for funding than under the current system. I am pleased that we were able to craft a temporary provision that balanced the desire to ensure that all states had an opportunity to participate under the old rules, with the desire to implement the new rules as quickly as possible.

Ms. SNOWE. I thank the chairman once again, and I yield the floor.

Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent to have the conference report agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements related to the conference report be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT. Officer. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUDANPEACE ACT

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 410, S. 1453.

The PRESIDENT. Officer. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (S. 1453) to facilitate famine relief efforts and comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, with an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

S. 1453

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Sudan Peace Act”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) While the Government of Sudan intends to intensify its prosecution of the war against areas outside of its control, which has already cost nearly 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000, a sustained and coordinated international effort to pressure combatants to end hostilities and to address the roots of the conflict offers the best opportunity for a comprehensive solution to the continuing war in Sudan.

(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.

(3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to bring an end to the war.

(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.

(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major impediment to achieving self-determination by the Sudanese people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.

(6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among Sudanese groups, the Government of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their population, and Congress finds that internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing the tactic’s effectiveness and human suffering.

(7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular groups for raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war through selective starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan’s accountability internationally.

(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas outside its control.

(9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by Sudanese people from the United States and other donor countries as a devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government’s control.

(10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS and the Government of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

(11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.

(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their populations at increased risk of famine.

(13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food needs of the recipients, the current relief distribution efforts are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long term.

(14) The ability of populations to defend themselves against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan’s control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of the frontline sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the battlefield can be achieved.

(15) The United States should use all means of pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war, including—

(A) the maintenance and multilateralization of sanctions against the Government of Sudan with explicit linkage of those sanctions to peace;

(B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside government control;

(C) continued active support of people-to-people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of government control;

(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide humanitarian relief to those areas;

(E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United States and within multilateral institutions toward those ends; and

(F) the use of any and all possible unilateral and multilateral economic and diplomatic tools to compel Ethiopia and Eritrea to end their hostilities and again assume a constructive stance toward facilitating a comprehensive solution to the conflict in Sudan.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(A) the term ‘Government of Sudan’ means the National Islamic Front and the Khartoum Government of Sudan’s control; and

(B) the term ‘IGAD’ means the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.

SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW TACTICS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

Congress hereby—

(A) condemns—

(A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict in Sudan;

(B) the Government of Sudan’s overall human rights record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial of basic human and political rights to all Sudanese;

(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice; and

(D) the Government of Sudan’s increasing use and organization of “murahalliin” or “murahallin” in Sudan; popular defense forces or organizations that are utilized and organized by the Government of Sudan as a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Blue Nile peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

(A) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby—

(1) declares its support for the efforts by executive branch officials of the United States and the President’s Special Envoy for Sudan to lead in a reinvigoration of the IGAD-sponsored peace process;

(2) calls on IGAD member states, the European Union, the Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and other key states to support the peace process; and

(3) urges Kenya’s leadership in the implementation of the process.

(B) RELATION TO UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY.—It is the sense of Congress that any such diplomatic efforts toward resolution of the conflict in Sudan are best made through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994, and that the President should not create any process or diplomatic facility or office which could be viewed as a parallel or competing diplomatic track.

(C) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the support of—

(1) the secretariat of IGAD;

(2) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of Sudan and opposition forces;

(3) efforts to reach a political solution that will be carried out by the National Democratic Alliance and IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF); and

(4) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a peace process in Sudan.

SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should—

(1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations Security Council to investigate the practice of
slavery in Sudan and provide recommendations on measures that the United States can take to ensure a gradual and comprehensive end to slavery in Sudan.


(3) press for implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to human rights monitors in areas of conflict in Sudan.

(4) press for UNICEF, International Committee of the Red Cross, or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or the United Nations system, to maintain an active and representative role in the humanitarian assistance efforts in Sudan.


SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

The President shall report to Congress on:

(1) the specific sources and current status of Sudan's financing and construction of oil exploitation infrastructure and pipelines;

(2) the extent to which that financing was secured in the United States or with involvement of United States citizens;

(3) such financing's relation to the sanctions described in subsection (a) and the Executive Order of November 3, 1997;

(4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas outside its control, including targets, frequency, and best estimate of damage;

(5) the number, duration, and locations of air strikes or other humanitarian relief facilities to which access is denied by any party to the conflict; and

(6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace process and any other ongoing effort to end the conflict, including the specific and verifiable steps taken by non-IGAD parties to the conflict, the members of the IGAD Partners Forum, and the members of IGAD toward a comprehensive solution to the conflict.

SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

It is the sense of Congress that the President should organize and maintain a formal consultative process with the European Union, its members, the United Nations General Assembly, and other relevant parties on coordinating an effort within the United Nations to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power of the Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for air transport relief flights.

SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

(a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the progress made by officials of the executive branch of Government toward greater utilization of non-OLS agencies for more effective distribution of United States relief contributions.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to Congress describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (b).

SEC. 10. CONTINGENT PLAN FOR ANY RAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

(1) PLAN.—The President shall develop a detailed and implementable contingency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices, the essential and important programs, with respect to rebuilding and sustaining leaders and educators for the next generation of South Sudanese. Congress recognizes the uniquely important role the secondary school in Rumbek has played in sustaining the current generation of leaders in southern Sudan, and that priority should be given in current and future development or transition programs underwritten by the United States Government to rebuilding and supporting the Rumbek Secondary School.

SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUNTAINS AND OTHER AREAS SUBJECTED TO BANS ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

(a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes that civilians in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan are not receiving assistance through OLS due to restrictions by the Government of Sudan.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should—

(1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan;

(2) respond appropriately to those needs based on such assessment; and

(3) report to Congress on an annual basis on efforts made under paragraphs (2) and (3).

SEC. 13. OPTIONS OR PLANS FOR NONLETHAL ASSISTANCE FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PARTICIPANTS.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in classified form if necessary, describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (b).

(b) CONSIDERATION.—The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives shall consider the report submitted under paragraph (a).

Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent that the committee substitute amendment be agreed to, the bill be read the third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements related to the bill be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.

The bill (S. 1453), as amended, was read the third time and passed, as follows:

B 1453
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Sudan Peace Act.”

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

Congressional Record—Senate
November 19, 1999

30898
November 19, 1999

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

30899

(1) With clear indications that the Government of Sudan has taken the initiative in the resolution of the war against areas outside of its control, which has already cost nearly 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000, a sustained and coordinated international effort is required to end hostilities and to address the roots of the conflict offers the best opportunity for a comprehensive solution to the continuing war in Sudan.

(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored peace process, protected by a UN peacekeeping force, presents the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.

(3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to bring an end to the war.

(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.

(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the establishment of credible civil authority and institutions is a major impediment to achieving self-sustainability by the Sudanese people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.

(6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their population, and Congress finds that internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing the tactic’s effectiveness and human suffering.

(7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly utilizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular troops for raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans on air transport relief flights by the war through active starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan’s accountability internationally.

(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas outside its control.

(9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the United States and other donor countries as a devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government’s control.

(10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Government of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

(11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed, the long term issue that the population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.

(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely from food distribution by OLS, consequently placing their populations at increased risk of famine.

(13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per day, and with a low-intensity focus on providing only for the immediate food needs of the recipients, the current international relief operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long term.

(14) The ability of populations to defend themselves against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan’s control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the battlefield can be achieved.

(15) The United States should use all means of pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war, including:

(A) strengthening and multilateralization of sanctions against the Government of Sudan, with explicit linkage of those sanctions to peace;

(B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil authority and institutions in areas outside of government control;

(C) continued active support of people-to-people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of government control;

(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide humanitarian relief to those areas;

(E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United States and within multilateral institutions toward those ends; and

(F) the use of any and all possible unilaterally and multilateral economic and diplomatic tools to compel Ethiopia and Eritrea to end their hostilities and again assume a constructive stance toward facilitating a comprehensive solution to the ongoing war in Sudan.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Government of Sudan’’ means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.

(2) IGAD.—The term ‘‘IGAD’’ means the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.

(3) OLS.—The term ‘‘OLS’’ means the United Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and participating relief organizations known as ‘‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’’.

SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW TACTICS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

Congress hereby—

(1) condemns—

(A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict in Sudan, with particular reference to bombing and starvation; and

(B) the Government of Sudan’s overall human rights record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial of basic human and political rights to all Sudanese;

(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice; and

(D) the Government of Sudan’s increasing use and organization of ‘‘murahallin’’ or ‘‘mujahadeen’’, Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and regular Sudanese Army units into organized and coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and

(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of raiding and starvation by those parties is a tool of food shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in a bloodless and inhumane manner.

SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby—

(1) declares its support for the efforts by the Government of Sudan and opposition forces of the United States and the President’s Special Envoy for Sudan to lead in a reinvigoration of the IGAD-sponsored peace process;

(2) urges the IGAD member states, the European Union, the Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and other key states to support the peace process; and

(3) urges Kenya’s leadership in the implementation of the process.

(b) RELATION TO UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY.—It is the sense of Congress that any such diplomatic efforts toward resolution of the conflict in Sudan are best made through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles and its subsequent accords.

(c) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the support of—

(1) the secretariat of IGAD;

(2) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of Sudan and opposition forces;

(3) any peace settlement planning to be carried out by the National Democratic Alliance and IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF); and

(4) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a peace process in Sudan.

SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should—

(1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations Security Council to investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan and provide recommendations on measures for its eventual abolition;


(3) press for implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to human rights monitors in areas of conflict in Sudan;

(4) press for UNICEF, International Committee of the Red Cross, or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or other appropriate international organizations or agencies to maintain a registry of those individuals who have been abducted or are otherwise held in bondage or slavery in Sudan; and

(5) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of Sudan each time it subjects civilian populations to aerial bombardment and military operations.

SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

Beginning 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 3 months thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress on—

(1) the specific sources and current status of Sudan’s financing and construction of oil exploitation infrastructure and pipelines; and

(2) the extent to which such financing was secured in the United States or with involvement of United States citizens.
(3) such financing’s relation to the sanctions described in subsection (a) and the Executive Order of November 3, 1997;

(4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas outside its control, including targets, frequencies, dates of instances, and locations of air strikes or other humanitarian relief facilities to which access is denied by any party to the conflict;

and

(5) the number, duration, and locations of agreements required by subsection (a)(2).

SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

It is the sense of Congress that the President should organize and maintain a formal consultative process with the European Union, its member states, the members of the United Nations Security Council, and other parties to the conflict, to develop a strategy within the United Nations to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power of the Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for air transport relief flights.

SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF EFFORTS.

(a) Findings.—Congress recognizes that the President should continue the progress made by officials of the executive branch of Government toward greater utilization of non-OLS agencies for more effective distribution of United States relief contributions.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue any efforts to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.

SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

(a) Plan.—The President shall develop a detailed and implementable contingency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices, the largest possible amount of United States relief and privately donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.

(b) Element of Plan.—The plan developed under subsection (a) shall include coordination of other donors in addition to the United States Government and private institutions.

(c) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a classified report to Congress describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (b).

SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID’S SUDAN TRANSITION ASSISTANCE FOR REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

(a) Sense of Congress.—Congress hereby expresses its support for the President’s on-going efforts to diversify and increase effective transition assistance to populations in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, especially the long-term focus shown in the Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program with its emphasis on promoting future democratic governance, rule of law, building indigenous institutional capacity, enhancing self-reliance, and actively supporting people-to-people reconciliation efforts.

(b) Allocation of Funds.—Of the amounts available under the STAR program of part B of title I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.; relating to development assistance) for the period beginning on October 1, 2000, and ending on September 30, 2003, $16,000,000 shall be available for development of a viable civil authority, and civil and commercial institutions, in Sudan, including the provision of technical assistance, and for people-to-people reconciliation efforts.

(c) Additional Authorities.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is granted authority to undertake any appropriate programs using Federal agencies, contractual arrangements, or direct support of indigenous groups, agencies, or organizations that can provide the cooperation of the Government of Sudan in an effort to provide emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency, build civil authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and the development of judicial and legal frameworks, promote people-to-people reconciliation efforts, or implementation of any programs in support of any viable peace agreement at the local, regional, or national level.

(d) Implementation.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should immediately and to the fullest extent possible utilize the Office of Transition Initiatives at the Agency for International Development in an effort to pursue the type of programs described in subsection (c).

(e) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that enhancing and supporting education, health, and the rule of law are critical elements in the long-term success of United States efforts to promote a viable economic, political, social, and legal basis for development and democracy. Congress recognizes that the gap of 13–16 years without secondary education for the current generation of leaders in southern Sudan recognizes that the gap of 13–16 years without secondary education for the current generation of leaders in southern Sudan.

(f) Program in Areas Outside Government Control.—Congress also intends that such programs include cooperation and work with indigenous groups in areas outside of government control in all of Sudan, to include northern, southern, and eastern regions of Sudan.

SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUNTAINS AND OTHER AREAS SUBJECT TO BANS ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

(a) Findings.—Congress finds that the President recognizes that citizens in the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan are not receiving assistance through OLS due to restrictions by the Government of Sudan.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should—

(1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan;

(2) respond appropriately to those needs based on such assessment; and

(3) report to Congress on an annual basis on efforts made under paragraph (2).

SEC. 13. OPTIONS OR PLANS FOR NONLETHAL ASSISTANCE FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PARTICIPANTS.

(a) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in classified form if necessary, detailing possible options or plans of the United States Government for the provision of nonlethal assistance to participants of the National Democratic Alliance.

(b) Consultations.—Not later than 30 days after submission of the report required by subsection (a), the President should begin formal consultations with the appropriate congressional committees regarding the findings of the report.

(c) Definition.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

REAUTHORIZING THE COASTAL WETLANDS PLANNING, PROTECTION AND RESTORATION ACT

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 328, S. 1119.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill (S. 1119) was read the third time and passed, as follows:

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 1119) to amend the act of August 9, 1950, to continue funding for the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent the bill be read the third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements related to the bill be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bill (S. 1119) was read the third time and passed, as follows:

S. 1119

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that:

SECTION 1. FUNDING OF THE COASTAL WETLANDS PLANNING, PROTECTION AND RESTORATION ACT.

Section 4(a) of the Act of August 9, 1950 (16 U.S.C. 777c(a)), is amended in the second sentence by striking “1999” and inserting “2009.”

HOLDING OF COURT AT NATCHES, MISSISSIPPI, IN THE SAME MANNER AS COURT IS HELD AT VICKSBURG, MISSISSIPPI

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent the Chair lay