

only are he and his assistant coaches teaching their players hockey skills, but important lessons for life—courage, stamina, tenacity and dedication. Although he has enjoyed great success throughout his coaching career, his achievements go far beyond his great talent in coaching. He was a second round draft pick for the Boston Bruins in the 1970 American Hockey League where he was the co-winner of the Happs Holmes Trophy which honors the top goalie in the AHL. Coach Bouchard moved to the National Hockey League in 1972 where he gained a number of honors. In 1976, he was chosen to play for Team Canada and in 1979 he co-founded the Atlanta Sports Carnival which fund raises for leukemia research at Emory University. I would be hard pressed to enumerate all of his magnificent life achievements and contributions to Life University, the Marietta community and to all of the athletes whose lives he has touched.

In this year's championship game the team quickly jumped ahead with a 4-1 lead in the second period against Michigan State, thus setting the tone for defeat. With a final score of 6-2, they claimed their third national title. The Most Valuable Player award went to the Running Eagles' Mark Brodeur who scored 12 goals and had six assists for a total of 18 points. He led the tournament in scoring.

Mr. President, I ask that you and my colleagues join me in recognizing and honoring the dedication and hard work of the athletes and coaches of the Life University Running Eagles. They have displayed their skills and dedication to excellence in hockey throughout this entire season and I extend my best wishes to them and congratulate the Life University Athletic Department on their continued success.●

#### TRIBUTE TO MERRILL S. PARKS JR.

● Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the life and achievements of Mr. Merrill S. Parks Jr., the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Special Agent in charge of Connecticut, who recently passed away after a brief illness at the age of 55.

Merrill Parks began his career with the FBI 29 years ago in Montana after graduating from Memphis State University. He quickly moved on to serve in the FBI's New York division where he worked from 1971 to 1975. While there, he became a supervisory Special Agent overseeing the investigation of organized crime and white-collar crime.

Special Agent Parks's success as an investigator earned him a reputation as an expert in dealing with organized crime. By 1979, Special Agent Parks had been reassigned to the FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. to man-

age the bureau's national program of identifying and infiltrating organized crime. He also initiated a long-term program that dealt with combating money laundering.

One of Special Agent Parks most widely profiled accomplishments was his leadership of what became known as the Pizza Connection case. His experience and knowledge of the inner-workings of crime families led to the successful prosecution of Mafia-connected drug dealers who sold heroin through pizza parlors and bakeries.

In 1986, Special Agent Parks was reassigned as an Assistant Special Agent in charge of Houston's FBI office. The Houston area had been witnessing a growth of Mexican organized crime groups attempting to distribute drugs throughout the United States, and Special Agent Parks's expertise was enlisted to help curb their illegal activities. Within the first year, under the guidance of Special Agent Parks, the Houston office solved 32 drug-related kidnappings.

The course of Merrill Parks's career eventually brought him to Madison, Connecticut in 1994, where he made his home with his wife, Patricia. In that year, he was also appointed to head the FBI's Connecticut office.

Vigorous in his determination to stop the flow of drugs and violence within our communities, Special Agent Parks faced the new task of eliminating gangs. Sadly, Connecticut, like so many other states, has experienced an emergence of gangs and gang-related crime in recent years. Special Agent Parks's work in Connecticut was no less impressive and, as with his previous assignments, he was, once again, successful. In his first year working in Connecticut, Special Agent Parks infiltrated one of the state's most infamous gangs, the Latin Kings, and arrested numerous gang leaders.

Realizing that gangs were a long-term problem, he created a task force that for three years continued to monitor and collect evidence on gang activity. Finally, in 1997, federal charges were brought against 20 Latin King members throughout the state, and his hard work ultimately led to the prosecution of dozens, helping to rid our streets of gang violence.

Mr. President, although Merrill Parks only lived in Connecticut for a short five years, the contributions he made to the state and the protection of its residents will be long remembered. I appreciated his willingness to always keep me and my staff informed of recent developments within his office and his obvious concern for making Connecticut a safer place to live. His stay was brief but his accomplishments were many and on behalf of myself, and the entire state of Connecticut, I would like to offer our sincere thanks for his outstanding efforts. Merrill Parks is survived by his wife, Patricia, a son,

Andrew, and a daughter, Meredith. I would like to extend my heartfelt condolences to each of them on the passing of an outstanding father, husband, and law enforcement officer.●

#### SUBMISS

● Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, today I ask that the second portion of Mark A. Bradley's article on the disappearance of the U.S.S. *Scorpion* be printed in the RECORD. The first portion of this article, which was featured in the Spring/Summer volume of the Journal of America's Military Past, appeared in yesterday's RECORD. Mr. Bradley was awarded the James Madison prize by the Society for History in the Federal Government for this article. I will ask that the third and final portion of this article be printed in tomorrow's RECORD.

The material follows:

SUBMISS: THE MYSTERIOUS DEATH OF THE U.S.S. "SCORPION" (SSN 589), PART II

(By Mark A. Bradley)

While the theory of Russian involvement is tantalizing, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Navy possessed the capability in May 1968 to hunt down the *Scorpion*. Although the Soviets were on the brink of commissioning two new classes of hunter-killer and ballistic missile submarines—the Victor I and the Charlie I—fully able to contend with American sea power, they still relied heavily at that time on their vintage diesel Whiskey class submarines to shadow and challenge hostile warships. Slow and lacking advanced weapons and sophisticated electronics, the outdated Whiskeys were no match for the *Scorpion*.

Similarly, the Soviet's Echo II class nuclear submarine had limited capabilities. Although the Echo II was armed with conventional antisubmarine torpedoes, her main weapons were surface-to-surface missiles. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, the Echo II required over 25 minutes to surface and fire, ample time for the *Scorpion* to parry an attack and to launch one of her own. Moreover, the United States Navy did not begin to decommission its Skipjack class submarines until 1986. Until then, the surviving five remained in frontline service, an unlikely practice for the Navy to maintain if it knew or suspected that the Soviets so easily had hunted down and killed the *Scorpion* nearly 20 years before.

After rejecting Soviet involvement, the Court similarly discounted sabotage, a collision with an undersea mountain, a nuclear accident, a structural failure, a fire, an irrational act by a crew member, a loss of navigational control and, with far less certainty, a weapons accident. Although it found no direct evidence that one of the submarines's own torpedoes had exploded, the Court noted that on December 5, 1967, the *Scorpion* had confronted an accidentally activated Mark 37 torpedo in one of its firing tubes and had sidestepped disaster by expelling it before it could detonate.

Her standard method for deactivating a "hot run"—the Navy's term for an accidentally activated torpedo with a live warhead—was to flood the tube with cold water, keeping the torpedo cool, and turn the warship in a U turn more than 170 degrees, activating an anti-circular homing device that shut

down the projectile's motor. Then her crew would drain the tube, install a propeller lock and jettison it. Small and battery powered, the Mark 37 was a wire-guided anti-submarine torpedo that had a disturbing history of accidentally activating, particularly during testing. In May 1968, the *Scorpion* had 14 Mark 37s in an arsenal that included two Mark 45 ASTOR torpedoes with nuclear warheads and 7 other conventional projectiles.

She also had a new commander. When he took over the *Scorpion* on October 17, 1967, Francis Atwood Slattery was 36 years old. From West Paris, Maine, he had graduated from Annapolis in 1954 and was a member of the Naval War College's class of 1967. A former executive officer on U.S.S. *Nautilus*, "Frank" Slattery was among a very small cadre of technically gifted officers the Navy had tapped for elite nuclear submarine duty. After promotion to the rank of commander on October 2, 1967, the *Scorpion* was his first command.

His newness to command showed in December when navy inspectors gave the *Scorpion* an unsatisfactory rating after she failed a series of casualty drills involving her nuclear torpedoes and again in January when she engaged in an advanced submarine versus submarine exercise and received the lowest tactical grade of all the participants. Nevertheless, by the time she was deployed to the Mediterranean in February, the Navy rated her fully ready and, by March, she was praised by the 6th Fleet Command Staff for begin a well-trained, well-run submarine. By April 1968, seven of her 12 officers and 61 of her 87 enlisted men were fully qualified in submarines, and the Court found no ground to blame either her officers or her enlisted men for what happen on May 22.

As Admiral Austin closed his investigation and submitted his inconclusive findings, the *Mizar* found the *Scorpion* in the early morning hours of October 28, 1968, and began photographing the wreckage. Once all the photographic and sound recordings were collected, Admiral Austin reconvened his court in early November and asked a special Technical Advisory Group comprising scientists and veteran submariners to pore over the newly discovered physical evidence. Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Chief of Naval Operations, earlier had created this group to provide technical expertise to the Court.

Headed by Dr. John Craven, the naval scientist who in 1966 led the team that retrieved a hydrogen bomb that had plummeted into the Atlantic near Palomares, Spain, after two U.S. Air Force planes collided, and assisted by the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C., the technical experts first examined the acoustical recordings and made a startling discovery—the *Scorpion* had been heading east, instead of west toward Norfolk, when the first cataclysmic explosion erupted. The advisors estimated that the first sound to register on SOSUS had been caused by at least 30 pounds of TNT detonating 60 feet or more below the surface and theorized that the *Scorpion* had been engaged in a hastily ordered U-turn in a desperate attempt to disarm a hot run torpedo that exploded and caused uncontrollable flooding. According to Craven, the hot run scenario was the only one that fit all the evidence.

In a December 16, 1984, article published in the *Virginian-Pilot & Ledger-Star*, Craven related that the photographs indicated that the *Scorpion*'s torpedo room was still intact and had not been crushed by water pressure as she spiraled toward her watery grave. In that interview, Craven said he believed the

torpedo room did not implode, pointing out that it was the first part of the *Scorpion* to flood after the explosion and already had filled with water when the submarine began to sink. Noting the absence of visible damage from outside the hull, he added that a torpedo probably detonated inside the compartment instead of in one of the submarine's six firing tubes.

Craven also noted that the photographs showed that several access hatches to the torpedo room were open. This meant they probably were pushed out by internal pressure. The other SOSUS recordings were sounds of the *Scorpion*'s various compartments collapsing and buckling as she bent like a piece of taffy as she sank below her crush depth and slammed into the ocean floor at a speed estimated to between 25 and 35 knots per hour.

Although the Court discovered that Schade's May 20 operational order did not specify whether the *Scorpion*'s torpedoes were to be fully armed, it seems likely that Slattery would have exercised his discretion and ordered them ready as she approached the Soviet ships. If so, this would have been the first time in over a year that the *Scorpion* had engaged in an operation which required her tactical torpedoes to be fully loaded. She would have done so with a new torpedo gang and weapons officer. All her torpedo men had been replaced since her last operation, and her weapons officer had been relieved during her Mediterranean deployment.

The Court speculated that the *Scorpion* probably had begun disarming her torpedoes by the time she broadcast her final message on the evening of May 21 because of the Navy's strict policy forbidding submarines from entering Norfolk with fully armed warheads. If so, the investigators theorized that something as simple as a short in a piece of testing equipment accidentally could have activated one of the Mark 37's batteries and triggered a hot run. Left with only seconds to react, Slattery would have ordered the *Scorpion* into the abrupt U-turn she was making when the torpedo exploded and filled her with rushing sea water.

Almost immediately, the Navy's Bureau of Weapons challenged the hot run theory and commissioned its own study to undermine it. The Bureau's position was supported by Admiral P. Ephriam Holmes, the commander of the Navy's Atlantic Fleet, and Vice Admiral Schade. Both pointed out that there was no visible torpedo damage to the *Scorpion*'s hull in any of the thousands of photographs taken by the *Mizar* and *Trieste II*, that her weapons room showed no signs of a cataclysmic explosion that would have followed as the warship's torpedoes erupted in a massive chain reaction, and that her torpedo firing doors were tightly shuttered. Moreover, former crew members were unable to identify any objects in her debris field that came from her torpedo room.

Admiral Schade, a veteran World War II submariner and holder of both the Navy Cross and the Silver Star, told the Court that he believed the *Scorpion* simply was lost after she flooded and sank below her designed operating capacity. Although unsure of how the flooding started, Schade speculated that it happened while the submarine was at 60 feet or at periscope depth and that she already was full of water by the time she began to sink. In a letter to Admiral Austin, he wrote that he believed that the most likely cause of the disaster was an accident involving the submarine's trash disposal unit.

Located in the *Scorpion*'s galley, her trash disposal consisted of an inner door separated

from highly pressurized sea water by a basketball-sized valve connected to a 10½-inch tunnel. Although the inner door was supposed to be mechanically prevented from opening while trash was being flushed, and the crew was trained to use a bleed valve to make sure no pressurized sea water was outside before ejecting waste, a broken system or valve coupled with human error could have unleashed a fatal chain of events as a torrent of high-pressure sea water roared through the submarine. Pouring through the *Scorpion*'s galley and swamping her operations center, the rushing cascade would have overwhelmed her pumps, washed over and shorted out her electric control panels, flooded over her huge battery several decks below and exploded into a deadly mist of fiery hydrogen and poisonous chlorine gas. With her crew dead or unconscious and water pressure squeezing her as she plunged deeper and deeper, the *Scorpion* would have imploded as she rocketed nearly two miles to the ocean's floor.

Vice Admiral Robert Fountain (Ret), the former executive officer on the *Scorpion* from 1965 until 1967, supports this theory. In a recent interview, Fountain explained that the *Scorpion* normally came up to periscope depth to expel her trash and that she especially would have needed to do so after completing an underwater intelligence operation. He also pointed out that the submarine had experienced flooding because of her trash disposal unit before. Some of the photographs taken by the *Mizar* and *Trieste II* appear to back Fountain's claim. These show that all the submarine's identifiable debris is from her operations center where her galley was located, and that a large section of her hull is missing where her huge 69-ton battery was stored.

The Austin Court considered this theory and determined it was possible but "not probable" without further comment. Moreover, the several witnesses testified that they believed the warship's safety systems would have deployed to save her if she was flooding that close to the surface. This assessment might have been right if the *Scorpion*'s safety systems were fully working and certified, but they were neither.

The *Scorpion*'s safety systems were a direct product of the worst submarine disaster in American history—the loss of U.S.S. *Thresher* and her entire crew of 112 sailors and 17 civilians on April 10, 1963. It is impossible to overestimate what the *Thresher*'s loss meant to the Navy. A public relations nightmare during the very dangerous middle years of the cold War, the *Thresher*'s abrupt demise during test dives 220 miles off Cape Cod shattered the myth of the service's technological invincibility—much like the *Challenger*'s explosion did to NASA's some 23 years later—and caused acute embarrassment and unwelcome political oversight. Not only did it deprive the Navy of its most advanced submarine, but the disaster also spawned a round of congressional hearings and newspaper editorials questioning the design, testing and safety of the service's underwater nuclear fleet.

To combat these criticisms and regain its prestige, the Navy instituted its Submarine Safety Program (SUBSAFE). First initiated in May 1963 and formalized that December, SUBSAFE was designed to ensure the *Thresher* was not repeated. After months of exhaustive hearings, which produced 12 volumes and 1,718 pages of evidence, the service's experts traced the *Thresher*'s sinking to a series of failed silver-braze joints and pipes that set into motion a deadly chain of catastrophic events that ended with the warship's main systems flooded and her ballast

system unable to muster enough air to send her to the surface. The investigators concluded that once the submarine dove to her test depth of 1,300 feet, water pressure ruptured her pipes and created a two inch leak. This sent an unstoppable stream of icy water over her control panels that her crew was unable to stop because they could not reach her centralized shutoff valves in time. It stopped her reactor and sent her backwards and downwards as she lost all power. Unable to blow enough air into her ballast tanks through her narrow pipes—moisture in her pipes had frozen, blocking her air vents—the *Thresher* imploded as she fell over 8,000 feet to the bottom.

In the wake of this, the Navy's Bureau of Ships and the Ship Systems Command placed depth restrictions on all the service's post-World War II submarines—the *Scorpion* was limited to a depth of 500 feet instead of her standard operating depth of 700 feet—and ordered their inspectors and workmen to begin the time-consuming and expensive task of examining and replacing faulty sea water hydraulic piping systems and welding possible faulty joints in over 80 submarines. They also ordered the improvement of flood control systems by increasing ballast tank blow rates and the installation of decentralized sea water shutoff valves.

By the time SUBSAFE was instituted, the *Scorpion* was in dry-dock at the Charleston Naval Shipyard for her first and last full overhaul. Arriving on June 10, 1963, and remaining until April 28, 1964, she had nearly completed her repairs by the time the yard's command received orders to implement the new safety requirements. Although workmen inspected the *Scorpion's* hull and replaced many of her welds, they were not authorized to install emergency sea water shut-off valves. Moreover, the Naval Sea Systems Command deemed the interim emergency blow system the yard constructed unsuitable for service and ordered it disconnected. The Navy decided to defer installing these two systems until early 1967, the date of the *Scorpion's* next scheduled overhaul.

By then, the Navy had spent over \$500 million on SUBSAFE and estimated that it needed at least another \$200 million more to certify all its submarines. In addition, severe outside pressures were forcing the Navy to rethink how best to allocate its already stretched resources. Faced with fighting an increasingly protracted war in Vietnam while meeting the unchanging demands of maintaining America's global security obligations at a time when the Soviets decided to expand and transform their navy into a full-blown blue water fleet, the service's high command began to grope for new ways to meet its backbreaking obligations.

Confronted now with the urgent need to launch more warships and to keep the ones it already had at sea, the Navy decided to delay installing full SUBSAFE systems in many of its older submarines. What prompted this shift started with a series of confidential memoranda and messages drafted in 1966 as the Navy sought ways to reduce the time its submarines spent in dry dock meeting SUBSAFE's requirements. A Naval Sea Systems Command study of that era revealed not only the rising costs of this program but that approximately 40 percent of the average submarine's time was spent undergoing reconditioning instead of serving at sea.

The Navy's leadership was clearly worried by the political fallout these statistics would generate. On March 24, 1966, the Commander of Submarine Squadron 6—the *Scorpion's* unit—drafted a memorandum to Admiral

Schade, Commander Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet that candidly admitted that "the inordinate amount of time currently involved in routine overhauls of nuclear submarines is a recognized source of major concern to the Navy as a whole and the submarine force in particular and stands as a source of acute political embarrassment." The memorandum blamed the Navy's Bureau of Ships and the managers of the service's shipyards for these problems and complained about the shortage of skilled workers needed to complete the overhauls, their poor planning in ordering critical materials on time, and the overall magnitude of what SUBSAFE required. It also warned that the *Scorpion's* next scheduled reconditioning in November 1966 "will establish a new record for in overhaul duration."•

#### SMALL FARM RIDER AMENDMENT

• Mr. REED. Mr. President, I want to speak briefly about an amendment regarding OSHA inspections of small farms, which I was prepared to offer to S. 544, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill. To expedite the consideration of this emergency legislation, I withdrew my amendment, but I want my colleagues to know that I will continue to press this issue.

As other Senators may know, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, by statute, can enforce health and safety rules and investigate accidents on farms or businesses of any size.

However, a rider prohibiting OSHA from expending funds to carry out its statutory duty with respect to small farms has been attached to Department of Labor appropriations bills for the past several years. Small farms are those that employ ten or fewer workers and do not maintain a camp for temporary employees.

I want to emphasize that this prohibition extends even to the investigation of fatal, work-related accidents. I am not speaking of malicious acts leading to deaths on the job—law enforcement authorities are capable of addressing those circumstances. I am speaking of deaths caused by preventable health and safety hazards—hazards that no agency other than OSHA has the capacity to address.

Since the death of a sixteen-year-old Rhode Islander in an accident on a small farm in 1997, I have worked to address this issue.

Mr. President, it is heartbreaking for a parent to send a child off to a summer job only to see him die in an accident, and it is infuriating for these parents to wonder whether other youngsters now working on that job are safe.

I am sensitive to the concerns that some Senators will have about protecting the interests of family farms. That is why I have attempted to only moderately amend the current rider. Indeed, my amendment only allows OSHA access to small farms if there is a death, and only for investigation, not punitive action.

I have advanced this proposal in the hope of disseminating information about the causes of fatalities in order to prevent repeat tragedies and to bring a sense of closure to families who lose a loved one.

When I raised this issue during the markup of the Safety Advancement for Employees (SAFE) Act in the Labor and Human Resources Committee during the last Congress, several of my colleagues expressed a willingness to work with me on this issue. Regrettably, there is little the authorizing committee can do, because the problem stems from an appropriations rider, and an appropriations bill is where a correction should be made.

Mr. President, agriculture is one of the most hazardous industries in the United States today. We should take at least this minimal step to ensure the safety of agricultural employees.

Last Fall, the National Research Council (NRC), an arm of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), issued a report entitled *Protecting Youth at Work*. Among its recommendations was the following related to small farm safety:

To ensure the equal protection of children and adolescents from health and safety hazards in agriculture, Congress should undertake an examination of the effects and feasibility of extending all relevant Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations to agricultural workers, including subjecting small farms to the same level of OSHA enforcement as that applied to other small businesses.

Mr. President, it is the opinion of the NAS panel that small farms should be subject to the same level of enforcement as all other small businesses. In comparison to this recommendation, my proposed amendment is moderate, because, again, my amendment only allows an OSHA inspection on a small farm following a fatal accident. The inspection could not result in fines or any other OSHA enforcement.

During consideration of the SAFE Act in the 105th Congress, the Labor Committee voted for a provision requiring an NAS peer review of all new OSHA standards. Today, we have a report from the NAS making recommendations on OSHA enforcement on small farms. I hope that colleagues will keep that in mind and that they will remember that my amendment is not as extensive as the NAS recommendation.

Mr. President, some have criticized my amendment as unfair to small farm owners. I am mystified by their argument. The only small farms to be impacted would be those where an employee dies in a work related accident. Then, the only imposition the business would face would be an investigation: no fines, no enforcement, and no regulation. If information could be disseminated to prevent just one of the 500 deaths that occur annually in the agriculture industry, I believe this minor