

proceed to closing arguments for not to exceed 3 hours each and further business will resume after that.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M., MONDAY,  
FEBRUARY 8, 1999

Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Court of Impeachment stand adjourned under the previous order.

There being no objection, at 5:06 p.m. the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Monday, February 8, 1999, at 1 p.m.

#### LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, further, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate resume legislative session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ENZI). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The majority leader.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I believe we have some routine business to conclude.

#### REPORT CONCERNING THE ONGOING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED DURING ADJOURNMENT—PM 4

Under the authority of the order of the Senate of January 6, 1999, the Secretary of the Senate, on February 5, 1999, during the adjournment of the Senate received the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

*To the Congress of the United States:*

Pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174, I am providing this report to inform the Congress of ongoing efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This is the first semiannual report that evaluates progress in BiH against the ten benchmarks ("aims") outlined in my certification to the Congress of March 3, 1998. NATO adopted these benchmarks on May 28, 1998, as part of its approval of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) military operations plan (OPLAN 10407). The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) subsequently adopted corresponding benchmarks in its Luxembourg Declaration of June 9, 1998.

NATO, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and my Administration have coordinated closely in evaluating progress on Dayton implementation based on these benchmarks. There is general agreement that there has been considerable progress in the past year. The basic institutions of the state, both political and economic, have been established. Key laws regarding foreign investment, privatization, and property are now in place. Free-

dom of movement across the country has substantially improved. Fundamental reform of the media is underway. Elections have demonstrated a continuing trend towards growing pluralism. Nevertheless, there is still much to be done, in particular on interethnic tolerance and reconciliation, the development of effective common institutions with powers clearly delineated from those of the Entities, and an open and pluralistic political life. The growth of organized crime also represents a serious threat.

With specific reference to SFOR, the Secretaries of State and Defense, in meetings in December 1998 with their NATO counterparts, agreed that SFOR continues to play an essential role in the maintenance of peace and stability and the provision of a secure environment in BiH, thus contributing significantly to progress in rebuilding BiH as a single, democratic, and multiethnic state. At the same time, NATO agreed that we do not intend to maintain SFOR's presence at current levels indefinitely, and in fact agreed on initial reductions, which I will describe later in this report. Below is a benchmark-by-benchmark evaluation of the state-of-play in BiH based on analysis of input from multiple sources.

1. Military Stability. Aim: Maintain Dayton cease-fire. Considerable progress has been made toward military stabilization in BiH. Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) are in compliance with Dayton, and there have been no incidents affecting the cease-fire. EAFs remain substantially divided along ethnic lines. Integration of the Federation Army does not reach down to corps-level units and below. However, progress has been made through the Train and Equip Program to integrate the Ministry of Defense and to provide the Federation with a credible deterrent capability. Although it is unlikely to meet its target of full integration by August 1999, the Federation Ministry of Defense has begun staff planning for integration. The Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) continues its relationship with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Army. Similarly, the Bosnian Croat element of the Federation Army maintains ties with Croatia. In both cases, however, limited resources impinge on what either Croatia or the FRY can provide financially or materially; the overall trend in support is downward. In some areas, the VRS continues to have certain qualitative and quantitative advantages over the Federation Army, but the Train and Equip Program has helped narrow the gap in some key areas. The arms control regimes established under Articles II (confidence and security-building measures) and IV (arms reduction and limitations) of Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Accords are functioning. In October 1997, BiH and the other parties were recognized as being in compliance

with the limitations on five major types of armaments (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters) set forth in the Article IV agreement, which were derived from the Annex 1B 5:2:2 ratios for the FRY, Republic of Croatia, and BiH respectively. The parties have since maintained armament levels consistent with the limitations and are expected to do so in the future. A draft mandate for an Article V agreement (regional stability) has been approved; negotiations are due to begin in early 1999. Military stability remains dependent on SFOR as a deterrent force.

2. Public Security and Law Enforcement. Aim: A restructured and democratic police force in both entities. There has been considerable progress to date on police reform due to sustained joint efforts of the International Police Task Force (IPTF), Office of the High Representative (OHR), and SFOR, which have overcome a number of significant political obstacles. So far, approximately 85 percent of the police in the Federation have received IPTF-approved training, as have approximately 35 percent of the police in the Republika Srpska (RS). All sides continue to lag in the hiring of minority officers and, as the IPTF implements its plans to address this problem, tensions will increase in the short-term. SFOR often must support the IPTF in the face of crime, public disorder, and rogue police. Monoethnic police forces have often failed to facilitate minority returns. In these types of scenarios, SFOR's use of the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) has been a force multiplier, requiring fewer, but specially trained troops. At this point, SFOR's essential contribution to maintaining a secure environment, to include backing up IPTF in support of nascent civilian police forces, remains critical to continued progress.

3. Judicial Reform. Aim: An effective judicial reform program. Several key steps forward were taken in 1998, such as the signing of an MOU on Inter-Entity Legal Assistance on May 20, 1998, and establishment of an Inter-Entity Legal Commission on June 4, 1998. The Federation Parliament in July adopted a new criminal code. Nevertheless, the judicial system still requires significant reform. Judges are still influenced by politics, and the system is financially strapped and remains ethnically biased. Execution of judgments, in particular eviction of persons who illegally occupy dwellings, is especially problematic. The progress made in the area of commercial law is encouraging for economic development prospects.

4. Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime, and Corruption. Aim: The dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions. Corruption remains a major challenge to building democratic institutions of government. Structures for