

must be dealt with in an aggressive, firm way. There is still that possibility. We must take up that effort. And we must stop the talking about a ground war operation, a ground campaign and subjecting young Americans in a way that is going to cost lives and cause serious hardship for American families.

REGARDING THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. SIMPSON). Without objection, the previous order for 5 minutes is vacated and the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN) is recognized for not beyond midnight.

There was no objection.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, like the gentleman before me who stood before this House, the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania, I rise to address this House regarding the crisis in Kosovo, and my speech will echo some of the themes that he addressed, particularly at the end of his presentation.

Mr. Speaker, our actions in Kosovo are motivated by the highest level of idealism. We are willing to spend our treasure and, much more importantly, risk the lives of our men and women, to prevent atrocities and to assure that the Albanian Kosovars will be able to live in peace and with autonomy.

In some foreign capitals, they simply cannot believe this level of idealism. They are scurrying to find some ulterior motive. But those who understand America know that we are in Kosovo motivated by that idealism and certainly not motivated out of a desire to have some interest in some mineral resources less valuable than a single B-2 bomber. We who understand America and understand American idealism, know that that idealism will be expressed through our government.

Yet even in such a great idealistic undertaking, we must establish a realistic strategy. We must make sure that our idealistic motivations do not cloud our judgment. And here, Mr. Speaker, I would like to contrast realism with blinding idealism.

In a more ideal world, Kosovo would be the only place of tragedy and atrocity. But realistically we should note that the government of Sudan has killed 2 million of its African citizens, and that killing continues tonight; that 800,000 Tutsis were killed in Rwanda; and there are continuing mass murders on an enormous scale in the Congo, Myanmar and elsewhere.

In an ideal world, we could hope to easily restore Kosovo as a multiethnic, semiautonomous region. Realistically it is unlikely that Albanians and Serbs will live in harmony in the absence of an outside force. And it is just as unlikely that the Kosovars will renounce their goal of independence.

A blind idealist might see the world as pure good versus pure evil. Yet the

Serbs, who we vilify today, were just a few years ago themselves victims of ethnic cleansing. Some 180,000 Serbs who had lived for centuries in Croatia were expelled from that country—while America said nothing, and did nothing. And the Kosovar Albanians, who are pictured today as the embodiment of all ideal virtue—we must remember that they are tragic victims of present circumstance—but they are represented in large part by the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army, an organization that the United States Government has described as terrorist, an organization that may have alliances with Iran, with Osama Bin Laden, and even with drug dealers.

Blind idealism would cause us to demand the maximum possible objective and believe that we could achieve that objective with the minimum force. Yet realism requires us to adopt perhaps more limited objectives consistent with the future safety of the Albanian Kosovars. And realism demands that we marshal the substantial force which may be necessary to achieve any realistic objective.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that we should take three steps.

The first echoes the comments of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I believe that we should involve Russia in the diplomatic efforts to the maximum possible degree. Russia may be able to pull the Serbs to a negotiating position that is more realistic, and more just, than the position that Milosevic insists upon taking at the present time.

Russian involvement in both diplomacy and in peacekeeping offers a face-saving method for Milosevic to make major concessions.

Now, I know that there are those who will stand before this House and who will say we should not be negotiating with Milosevic, we should be seeking to dispose of him. But I would point out that we are still waiting for someone to dispose of Saddam Hussein. And in a realistic world, we must try to bring an end to the mass murder as quickly as possible.

Involving Russia is important beyond the events at hand. Ten years from now, Kosovo may be nearly forgotten if we are successful in bringing peace today, but Russia will continue to be a critical nuclear-armed state, and treating Russia with respect now will be important in our relationship with Russia in the future. And we should remember that 85 years ago, Russia mobilized its army in support of Serbia in events that led immediately to World War I.

Tomorrow, Secretary Albright will meet with Igor Ivanov, the Foreign Minister of Russia. That meeting will take place in Oslo. Hopefully this is the first step toward the maximum possible involvement of Russia in bringing peace to Kosovo.

Second, we should signal now that we are willing to reach peace on the basis

that the Rambouillet agreement would apply to roughly 80 percent of Kosovo territory rather than all of Kosovo.

No one denies that the Serbs have rights in Kosovo. They represented over 10 percent of the Kosovo population even today. When I say "today," I mean before the tragic recent events. Kosovo has been part of Serbia for centuries, and Kosovo is the religious and cultural birthplace of the Serbian nation. In fact, the Rambouillet agreement itself seeks to recognize Serb rights by stating that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia.

By leaving Serbs in control of the historically and religiously significant sites, including the original seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the most important of the monastery lands, and the battlefield of Kosovo Polje, on which the Serbs fought the Turks in the 14th century, we can make an offer that the Serbs can accept. Or, rather, Russia can make an offer that both sides can accept. In contrast, no Serb government, even one without Milosevic, even after 20 days of bombing, could accept the current Rambouillet agreement which the Serbs, and many other observers, believe would end all Serbian rights in all of Kosovo.

Certainly the Kosovar Albanians who represent roughly 85 percent of the population before the recent tragedy could live far better in roughly 80 percent of Kosovo's territory, protected by NATO troops as compared to asking those same people to live in refugee camps.

Third, we should begin training an army of Kosovar Albanians. This army should be independent of the KLA, and for now U.S. troops should control custody of the weapons while the training proceeds.

Milosevic may not believe that bombing will compel his departure from Kosovo, and he may not believe that NATO troops are willing to risk casualties in ground combat. But if there is an Albanian army being trained, then even Milosevic will know that there will be a ground force willing to absorb combat casualties which could be deployed in a matter of months.

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This will hopefully impel him to negotiate now.

The administration asserts that bombing alone will bring Milosevic to his knees. If this is true, then we can cease the training operation and retain custody of the weapons without affecting the long term future of the Balkans.

There are those who insist that we try to achieve the maximum objective, Rambouillet applied to all of Kosovo with the minimum involvement of the Kosovars themselves. They advise deploying NATO troops while not even

training the Kosovars. This approach is not only dangerous for our service men and women, it is also dangerous for our foreign policy. If we deploy NATO troops into hostilities, and if casualties rise to the point where the American public, or the German public, or the French public, or the British public demand the withdrawal of their Nation's soldiers, then the NATO alliance will be broken and Milosevic may prevail. If that occurs, then every tyrant and mass murderer in the world will feel that he can act with impunity. The Vietnam syndrome and the Somalia syndrome will return.

Mr. Speaker, we need the option, sometime in the near future, of being able to deploy a well-trained, well-armed force of Albanians—a force willing to take casualties because they are fighting for their own homes. Hopefully, by negotiating from strength we can achieve an agreement that will eliminate the need to deploy any combatant ground troops, NATO or Kosovar.

In conclusion, the American people have shown a willingness to commit their treasure, and more importantly the lives of their sons and daughters, to preventing atrocities and ameliorating tragedies. If we realistically define our objectives and if we prepare to use all of the tools at our disposal, we will secure a reasonable life for the Kosovars, and we will inspire the American people to support limited, realistic efforts to stopping atrocities in Sudan, Myanmar, the Congo and elsewhere. If instead we devote inadequate resources to an effort to achieve an absolute idealistic objective, we may fail, and that would be a tragedy for those service men and women who die in such an effort. It will be a tragedy for the Kosovars, and it would be a tragedy for the victims of atrocities around the world.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. McNULTY) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

- Mr. GEJDENSON, for 5 minutes, today.
- Ms. NORTON, for 5 minutes, today.
- Mr. POMEROY, for 5 minutes, today.
- Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas, for 5 minutes, today.
- Mr. SHERMAN, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DUNCAN) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. DEAL of Georgia, for 5 minutes, on April 13.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana, for 5 minutes each day, today and on April 13, 14, 15 and 16.

Mr. JONES of North Carolina, for 5 minutes, on April 13.

Mr. GOODLING, for 5 minutes each day, today and on April 13.

Mr. WICKER, for 5 minutes, on April 13.

Mr. PAUL, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. KASICH, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GIBBONS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART, for 5 minutes, on April 13.

Mrs. CHENOWETH, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DUNCAN, for 5 minutes, today.

SENATE BILLS REFERRED

Bills of the Senate of the following titles were taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 243. An act to authorized the construction of the Perkins Country Rural Water System and authorized financial assistance to the Perkins County Rural Water System, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, in the planning and construction of the water supply system, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Resources.

S. 278. An act to direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain lands to the country of Rio Arriba, New Mexico; to the Committee on Resources.

S. 292. An act to preserve the cultural resources of the Route 66 corridor and to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to provide assistance; to the Committee on Resources.

S. 293. An act to direct the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to convey certain lands in San Juan County, New Mexico, to San Juan College; to the Committee on Resources.

S. 334. An act to amend the Federal Power Act to remove the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to license projects on fresh waters in the State of Hawaii; to the Committee on Commerce.

S. 382. An act to establish the Minuteman Missile National Historic Site in the State of South Dakota, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Resources.

S. 422. An act to provide for Alaska state jurisdiction over small hydroelectric projects; to the Committee on Commerce.

S. 756. An act to provide adversely affected crop producers with additional time to make fully informed risk management decisions for the 1999 crop year; to the Committee on Agriculture.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. THOMAS, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that committee did on the following dates present to the President, for his approval, bills and joint resolutions of the House of the following titles;

On March 26, 1999:

H.R. 774. To amend the Small Business Act to change the conditions of participation and provide an authorization of appropriations for the women's business center program.

H.R. 808. To extend for 6 additional months the period for which chapter 12 of title 11, United States Code, is reenacted.

H.J. Res. 26. Providing for the reappointment of Barber B. Conable, Jr. as a citizen

regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

H.J. Res. 27. Providing for the reappointment of Dr. Hanna H. Gray as a citizen regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

H.J. Res. 28. Providing for the reappointment of Wesley S. Williams, Jr. as a citizen regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

On March 31, 1999:

H.R. 171. To authorize appropriations for the Coastal Heritage Trail Route in New Jersey, and for other purposes.

H.R. 193. To designate a portion of the Sudbury, Assabet, and Concord Rivers as a component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System.

H.R. 705. to make technical corrections with respect to the monthly reports submitted by the Postmaster General on official mail of the House of Representatives.

H.R. 1212. To protect producers of agricultural commodities who applied for a Crop Revenue Coverage PLUS supplemental endorsement for the 1999 crop year.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 11 o'clock and 14 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, April 13, 1999, at 9:30 a.m., for morning hour debates.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 8 of rule XII, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1302. A letter from the Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service, Department of Agriculture, transmitting the Department's final rule—Table Grapes (European or Vinifera Type); Grade Standards [Docket Number FV-98-302] received March 30, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1303. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule—Cinnamaldehyde; Exemption from the requirement of a Tolerance; Correction [OPP-300769A; FRL-6069-2] (RIN: 2070-AB78) received March 17, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1304. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule—Clopyralid; Extension of Tolerance for Emergency Exemptions [OPP-300802; FRL-6066-2] (RIN: 2070-AB78) received March 17, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1305. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule—Imidacloprid; Extension of Tolerance for Emergency Exemptions [OPP-300808; FRL 6066-9] (RIN: 2070-AB78) received March 17, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1306. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information,