

such subparagraphs only if, not later than September 30, 2000, the South Dakota Department of Transportation enters into an agreement with the Federal Highway Administration providing for the construction of an interchange on Interstate Route 90 at Box Elder, South Dakota.

(B) ALTERNATIVE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—If the agreement described in subparagraph (A) is not entered into by the date referred to in that subparagraph, the amounts described in that subparagraph shall be available to the Secretary of the Air Force as of that date for purposes of real property and facility maintenance projects at Ellsworth Air Force Base.

(3) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS.—

(A) ACCESS ROAD.—Amounts available under this section for construction of the access road described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii)(I) are in addition to amounts available for the construction of that access road under any other provision of law.

(B) PROPERTY AND FACILITY MAINTENANCE PROJECTS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, amounts available under this section for property and facility maintenance projects at Ellsworth Air Force Base shall remain available for expenditure without fiscal year limitation.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask that the amendments be adopted.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments are agreed to.

The amendments (Nos. 121 through 123) were agreed to.

Mr. STEVENS. I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendments were agreed to, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to strike the following amendments which are on the list of proposed amendments: Senator HATCH's amendment on ethical standards; Senator DEWINE's amendment on counterdrug funding; Senator ENZI's amendment, which is the first livestock assistance amendment; Senator FEINSTEIN's WIC increase amendment; Senator HARKIN's tobacco and two relevant amendments, leaving Senator HARKIN with one relevant amendment; and Senator BURNS' sheep improvement program.

I further ask unanimous consent that an additional slot be added to the list entitled "managers' amendment" for use by the managers—Senator BYRD and myself—for a final package of cleared amendments when we get to the end of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a period for the transaction of morning business, to expire at 1 p.m. this afternoon, with Senators permitted to speak therein for not to exceed 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GREGG addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.

KOSOVO

Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I rise to speak about the issue of Kosovo. It is obviously a topic of extreme importance. It appears that the administration and the President have decided to use American military force in Kosovo in conjunction with NATO. This, to me, is a serious mistake.

I wish this administration had a set policy we could turn to and say, "This is why they have decided to do this." But they do not. In fact, the Kosovo decision has many parallels to the Haiti decision, and the Haiti decision, as we know, has turned into a complete disaster, costing millions of dollars—potentially, I think, billions of dollars—although luckily no American lives, but it has not corrected the problem in Haiti in any significant way.

Kosovo, on the other hand, has the potential of not only to cost billions of dollars, but also to cost American lives. It is a mistake to pursue a policy of using American force without a doctrine or a guideline or a theorem as to why you are using that force.

My belief is that before we use American force in this world today to address issues which are ethnically driven, religiously driven, or which involve civil war type of instances, which are the new threats we so often seem to get involved in—I am not talking about issues of terrorism, which is a separate issue, or state-sponsored terrorism, which is a separate issue. I am talking about regions of the world where we are seeing ethnic, civil, and political violence of such a nature that American forces are considered to be sent into that region.

It is my belief that before we make a decision to pursue the use of American force and put American lives at risk, we need to answer three basic questions.

The first question is this: Is there a national interest, is there an American interest, which is significant enough to justify risking American lives? Is there a national interest which can be clearly and concisely explained, if it has to be explained, regrettably, to a parent, to a wife, to a child of an American service man or woman who may lose their life because we have pursued the use of American force? Is there a definable American interest of such significance that we are willing to put at risk the cream of America's young people—our service individuals?

So far, this administration has set forth absolutely no presentation of doctrine or ideas or position which establishes that there is such an American interest. There may be a European interest, no question about that. Clear-

ly, what is going on in that part of the world is horrific in many instances. But is there an American interest that justifies using American force and risking American life? We have not heard that explained to us.

If people are being indiscriminately killed by a group of thugs, then are we not also supposed to be in Georgia or Azerbaijan or Rwanda or any number of other places in this world? In fact, I think there was some tallying up of this, and there is something like 39 places in the world today where there is this type of activity going on, and some of it involving much larger deaths in the way of civilian casualties than is occurring in Kosovo. Of course, any death is a tragedy.

The fact is that there has to be a reason for Americans stepping in to try to stop that conflict. In this instance, we have not seen a differentiation that justifies us going into Kosovo versus going into some other of these 39 confrontations around the world. There has been no definition given to the purpose of the use of American military force, other than that this conflict appears on television. This conflict involves a European state. This conflict, therefore, maybe attracts more sympathy from a country which has always identified itself with Europe, but sympathy is not a good reason for putting at risk American lives.

The Balkans represent no strategic issue for the United States today of any significance. It is a strategic issue for the European nations, and it is a European issue which should be addressed by the European nations, but clearly there is no definable American purpose for going into Kosovo, and this administration has presented none.

I was at a briefing where I heard the Secretary of State say something to the effect, this might lead to World War III if we let this conflict ensue between Serbia and Kosovo, because she was referring back to World War II and World War I which started in this region of the world.

The dynamics of the world have changed. There are no alliances which are going to cause the domino effect that is going to bring the death of the Archduke of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into play with Germany, with Prussia. There are no such alliances that exist today. There is no Adolf Hitler who has the capacity to project force throughout Europe as a result of actions occurring in the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. In fact, the Balkans have been, for all intents and purposes, strategically bypassed.

There are other regions of the world where America has significant strategic interest—Iraq is obviously the most apparent at this time, but there are others also—where, if we have to use American force, we should use American force. But to use American force arbitrarily and simply because

the region happens to be European and because it happens to be on television, and for no other apparent reason, is a very hard explanation to make, should American lives be lost, to the parent or the spouse or the child.

That is the first point we must test. The first test of engagement is, Is there a vital national interest for us? No, there is not. I want to come back to that because there are a couple of other points on that.

Let's go on to the second point. The second point is, Can the use of American force stabilize or terminate the conflict?

When we are looking at these racial, political, religious, civil war type situations, can the introduction of American force have a long, lasting effect? That has to be the second question. And if it cannot, then why would we put the force in?

I think anybody who has done even a cursory study of the Balkans knows that these folks, these cultures, regrettably, have a historic, almost a genetic, attitude which causes constant conflict and which creates tremendous antagonism which leads to violence between these different cultures.

I have tried to trace it back a little bit. I was reading the history of the Ottoman Empire. Ironically, it goes back, I think, to Kosovo and a battle that was fought, I think, in 1555 or 1585 where Solymán "the Great" fought the Serbs in Kosovo. In fact, just a few years ago, the Serbs dug up their hero of that battle and took his body all around Serbia as an expression of support for that battle and for their hatred of the Moslem empire which had caused that fight to occur. And those hatreds have developed and evolved and have gone forward in every generation, been passed down from generation to generation to generation.

We cannot understand it as Americans because we are a melting pot, and we do not have that type of hatred in our Nation. A lot of people came to the United States, however, to get away from it and immigrated here for that purpose.

But I remember, I worked in Montenegro one summer, and I would meet people—and this was back a long time ago, back in 1970-something—and I would meet people, the local folks who I was working with, and they would tell me, forthrightly, that as soon as Tito died there was going to be a genocide in that part of the world because the Serbs hated the Croats. And it was just a matter of fact, a matter of their lives that as soon as this stabilizing force, Tito, died, this was going to occur. They knew it as a culture.

So what arrogance do we have as a nation, sitting here across the ocean, that we think we can project arms into a region, putting American lives at risk, and stabilize that region which has not been able to settle things out

for hundreds of years—hundreds of years. I think it is foolish for us to presume that.

But equally important, I think we have to understand that, in this instance, to put American forces in there is essentially an act of war on our part, because this is a freestanding nation and Kosovo is a province of that freestanding nation. It is as if Canada decided to put troops in Vermont because New Hampshire and Vermont were not getting along. That may be too glib a statement, but the fact is, from a physical standpoint and a political standpoint, that is essentially the same situation. This is a nation which is at civil war. What if the English during our Civil War had decided to set troops down in North Carolina? I don't think the North would have taken that very well.

Granted, in this instance, the Serbs are led by a malicious and malignant individual who is acting in a manner which is outside, in many ways, the bounds of any type of confrontation that should occur in the 20th century or the 21st century. But the fact is, for us to put American troops in there will be legally, at least, an act of war because we will be invading a sovereign nation which is fighting within itself relative to a province in that nation which is trying to create independence, and we will be deciding to separate that country by our use of military force.

Of course, this administration has not come to this Congress and suggested that. In fact, this administration has not come to the Congress at all. It has violated all sorts of directives, but it has just marched down this road of arbitrary evolution into a position of confrontation in Serbia and Kosovo. It has set our prestige at risk without having any idea why our prestige should be at risk, in my opinion.

But that is the second point: Can you resolve the conflict by the use of American force? I would have to say that history tells us we cannot. A lot like Haiti. When we went into Haiti, a lot of people asked, Are we going to correct this situation? Is this going to improve this situation? Are we putting our people at risk? Are we spending all this money and getting something out of this that is better after we leave? Is it going to change the culture?

We have seen it did not. Haiti is back to almost the exact position it was before we put our troops in, except that it has absolutely no private enterprise now because we basically wiped out the private enterprise when we went in and closed all the private enterprise down and pushed it offshore. We wiped out their private sector workforce and capitalist base. So we actually put them in a worse position economically. And politically they are in the same position.

I suspect that no matter how long we put American troops in there—and

there is no definition coming; and that is the third point of how long we will be there—no matter how long American troops are in that region, there will be no resolution of this problem by the introduction of American troops into that region which will have any long-term impact. They will be back at each other's throat as soon as the opportunity arises, unless we wish to stay there forever, which brings us to the third point.

The first point is: Is there a vital national interest for us? The second point is: Can the conflict be resolved by the use of American forces? The third point: Is there an exit strategy or are we committing Americans' tax dollars and the lives of American troops without any—any—idea as to how we are going to get out of this situation?

As far as I know, this administration has not really defined an entrance strategy. They have sort of stumbled into that, so, clearly, they have not found any exit strategy. In fact, if you ask them, all they have thought about is the first bombing raids. They have not even thought about the second—they may have thought about the second series of bombing raids, but they have not thought about what they do after that. There is no exit strategy. In fact, there is very little strategy at all other than what the military has been willing to do and has to do in order to prepare itself to execute public policy which is so haphazardly designed.

We could be there a long time. I mean, since 1385 or 1355, it has been 600 years. Are we going to stick around another 600 years in order to pacify this region? I think we might have to if our intention is to accomplish that goal.

And for what purpose? What is the national interest that justifies that? And remember, this is not like Haiti in many ways. This is a country where people do fight, where people are under arms. This is a country of military-type individuals. This is a country which fought the German army to a standstill; the greatest army in the world at the time they invaded, fought them to a standstill through guerrilla tactics. These are proud people, proud people and militaristic people. I know that. I was there for awhile. It was a long time ago, but I do not think they have changed. They do not seem to change much.

So where is this policy going? It appears that it is a policy that is undefined, that cannot give us a legitimate national reason, that cannot proclaim that the introduction of American forces will settle the situation. And it cannot give us a definition as to how they are going to get out of the situation once we get into the situation.

It is a bad policy. It is one that, unfortunately, puts many American lives at risk if it is pursued. But this administration seems insistent on going down that road. And I think that is wrong.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. AL-LARD). Without objection, it is so ordered.

A STUNNING REVELATION

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I read a remarkable article this week in the Hill newspaper concerning the distinguished Senator from Georgia, Mr. CLELAND. The article recounted events that occurred 31 years ago in Vietnam when then-Captain CLELAND was gravely injured in a grenade explosion. The injuries that he received in that horrible accident cost him his right arm and both of his legs, and very nearly cost him his life. He was 25 years old at the time, and just 1 month shy—just 1 month shy—of completing his tour of duty in Vietnam. Now, think of that. Just a month to go.

For more than three decades, MAX CLELAND lived with the crushing belief that his own carelessness had caused the accident, that the hand grenade that shattered his body and shattered his life had somehow fallen from his own web belt when he jumped from the helicopter. Most people in MAX CLELAND's situation would have been consumed with self-pity, even if they had had the grit to live. Think of that. The young Captain CLELAND certainly battled it. But as he has handled so many of the challenges that have marked his life since that terrible day in Vietnam, MAX CLELAND triumphed over the lure of self-pity. He triumphed over his injuries. He triumphed over self-doubt. He triumphed over bitterness.

MAX CLELAND could have given up after that accident in Vietnam. Most of us would have. But he did not. He turned his misfortune into the service of others. Three years after returning home from Vietnam, he was elected to the Georgia State Senate, becoming the youngest member and the only Vietnam veteran in that body. In 1977, he became the youngest administrator of the U.S. Veterans' Administration and the first Vietnam veteran to head that Agency. He returned to Georgia where, in 1982, he was elected Secretary of State. And, in 1996, he was elected to the U.S. Senate from Georgia.

Now, that is a remarkable record, a remarkable feat. It is remarkable for anyone to reach the Senate of the United States. Out of all the millions of people that are in America, there are 100 Senators—the same number that were in the original Roman Senate when Romulus founded that city on the

banks of the Tiber. He created the Senate, made up of 100 of the wisest men, and he chose old men for that Senate.

So here is a man with the disadvantages that MAX CLELAND had to overcome, the struggle that he had to undergo daily and nightly, every hour of the day, even to live, and he made it to the U.S. Senate. In all of that time, he quietly blamed himself for the accident that so radically altered his life.

But last week, according to the report in the Hill, Senator CLELAND was stunned to learn from an eyewitness that the grenade that injured him was not one of his own, but had been lost by another soldier.

My wife and I are reading the Psalms. Every Sunday, we read it. Actually, we have completed the Psalms, and now we are in Ecclesiastes.

Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity.

In our reading of the Bible, we have already read the New Testament and we have read the Old Testament. We have come all the way down, as I say, to the Book of Ecclesiastes. From the 85th Psalm, I will quote two lines:

Mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other.

Through his indomitable spirit, MAX CLELAND overcame the injuries he received as a young Army captain in Vietnam and conquered the temptation to succumb to self-pity. He is an inspiration to us all, and I hope that he finds a measure of peace and solace in the long-lost truth that was revealed to him this past week.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article from the March 17 issue of the Hill, titled, "For Senator Cleland, a Searing Revelation After 31 Years," be printed in its entirety at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Hill, Mar. 17, 1999]

FOR SEN. CLELAND, A SEARING REVELATION
AFTER 31 YEARS

(By E. Michael Myers and Betsy Rothstein)

For 31 years, Sen. Max Cleland (D-Ga.) has labored under the belief that he was to blame for dropping the hand grenade that forever transformed his life.

It was an otherwise insignificant moment in a still-divisive war, a terrible instant when Cleland lost his legs, his right arm and, for the time being, his dignity.

But from the confusion of that moment—the bleeding, the flood of nausea, the blinding pain, the medics scrambling to patch him together—has emerged an unshakable notion: that he was most likely responsible for that act.

That is, until now.

The year was 1968. The war, Vietnam. The place, a valley called Khe Sanh.

The valley, only 14 miles from the demilitarized zone, was as dangerous as it was deceptive.

From the air, Khe Sanh was a bastion of streams, rolling hills, picturesque cliffs, lush vegetation and even a waterfall. On the ground, it was teeming with giant rats,

razor-sharp grasses, precipitous grades and rivers with violent rapids.

Some 6,000 American Marines were holed up in Khe Sanh. Hiding in the hills surrounding the valley were North Vietnamese army troops. Nobody knew exactly how many. One estimate said 20,000. Another said twice that number.

The hills were so dangerous that supply convoys could not make it through Route 9, the main road into Khe Sanh. The Marines turned to helicopters for their shipments. But even that became so dangerous that C-130 planes had to swoop from the skies to drop supplies from the cargo bays.

Khe Sanh itself was hardly worth saving. Its strategic importance was so low that, when the Americans did finally capture it, they let it go again.

Instead, Gen. William Westmoreland feared another Dien Bien Phu, the 1954 battle which led to the French retreat from Vietnam. The sight of a brigade of Marines in body bags being hauled from Khe Sanh would have been a tragedy of awesome proportions.

That is why the general ordered Operation Pegasus, a large-scale joint Army-Marines rescue effort. Included in the operation was the Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division, the division of 25-year-old Capt. Max Cleland.

The tall son of a secretary and an automobile salesman from Lithonia, Georgia, had signed up for Reserve Officers' Training Corps at Stetson University, was trained in guerrilla warfare and had always ached to fight in an important battle.

After his first three months as a platoon leader of a signal battalion, he thought, "It didn't seem like much of a war."

So he volunteered for a dangerous new assignment that would take him to what he considered the nucleus of the war. He became communications officer with the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the 12th Cavalry with the Cav's 2nd Brigade.

Cleland's boredom quickly subsided. At one point during Operation Pegasus, he spent five days and five nights in a bomb crater 20 feet in diameter. In a letter to an aunt, he wrote, "If I ever make it back to the Atlanta airport, I'll be happy just to crawl home regardless of what shape I'm in."

Some of the hills around Khe Sanh were battlefields almost as harrowing as any in U.S. military history. Marines still boast of having survived battles known only as Hill 881 and Hill 861.

But the hill where Cleland's fate was decided—once east of Khe Sanh—would not become known for any great act of valor. Its strategic importance was as a communications relay station.

The 12th Cav's Maj. Maury Cralle, Cleland's commanding officer who was stationed in the rear, recalls that he had trouble communicating consistently with the front lines. A relay was needed.

On April 8, 1968, less than a week before the siege of Khe Sanh was broken and one month before his anticipated departure from Vietnam, Capt. Cleland accompanied his men by helicopter to the hill, arriving within minutes.

He had jumped from helicopters countless times before. Usually, there was nothing to it.

He jumped, and once clear of the spinning helicopter blades, turned, watching the chopper lift into the air. That's when he noticed the hand grenade resting on the ground.

Ordinarily, grenades only detonate when their pins are pulled. Somehow, this grenade's pin had become dislodged. All Cleland saw was the grenade.