

Kosovars clamoring for republichood. Belgrade, no longer restrained by Tito's aversion to exacerbating ethnic conflict, cracked down. Polarization followed: Slobodan Milosevic—first as a Communist and then as a Serbian nationalist—whipped up anti-Albanian sentiment. In 1989, he stripped Kosovo of its cherished autonomy. Meanwhile, Albanian Kosovars proclaimed their territory a republic and, through channels violent and nonviolent, sought actual independence. Unrelenting, Milosevic undertook the massacres of the last year, which finally precipitated NATO's bombing.

That, in a nutshell, is the history of Kosovo. If you can find a solution to today's mess in there, let me know. Take a snapshot at 1200 B.C. and the Albanians can claim it; look at A.D. 1200 and it's a Serbian kingdom. The United States prefers to use the 1974 benchmark. Milosevic points to 1989. But even at those points, the snapshot looks pretty blurry.

Before NATO began bombing Yugoslavia March 24, the proposed Rambouillet solution—restoring Kosovo's autonomy but not granting it independence—seemed like a plausible outcome. Now it's hard to imagine Kosovars accepting any kind of Serbian rule. If victorious, NATO may grant Kosovo independence or perhaps divide it up. History won't decide Kosovo's fate. Our actions in the weeks ahead will decide history.

I bring this to the attention of my colleagues simply to highlight a little history and point to the complexities in reaching a resolution to this very difficult foreign policy question.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. COLLINS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT—S. 531

Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at 4:30 the Banking Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. 531 and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration under the following limitations:

One hour for debate equally divided between Senator ABRAHAM and the ranking member. No amendments or motions will be in order.

I further ask consent that following the use or yielding back of time, the bill be read for a third time at 5:30 this afternoon and that the Senate proceed to vote on passage of the bill with no intervening action or debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE WAR IN KOSOVO

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, President Clinton has just signified his intention to ask Congress for additional appropriations of some \$5.45 billion for military costs involved in the war in Kosovo and some \$491 million to pay for humanitarian assistance. It is my thought that Congress will be receptive to supporting our fighting men and women overseas and will similarly be receptive to humanitarian aid for the thousands of refugees who have been driven from their homes in Kosovo. These requests will give us an opportunity to ask some very important questions and get some very important information to assess our military preparedness and to make the determination as to how much our allies are contributing to this effort, which ought to be a joint effort.

We have seen the U.S. military preparedness decline very markedly in the past decade and a half. During the Reagan years, in the mid-1980s, the defense budget exceeded \$300 billion. In 1999 dollars, that would be well over \$400 billion, might even be close to the \$500 billion mark. But our budget for this year, fiscal year 1999, was \$271 billion, and according to the President's request, is projected to be slightly over \$280 billion for fiscal year 2000.

That raises some very, very important questions as to the adequacy of our defense and our ability to deal with a crisis in Kosovo, where we are at war, notwithstanding the fact that a declaration has not been filed. The Senate of the United States has authorized air strikes in our vote of 58 to 41 on March 23, but the House of Representatives has not had a correlating move. Constitutionally this is a very, very dangerous situation, because only the Congress under our Constitution has the authority to declare war. We have seen a constant erosion of congressional authority, which is a dangerous sign, in terms of the requirements of constitutional law—this is bedrock constitutional law—and also in terms of having congressional support, which reflects public support, for the military action.

We have seen this war in Kosovo move ahead. We have seen missile strikes, air strikes. The authorization of the Senate was limited in the air strikes because of our concern about not putting too many U.S. fighting men and women in so-called harm's way. It is rather a surprising consequence to find we are in short supply of missiles. We have seen the activity in Iraq reduced, according to military reports. We know of our commitments around the globe, including South

Korea. I believe this is an occasion to take a very close look as to the adequacy of our military preparations. At this time, we have some 18 divisions: 10 active, 8 reserve, twenty wings: 12 active, 8 reserve and some 256 naval surface combatants. This is very limited, compared to the power of the United States during the mid-1980s in the Reagan years.

Of course, it is a different world. It is a world without the potential clash of the superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—but it is still a world with major, major problems.

When the President comes to Capitol Hill, comes to the Appropriations Committee on which I serve, comes to the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on which I serve, then I think we need to ask some very, very hard questions. Those questions turn on whether the United States is, realistically, capable of carrying on the kind of a war in which we have become engaged in Kosovo. Do we even have sufficient air power to carry out our objectives? Do we have sufficient missiles to carry out our objectives?

So far, we have bypassed the issue of ground forces. Some of our colleagues have advocated a resolution which would authorize the President to use whatever force is needed. I am categorically opposed to such a resolution. I do not believe that the Senate and the Congress of the United States ought to give the President a blank check, but I am prepared to hear whatever it is that the President requests, to consider that in the context of our vital national security interests and in the context of what we ought to do. But at a time when the Congress and the country has been put on notice that the President is considering calling up Reserves, we find ourselves in a military entanglement, a foreign entanglement and, by all appearances, we are ill-equipped to carry out the objectives and the course which the President has set out for us.

We need to know on an updated basis what is happening in Iraq and what our commitments are there and what our potential commitments are around the world.

Similarly, we need to know, Madam President, our allies' contributions. At a time when the Congress of the United States is being called upon to authorize \$5.450 billion for the Pentagon, it is fair to ask what the contribution is from Great Britain. What is the contribution from France? What is the contribution from Germany? What is the contribution from the other NATO countries?

The morning news reports carried the comment that the French are opposed to a naval blockade to cut off Yugoslavian oil reserves. That is sort of a surprising matter. As General Wesley Clark has noted, why are we putting U.S. pilots at risk in bombing Yugoslavian oil production at oil refineries