous statements that they were shot down.

QUESTION. And I have a follow-up. You have been a key player in the Kosovo operation since it started. How difficult is it going to be for somebody else to take over your position and how do you feel about it personally? Is it going to be difficult for you to be no longer operationally involved in something that you have been involved in from the beginning, and is there a risk of you turning into one of those people that you have criticized in the past, an armchair General, who will be advocating sending in ground troops the minute you take your uniform off?

GENERAL NAUMANN. Starting with your last point, I can assure you I will not join the league of armchair generals and I will refrain from any comment with regard to the activities of any of my successors. That is for me part of fair play. And I am pretty well aware that it is very easy to sit in an armchair and to make wonderful proposals since you do not feel the burden of responsibility on your shoulders. The only responsibility you have is to cater for the cheque you receive in some of the broadcasting stations for giving interviews, and I do not want to join that league.

Secondly, with regard to how I feel personally, well of course you are not entirely happy in such a situation. It is like leaving a group of friends aboard a ship which is in stormy seas and suddenly I am whisked away by a helicopter. I haven't ordered the helicopter and I am not entirely happy that I have to leave and pack, but there is no choice, that is not my choice.

And with regard to how I feel to be replaced, I think no-one is irreplaceable. Had I run my car into a tree yesterday night, they had to face the problem to replace me as well, or had I hit myself with a golf club by trying to have too good a swing, they may have a problem as well. So that is not a question, everyone is replaceable.

MARK LAITY (BBC). You are not yet an armchair general so can I invite you to talk about ground forces? You have said in interviews that military doctrine states that air power has never yet won a war on its own so do you think this one can and if so why? And taking up your theme of the limitations of coalition warfare, do you think the lack of a ground option is a result of the limitations of coalition warfare and the lack of agreement on that?

GENERAL NAUMANN. First of all, it's true that military experience so far has suggested that an air campaign so far in history never won a war, that is true and we have mentioned this again and again. But as I said in

my briefing, we see a real chance that we can make it and for that reason I think there is no necessity at this point in time to change strategy. We would give out all the wrong signals. We are making progress, we are nibbling away night by night and day by day at some of his military capabilities? Why should we change?

You should also not forget that this air campaign is after all, as far as I can see, presumably one of, if not the most successful one which we have seen so far. That is to some extent related to technology since we have many new assets in our inventory which we use successfully, and it is on the other hand related to the fact that we succeeded in winning the necessary air superiority in mid- to high-altitudes.

Furthermore, I should say this campaign was never planned without a ground force option at the end but the ground force option is based on a permissive environment. So that will come at the end of the campaign, and for that reason we still stick to military doctrine and, as you know, we are advised to keep all our plans under permanent review—which by the way is a good old military custom and experience. I hope with that I have answered the question.

MARK LAITY. Could you take up the point about whether coalition warfare is the problem here that has restricted your options regarding a non-permissive ground force?

GENERAL NAUMANN. I said earlier on that from my perspective we have seen really good co-operation between the military and the political sides in the planning and preparation of this campaign. For that reason, I simply cannot confirm the notion that the conditions of coalition warfare prevented us from taking up any options at all.

QUESTION. General, the strategy behind the air campaign has been criticized in that it limited the number of initial targets and that the phased nature of the campaign gave time to the Yugoslav forces to adjust. With the benefit of hindsight, what would you have done differently to make this campaign more effective?

GENERAL NAUMANN. First of all, I really dispute that the campaign is not effective. It is not working as quickly as perhaps many of you had expected. What I think, with hindsight, worth considering are the two points, which I made earlier when I spoke about the two principles of military operations, and that is surprise and overwhelming power. That of course is not possible as far as I can see under the conditions of coalition warfare and that makes a difference between a coalition facing a national state and a coalition facing another coalition. For that reason, I think we need to think through how we can make sure in future operations how we can achieve one or both of them.

QUESTION. General, there are assessments that the present operation would have been more effective if NATO had launched the whole operation sooner. Can you share this view?

I would come back again to the air campaign. Taking just a military point, what could we achieve just through an air campaign within the different time-scale?

And thirdly, if I may, how seriously has NATO/Russian military co-operation been damaged?

GENERAL NAUMANN. On the last point, better leave it to the judgement of our Russian colleagues. It is not we who have left co-operation, it is them, and so they have the onus to come back.

With regard to the air campaign, I believe that the air campaign is properly working

but you should also take into account that we have conditions which we have to follow which are degrading to some extent the impact of the air campaign, most notably the conditions that we have to avoid collateral damage.

The Serb military forces are hiding their vehicles, their armour, their artillery in Kosovo next to civilian buildings, to churches, to mosques and what have you. We don't attack them under these circumstances, although we technically could do it, but this would destroy something which we don't want to destroy. I think we have the justified value of all of our society—after all in sharp contrast to Mr. Milosevic—that we don't like war, we the democracies hate war. And for that reason we have got the task of avoiding the loss of human life and I think you would have to look for quite a time in your history books to find an air campaign which lasted 41 days, being conducted in quite an impressive air-defense environment, without one soldier wounded let alone killed. It is not a bad result.

On the question of how long it will take us, I cannot give you an answer. There are two to tango and we have a lot of patience if he wants to challenge us.

QUESTION (New York Times). General Naumann, you said in your opening statement that an air campaign alone can't stop the ethnic cleansing operation.

GENERAL NAUMANN. Entirely, I said.

SAME QUESTIONER. Entirely. If President Milosevic doesn't change his mind and back down and accept the five points, is it possible do you think that ground forces would not be able to go in a permissive environment and get the refugees back home before the winter sets in, which comes early in Kosovo, at the end of September or October?

GENERAL NAUMANN. First of all, when I said "cannot entirely stop ethnic cleansing and killing from the air" I think I simply referred to the fact that if we have a policeman or one of these paramilitary thugs running around chasing unarmed civilians with rifles or threatening them with knives, you cannot stop this from the air. It is asking the impossible. But what we can do is to make life for these people so miserable that they will think twice whether they should continue. And then of course we should not speculate at this point in time under which conditions an implementation force will go in. Of course, we will see the impact of a continued air campaign and we will see how they will feel after a few more weeks, months or what have you of continuously pounding them into pieces.

QUESTION. General Naumann, I think you said, if I heard right, that President Milosevic's campaign of mass deportation is still achievable. Could you expand on that and tell us what you mean? Although there are still many hundreds of thousands of Albanians still in Kosovo, do you believe it is still achievable?

GENERAL NAUMANN. I think if he really wants to get them out and if he uses in the same way the brutal tactics he has used so far, he may have a chance to do this. I don't know how long they will be able to hide, how long they will be able to sustain their lives under very miserable conditions. And we should not forget what we have seen and statements we have seen of his brutal shelling of unarmed civilians with artillery and with tanks. This will have an impact over time and I only hope that the appropriate international bodies will take care of those who committed these crimes of war.

QUESTION (Newsweek Magazine). General Naumann, this seems to be a war in which we

count the bodies of our friends and the people we're defending. We count them by the hundreds of thousands, the people we are defending, who have been thrown out of their country and we are proud that we have killed a couple of dozen of the enemy. Does this strike you, as a soldier, as ironic or as a good way to fight a war?

And why do we think that the Serbs will capitulate if they are left untouched while the people we are defending are massacred and deported en masse?

GENERAL NAUMANN. First of all, I think it is a wrong impression that they are untouched. What we do not know is how many casualties they have, but if I take the fact which presumably was briefed—I didn't have the time to follow the briefing this afternoon—of what result they achieved last night and during the day, if you take it that several tanks and artillery pieces were hit, this is not free of cost of life.

SAME QUESTIONER. But we don't count those, we are not given those numbers, we are only given the numbers of the people being deported.

GENERAL NAUMANN. We don't count—and we cannot count—since, as you all know and you can hear it day by day if you watch CNN when they issue their pictures from Serbia they mention after—I would appreciate it much more if they could do it in the beginning before they make their reports from Mr. Sadler—they mention that this has been censored and that they have to submit their film material to the Yugoslav authorities so that they can control what they are allowed to report. That is the daily statement which we hear on CNN and for me it is quite amazing as a military man that we have not heard one single statement about loss of military life from the Serb side. They mention buses, just the one yesterday which they alleged we had hit with an air bomb, but if you looked at the bus only a layman could believe that this was the impact of an air-delivered weapon, since the bus looks different if you hit it with a bomb as we have seen. But they get credibility for that and many of you take the story up and say: "This was NATO!"

I think you are all experts to some extent and I think many of you are capable of differentiating whether a bus was hit by a bomb or by something like infantry weapons and regarding this last one, I have seen buses which were hit by real weapons and they look different.

SAME QUESTIONER. But why are we so worried about Serb civilians in fact? Why are we worried so much—not the press—why are you so worried about killing Serb civilians when the Serb government that they support very strongly is massacring and deporting hundreds of thousands of people?

GENERAL NAUMANN. You may be right from a moral point of view but we have got the clear order to avoid civilian casualties and that order we execute. And so you should not be surprised if we regard it as a mistake if one civilian has been killed. And it is not our judgement to establish the moral balance. For us it is a deficiency if we kill innocent lives, and I leave aside what the inmates of this bus were doing. That doesn't matter for us. It is deplorable that we hit this bus—the one on the bridge I mean—and that people lost their lives since it was something we were told to avoid. But as I told you, the overall performance in executing this order I think is good and if I compare the number of approximately 15,000 pieces of ordnance dropped and six mishaps, I think it is really not a bad performance.

QUESTION (CBS News). General, you said just a few moments ago that there is no reason to change tactics, to bring in ground troops and then in the next breath you say that Milosevic, if he really wants to, can ethnically-cleanse all of Kosovo. We have had figures today of 90 percent of people thrown out of their homes, of killings, of rapes. Is that not reason enough?

GENERAL NAUMANN. You are asking a moral question, I understand you fully and from a moral point of view I also hate to see this news, but on the other hand, you can only do what is achievable and what is acceptable by our nations in this Alliance. And for that reason I have to tell you once again that we have no reason at this point in time to change the strategy which is focused to some extent on the philosophy of our democracies that we should avoid casualties, we should avoid the loss of life. That is the basic point. You may be morally dissatisfied with that but that is how life is.

QUESTION. General, you had the opportunity and the experience to meet Milosevic. You said before that we needed two to tango. Do you think that the international community can still ask Milosevic for a tango and make a political agreement with him? Secondly, according to your statement before, are the Albanians paying the price of an experiment which wants to show that the war can be won without ground troops?

GENERAL NAUMANN. No, to your last point definitely no. I think I explained to you where we stand in our societies and I think I also mentioned to you that we have to have consensus among 19 nations and that is something which you can't get on this critical issue. With regard to Milosevic and my personal experience of him, the only thing which I am really looking forward to in my imminent retirement is that this makes sure that I will never see him again!

QUESTION. General, you said that Milosevic was the best recruiting agent for the KLA but in fact it seems to me that NATO is really the best recruiting agent of the KLA since the air campaign which is taking place is partly to their benefit. You pointed out that it was impossible to eliminate the forces that merely clear villages and so on, two or three policemen could do that, but it was possible of course to degrade the Serb forces. Is in fact NATO, since there is no consensus of putting in forces in a non-permissive environment, basically hoping that the KLA will be able to do that job for them, thereby really becoming the KLA's air force?

GENERAL NAUMANN. We clearly do not want to become the KLA's air force. We have no intention of clearly siding with the KLA since we know pretty well what the political consequences may be and we still stick to the line—and I hope that President Milosevic will eventually understand it—that Kosovo should remain part of the FRY, that is part of the five points, and if he is really responsible with regard to his own people and the future of his own country, he would really grasp the opportunity.

QUESTION. General, how serious is the lack of deeds you mentioned in your statement that we need to see concerning the ESDI and the Combined Joint Task Forces. How serious is this lack in your opinion?

GENERAL NAUMANN. I have to tell you that if I read all these wonderful declarations on European Security and Defence Identity, I always admire the fantasy of those who are drafting but I am a very pragmatic, very simple-minded soldier, I would like to see something and then I compare what the Europeans can do in this present campaign and

what they cannot do and for that reason for me the very simple conclusion is that they have got to do something. And there are very simple things which you can do that do not eat up a tremendous amount of money. I am not talking of launching a European satellite programme or what have you but you have deficiencies in the European forces which have to be corrected as a matter of urgency.

Many of our air forces, for instance, do not dispose of stand-off weaponry. They have to fly more or less over the target which is the most stupid thing you can do since you expose yourself to the enemy air defence.

Another essential capability, the capabilities of the Europeans with regard to combat search and rescue are not very impressive. That is not a thing which costs tremendous billions of dollars, it is not something which would make the armaments industry open the bottles of champagne but it is extremely important for the morale of the pilots and for them nothing counts more than the assurance "We'll get you out!" And for the morale of our pilots I think nothing was more important than these two successful search-and-rescue operations and that is something we need to do.

And if I look at the deplorably slow deployment of our forces to Albania and FYROM, had we something like a European transport aircraft capability then we could do better.

Take the example of the humanitarian effort. We looked into this but most of the European transport aircraft are two-engine aircraft and they cannot climb to an altitude where you can safely travel without being exposed to missile air defences.

These are all things which can easily be done and for that you don't need another voluminous conceptual paper—we Germans are very good at liking concepts, nothing without concepts. It buys you time by the way so you have a lot of time to talk of the concepts before you have to take action!—and that is what we need to avoid. And we can take decisions, we can take them now and it would not blow up the defence budgets of the nations.

Another point which from my point of view is really the core of the issue is that if we really want to do something in Europe then we have to start to harmonise the research and development programmes of our nations. The United States of America is spending \$36 billion dollars per year for research and development, the Europeans all together—I think plus Canada—spend \$10 billion dollars per year but in contrast to them, the European programmes are not co-ordinated. So what we see expressed in these facts is an ever-growing gap between the Europeans and the Americans, and this needs to be redressed. And for something like this you don't need a European summit, you need something like the will to decide.

QUESTION. Are we positive that the VJ is digging-in in Kosovo. Jamie Shea talked this afternoon about Maginot Line kind of works. What conclusions do you draw from that and do you have the impression that still quite a lot of the refugees in Kosovo are being kept there for tactical reasons? And did you solve the problem with spies when it was talked about. That the target list was known in Belgrade at the beginning of the campaign have you any news on that?

GENERAL NAUMANN. I do not wish to comment on such speculations like the last one. That the VJ is digging-in we have seen for the last couple of weeks. They are preparing for the defence of Kosovo and they follow the good old tactics which we learned in the days of the Cold War of the Soviet tactics of

defence, so it is exactly what we have in our text books that we see right now. We are not surprised by that and by the way, the more they dig in the more fixed the targets will be, the easier to hit them.

QUESTION. For the last question, General, to sum up all this discussion, what would be your vision for the development of NATO's armed forces for the future?

GENERAL NAUMANN. First of all, I think we need to find ways in which we can achieve a complementary contribution between the United States and Europe. This does not mean competition but we need to harmonise our capabilities in such a way that they really complement each other. I think that is feasible and I think it is necessary since after all we will continue to be confronted with very scarce defence dollars or euros and so we have to follow the line which our American friends are expressing with the simple sentence: "We have to get the biggest bang possible for the buck!" That is something we are not doing right now.

Secondly, we need armed forces which are ready for quick deployment, which are capable of operating under austere conditions. Whether this will be inside or outside the NATO treaty is unimportant.

We need to have forces which have a mission effectiveness and by that I mean they have to be able to project power from a distance. This means in the initial phase presumably something like unmanned vehicles like the Cruise missile, or similar capabilities, but also it goes in the direction of stand-off weaponry for our air forces and for some of our ships.

Then we need the capability to command and control such forces wherever they will be employed. We need very mobile Command, Control and Communications (C3) and we need excellent intelligence.

And if we think added as a fifth point that we have to be able to sustain these forces then I think you have the description of the future alliance forces. This means employed only on their own territory, this does not fit into NATO's future pattern and we have too think this through. By the way that is not only a problem for Germany, it is a problem for many other countries in this Alliance but if politicians are serious about using their armed forces—which I think is presumably the proper answer to the security environment—then we have to be sure that the remaining forces are so flexible and so deployable that we will be able to defend an ever-increasing NATO treaty area with ever-decreasing forces.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.

TAX CUTS HELP AMERICAN FAMILIES

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, the Congress has just sent to the President a tax relief package. I believe very strongly that we can do three things: We can cut taxes, we can make substantial strides in paying down the debt, and we can save Social Security.

I do not think that asking for a tax cut of between 3 and 3.5 percent of the total anticipated budget spending in the next 10 years is being irresponsible. That is how this administration—the President and the Vice President, AL GORE—would like to characterize it. We have the highest tax burden since