

agreement requires a substantial loss in valuable power generation, but represents an unprecedented example of how hydroelectric projects can work proactively and cooperatively with fishery management agencies to protect salmon. This model effort deserves our encouragement and support.

Clearly, the approach being taken by communities throughout my state is far preferable to the divisive one being advocated by those who want to rip out dams in the Northwest. Rather than continuing down this misguided and confrontational course which will cost more and provide no assurances of enhanced recovery, I today call on dam removal advocates to abandon their cause, and to recognize the real implications of the NMFS report. If they are truly interested in restoring salmon, they will work with me and others in the mainstream who want to do something now positively to recover our salmon resource.

But Mr. President, we must keep in mind one important fact. Environmental bureaucrats in the Clinton-Gore administration have made it their standard operating procedure not to listen to what I, much less the region, thinks about dam removal. In fact, the Administration must have an unwritten rule somewhere not to pay attention to local people in the communities that would be destroyed by such action. It's alarming that while the region is increasingly united in its effort to preserve dams and the Northwest way of life, from the local level to the statehouse to our congressional delegation—the administration and the environmental community refuses to concede.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to speak in morning business for up to 25 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBERTS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE BALKANS

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I returned from Albania just a few hours ago. This is the third time I have made such a trip. I went over to see whether or not the beliefs I have developed over the last 7 months were true, and I came back, really, very convinced that they in fact are true.

For one thing—I have been saying for quite some time—even though the President denies it, the President has planned all along to send American ground troops into Kosovo. I am prepared to document this.

I want to put my remarks into four categories: One is the administration's approach to this war that we are about to get in; secondly, the cost in terms of both national security and dollars;

third, refugees; and fourth, what our troops are in right now.

Before I do that, I want to go back and review a couple of remarks I made on March 23, just a month ago, to put it in proper perspective.

A month ago, I stated that I felt if we did not try to put a stop to this, we would, in fact, be in a protracted, bloody long war. This is a war in which we do not have national security interests.

A lot of people say, "Well, we do have national security interests." I know this is a relative term. You can argue it, I suppose, but the people who are really knowledgeable on this are convinced that we do not have national security interests at stake.

Henry Kissinger said:

The proposed deployment in Kosovo does not deal with any threat to American security. . . . Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe.

I further went into the conclusion that if, in fact, we do not have national security interests, it is the humanitarian motivation which is getting us involved in this war. We are concerned about it, and I want to get into some detail about that.

There are some things I have discovered in the last 3 days. However, a month ago I mentioned that if this is the case and if we are concerned about humanitarian problems that exist all around the world, why are we not concerned about the 800,000 who have been killed in ethnic strife in Rwanda, the thousands who have been killed in Ethiopia, the 140 civilians killed by paramilitary squads in Colombia, including 27 worshippers slain during a village church service? Why is there no outcry for United States involvement in these obvious humanitarian situations where far, far more people have been brutally murdered than in the current Kosovo crisis?

Let me share with you, as I did back on March 23, a couple of paragraphs from an article in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune. This was written on January 31, 1999. This was just a few days after 45 people were killed in Kosovo. Let's keep that in mind when putting this in the proper context, Mr. President.

I am quoting from the Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune:

But no one mobilized on behalf of perhaps 500 people who were shot, hacked and burned to death in a village in eastern Congo, in central Africa around the same time. No outrage was expressed on behalf of many other innocents who had the misfortune to be slain just off the world's stage over the last few weeks.

Why do 45 white Europeans rate an all-out response [from the administration] while several hundred black Africans are barely worth the notice?

While U.S. officials struggled to provide an answer, analysts said the uneven U.S. responses to a spurt of violence in the past month illuminates not just an immoral or perhaps racist foreign policy, but one that

fails on pragmatic and strategic grounds as well.

So now the President wants to send the U.S. military into Kosovo. Keep in mind, when we talked about this 1 month ago, he was still denying that he was going to send troops, and yet now we find out in the recent meeting which was held by NATO in Washington that they are doing an update strategy—an update strategy, Mr. President. That means perhaps an update of what we have previously said was our position on sending in ground troops.

I have to say, the whole purpose for me to be on the floor right now is to say I know there is no way to stop this. Once American troops are on the ground in Kosovo, we will all support them and do everything we can for the American troops. It will be the same situation we faced in Bosnia. We will not be able to turn this around. That is when it becomes protracted and without an end.

I will recount a trip I made to Kosovo recently—it was in January of this year—to find out what Kosovo was really like at that time. Keep in mind, Kosovo is only 75 miles across and 75 miles long. It is a place that has been in strife and civil war since 1389.

As I was going across Kosovo, I had a couple of experiences. One experience I had was seeing two dead bodies. These were obviously soldiers. When we turned them over, we saw that they were not Albanians; they were Serbs. They had been executed at close range by the KLA.

We went on a little bit further. I saw on the map something called a "no-go zone." I said: I would like to go in to see what it is like. They said: You can't do that; it is occupied by the KLA, the Albanian military, and they will kill anybody who comes in. They don't care if you are a United States Senator or someone from the press. Nonetheless, you will be dead if you go in there.

We did not go in.

Then we rounded another corner. There was a rocket-propelled grenade, an RPG-7, that was aimed right at our heads. They put it down, and we went over and found out they were Albanians, not Serbs.

I am saying this, and I said this back on the 23rd of March, for a specific reason, and that reason is that while Milosevic is a bad guy, he is not the only bad guy in that conflict which is taking place.

There is one more thing I will mention with Henry Kissinger that I mentioned back on the 23rd of March. He said:

Each incremental deployment into the Balkans is bound to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein

Of course, this is the most critical thing we are dealing with. I happen to

chair the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness. This committee is in charge of all readiness issues and military construction, all training. Since this President took office, we have watched what has happened with our military and our ability to defend ourselves. I am going to elaborate on that a little bit later.

The bottom line is, we are one-half the strength we were when he took office. I quantify that by saying one-half of the Army divisions, one-half of the tactical air wings, one-half of the ships. We have gone down from a 600-ship Navy to a 300-ship Navy. And all these things are happening at a time when we do not have the capacity to fund and to logistically support another ground movement.

A month ago, I went by the 21st TACOM. It is located in Germany. Its function is to logistically support ground operations. At that time, the 21st TACOM said they were at 100 percent capacity and could not take on any more responsibilities because they were devoting all their attention to Bosnia. The trucks were going into Bosnia from Hungary, taking everything necessary to keep that exercise going.

I looked at the problem we have within the administration in the 21st TACOM. This President has cut the number of troops managing from 28,500 to 7,300. They are operating with just a fraction of the number they had before, about one-fourth.

I asked the question: If we get into something—at that time, we thought it was going to be Iraq; we didn't know about Kosovo at that time—if something happens and we need ground troops in Iraq, what are you going to do? That is in your theater, too.

They said: We couldn't do anything. We would be 100 percent dependent upon Guard and Reserve. As we know, our critical operational specialties, MOSS, are failing in our Reserve and Guard components, and the reason is that we have had so many deployments under this administration that they cannot be expected to leave their jobs. A doctor can no longer expect to leave his practice for a period of 270 days and go back and have any practice left. And the same thing is true with the employers around the country. So we have those serious problems. Again, this is from a month ago.

And lastly, I mention, in a hearing before us, what the various generals had said. General Ryan, who is the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, said, "There stands a very good chance that we will lose aircraft against the Yugoslavian air defense." The Navy Chief of Staff said, "We must be prepared to take losses." The Marine Corps Commandant, General Krulak, said it will be "tremendously dangerous." And George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence of the United States, re-

minded us that Kosovo is not Bosnia, and if we get on the ground there, their participants are not tired and worn out, they are ready and willing and culturally prepared to fight and to kill Americans.

I mention that, Mr. President—that was a month ago—to get it in a context that helps me to understand where we are today. I want to mention, I am not saying this as a Republican; I am saying this as a Member of the U.S. Senate and as the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, with a responsibility to tell the truth about what is going on.

The American people have not been hearing the truth. They have heard that the President does not want to send in ground troops, and yet we know he does want to send in ground troops. I have to say that the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, has a propensity to say things that are untrue with great conviction. And for that reason, I am afraid there are a lot of people who are afraid of this man, because he is so adept at getting the American people behind him.

One of the things he has said that is not true is what he told the American people as to the reason why we were going to get involved. He talked about the history, and he said that this is exactly what precipitated World War I, and the same thing with World War II. I am not a historian, Mr. President, certainly not the historian that you are, but I would say there are some historians around who have voiced themselves on this.

Again, going back to Henry Kissinger, no one will question his credentials concerning the history of that region and that period of time. He said—and I am quoting now—"The Second World War did not start in the Balkans, much less as a result of its ethnic conflicts," totally refuting what the President told the American people. He goes on—and this is further quoting—"World War I started in the Balkans not as a result of ethnic conflicts but for precisely the opposite reason: because outside powers intervened in a local conflict. The assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria—an imperial power—by a Serbian nationalist led to a world war because Russia backed"—listen to this, Mr. President—"Russia backed Serbia and France backed Russia while Germany supported Austria."

That is exactly the same thing right now. If a person wanted to start World War III, based on the model that took place for World War I, they would do exactly what we are doing; that is, go in there and say to Russia and to China, who is with Russia, "All right. We don't care what you say, we're going to get involved in a war here," and rub their nose in it.

Let's keep in mind that China and Russia have missiles that will reach the United States of America, and they

have every different kind of weapon of mass destruction put on those missiles. So it is just exactly the opposite of what the President said. That war started because the superpowers of the time took each side in a civil war that was taking place in what was then Yugoslavia.

I have said several times that the President has not been telling the American people the truth in terms of ground troops and the number of ground troops that are going to be going in. I would like to quote now to try to validate what I have said. General Wesley Clark, who is the Supreme Allied Commander for NATO and our troops in Europe, said—this is way back in the beginning, 7 months ago—"We never thought air power alone could stop the paramilitary tragedy . . . everyone understood it. . . ."

And just a week ago, Thursday, the Presiding Officer will remember, because he was sitting there, Secretary Bill Cohen, in whom I have the most respect, said, "We would try diplomacy, and that's what Rambouillet was all about . . . we would try deterrence . . . but failing that, we understood that [Milosevic] could take action very quickly and that an air campaign could do little if anything to stop him."

So we have not just the experts in the field, the commanding general, but also the Secretary of Defense who said they have known all along we are going to have to send troops in. Obviously, they both work for President Clinton. And President Clinton knew it.

I was a little disturbed last week when Joe Lockhart, in one of his press conferences, brushed off some questions, and then he volunteered without a question being asked—he said, "Senator Inhofe is wrong in that we are in great shape. Our state of readiness is just as good as it was back in 1991," or words to that effect. And I have to say either he is intentionally lying or just incredibly misinformed, because, as I said before, we, right now, are one-half the troop strength that we were in 1991. I think it is a terrible disservice for Joe Lockhart and the President to try to convince the American people that we are more prepared than we really are.

I would like to also mention that the President is breaking the law today. I was over there in just the last 3 days, and I went in there on a C-17. That C-17 had multiple launch rockets right there, all of them hot and ready to be fired—two of those, along with some two pallets of additional ammunition, a humvee, and additional troops.

Troops are there right now within the sight of the border of Kosovo. And one of our most brilliant Senators, Senator PAT ROBERTS, had passed an amendment to the 1999 defense appropriations bill where he said that the President cannot deploy troops to—and

he named different places, which would include this area—unless eight different conditions were met. One was that we have national security interests; No. 2, why they are national security interests; No. 3, what is the mission; No. 4, what is the exit strategy; No. 5, what is the cost; No. 6, identify the cost; No. 7, how it will affect readiness; and there is an eighth one. He has not complied with any of these eight. I say just by sending them into Albania, he has already broken that law.

The second area I want to get into is cost. In "cost," I am not talking about just dollars but also national security.

Because the President has decimated our defense budget, we no longer can defend America on two simultaneous, what they call MTWs—major theater wars. Ninety percent of the American people think we can because they have been told we can, but we cannot. We are not able to do that. We are one-half the force strength we were.

In addition to that, we are handling all of these deployments. We have had more deployments in the last 6 years than we had in the 20 years prior to that. In almost every case, they are being deployed in areas where we have no national security interests. So we are paying without any national security interest.

I think it is very interesting to note that, of the great effort we have put forth in the air, which has been very successful in terms of our deployment and our ability and our equipment, a total of 480 aircraft were used. Well, guess what, Mr. President. Three hundred sixty-five of those 480 were us, the United States of America.

So we have Tony Blair standing up and making these great profound statements: "We have to escalate the war." That is easy for him to say. We have 365 airplanes over there. He has 20. I

will tell you, that is a pretty good deal. "Let's go ahead and escalate," if you are Tony Blair.

I have a problem with all these multinationalist things, obligations or obsessions, that this President has. In the case of NATO, we have 80 percent of the effort right now we are paying for and yet we only have 5 percent of the vote.

General Hendrix is the commander in chief of the V Corps over there. The V Corps, Mr. President, has 50,000 troops. To give you an idea of the significance of what is going on right now with the deployment to Tirana, just south of the Kosovo border, where I just came back from—where you have already been—he is there now full time. And what do we have? As of today, we have 5,000 troops—wait a minute—we have 5,000 out of his 50,000, and he is spending all of his time there. Why is he doing that? I can tell you—and I am sure the others who have been over there are fully aware—the big problem is that the decisions on targets for our military aircraft are being made by committees. You have NATO. You have all these other countries that have to pass on targets. It is my understanding that even the President personally wants to pass on those targets.

This is a big difference from the war in Kuwait in 1991. George Bush and the administration got together and said, we have a serious problem over there. We are going to have to take care of it. This is our mission. Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, you go out and do it. These people are experts. They are professionals. So is General Hendrix, but he is not able to do it on his own because these are committee decisions as to where they are supposed to be able to fire at their targets.

I will just update for a minute. This is as of 2 or 3 days ago. We are just now

approaching 400 sorties coming out of Ramstein Air Force Base. These are C-17s carrying our equipment. You go over there and you get on the ground where all of our troops are in tent cities. You see everything over there is American.

I will also mention the cost of this and the three scenarios. One scenario is you just send the troops in as far as Kosovo, and that would be about 60,000 troops, according to what I found out over there, 30,000 of which would be Americans. Or the next step, if we went all the way and took Belgrade, that would take 200,000 troops, of which half would be U.S. troops. Or if we wanted to destroy Yugoslavia altogether, it would take a half million troops, a quarter million of those would be Americans.

I thought this was interesting because I found this out when I was over there. And I thought I had heard these figures before. The Heritage Foundation came out on April 21 and put down the cost of the three options, and I found that to be exactly what I found out over there. The only thing is, they went one step further. They included U.S. casualties and the cost. The cheap way, going into Kosovo, would cost from \$5 billion to \$10 billion—this is the United States cost—and would take from 500 to 2,000 American casualties. The second, going into Belgrade, would be \$10 billion to \$20 billion. It would take a toll of 5,000 to 10,000 American casualties. The third, \$50 billion to \$60 billion, and that would result in 15,000 to 20,000 casualties.

I ask unanimous consent to have a chart printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the chart was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GROUND TROOP SCENARIOS FOR U.S. MILITARY ACTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Number of ground troops required	Time needed to field force	Time needed to execute mission	U.S. casualties ad cost
Destroy All of Yugoslavia's Military Forces and Occupy the Entire Country.	500,000 NATO troops, including at least 250,000 Americans	6-8 months	Open-ended	15,000-20,000 casualties: \$40 to \$50 billion in the first year.
Seize and Occupy Belgrade	150,000-200,000 NATO troops, including 75,000-100,000 Americans.	3-6 months	1-2 months	5,000-10,000 casualties: \$10 to \$20 billion.
Expel Yugoslavia's Forces in Kosovo	50,000-70,000 NATO troops, including 20,000-30,000 Americans.	1-3 months	4-6 weeks	500-2,000 casualties: \$5 to \$10 billion.

Mr. INHOFE. So we have that very serious problem.

I will briefly, in the remaining time, talk about the refugee situation. The toll we have heard about in terms of deaths over there has been somewhere between 2,000 and 3,500. NATO is now saying 3,500; some are saying 2,000. Let's say 3,000. That means that 1 out of 600 of the Kosovar Albanians has lost his life, 1 out of 600. If you compare that—I have a ministry in West Africa. Three weeks ago, I came back from there. In the two countries of Angola and Sierra Leone, for every 1 person who has lost his life in Kosovo, 80 have

lost their lives in just those two countries alone.

We knew this was coming. I am reading now from the Washington Post of March 31:

For weeks before the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia, CIA Director George Tenet had been forecasting that Serb-led Yugoslavian forces might respond by accelerating ethnic cleansing.

Then when we asked Secretary Cohen about this, he said:

With respect to George Tenet's testifying that the bombing could, in fact, accelerate Milosevic's plans, we also knew that.

So they knew it. The President knew it, and the administration knew it. I

have to say this—and this has not been observed by anyone so far—I interviewed these refugees just 2 days ago. When I interviewed the refugees, I found some very interesting things. They all said the same thing. They said that, in fact, they didn't have any problems until the bombing started. I was interviewed by a Tirana TV station, I think it was Tirana. It was Albanian, anyway. And they said, What is the United States going to do about all these refugees? I said, What do you mean, what are we going to do? He said, You are the reason we are here. You are the ones that bombed, and that

is what has caused the ethnic cleansing and the forced exodus.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have to say one other thing about the refugees. The refugees, in spite of the fact it is a horrible thing that some 3,000 of them have lost their lives, still when you look at the refugees, I was shocked to find out, as perhaps you were, that they are very well off, considering they are refugees. Kids are all wearing Nikes and were very well dressed. They have the food that they need to eat. They seem to be in much better shape, certainly much better shape than the refugees in some other areas.

Lastly, I want to mention the troops. Our troops are doing a great job. I just couldn't feel better about that. But I really want to get into this, because the New York Times said, on April 13, we are going into Kosovo, the middle of nowhere, with no infrastructure. They will be naked, an official told the New York Times.

I went in there and I found that is exactly right. Our troops have just arrived there, and they are up to their knees, literally, in mud in a tent city. You have to keep in mind that Albania has some things that are very unique. First of all, it is the poorest country in Europe. Secondly, it is always listed as one of the three most dangerous countries in the world. And third, a guy named Hoxha came along right after the Second World War, and he actually declared, and it is still official policy, it is the only nation that has a declared policy of atheism. So we are dealing with that kind of people there, too.

Then something happened in 1997. It is called a pyramid scheme. In 1997, these poor Albanians, from this country in poverty, as poor as Haiti, revolted and they took over the military. When they did that, they took over all the weapons they had. What kind of weapons did they have? They had rocket-propelled grenades, RPG-7s. They had AK-47s. They had SA-7s, a shoulder-launched, surface-to-air missile that can knock down one of our Apaches very easily, and they had mortars. So here we have our troops who are there in the mud without any infrastructure protecting them and with all of this hostility around them. I might also add, I was sorry—I hate to even say this—that one of the units that came in there when I was there was the mortician unit, so the body bags have arrived.

Mr. President, if there is ever a scene that is set for gradual escalation and for mission creep, this is it. I can see our Troops going in right now. When the President, who has already decided he is going to send in American troops, takes these troops and puts them

across the border—and we were standing there watching these high mountains where the border is—if they go in that way, or they go around through Macedonia or some other way, and they have to take over Kosovo and get the Serbs out of Kosovo, that mission is going to creep into the Belgrade scenario, and then that will creep into the Yugoslavia scenario, and let's remember what the Heritage Foundation said in terms of American casualties.

I will say this, and I am not enjoying doing this. There is only going to be one possible way to keep us out of a war, in my opinion, because the President is going to send in troops. Once our American troops get into Kosovo, it is irreversible. One way to keep that from happening is if the American people wake up and realize that we are getting involved in a war where we do not have any national security interests. We are getting involved in a war that is keeping us from adequately defending America in areas where we do have a national security interest such as Iraq or North Korea. Let us keep in mind that in Korea we still have about 367,000 troops and their families. This would greatly impair them. I hope we can have a concerted effort and a wake-up call to the American people to stop this President from starting this war that we will all live to regret.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Kansas and Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair. I thank the Chair doubly for the double acknowledgment of representation, the distinguished Presiding Officer being the Senator from Kansas and this Senator having been born and raised in Kansas. If the sitting Senator from Kansas acknowledges representation of that State, I second the motion.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak for up to 15 minutes in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NATO ACTION INVOLVING UNITED STATES AGAINST FEDERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, now that NATO has celebrated its 50th anniversary with unity, I believe it is important that the Congress of the United States should now carefully assess what action is next to be taken by NATO involving the United States against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

It is critical that Congress discharge its constitutional responsibility where the Constitution specifies that only the Congress of the United States has the authority to declare war and to involve the United States in war. The black-

letter pronouncement of the Constitution is sufficient reason in and of itself for meticulous observance, but the public policy reasons behind that constitutional provision are very sound. Unless there is public support for war, shown first through the action of the Congress of the United States, it is not realistic or possible to successfully prosecute the war. We learned that from the bitter experience of Vietnam.

When the Congress of the United States makes a declaration, either formally or through a resolution, it happens after deliberation, after analysis, after an interchange of ideas and after a debate. In so many instances now, we have seen erosion of the congressional authority to declare war. Korea was a war without a declaration by Congress. Vietnam was a war without a declaration by Congress. Only the Gulf of Tonkin resolution has been held up by some as a thinly veiled authorization for the military action taken by the United States in Vietnam.

I believe that we must be very, very cautious not to repeat the mistake of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and not to endorse hastily a resolution proposed by some of our colleagues in the United States Senate to authorize the President to use whatever force the President may determine to be necessary in the military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I am not prepared to give the President a blank check. I believe that the constitutional responsibility of a Senator and the entire Senate, both Houses of Congress of the United States, involves a deliberate judgment as to what ought to be undertaken before we involve the United States in war and before we, in effect, have a declaration of war. And there are many, many very important questions which have to be answered before this Senator is prepared to authorize the executive branch—the President—to use whatever force the President deems necessary.

First of all, we need to know what the U.S. commitment will be. We need to know what the plan is. We need to know the strength of the Serbian Army, the military forces of the Republic of Yugoslavia. We need to know to what extent the airstrikes so far have degraded or weakened the military forces of the Serbs or the Republic of Yugoslavia. We need to know what the other commitments will be from the other NATO nations. We need to know how long our commitment will be, or at least some reasonable estimate as to how long we may be expected to be in Kosovo.

We know that the initial deployment in Bosnia was accompanied by a Presidential promise to be out within a year. That was extended by a period of time. That extension was re-extended, and now we don't even have an outer limit as to how long we are to be in Bosnia.