

war effort by either political party, and there is a precise reason for this, over and above the petty partisanship of many.

The use of government force to mold personal behavior, manipulate the economy and interfere in the affairs of other nations is an acceptable practice endorsed by nearly everyone in Washington regardless of party affiliation. Once the principle of government force is acknowledged as legitimate, varying the when and to what degree becomes the only issue. It is okay to fight Communists overseas but not Serbs; it is okay to fight Serbs but not Arabs. The use of force becomes completely arbitrary and guided by the politician's good judgment. And when it pleases one group to use constitutional restraint, it does, but forgets about the restraints when it is not convenient.

The 1960s crowd, although having a reputation for being anti-war due to their position on Vietnam, has never been bashful about its bold authoritarian use of force to mold economic conditions, welfare, housing, medical care, job discrimination, environment, wages and working conditions, combined with a love for taxes and inflation to pay the bills. When in general the principle of government force to mold society is endorsed, using force to punish Serbs is no great leap of faith, and for the interventionists is entirely consistent. Likewise, the interventionists who justified unconstitutional fighting in Vietnam, Panama, Nicaragua, Grenada, Libya and the Persian Gulf, even if they despise the current war in Yugoslavia, can easily justify using government force when it pleases them and their home constituency.

Philosophic interventionism is a politician's dream. It allows arbitrary intervention, domestic or international, and when political circumstances demand opposition, it is easy to cite the Constitution which allows and correctly rejects the use of government force, except for national self-defense and for the protection of life, liberty and property.

Politicians love interventionism and pragmatism, the prevailing philosophy of our age, a philosophy based on relative ethics. No rigid adherence to law or morality is required. Even the Constitution can be used in this delicate debate of just when and for whom we go to war. The trick is to grab the political moral high ground while rejecting the entire moral foundation upon which the law rests, natural rights, rejection of force and the requirement politicians be strictly bound by a contract for which all of us take an oath to uphold.

What does this hodgepodge philosophy here in the Congress mean for the future of peace and prosperity in general and NATO and the United Nations in particular? Pragmatism cannot prevail. Economically and socially it

breeds instability, bankruptcy, economic turmoil and factionalism here at home. Internationally it will lead to the same results.

NATO's days are surely numbered. That is the message of the current chaos in Yugoslavia. NATO may hold together in name only for a while, but its effectiveness is gone forever. The U.S. has the right to legally leave NATO with a 1-year's notice. That we ought to do, but we will not. We will continue to allow ourselves to bleed financially and literally for many years to come before it is recognized that governance of diverse people is best done by diverse and small governments, not by a one-world government dependent on the arbitrary use of force determined by politically correct reasons and manipulated by the powerful financial interests around the world.

Our more immediate problem is the financing of the ongoing war in Yugoslavia. On February 9 of this year I introduced legislation to deny funds to the President to wage war in Yugoslavia. The Congress chose to ignore this suggestion and missed an opportunity to prevent the fiasco now ongoing in Yugoslavia.

The President, as so many other presidents have done since World War II, took it upon himself to wage an illegal war against Yugoslavia under NATO's authority, and Congress again chose to do nothing. By ignoring our constitutional responsibility with regards to war power, the Congress implicitly endorsed the President's participation in NATO's illegal war against Yugoslavia. We neither declared war nor told the President to cease and desist.

Now we have a third chance, and maybe our last, before the war gets out of control. We are being asked to provide all necessary funding for the war. Once we provide funds for the war, the Congress becomes an explicit partner in this ill-conceived NATO-inspired intervention in the civil war of a sovereign nation, making Congress morally and legally culpable.

Appropriating funds to pursue this war is not the way to peace. We have been bombing, boycotting and killing thousands in Iraq for 9 years with no end in sight. We have been in Bosnia for 3 years, with no end in sight. And once Congress endorses the war in Yugoslavia with funding, it could take a decade, billions of dollars, and much suffering on both sides, before we put it to an end.

Bellicosity and jingoism associated with careless and illegal intervention can never replace a policy of peace and friendship whenever possible. And when it is not, at least neutrality. NATO's aggressive war of destruction and vengeance can only make the situation worse. The sooner we disengage ourselves from this ugly civil war, the better. It is the right thing to do.

COMMEMORATION OF THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BASS). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I know I am the last Speaker before the staff goes home, and they will be gratified to know that I will use roughly half the allotted time. Even with half the allotted time, 30 minutes is quite long, perhaps too long to devote to a single subject, and that is why I wish to give, in effect, three separate speeches.

The first speech I would like to give is in commemoration of the remembrance of the Armenian Genocide. April 24 is the day when Armenians and those of good conscience around the world remember the genocide that took place at the beginning of this century. Because it was on April 24 that 200 Armenian religious, political, intellectual leaders were rounded up in Constantinople, taken into the interior and executed.

This was a seminal day in a pattern of oppression that began in the 1890s, and at a level of oppression which between 1915 and 1923 caused the death of 1.5 million Armenians in mass executions in forced marches, through disease, and through starvation, thus eliminating virtually the entire Armenian population of Anatolia and Western Armenia.

There were many contemporaries who were there to see this first genocide. Perhaps no one speaks with the authority of our own ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Ambassador Henry Morgenthau. I will probably mispronounce our ambassador's name, so I will simply refer to him as our ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. He recounts in his statement, "When the Turkish authorities gave orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race. They understood this well, and in their conversations with me made no particular attempt to conceal this fact."

In the poignant passage in his book, *Black Dog of Faith*, Peter Balakian relates the story of a genocide survivor. After seeing the massacre of Armenians in her own village, her father beheaded and crucified on the door of their home on one morning, the Armenian woman was forced to dance in the village square while being brutalized and set on fire, as their children clapped, and other images too horrific to describe. The death march and the Euphrates so filled with blood and corpses that no reasonable person could see it and not be sick.

The first genocide of this century laid the foundation for the Holocaust, the largest genocide and the most horrific of this or any century. It was interesting that our ambassador to the

Ottoman Empire happened to be an American Jew who was told by Turkish authorities, "These people, these Armenians, are Christians. Since you are a Jew, why don't you let us do with the Christians as we please?"

Well, whether it is in Anatolia or in Europe or anywhere in the world, we cannot countenance genocide simply by saying the victims are not of our religion or ethnic group. No wonder 30 years later Adolf Hitler uttered his infamous statement about the Armenian Genocide.

Eight days before the invasion of Poland, which would place 3 million Jews under his control and which allowed Hitler to send them to their deaths, he told those in his inner circle who thought that the world might question this policy, "Who today remembers the extermination of the Armenians?" Clearly, the impunity that the Turkish government felt that they had in annihilating the Armenians emboldened Hitler before the worst of the Holocaust.

□ 1800

And that is why those of us of Jewish faith, Armenians, and everyone of good conscience must say, "never again."

The last act of a genocide is genocide denial. Because those who have committed it wish to blot out even the memory of those who they have killed. And it is, in fact, unfortunate that the Turkish Government continues its genocide denial, a genocide denial that is not just passive, not just intransigent, but takes the form of trying to erase from the history books of others that which happened at the beginning of this century.

Today I was honored to meet with the new chancellor of UCLA, my alma mater. And I am proud of UCLA. I was a Bruin when Walton was on the basketball court. And I was proud to meet our new chancellor, who described what is happening at UCLA. But the proudest day for UCLA was when it rejected a gift of over a million dollars from the Turkish Government, rejected a gift of over a million dollars.

It is not in the nature of universities to reject gifts, but this gift came with strings attached. It was to fund a chair in Ottoman history with various strings and provisos that virtually ensured that the Turkish Government would control who sat in that chair. It would not have been a chair for legitimate inquiry into historical facts but rather a chair in genocide denial. And UCLA stood firm and rejected that gift and said that the academic integrity of my alma mater and the academic integrity of all American universities is not for sale.

It is time for the American State Department to show this same level of courage and determination. It is time for the State Department and the U.S. executive branch of Government not

just to remember the day April 24 but to use the word that describes what that day remembers. The word is "genocide." And it is time for the State Department to recognize what happened.

Clearly, at a time when the State Department is trying to rally our support to prevent mass murders in the Balkans, they should be honest as to what happened in Anatolia some 80-plus years ago.

PLAN NEEDED TO PROVIDE DIRECTIONAL SIGNS
AT U.S. CAPITOL COMPLEX

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would now like to address a completely different subject and one that is not nearly so grave.

I had a chance to meet with the Architect of the United States Capitol, the man who keeps the facilities here running, to talk to him about some of the ways we could make this institution work better as a physical plant.

Mr. Speaker, we get four to five million tourists every year. Now, that does not cause us to rival Disneyland, although there are those who assert that the U.S. Congress rivals Disneyland in other respects, but it is indeed a large number of people to accommodate. And yet, I will just illustrate the problem with a story that happened last year.

Some constituents of mine came and visited the gallery, right up there. And after watching their fill of Congressional pontificating, they decided to walk back to my office in the Longworth building through the tunnels. For it was winter and the tunnels were warm. And, as everyone knows, there are a network of tunnels that connect the Capitol with the House office buildings. Well, they walked down into the tunnels and they have not been heard from since. For that labyrinth, that maze, lacks almost any sign to tell them where they are going.

Now, as a serious matter, the absence of signage so far has not been responsible for somebody being lost to the point where they were never heard from again, but it does imperil the efficiency not only of this House's business, the efficiency of those who come here to persuade us on various issues, but it also impairs the efficiency of the Capitol Police that are here to protect us. And last year the importance of that protection was illustrated.

If we talk to any Capitol policeman or Capitol police woman, if we talk to them for a while and ask them to let down their guard a little bit, they will tell us they spend less than a third but close to a third of their time giving directions.

Well, that is not surprising. There are four to five million tourists here each year not to mention a few freshmen and sophomore Members of Congress who ourselves do not always know the best way to get from one place to another. We need a plan to provide signs throughout the Capitol complex.

I am happy to report to the House that the architect has already signed a consulting contract, half of that contract is completed, for a plan to put signs virtually everywhere, literally thousands of new directional signs so that people who visit us will know where they are and how to get to where they are going.

I was told once, if we want to influence what happens in Washington, we need to hire an expensive lobbyist who knows his way around the Capitol. I thought that meant understanding parliamentary procedure. But parliamentary procedure is simple compared to the labyrinth of tunnels underneath this building, and knowing our way around Washington may very well mean simply knowing how to get from one building to the other.

Thousands of directional signs throughout the buildings and tunnels will make it easier for people to do business whether they are here for a day or whether they are just coming to Congress as freshmen or new staffers. I will simply point out that the way they test the intelligence of rodents is they put them in a maze of tunnels and see how quickly they can figure out their way around.

I personally am not going to go one-on-one against the more intelligence white rats because, if my own experience in the tunnels is any indication, I am not certain that I would prevail. We need these directional signs.

And I am also happy to report to those who protect the entrance at the southeast corner of the Longworth building that I have the assurance of the Architect that a new series of signs will be put up there very soon so that they can do their job instead of telling people that they are in the Longworth Building and where the Rayburn Building is and where the Cannon Building is.

There is one other step that we could take. It has been analyzed by the consultants. I believe the consultants have not embraced it, but it deserves some additional attention. And that is the idea of putting colored striping not in the beautiful buildings but in the I will use the term "ugly" tunnels that are underneath this building.

I think my colleagues are well aware that those tunnels are not in any way aesthetic. They have open pipes and dangling wires, and certainly colored stripes on the ground would do nothing to decrease their aesthetic appeal. But those colored lines could direct people from one building to the other effectively and direct them to the Capitol building effectively.

There is perhaps a plan to make those tunnels a little bit more aesthetically consistent with the rest of the Capitol; and if that is the case, I would well understand why colored lines on the ground are inconsistent with that. But if the tunnels are going to remain

the functional-only tunnels that they are today, then nothing should be ruled out as far as making them more usable and providing some direction to those who use them.

A second issue I would like to raise would perhaps make it easier on Americans by not requiring them to even come to Washington at all, although it is beautiful and I urge Americans to come here to see their Government in action, and that is an idea that has been used in the California capitol in Sacramento for over 20 years.

Each of the hearing rooms for each of the committees here in Congress has a microphone system and anywhere in that room we can hear whoever is speaking, and that means their voice is going through a wire to the loudspeakers. But, unfortunately, that wire only goes to loudspeakers in that hearing room.

As has been remarked on many occasions, Congress in committee is Congress at work. What goes on in committee is every bit as important as what goes on on this floor. And if my speech lasts as long as it might, perhaps many would argue that what goes on in committee is far more interesting than what is going on on the floor.

But, in any case, what goes on in committee, whether it is a subcommittee or full committee, is of critical importance. And yet in Sacramento, if we are anywhere in the capitol complex, they have at their desk a box and they can simply turn a 1970s technology dial on that box and listen through a speaker to what is happening in committee hearing room number 1 or number 2 or number 15 or number 22, so that every legislative assistant in Sacramento can hear what is going on in their Ways and Means Committee while at the same time being able to prepare their member for what is going to go on in their Appropriations Committee.

Just as C-SPAN plays what is going on on the House floor, which is of occasional interest to the legislative assistants, they could instead listen to what is going on in an appropriations subcommittee of direct relevance to the district that their Member represents.

So I think that we can also rig up a system at virtually minimal cost so that each of us in each office here in the Capitol could listen on a box to what is going on in the committee hearing room of our choice, listening perhaps on one hour to what is going on in the International Relations hearing room and then turning a dial to listen to what is going on in Ways and Means.

But we do not have to stop at 1970s technology. We could work our way up to 1980s technology. We could take those same 20 or 30 audio choices and put them on an 800 number. Or if we wanted to be cheap, we could put them on a 900 number. But either way, we

can allow people all over the country to dial in and hear what is going on in this or that committee of the House of Representatives.

Today there their only alternative is to hire some expensive lobbyist to come monitor a committee or, alternatively, to fly to Washington so that they could be there for a committee hearing.

Now, I know that C-SPAN covers what seems to be an interminable number of committee hearings. But, in fact, only two or three percent of the committee hearings are carried live and those interested in what is going on in committee and subcommittee have to be physically in the room to hear what is going on. We could, through 1980s technology, provide that to every American everywhere in the country. And I know there are people who watch this floor on C-SPAN who would prefer to know what is going on in the committee that is relevant to them.

But we do not even have to stop at 1980s technology. As we approach the new century, we could even think of 1990s technology. At virtually no cost, we could put that same audio signal on the Internet and anyone with a computer and a modem and 10 or 20 bucks to provide their Internet service provider could listen anywhere in the country to what is going on in any committee room here in the House of Representatives.

This is the people's House, but the people should not have to fly to Washington to hear what is going on.

Now, I realize that the system will not be perfect. They will not necessarily be certain who is speaking when listening on a squawk box or listening on the Internet. But certainly this is an option that we should provide. And those who listen carefully will hear who the chairman or chairwoman of a committee has recognized and will be able to remember who is speaking.

Mr. Speaker, I would now like to give my third speech. And while I said that I would use only half of the allotted hour, I fear that I may use perhaps two-thirds of it. And I apologize to those staff members who are extremely anxious to leave.

□ 1815

THE CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS

Mr. SHERMAN. But the third issue that I would like to address is the one that is on all of our minds, and that is the conflict in the Balkans, and I have a few basic observations before I would like to give a more organized and cogent presentation.

The first observation is that we are about to play host to the NATO ministers. They are coming here to celebrate 50 years of NATO, but I fear that what they are here to celebrate is 50 years of us spending on our defense budget enough money to protect them

and the peace of their continent while Europe fails to spend enough on its own defense.

Now when NATO was born 50 years ago, the European economies were in shambles, and the concept of burden sharing was perhaps not applicable. But today, as the alliance engages in military affairs in the Balkans, the most that can be said is the Europeans are helping us.

Europe is the richest continent on the planet. Its gross domestic product exceeds that of the United States. We are told that the reason we are focusing on Kosovo is that this is destabilizing to the most powerful continent on the planet, Europe, and yet somehow the most this great colossus can provide is some assistance while a North American country is required to do the work. And we are even told that we should be grateful that they are assisting our efforts to protect their continent.

Now is not the time for restructuring the military relationships, but clearly the time has come to end American acquiescence as the Europeans slash their own defense budgets far below what they proved they could afford during the 1980's. If there is a peace dividend, it should be paid to the American taxpayers who bore the lion's share of the economic burden of winning the Cold War. It should not be reaped by a European continent which demanded through its own inaction American protection.

If we look at what is happening in the Balkans, we see that America is now required to mobilize its reserves. Certainly all of the European air forces should have mobilized all of their reserves before Europe asked us or NATO asked us to mobilize ours, and the importance of stopping the mass murder in the Balkans may exceed these concerns for now. But 6 months from now, a year from now, we must make it clear to the Europeans that dialing 911 and reaching the Pentagon is not a substitute for spending their own money for their own defense forces.

The second observation I would like to make is that the vilification of Slobodan Milosevic is justified but may impede our efforts because I do not think, and I will get to this later, that we can be certain of such total battlefield dominance that we can just send a telegram or a fax to Belgrade instructing them what to do. Instead, I suspect that we will have to negotiate a compromise or a settlement with Mr. Milosevic, and while he is a mass murderer, the people of this country must be aware that Saddam Hussein is an even worse mass murderer and we had to negotiate with Saddam, and the government in Beijing has killed millions of Chinese, and we just welcomed their prime minister.

Why must America do this? Why does America do this? Why do we deal with

mass murderers? Why must we deal with Milosevic?

I would put forward that if we want to hide from the truth, we could try to convince ourselves that Milosevic is the only malignancy on this planet and that everywhere else governments are free, people are safe, yet nothing could be further from the truth. Half of the people of this world are ruled by governments that have committed mass murder, and as long as the world is as it is rather than as we would like to pretend it is, like to deceive our children and even our voting age citizens into believing it is, as long as half the world is governed by governments guilty of mass murder, we will have to deal with those governments.

Third, I would like to observe an unfortunate tendency in the rhetoric surrounding Kosovo, both rhetoric of our own State Department and rhetoric in London and in other European capitals. That rhetoric is to increase the objectives that we demand that we reach in Kosovo while at the same time, frankly, our military campaign is not working out as we planned. To increase the objective while not achieving any of your objectives on the battlefield, or any of your major objectives, is folly and sets us up for defeat. We must instead recognize that we did not begin these hostilities for the purpose of sending American troops into Belgrade with an arrest warrant for Slobodan Milosevic and the British did not begin their effort alongside us for that purpose either, and while those who are watching action thrillers out of Hollywood may believe that you can land one Jean Claude Van Dam and maybe a Schwarzenegger or two, and rush into the Presidential Palace in Belgrade, extract Milosevic and fly him to the Hague for trial, in fact the overthrow of Milosevic is probably not going to occur, and to enter Belgrade means either you enter us with a small force, which would probably be completely extinguished, and I will point to our lack of success in sending a small force into Tehran to rescue our hostages. Perhaps we should thank God that that force never actually reached Tehran because I am not sure that it would have been successful had it reached that city. In fact, it was not successful in even reaching the capital of Iran.

So, sending in a small force risks the annihilation of that force. Sending into Belgrade, that means all the way through Serbia, a force capable of exercising dominion over that city would probably involve a military campaign involving thousands and thousands of American casualties. So while it is glorious to beat our chests and to say that the world must rid itself of Milosevic, and perhaps some day that will come, to make that an objective of our current campaign is to doom that campaign to failure and perhaps to ensnarl us in a ground campaign that would have very high casualties.

I do want to point out that our actions in Kosovo are motivated by the highest level of idealism, that we are willing to spend our treasure and, more importantly, to risk the lives of our men and women to prevent atrocities and to assure the Albanian Kosovars of a chance to live in peace, security and autonomy. Perhaps there is no more moral statement that can be made about America than that we are willing to do that. But in any such great idealistic undertaking there is a risk that the idealism that motivates the action will cloud your judgment and have idealism cloud the effort to develop a realistic strategy. Realism requires us to remember some unpleasant facts.

The first of these is that Kosovo is not the only place of mass murder, of tragedy and atrocity. It is not a place where we can spend our entire willingness to work for humanitarian ideals, because in fact there are other victims of mass murder, perhaps also that would be just as just for us to try to help as the Kosovars.

I will point out that 800,000 members of the Tutsi tribe were killed in Rwanda, but that is pretty much passed, but today there is massive tragedy, death and atrocity in the Congo, in Myanmar, in East Timor, and especially in southern Sudan where 2 million people have been killed, and the killing goes on every year.

There are those that say we cannot stand by and watch atrocities in the Balkans. We should not watch, but we have demonstrated our capacity to watch atrocity because for 10 years we have ignored the atrocities in southern Sudan where 2 million people have been killed and where America has done almost nothing to help them.

I would hope that our actions in Kosovo are so successful that we are emboldened to provide some limited level of assistance, and I am not proposing sending American Armed Forces, but some limited level of assistance to those in southern Sudan who are trying to protect their lives from a government more guilty of mass murder than the government in Belgrade.

A second fact that we are perhaps unwilling or at least reluctant to recognize is that our goal creating a multi-ethnic, autonomous Kosovo, multi-ethnic and harmonious may be beyond reach. Realistically it is unlikely that Albanians and Serbs will live in Kosovo in harmony and peace in the absence of an outside force. We should remember that it is not just the Serbs who have committed massive atrocities, but the KLA that has committed atrocities on a smaller scale as they have killed Serb civilians, and we may have to settle for a Kosovo in which part is inhabited by Albanians, the lion's share, and part is inhabited by Serbs. The goal of them living side by side is a noble and idealistic goal, but one that a realist

might say cannot be achieved any time soon.

Finally, or another important fact to point out, one that we are clouded in our judgment for not realizing, is that this is not a battle between pure good and pure evil. Yes, in an idealistic melodrama there is pure good and pure evil, yet that is not the case here. I have already mentioned that the KLA has engaged in atrocities to try to expel Serbs from Kosovo, far smaller in number, far less heinous a policy, but murder is murder, and the KLA, who are fighting more or less on our side, fighting for the Kosovars, is an organization with some ties to Iran, an organization that Osama Bin Laden has tried to assist and we are not certain of whether those entreaties and offers of assistance have been honored and an organization with ties to drug dealers. Until a few months ago, the official policy of our State Department was to call the KLA a terrorist organization.

Likewise, the Serbs are not just victimizers, but also victims. 180,000 Serbs were ethnically cleansed from Croatia just a few years ago, forced at the point of bayonet and gun to leave homes they had lived in for centuries.

□ 1830

I would point out that during that ethnic cleansing, where Serbs were the victims, America did almost nothing.

It is true, while there were a few murders they did not reach the level of mass murder that has been achieved in Kosovo, but still some murders and 180,000 to 200,000 people ethnically cleansed, this was an atrocity. Yet at the time, the Croatians who were committing this atrocity were our allies with regard to bringing the Bosnian conflict to a conclusion so America said virtually nothing and did absolutely nothing.

Finally, blind idealism would say that we should be increasing our objectives to reach pure justice for our cause, and I have mentioned this earlier, adding on to our objectives the idea that not only Kosovo but all of it would be liberated and under total NATO domination but that Milosevic would be taken prisoner, et cetera, et cetera. In fact, given the situation, militarily it would be wise for the United States to define a more realistic objective.

We should not give up on the idea that the Albanian Kosovars need a place to live in Kosovo where they are safe and where they can succeed with our aid in building a prosperous homeland, but this does not necessarily need to be 100 percent of Kosovo in multi-ethnic harmony, which is our stated objective.

Let me talk for a moment about some of the strategies that we should at least explore to go along with those that we are using. Today I had the opportunity in hearings to hear from and

question our Secretary of State Madeline Albright.

Mr. Speaker, if anyone saw me running into this hall it was so that I could make it here on time because we had a meeting, with several of my colleagues, with Sandy Berger, who is the President's national security advisor.

The administration remains welded to its existing policies. They are optimistic that continued bombing will lead to a collapse of the Milosevic capacity to resist. If they are right, we will find out because nothing this Congress does, nothing the people of this country do, will prevent a continued bombing campaign for at least several weeks, perhaps a month, before there is even the possibility that anyone other than the administration would cause in any way a change in policy.

If during those weeks there are not signs and far greater signs than we have seen so far of success, we do need to look at other strategies. One of those strategies is being embraced by the administration but only to a limited extent, and that is to involve Russia in the peacemaking process. Russia is critical because Russia can persuade the Milosevic government to do things and to make concessions they would not make on their own. Russia is important because they can provide a fig leaf or political cover so that Milosevic can make any concessions that he decides are in his interest to make but he needs a political excuse to make.

Finally, Russia is important to the Balkans because Russia could provide an essential part of the peacekeeping force, and I will get to some of the possibilities for a makeup of a peacekeeping force later. Involving Russia in the Balkans may be more important than anything that is happening in the Balkans.

Ten years from now Kosovo may be somewhat forgotten but Russia will remain a critical nuclear arms state, and if we do not treat Russia with respect now the Russian people and the Russian leadership will remember that in the future.

By way of historical footnote, I should mention that 85 years ago Russia mobilized its Army in support of Serbia, and that led directly to World War I. It is not surprising that the Russians, mindful of their own history, mindful of the sacrifices of World War I, believe that they have a definite stake in what happens to Serbia.

So we can and should involve Russia, and if Russia gets the credit for peace that is two good things. It is peace and it is a Russian Government that can hold its head high against the ultranationalists in Moscow and elsewhere.

Second, and this is controversial, we need to signal that we are not demanding that Rambouillet, that the Rambouillet agreement, apply to all of Kosovo's territory but, rather, that it

apply to only the lion's share of that territory.

No one doubts that the Serbs, like the Albanian Kosovars, have rights in Kosovo. The Serbs represent 10 percent of the population, the Kosovars a little over 80 percent. Kosovo has been part of Serbia for hundreds of years, and Kosovo is the religious and cultural birthplace of the Serbian nation. In fact, even the Rambouillet agreement recognizes Serb rights in Kosovo by stating that Kosovo should remain part of Serbia.

We should imagine an agreement that does not involve one peacekeeping force but, rather, two geographically separate peacekeeping forces. One of those forces should occupy 70, 80 percent of Kosovo and should be led by NATO. This force will provide the security necessary so that Albanian refugees feel free to return, and on that 80 percent of the territory they will build lives more prosperous than the lives they had before this conflict because they will enjoy not only American aid but, with a little common sense, we will allocate to them all of the former Yugoslavia's textile quota and other trade concessions, aid and trade. This would leave another 20 percent of Kosovo that would be patrolled exclusively by Russian peacekeepers.

The final status of Kosovo could wait, but in this area Serbia would feel secure. In this area, the Serb population would feel very secure and, frankly, in this area I am not certain that refugees would choose to return. This would allow the Serbs to notice that their friends, the Russians, were the force occupying the ancient site and origin of the Serbian orthodox church, the important monastery lands, at least those that are contiguous, and the battlefield of Kosovo Polje, where the Serbs fought the Turks in the 14th century.

By letting the Serbs know that there will be no NATO occupation of this section of Kosovo, we leave them with a reason to bargain. Otherwise, they lose not one more square inch of territory by losing this war than they would if they agreed to our bargaining position. Giving them security in 20 percent of Kosovo gives them a reason to make concessions other than ending the bombing, and clearly ending the bombing has not imperiled them to reach a compromise with us so far.

It is true that the Serbs claim to have monasteries virtually all over Kosovo, but I am confident that they would regard it as a compromise rather than a total defeat if they were allowed to see the Russians, rather than NATO, who is bombing them, occupy the most important sites, particularly in the far west and the far east of Kosovo.

Finally, we need to look at other mechanisms to either defeat the Serbs or perhaps more importantly to let the Serbs know that they may be defeated.

Milosevic, I believe, is convinced that he can continue to occupy Kosovo because we will never send in ground troops. His tanks will be there as long as they hide among civilians or dig in so that they cannot be destroyed by our Apache helicopters. What Apache helicopter is going to fire at a tank if they put 10 or 20 unwilling Albanians on top of it? So he can keep his tanks and his heavy armor and his artillery in Kosovo unless a ground force, with tanks and with heavy armor and willing to take casualties, can be deployed against him.

When he sees us training an army of Albanians to use American tanks and American artillery and American heavy weapons, then he will know that such an Army may soon be deployed against him. At that point, a Russian brokered compromise will begin to look far more appealing.

We do not have to let the Albanians take control of these weapons. They can train on them during the day and American soldiers can retain them at night. Therefore, we are not even technically violating any of the rules against providing weapons to any of the residents or citizens of the former Yugoslavia since we are not giving them any weapons; we are just giving them training. If at some point in the future we decide to unleash them, we can give them the custody of those weapons and heavy armored divisions of Albanians with America's best armored weapons can move in to Kosovo along with the lightly armed KLA. That is what it would take to dislodge Milosevic, a ground army with both heavy weapons and lightly armed mobile soldiers and an army willing to take casualties.

I want to talk a little bit about the other alternative, and that is sending in NATO ground troops. One alternative is to send in NATO ground troops behind an Albanian Army, in support of it. Under those circumstances, NATO might take only slight casualties, but if instead NATO has to defeat by itself the Serbian Army deployed in Kosovo, then NATO will take casualties and then the danger is this: What if those casualties are too much for Americans to endure? What if those casualties are too much for the French to endure or the British or the Germans?

The first NATO nation that cries uncle and demands that its soldiers be withdrawn or even moved to the rear will cause the other NATO countries to demand the same level of safety for their soldiers. If all of the NATO troops need to be put at the rear, then our efforts against Milosevic will be over. If that happens, then every tyrant and mass murderer in the world will feel that he can act with impunity. The Vietnam syndrome and the Somalia syndrome will return.

That is why we need at our disposal not only the KLA, and they are operating independently and they will get light weapons with or without us, but also another well-armed Albanian force.

In conclusion, the American people have shown their willingness to commit their treasure and more importantly the lives of our sons and daughters to preventing atrocity, ameliorating tragedy. If we realistically define our objectives and if we prepare to use all of the tools at our disposal, we may secure a reasonable life for the Kosovars, and just as important we may inspire the American people to use limited realistic efforts to try to stop the ongoing atrocities in Sudan and Myanmar, in the Congo and East Timor and elsewhere.

If instead we fail, if we devote inadequate resources to a pristine, perfect, no-compromise objective and fail to achieve it, then this is going to be a tragedy; first for those servicemen and women who die in an unsuccessful American effort.

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More importantly perhaps even than that, it will be a tragedy for the Kosovars who will be told that well, we tried, but we did not use all of the options and we are too idealistic to make compromises, and so you will live your life here in a refugee camp.

Finally, if we use inadequate resources to try to achieve the absolute objective, it will be a tragedy for victims of atrocities around the world, both today and whatever atrocities are committed in the decades to come, by tyrants who at that time would know that America had tried in Kosovo unsuccessfully.

It will be a while before the administration is looking for new alternatives. They are convinced that the current strategy will be successful, and I hope that whatever comes out, it is good enough so that the administration can claim that it is a total victory and not a compromise. But we must begin to look at other alternatives, and if, in a few weeks, we recognize that the current strategy has not been successful, we must have the courage to use them.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

The following Members (at the request of Mr. McNULTY) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:

Mr. LIPINSKI, for 5 minutes, today.
 Ms. NORTON, for 5 minutes, today.
 Mr. STUPAK, for 5 minutes, today.
 Mr. RUSH, for 5 minutes, today.
 Mr. MEEHAN, for 5 minutes, today.
 Ms. WOOLSEY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. TIERNEY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DOOLEY of California, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SMITH of Washington, for 5 minutes, today.

Mrs. MALONEY of New York, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. BLUMENAUER, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. ESHOO, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. LEE, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GREEN of Texas, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SANDERS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. CAPUANO, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. STABENOW, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. CARSON, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. HOOLEY of Oregon, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. BERMAN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. MCGOVERN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. CROWLEY, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. LUCAS of Oklahoma) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. NEY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ENGLISH, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. HULSHOF, for 5 minutes, on April 22nd.

Mr. KASICH, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ROGAN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. EHRLICH, for 5 minutes, on April 28th.

Mr. DOOLITTLE of California, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DUNCAN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. MCINTOSH, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at their own request) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. HINOJOSA, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. UDALL of Colorado, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Member (at his own request) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. KNOLLENBERG, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Member (at his own request) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. SWEENEY, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Member (at his own request) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. LATOURETTE, for 5 minutes, today.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 48 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, April 22, 1999, at 10 a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 8 of rule XII, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1617. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a request for emergency FY 1999 supplementals for the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development; (H. Doc. No. 106-50); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

1618. A letter from the Chairman, National Credit Union Administration, transmitting the 1998 Annual Report of the National Credit Union Administration, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1752a(d); to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services.

1619. A letter from the Acting Assistant General Counsel for Regulatory Law, Department of Energy, transmitting the Department's final rule—Acquisition Letter—received April 9, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce.

1620. A letter from the Deputy Director, Regulations Policy and Management Staff, Office of Policy, Food and Drug Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule—Mutual Recognition of Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practice Inspection Reports, Medical Device Quality System Audit Reports, and Certain Medical Device Product Evaluation Reports Between the United States and the European Community; Correction [Docket No. 98N-0185] (RIN: 0910-ZA11) received April 9, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce.

1621. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 13-44, "Lease Approval Technical Amendment Act of 1999" received April 19, 1999, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform.

1622. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 13-46, "Tax Conformity Temporary Act of 1999" received April 19, 1999, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform.

1623. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 13-45, "Motor Vehicle Excessive Idling Fine Increase Temporary Amendment Act of 1999" received April 19, 1999, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform.

1624. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 12-624, "Solid Waste Facility Permit Amendment Act of 1998" received April 19, 1999, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform.

1625. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 13-53, "Community Development Program Amendment Act of 1999" received April 19, 1999, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform.

1626. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 13-48, "Homestead Housing Preservation Amendment Act of 1999" received April 19, 1999, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform.