

shall not apply to debtors if applicable State law provides by statute that such provisions shall not apply to debtors and shall not take effect in any State before the end of the first regular session of the State legislature following the date of enactment of this Act.

#### AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

##### COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, November 10, 1999, beginning at 10 a.m., in Dirksen Room 226, to conduct a hearing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, November 10, 1999 after the first vote, approximately 12 p.m., in the President's Room to conduct a markup.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Governmental Affairs Committee be authorized to meet on Wednesday, November 10, 1999, at 1 p.m., for a hearing entitled "Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, November 10, 1999 at 10 a.m. for a hearing regarding Federal Contracting and Labor Policy: Could the Administration's Change to Procurement Regulations Lead to "Blacklisting" Contractors?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

##### SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on International Relations of the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, November 10, 1999 at 2 p.m. to hold a hearing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

##### GEORGE GABRIEL CELEBRATING HIS 90TH BIRTHDAY

• Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise today to honor my fellow New Yorker

George Gabriel on the occasion of his 90th birthday. George has been a war veteran, tennis instructor, lawyer, and vice president of Broadcast Music, Incorporated (B.M.I.). His family will always know him for his love of classical music, quick wit, and pertinent advice.

During World War II, George was stationed in Australia and the Philippines. He distinguished himself as a member of the Army's code-breaking operations, reading enciphered cables intercepted from Japan. This might explain his affinity for the always challenging New York Times crossword puzzles!

After the war, he graduated from Brooklyn Law School and went to work for B.M.I. His work in the field of music copyright prompted a quick rise up the corporate ladder. He was eventually promoted to the position of vice president, where he remained until the time of his retirement.

Yet, for all his professional achievements, it is his personal life that gives him the most fulfillment. This epochal moment marks a grand achievement for a man who is a mentor to grandchildren, nieces, and nephews. I offer my prayers to George for continued good health and cheer, and close with a particularly apt Irish blessing:

May joy and peace surround you,  
Contentment latch your door,  
And happiness be with you now,  
And bless you evermore.●

#### COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

• Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, several weeks ago the Senate wisely rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Much was written about how the debate evolved here in the Senate. As one closely involved in this historic debate, I submit for the RECORD an excellent article in the November 8 issue of National Review by Richard Lowry. The article follows.

[From the National Review, Nov. 8, 1999]

##### TEST-BAN BAN

(By Richard Lowry)

"If we had a hearing and had a vote on the CTBT, we would win overwhelmingly."

—Sen. Joe Biden, July 29, 1998

Jesse Helms mounted his motorized cart and left the Republican cloakroom, just off the Senate floor. Arizona senator Jon Kyl was right behind him. Georgia's Paul Coverdell got word in his office and immediately headed out the door. All were converging on the offices of majority leader Trent Lott late Tuesday afternoon, Oct. 12, as Senate staffers and others buzzed of an imminent deal to avoid a vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Minority leader Tom Daschle had just offered Lott a treaty-saving agreement. Now the small group of Republicans—after clearing Lott's cramped conference room of all staff, to ensure privacy—would decide whether the Senate would vote down a major international treaty for the first time in 80 years.

Their decision would be the culmination of months of work, and it would determine

whether the congressional wing of the GOP would win its most significant victory since welfare reform in 1996. They knew they had a strong case on the merits. Defeating the treaty would, among other things, fit into a two-pronged national-security strategy featuring both missile defense and nuclear deterrence; deterrence is impossible without a safe, reliable American arsenal of the sort that the treaty would endanger. Shrewd GOP tactics and a series of Democratic miscalculations had brought the treaty to the brink, and now the senators were back where they had started—around that conference table—pondering whether to push it over the edge.

The first meeting in Lott's office had been in late April, when those same four began a quiet, well-organized effort to defeat the treaty. Kyl was the point man. A bright, serious-minded conservative and an authority on arms control, he had hosted meetings of anti-treaty staff as early as February. Soon after, he enlisted the help of Coverdell, always an important behind-the-scenes Senate player. Treaty opponents realized from the beginning that they would be wise to learn from their defeat on the Chemical Weapons Convention two years earlier, when Lott undercut them at the last minute. The first lesson? Get Lott on board early.

At the April meeting, Lott indicated his opposition to the treaty but said that no decisions could be made until the group determined how many Republicans were with them. So, in early May, treaty opponents began the first in a series of careful "whip checks" of how GOP Senators intended to vote. They gave wide berth to Senators who were likely to support the treaty or might spread word that something was afoot. "There were 15 to 20 members we didn't even ask," says a Senate aide. The first count showed 24 votes against the treaty—10 short of the number needed to stop it—with another 11 "leaning against."

Around this time, an internal debate among treaty opponents was close to resolution, at least in the minds of Kyl and Coverdell. The question had been whether it was better to "go fast"—gather the votes to defeat the treaty, then vote on it right away—or "go slow," in the hope of bottling it up forever. The "go fast" advocates figured treaty opponents would only lose strength as the November 2000 elections neared. With the approach of Election Day, Senators would want to avoid any controversial vote, while the White House would benefit from additional time to hammer its opponents. The chemical-weapons fight had demonstrated the awesome communications power of the administration. Why wait for it to shift into gear?

In early August, Lott was shown a binder full of clips—op-eds and letters—that supported the treaty, which seemed to indicate that the administration's push for it was underway. For a long time, treaty opponents had feared the administration would use a September conference commemorating the third anniversary of the treaty's signing as a deadline for Senate action. A July 20 letter from all the Senate Democrats—demanding hearings and a vote by October—seemed to confirm this plan. A fall treaty fight would coincide nicely with the period in which Republicans would be scrambling to pass appropriations bills. Democrats would have leverage to threaten to bollix up the spending process—creating the conditions for another "government shutdown"—unless Republicans released the treaty.

Lott settled on a three-part interim strategy: (1) Helms—with 25 years' experience opposing ill-conceived arms-control treaties—