

that what is at the heart of the President's proposal, to transfer some resources from the general fund to strengthen Medicare, has no merit and that the answer is what the bipartisan reform Commission came up with—which did not achieve the necessary agreement of that Commission to make a recommendation.

Frankly, I do not think this body should be in a position now to decide that is the answer. I do not think a plan to—

Mr. WELLSTONE. Would my colleague yield for a question?

Mr. CONRAD. I am happy to yield to my colleague.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Right here:

(6) Congress should move expeditiously to consider the bipartisan recommendations of the chairmen of the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare.

That sounds to me like an endorsement of the Commission's proposal. Am I wrong or right about that?

Mr. CONRAD. It reads that way to me. I read the whole thing in its totality.

Mr. WELLSTONE. People can disagree, but then a vote for this would be an endorsement of any number of the different recommendations. That might be good for some, but I want to make it clear to colleagues, if you move the Medicare age up from 65 to 67, you go forward with the notion of "voucherizing" Medicare, which is very different from Medicare today. To me, this is an up-or-down vote on these recommendations. I could not possibly vote for this right now. I hope other Senators will seriously consider that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. CONRAD. I just reclaim my time.

Mr. President, I hope colleagues will resist this amendment. I think some of the statements in here are inaccurate. I think it sends a message which is not the message that should be sent at this time. I say that as somebody who is committed to reforming Medicare, as well as one who is committed to putting additional resources into the program.

I yield the floor.

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Roth amendment. I recognize, as I know all of my colleagues do, that Medicare is facing very serious financial problems. I agree with the proponents of this amendment that Congress must act carefully and expeditiously, in a bipartisan way, to make the structural reforms necessary to preserve Medicare for both current and future seniors. And I want to commend Senator BREAUX and all of the members of the Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare, for working so hard in this effort and creating a starting point for reform.

However, at this point, that's what the Breaux plan is—a starting point. I

do not necessarily agree with every piece of the Breaux plan, but frankly, it is just too early for the Senate to endorse it. The Commission only finished its work last week, and most of us have not had a chance to study the plan in detail. In addition, the Roth amendment dismisses too quickly the President's proposal to devote 15% of the surplus to Medicare. Even with enactment of structural reforms, it is likely that more money will be needed for Medicare, and we shouldn't have to cut other health and education programs to find it. Even more importantly, in order for Medicare reform to be truly successful, it is essential that we all work cooperatively with one another—and with the President. It is unnecessary to pass an amendment that blasts the President's proposal without giving it full consideration.

Mr. President, while I believe we must address Medicare reform, the Budget Resolution is not an appropriate nor meaningful place to do it. The Roth amendment would tie the Senate's hands. It would force us to declare right now that the Breaux plan is the best plan, and that we will not put even a fraction of the surplus into Medicare. I think that would be a mistake. I urge my colleagues to vote against the Roth amendment, and I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, through his work on the Medicare Commission, Senator BREAUX has offered some very strong recommendations to deal with our long-term problems in Medicare, and I hope that the Finance Committee will act expeditiously in considering these and other reform elements. While I share many of the sentiments expressed in this amendment, I don't believe it will bring us closer toward finding common ground on the Medicare question. Realization of comprehensive Medicare reform will require a genuine bipartisan effort from all parties involved, and we ought to be working to keep the political tension surrounding this debate to a minimum. I'm concerned that the wording of the amendment offered by Senator ROTH will further divide us rather than bring us together on this important issue. For this reason, I will oppose it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from New Mexico is recognized.

Mr. DOMENICI. We would like to proceed, if we can, with the Kennedy amendment. I ask the Senator, you are on that same amendment, are not you?

Mr. DODD. Yes.

Mr. DOMENICI. Let me just say, we can leave time for more debate on this. The problem is, we are going to run out of time, and people are not going to get any time on a score of amendments that they think are very, very impor-

tant, also. From my standpoint, you have control of plenty of the time. If we can get on with the next one, you can reclaim time and use it off the bill if there is somebody who wants to discuss this issue.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, we would be pleased to go to the next amendment and lay this one aside. If someone wants to return to it later, we can provide time to them. But we are ready to move on.

Mr. DOMENICI. Let me ask, in terms of time, we still have how much time on the bill? Something like 8 and a half hours?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct; approximately 8 and a half hours.

Mr. DOMENICI. How much time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eight hours 29 minutes.

Mr. DOMENICI. Has the time been yielded on the amendment itself?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 3 minutes 14 seconds; the distinguished Senator from North Dakota has 5 minutes 13 seconds.

Mr. DOMENICI. I am not going to ask them to yield back their time. I ask unanimous consent that we set this aside temporarily while the Kennedy amendment proceeds.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Hearing none, without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KENNEDY. If I could ask the floor managers, the Senator from New York would like to have general time for 15 minutes, and then we will move ahead with this amendment. We will try to move it along rapidly and not take all the time.

Mr. DOMENICI. I say to the Senator, we will not take it off yours, but take it off the bill. We will charge it equally.

How much time, I ask the Senator?

Mr. SCHUMER. Fifteen minutes.

Mr. DOMENICI. Fifteen minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from New York is recognized.

Mr. SCHUMER. I thank my colleagues, the Senators from New Mexico, North Dakota, and Massachusetts, for allowing me to make this address, which is of real importance to the people in my State.

PROTECT ME AND RESPECT ME

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, like many New Yorkers, I have spent a great deal of time in the aftermath of the Amadou Diallo killing reflecting about our city, our police, our country, and our people.

During my career, I think I have been considered a friend of both law enforcement and the minority community. But I have always been troubled by the rift between minorities and the

police. And I have always felt that this rift has caused pain and harm to both communities.

There are men, women and children, black and white, alive today because of the work of the New York City Police Department—their fine work. New Yorkers are proud of that fact. Most cops are decent, honorable, and hard-working—and it is wrong to judge all cops by the actions of the bad few.

But what we all must realize is that the momentous drop in crime and the model behavior of many officers does not undo the plain truth that black men and women in New York City who have never broken the law and who should have absolutely no reason to fear law enforcement, are all too often hassled and made to feel like lawbreakers, and that it is different for minorities than for the average white person in the city.

Many whites seem to feel that widespread frisking and patting down is a small price to pay for a steep reduction in crime. But most white people have never been frisked and have no conception of how pervasive the practice is.

But if you talk to black stockbrokers on Wall Street and black lawyers downtown—people who wear a suit and a tie every day—to a person they have a story of being stopped, frisked, and harassed by a police officer.

If you talk to minority co-workers or attend services at African American churches and ask the men and women from the congregation about their interaction with the police—they talk about how they or their law-abiding children were stopped, questioned and searched by the police.

And they will tell you, as they have said to me, that they know this doesn't happen as often to white people. They know that white people are treated differently.

All people, black and white, want very much for their neighborhoods to be safe and to feel confident that when they send their children or grandchildren to the corner store for a carton of milk they will come home safely. But in addition to these feelings, minorities are humiliated and angered by the indignity of being treated all too often as presumptive criminals.

And if you take the time to listen, the views of minorities about the relationship they want to have with the police can be summed up in five words: "Protect me, and respect me."

This poem was left on the shallow doorway where Amidou Diallo was killed:

When you look at me what do you see;
Am I innocent until proven guilty;
Am I your enemy;
Or were you sent here to protect me.

Protect me and respect me.

Whatever facts emerge from the killing of Amidou Diallo, or for that matter, the killing of a Syracuse man, Johnny Gammage, by the Pittsburgh

police—whether it is guilty, not guilty, suspension, or removal—our society must deal with the underlying problem of race and law enforcement.

There has been a great deal of rhetoric and anger in the aftermath of the Diallo shooting, I can understand why. But I wish to take a different approach.

I offer today, what I believe are constructive solutions that transcend any one set of circumstances and will allow both the "protect me and respect me" parts of the equation to coexist and even flourish.

First, for the sake of the city and for the sake of the police force, the NYPD must immediately put in place a system that more quickly gets bad cops off the street.

It was well known among police, for example, that Justin Volpe, one of the cops who tortured Abner Louima was a bad, bad seed with multiple complaints against him. It was well known that officer Francis Livoti was a ticking time bomb for years before he strangled Anthony Baez in 1994.

The force knew it and did nothing about it. That attitude of silence, protecting your own, sweeping problems under the rug has got to end, not only for the sake of future victims, but for the police department itself.

The tens of thousands of good, honest, hardworking officers pay a price when the Volpes are not removed. For that reason, it is in their interest to end any policy of silence.

The mayor, the police chief, police union leaders, community leaders and church leaders should all urge police officers to come forward when there is a bad element on the force. It should be an honorable action, not a shameful action, to come forward.

Second, minority recruitment at the NYPD must improve. The force is more than two-thirds white; the city is nearly three-fifths minority.

When mostly white cops patrol high-density, minority neighborhoods resentment is bound to follow.

The city should at last fully fund the Cadet Corps to recruit qualified, college educated minority applicants through the City University. The program is on the books, but until this crisis was basically ignored.

Also, the city should take advantage of a program created last year by Reverend Johnny Ray Youngblood and me to recruit and train young minority applicants through the churches and to help them become police officers who will patrol the neighborhood from where they came.

Next, beyond minority recruitment, New York City should look to what works in other places.

Two efforts stand out: Boston's Ten-Point Coalition and the military's Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute.

Boston had the same problems as New York: a rift between police and

the African-American community; several high profile incidents of abuse by certain officers; and clergy that took on the role of police critics.

Their hatred exploded into the open with the stabbing death of Carol Stuart, a pregnant white woman. The husband, Charles Stuart, told police that a black man committed the crime.

The Boston Police hit the streets in full force. They stopped and searched every black male that fit the general description. The neighborhood residents complained about the tactics, but the crime was so horrible no one listened.

They arrested William Bennett, a black man. Carol Stuart's husband, it was learned months later, was the killer. Bennett was innocent.

And Boston was on the verge of a meltdown.

With no place else to go, the police and the clergy agreed to stop fighting and to sit down to develop a plan to stop crime on the one hand, and preserve dignity on the other.

They initiated a five-point contract.

The heart of it was this: The ministers and respected community leaders agreed to help identify those in the neighborhood who were the real troublemakers. They took the responsibility of telling the police who was dealing drugs and committing violent crime.

The flip side is that when ministers and community leaders took responsibility and identified the troublemakers, others were left alone. And because most crime in each neighborhood is caused by just a few people, the use of the standard stop in frisk procedure that the community found so oppressive greatly diminished.

If an officer is abusive or disrespectful, ministers and community leaders have an open line to the police. If the police did not act, or if they refused to address the problem, the ministers and community leaders were free to go to the media.

The plan worked. The crime rate in Boston has dropped even faster than in New York. Serious youth crime is almost non-existent. And the important but difficult relationship between police and the minority community is vastly improved.

Last month in the Bronx, 100 members of the clergy met in the office of the Bronx Borough President and said they have always wanted to work with the police. They said, "We could be a resource. But they're not using us. The police don't even know us. They don't come and talk to us."

The Boston model will work in New York and we should move quickly to implement it here.

The military—and our prayers are with the American soldiers fighting over Kosovo—has also found a way to confront bigotry while increasing effectiveness.

The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, developed in the early 1970s to confront segregation and racial hostility among soldiers in Vietnam, is one of the reasons that the armed forces is the most integrated institution in America.

The military learned that unless bigotry was ended in the armed forces, America could not have an effective military. So by necessity they developed a program that lasts to this day.

Officers and supervisors take a course to confront their own stereotypes and to identify problems within their unit. They have a simple goal: change people's behavior. The rule is that if you've got a problem with race, it better not show up in your words or actions.

The thrust of the program is this: DEOMI, as it is called, continuously surveys enlisted soldiers and officers about race relations on their base. The results are made known only to the commanding officer and to people at DEOMI. When there is a problem on a base, a mobile team of trainers moves in to solve it.

The model has been so successful that DEOMI has signed contracts to work with police organizations. New York City should sign a contract as soon as possible.

In conclusion, this has been one of the most trying and emotional times in New York in years. We are a city, right now, divided. No good has ever come from divisiveness. No job was ever created. No street made safer. No school made better by pulling ourselves apart.

I worry about two things:

First, is that division in ours, the most diverse city on earth, has the potential to pull us down.

Second, failure to deal with this problem will ultimately weaken our efforts to fight crime and perhaps, forfeit the gains we made in crime reduction. That is unacceptable and unnecessary given that options abound if we choose them.

New York City is undoubtedly a safer place in every neighborhood from the far end of the Bronx to the tip of the Rockaways. But it is not necessarily a better place for every neighborhood.

Dr. Martin Luther King taught us that "we are tied together in the single garment of destiny, caught in an inescapable network of mutuality. And whatever affects one directly affects all directly."

The killing of Amdiou Diallo; the killing of Johnny Gammage affects us all directly.

We all love our city. Let's each side—as hard as it is to do—put aside our frustration and distrust so we can move past confrontation and collaborate constructively on solutions that protect and respect.

I again thank the Chairman and my colleagues for their consideration and I yield the floor.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I want to commend the Senator from New York on his maiden speech here in the Senate Chamber. The first speech by any member is one of the most important, and I think the Senator from New York chose well when he chose this subject. Obviously, it is a matter of urgent concern in New York, and the Senator has spoken movingly and persuasively about what must be done to respond to the crisis there. I want to thank the Senator from New York for bringing this to the attention of his colleagues and for doing a masterful job of informing us of what is facing the people of New York.

I again thank and commend the Senator on his initial speech here in the Chamber. In my 12 years in the Senate, I believe the Senator from New York is one of the most impressive new members and we are very happy to have him here.

Mr. SCHUMER. I thank the Senator from North Dakota.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

The Senate continued with consideration of the concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.

AMENDMENT NO. 177

(Purpose: To reduce tax breaks for the wealthiest taxpayers and reserve the savings for Medicare)

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, through an agreement with the floor managers, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] proposes an amendment numbered 177.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

Increase the levels of Federal revenues in section 101(1)(A) by the following amounts:

- (1) Fiscal year 2000: \$0.
- (2) Fiscal year 2001: \$3,000,000,000.
- (3) Fiscal year 2002: \$25,000,000,000.
- (4) Fiscal year 2003: \$13,000,000,000.
- (5) Fiscal year 2004: \$18,000,000,000.
- (6) Fiscal year 2005: \$31,000,000,000.
- (7) Fiscal year 2006: \$57,000,000,000.
- (8) Fiscal year 2007: \$58,000,000,000.
- (9) Fiscal year 2008: \$59,000,000,000.
- (10) Fiscal year 2009: \$56,000,000,000.

Change the levels of Federal revenues in section 101(1)(B) by the following amounts:

- (1) Fiscal year 2000: \$0;
- (2) Fiscal year 2001: \$3,000,000,000;
- (3) Fiscal year 2002: \$25,000,000,000;
- (4) Fiscal year 2003: \$13,000,000,000;
- (5) Fiscal year 2004: \$18,000,000,000;
- (6) Fiscal year 2005: \$31,000,000,000;
- (7) Fiscal year 2006: \$57,000,000,000;

- (8) Fiscal year 2007: \$58,000,000,000;
 - (9) Fiscal year 2008: \$59,000,000,000; and
 - (10) Fiscal year 2009: \$56,000,000,000.
- Reduce the levels of total budget authority and outlays in section 101(2) and section 101(3) by the following amounts:

- (1) Fiscal year 2000: \$0;
- (2) Fiscal year 2001: \$0;
- (3) Fiscal year 2002: \$1,000,000,000;
- (4) Fiscal year 2003: \$2,000,000,000;
- (5) Fiscal year 2004: \$3,000,000,000;
- (6) Fiscal year 2005: \$4,000,000,000;
- (7) Fiscal year 2006: \$6,000,000,000;
- (8) Fiscal year 2007: \$10,000,000,000;
- (9) Fiscal year 2008: \$13,000,000,000; and
- (10) Fiscal year 2009: \$17,000,000,000.

Increase the levels of surpluses in section 101(4) by the following amounts:

- (1) Fiscal year 2000: \$0.
- (2) Fiscal year 2001: \$3,000,000,000.
- (3) Fiscal year 2002: \$26,000,000,000.
- (4) Fiscal year 2003: \$15,000,000,000.
- (5) Fiscal year 2004: \$21,000,000,000.
- (6) Fiscal year 2005: \$35,000,000,000.
- (7) Fiscal year 2006: \$63,000,000,000.
- (8) Fiscal year 2007: \$68,000,000,000.
- (9) Fiscal year 2008: \$72,000,000,000.
- (10) Fiscal year 2009: \$73,000,000,000.

Decrease the levels of public debt in section 101(5) by the following amounts:

- (1) Fiscal year 2000: \$0.
- (2) Fiscal year 2001: \$3,000,000,000.
- (3) Fiscal year 2002: \$26,000,000,000.
- (4) Fiscal year 2003: \$15,000,000,000.
- (5) Fiscal year 2004: \$21,000,000,000.
- (6) Fiscal year 2005: \$35,000,000,000.
- (7) Fiscal year 2006: \$63,000,000,000.
- (8) Fiscal year 2007: \$68,000,000,000.
- (9) Fiscal year 2008: \$72,000,000,000.
- (10) Fiscal year 2009: \$73,000,000,000.

Decrease the levels of debt held by the public in section 101(6) by the following amounts:

- (1) Fiscal year 2000: \$0.
- (2) Fiscal year 2001: \$3,000,000,000.
- (3) Fiscal year 2002: \$26,000,000,000.
- (4) Fiscal year 2003: \$15,000,000,000.
- (5) Fiscal year 2004: \$21,000,000,000.
- (6) Fiscal year 2005: \$35,000,000,000.
- (7) Fiscal year 2006: \$63,000,000,000.
- (8) Fiscal year 2007: \$68,000,000,000.
- (9) Fiscal year 2008: \$72,000,000,000.
- (10) Fiscal year 2009: \$73,000,000,000.

Decrease the levels of budget authority and outlays in section 103(18) for function 900, Net Interest, by the following amounts:

- (1) Fiscal year 2000: \$0.
- (2) Fiscal year 2001: \$0.
- (3) Fiscal year 2002: \$1,000,000,000.
- (4) Fiscal year 2003: \$2,000,000,000.
- (5) Fiscal year 2004: \$3,000,000,000.
- (6) Fiscal year 2005: \$4,000,000,000.
- (7) Fiscal year 2006: \$6,000,000,000.
- (8) Fiscal year 2007: \$10,000,000,000.
- (9) Fiscal year 2008: \$13,000,000,000.
- (10) Fiscal year 2009: \$17,000,000,000.

Reduce the levels in section 104(1) by which the Senate Committee on Finance is instructed to reduce revenues by the following amounts:

- (1) \$0 in fiscal year 2000.
- (2) \$59,000,000,000 for the period of fiscal years 2000 through 2004.
- (3) \$320,000,000,000 for the period of fiscal years 2000 through 2009.

On page 46, strike section 204.

At the end of title III, insert the following:
SEC. ____ SENSE OF THE SENATE ON EXTENDING THE SOLVENCY OF MEDICARE.

It is the sense of the Senate that the provisions of this resolution assume that the savings from the amendment reducing tax breaks for the wealthiest taxpayers should be reserved to strengthen and extend the solvency of the Medicare program.