

Saddam's dictatorship gone and would work with democratic opposition groups to attain that goal.

The administration and our British allies took another big step in December with the Desert Fox airstrikes. By attacking the underpinnings of Saddam's power, the Special Republican Guards and the intelligence services, Operation Desert Fox reduced Saddam's ability to terrorize his people and showed Iraqis we and our allies were truly opposed to Saddam in a way previous air campaigns had not done.

Saddam responded to Desert Fox by undertaking regular violations of the northern and southern no-fly zones, trying to entice allied aircraft into air defense missile ambushes. The allied counter has been highly effective. Rather than simply chasing retreating Iraqi aircraft, United States and allied warplanes have been attacking the Iraqi air defense missile and radar and communication sites, which would support such ambushes. Almost every day so far in 1999 we have attacked some Iraqi air defense installation in response to a no-fly zone violation. The effectiveness and readiness of Saddam's air defense forces decline daily. Equally important, the complete impotence of Saddam's military relative to the allies is made plain to all Iraqis. In military terms, the Iraqi regime has never looked weaker.

Last weekend, the world saw signs of a political rally to match the decline of Iraq's military. The Grand Ayatollah of the Shiites, the spiritual leader of 65 percent of Iraqis who are Shiite Muslims, was murdered Thursday night with two of his sons. According to press reports, the Grand Ayatollah had reportedly opposed the regime's directive to all Muslims that they pray at home rather than at Friday services in mosques. Opposition sources said the Grand Ayatollah had preached against the regime and had blamed it for the misery of Iraqis. Perhaps for these reasons, Shiite Muslim Iraqis suspected the government of the crime and took to the streets in Baghdad and in several southern cities.

The Iraqi opposition groups claim scores, perhaps hundreds, of Iraqis were killed in the government's harsh response. Two other Shiite leaders of international reputation have also been mysteriously murdered in southern Iraq within the last year. The murder of the Grand Ayatollah, coming on these earlier murders and in the background of longstanding Shiite resistance to Saddam's regime, sparked demonstrations and violent government responses in Baghdad and several other cities, according to opposition reports. By Sunday night, the regime had apparently quelled the demonstrations. The human cost and the extent of continuing Shiite hostility to Saddam's regime are simply not known to us, but the episode demonstrates the Iraqi gov-

ernment's lack of legitimacy in the eyes of its people, as well as the extent to which Saddam would go to suppress any opposition. The episode reveals a weakening Iraqi regime lashing out in an increasingly desperate effort to maintain power. When dictatorships act this way, it may signal that their end is near.

But when the end comes, it may come quickly. The question will be, Is America prepared for the end? If we have done our homework on the various Iraqi opposition groups and actively supported the groups which qualify under the criteria set forth in the Iraq Liberation Act, we will be well positioned to help Iraq make the transition to democracy. However, if we delay full implementation of the act and take a wait-and-see posture toward the opposition, we should not be surprised if our influence on events in post-Saddam Iraq is slight. Similarly, if we do not have humanitarian supplies ready to be forwarded to Iraq as soon as Saddam falls, and if we do not have international consensus for forgiving the debts of a post-Saddam Iraq, we should not be surprised to see him replaced by another hostile dictator.

Mr. President, we have a vital national interest in Iraq's future. The lives of young Americans are invested there—our honored dead from the Gulf war, as well as from the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers. The valor of our young warriors—now being demonstrated daily in the skies over Iraq—is invested there.

Tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines have spent months of their lives on deployments to the Persian Gulf and to Turkey in support of the U.S. policy to contain Iraq. We have invested billions of dollars supporting this policy: \$1.36 billion on deployments in fiscal year 1998 alone, and \$800 million so far in fiscal year 1999.

The American people have made this heavy investment and they have the right to a good return—a democratic Iraq at peace with its neighbors and with its people, so we can bring our troops, ships, and planes home for good. To attain this return, we must be ready for an internal crisis in Iraq, which could occur sooner than we expect.

Mr. President, on later occasions, I intend to come to the floor to describe why I believe a policy other than containment is necessary. I understand there are people who are very suspicious and very guarded in their assessments of our success. But I ask them merely to look at previous examples of where the United States of America has been successful in the face of considerable skepticism about our ability to get that done.

In addition, Mr. President, we have, as I have tried to outline here, a considerable military investment and a risky operation going on today that

puts every single one of these men and women, their health, safety, and well-being at risk, and we should not and dare not take that for granted.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXTENSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that morning business be extended, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN KOSOVO

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to speak on a couple of issues that concern me greatly in the arena of foreign policy.

First, a couple of comments concerning the administration's recent policies in Kosovo. I am very, very concerned that the administration, in the negotiations in France, is making a mistake. I hope that is not the case. I wish that is not the case. Maybe I don't have all the information the administration has. But I have been to Kosovo. I have been in Pristina. I have met with Mr. Milosevic. I do happen to think he is a tyrant. I think he has conducted a lot of atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo against people—right now the Albanians in Kosovo. I think he is a bad guy. I think the international community needs to stand up to him.

But I am very, very concerned about the administration's policy, or objective, where they are talking about committing 4,000 U.S. troops out of a contingency of 28,000, where they are sending our military in without a militarily achievable objective and without an exit strategy. I am really concerned because I think we are going to be there for a long, long time. It seems like we are duplicating what happened in Bosnia, which the administration calls an outstanding success. But it looks to me like we are stuck in Bosnia. We are spending billions and billions of dollars there. Nobody seems to know exactly how much money we have spent in Bosnia. I heard some people say we have already spent \$12 billion in Bosnia. Some people say the real figure is closer to \$20 billion or \$22 billion. But we are spending billions of dollars.

I remember in 1995 the President, when he committed the troops, said

they would only be there for a year. As a matter of fact, the year would expire right around election time in 1996. He thought he was going to get them out before election time. But he didn't. Then he said he would extend them another year. And now they are on 3 years plus, and they are still in Bosnia, and we know they will be in Bosnia for a long, long time.

I visited our troops there. They are very dedicated and very committed. They are also very, very expensive peacekeepers. I have urged the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, that if we are going to get involved in Kosovo let's not repeat what we have done in Bosnia. It is not the same amount of cost and consternation for European troops, who live in Poland or live in Germany or live in Italy, to spend a little time in Bosnia or Kosovo as it is for somebody in the United States. They are able to go home at various points. We are not able to do that. We are awfully expensive.

So I just make the point that I am very concerned about the administration's strategy. I am concerned about this idea that if we just get the Kosovars to agree, then we can bomb Mr. Milosevic and he will now be a compliant partner for peace. That has not proven to be the case. I don't think it will be the case. I think we will be stuck there for a long time.

That is the main point I wish to bring as far as my objective. I don't see an exit strategy. I am afraid that we will be there for tens of years instead of 1 year or a very short period of time.

Mr. President, I make those comments on Kosovo.

FAILED POLICY ON IRAQ

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, the primary reason I came to the floor this afternoon is to speak about the administration's failed policy on Iraq. I say it is a failed policy. I wish that weren't the case, but it is. It is a failed policy.

The administration, this administration, President Clinton, inherited a situation where President Bush and the Secretary of State had won the war with Iraq. We achieved our military objective, which was to get Iraq out of Kuwait. We stated that was our objective. We accomplished that objective. We came home. We implemented sanctions against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990. We had a total embargo on Iraqi products, including oil. Oil was the No. 1 product, or commodity, that Iraq exported. It provided 95 percent, I believe, of its foreign currencies.

We put that embargo on because they invaded a neighbor. And, frankly, they probably intended to invade other neighbors—maybe Saudi Arabia—and really became the dominating power in the Persian Gulf. We didn't think that

was right. We sent 550,000 troops. We stopped them. We kicked them out of Kuwait, and we imposed sanctions to make sure that we would get rid of their weapons of mass destruction, because we knew they were building chemical and biological weapons and possibly nuclear weapons.

And so we set up an international regime called UNSCOM to inspect to make sure they wouldn't be doing this again, that they wouldn't be building these weapons of mass destruction to cause more problems for their neighbors and surrounding countries in the foreseeable future. The entire world community supported us, applauded us in that effort. I think we had 30 countries that were involved in the coalition aligned against Iraq in 1990, 1991, 1992. That is what President Clinton inherited.

Well, what has happened since? Let me walk you through what has happened since.

Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis and the Iraqi Government have really baffled the Clinton administration and, in my opinion, they have beaten the Clinton administration if you look at their objectives.

I will show you. The war was in 1991. They were producing over 2 million barrels of oil per day in 1990. After the embargo, they averaged—in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, about 4- or 500,000-barrels per day. We really curtailed their production. Basically, we had the implied reward that said, if you will allow arms control inspectors—if we know that you are not building weapons of mass destruction, we will allow you to produce more oil, there won't be an embargo, but we have to know that you are not building weapons to export throughout the world.

What did this administration do? Well, we had a conflict. Actually it happened in 1994 and 1995; Iraq amassed about 80,000 troops near the Kuwaiti border. We started activating troops. We said, well, we wouldn't let this stand; we will respond militarily, if necessary, and then the problem went away. How did they go away? In April of 1995, the United Nations approved Resolution 986, and this resolution allowed Iraq to sell \$2 billion worth of oil every 6 months, \$4 billion of oil per year.

Well, you might notice, all right, this happened in April of 1995. Their oil infrastructure took awhile to be rebuilt, but, as a result of the U.N. resolution, a couple of years later they doubled their oil production. And this was supposedly to get their cooperation. We didn't have to go to war at the time. We were able to, supposedly, have arms control inspectors, and so they had a little cooperation.

In March of 1996, Iraq blocked inspections. In June of 1996, we passed U.N. Resolution 1060 that deplores the refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow ac-

cess to sites designated by UNSCOM. In August, Iraq launched a campaign against the Kurds. The United States launched a few cruise missiles. The crisis continues. Our arms control inspectors are continually denied access.

In June of 1997, Iraq demands that UNSCOM finish their business. In June, the United Nations passed a resolution that demands—demands—Iraq comply fully with UNSCOM. In October of 1997, Iraq bars American inspectors totally. In October, the United Nations passed Resolution 1134 which condemned Iraq's refusal to allow UNSCOM access to certain sites. Boy, the United Nations is standing tough.

In November of 1997, we passed another resolution, Resolution 1137. We, again, condemned Iraq because they wouldn't allow these arms control inspectors to have access. We are getting close to finding their weapons of mass destruction.

Now, this is only a year ago. A year ago in January this administration was sending 35,000 troops to the Persian Gulf. We are getting ready to go to war again. We are going to have a significant strike. We had significant debate in this body: Is this the right thing to do? Will this bring about compliance? The administration is getting close to going to war. And then what happened? The standoff continues. The inspectors are not allowed access to any of these sites. And then you might remember, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, well, he flies to Baghdad and they come to an agreement. Peace is at hand. Arms control inspectors will be allowed back in.

Well, guess what. There was a little deal made that not too many people were aware of. I venture to say there weren't two colleagues in the Senate who were aware the administration already cut a deal with Iraq and on U.N. Resolution 1153, they allowed Iraq to sell \$5.2 billion worth of oil every 6 months; in other words, allowed Iraq to more than double its oil sales.

This is in February of last year. One year ago, February of 1998, the administration signed a deal. We are getting ready to go to war with Iraq because they wouldn't let us have our arms control inspectors in, and all of a sudden we delegate the authority to the Secretary General. He runs to Baghdad. They signed a deal. Everybody is shaking hands. War is avoided. Everybody can be at ease—no real problems now. We have an agreement. We have Kofi Annan's signature. We have the Iraqis saying they are going to comply; they are going to let in arms control people. And, yes, there was a little deal that they could double oil sales, the Iraqis could double their oil exports to as much as \$5.2 billion of oil every 6 months. That was February, a year ago, 12 months from this time.