

REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES
ARMED FORCES FROM THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 151, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 82) directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The text of H. Con. Res. 82 is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 82

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA.

Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), the Congress hereby directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within 30 days after the passage of this resolution or within such longer period as may be necessary to effectuate their safe withdrawal.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 151, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. DELAHUNT) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H. Con. Res. 82.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, let me begin by saying to the gentleman from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) that I fully respect and appreciate his diligent efforts to ensure that the Congress is appropriately involved in any decisions on war and peace, and we highly commend him for his efforts in that respect.

As I stated to Secretary Albright at our Committee on International Relations hearing last week, I believe that the administration had made a serious mistake in trying to prosecute a war against Yugoslavia without full involvement of the Congress.

The gentleman from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) is earnestly trying to rectify that situation, and I believe he should be commended for taking pains to ensure that the prerogatives of the Congress are respected.

At the same time, however, I cannot support this measure that the gen-

tleman from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) introduced in April and which is before us today, House Concurrent Resolution 82. This is a concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove our armed forces from Yugoslavia.

□ 1530

With regard to the merits of the Campbell resolution, we all know that Operation Allied Force has not been as successful as we would have liked, but now is certainly not the time to suspend our military operations in Yugoslavia. Doing that would only compound the humanitarian tragedy that has been unfolding before our eyes. It would reward President Milosevic for his murderous strategy of depopulating Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian majority and remove all pressure on him to agree to any diplomatic settlement that would protect the rights of the people of Kosovo.

The NATO military air operation now taking place over Serbia is a response, belatedly in my opinion, to more than a year of the most callous and brutal acts of repression aimed at innocent men, women and children in Kosovo whose only crime has been that they are Albanians.

The architect of these policies is Slobodan Milosevic, a man who has already accumulated a horrendous record in the former Yugoslavia and who should be indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague.

The cost of Milosevic's aggressive nationalism has been the uprooting of hundreds of thousands of people. While the Serbs have used NATO bombing as a pretext to escalate their hideous policy of ethnic cleansing, it is clear that they had prepared to embark on this course for Kosovo when the spring weather permitted better conditions for their military operations. There are alarming reports that in addition to the mass expulsions that we see on our television, there have been numerous atrocities and even mass killings perpetrated by the Serb forces, including civilian paramilitary groups notorious for their crimes that were committed in Bosnia and in Croatia.

In addition to these compelling humanitarian concerns that have led to our involvement, there is a threat to neighboring countries like Albania and Macedonia that could create a much wider conflict in Europe that could even result in the involvement of our NATO allies Greece and Turkey on opposite sides.

To prevent that kind of destabilization and escalation, our Nation has decided to act now. We have learned in two previous occasions this century that wars in Europe inevitably involve our own national interest, and that we pay a higher price by pretending that they do not and by delaying our involvement.

For these reasons, I strongly urge my colleagues in the House to oppose this resolution, H. Con. Res. 82, and indicate to the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that we will not cut and run when the going gets tough.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I find considerable irony in the question of what is our national interest in Kosovo, for I thought we unequivocally answered that question with American blood and American tax dollars.

If we have no national interest in Kosovo, why did we lose so many lives in Europe in two World Wars? If we have no national interest in Kosovo, why did we spend billions of tax dollars on the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan in the aftermath of World War II? It seems that we have forgotten that the Balkans are an integral part of Europe, and that Kosovo, as President Bush first enunciated, is critical to the peace and stability in the Balkans.

Senator Dole got it right when he testified before the Committee on International Relations advocating our engagement and involvement in Kosovo. I am quoting Senator Dole: "It is in America's interest to have a stable, democratic and prosperous Europe."

As did Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who served so well as our U.N. Ambassador under President Reagan. She stated at that same hearing, and again I am quoting: "I think that peace and security and the human rights of the people in the region and the future of NATO and a democratic, peaceful, prosperous Europe are all in the balance in Kosovo."

We should be proud that it was the United States that helped nurture prosperity and democratic institutions in Europe in the latter part of this century, for that investment truly changed the course of history and has not just benefited Europe, but our Nation and our people.

The prosperity that we have enjoyed in this decade can be partially traced to the reality of a Europe increasingly democratic in terms of its political institutions, with economies based on free market principles. We are joined at the hip, let us be clear about that, but it is to our mutual advantage. An expanded European Union represents a future of unprecedented peace and prosperity for a continent that has been ravaged by war throughout recorded history, and the genocidal ethnic cleansing of Milosevic is perhaps the final challenge, hopefully, to achieving that vision.

So when we ask what our national interest is in Kosovo, it is not simply Kosovo, it is more, much more. It is about Europe and beyond Europe.

In the so-called Christmas warning of 1992, it was President Bush that warned Milosevic if he attacked Kosovo, that the U.S. would support a military intervention, if necessary. Early in his administration, President Clinton confirmed the Bush warning. It was the conclusion of both administrations that conflict in Kosovo would destabilize the entire region and potentially threaten all of Europe.

It would indeed be tragic at this point in time to have defeated fascism in the 1930s and the 1940s, to have prevailed over communism in the 1980s, only to lose the peace at the end of the century. We may do just that by a unilateral withdrawal at this point in time.

I submit that the action would be irresponsible. Dictators worldwide would cheer. Milosevic would have won. We will have crafted a much more frightening and troubled future. The Kosovar Albanians would be condemned to permanent exile or death and genocide.

Again, Senator Dole was particularly eloquent when he spoke to what was occurring in Kosovo and to the evils of genocide. Again, let me quote the Senator: "Now I don't know how many people it takes before you call it genocide. And I'm reminded of the book, 'The Greatest Generation,' by Tom Brokaw, and I'm proud to be a part of that generation, and one of the things we failed to do in that generation was to nip genocide in the bud. It happened, we let it happen, and we stood back and we did nothing."

Let us not sometime in the future reflect back on this day with the same regrets expressed so eloquently by Senator Dole. An earlier speaker, my friend from Ohio, on the floor stated, "Let's give peace a chance." I respect him. I respect that sentiment. However, let me conclude by saying, let us not give genocide a chance. Let us not give genocide a chance.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DELAY), our distinguished whip.

Mr. DELAY. Mr. Speaker, this is a very difficult speech for me to give, because I normally, and I still do, support our military and the fine work that they are doing. But I cannot support a failed foreign policy. History teaches us that it is often easier to make war than peace. This administration is just learning that lesson right now.

But before we get deeper embroiled into this Balkan quagmire, I think that an assessment has to be made of the Kosovo policy so far. President Clinton has never explained to the American people why he was involving the U.S. military in a civil war in a sovereign nation, other than to say it is for humanitarian reasons, a new military/foreign policy precedent.

The President began this mission with very vague objectives and lots of unanswered questions. A month later, these questions are still unanswered. There are no clarified rules of engagement. There is no timetable. There is no legitimate definition of victory. There is no contingency plan for mission creep. There is no clear funding program. There is no agenda to bolster our overextended military. There is no explanation defining what vital national interests are at stake. There was no strategic plan for war when the President started this thing, and there still is no plan today.

Instead of sending in ground troops, we should pull out the forces we now have in the region. Many who argue we cannot pull out say we should stay to save face, if for no other reason. I would like to ask these people, was it worth to stay in Vietnam just to save face?

The root of this crisis is centuries old, and no occupation by foreigners can craft a peace where no desire for it exists. Unless you are willing to commit your sons and daughters into a war indefinitely, you should not vote to keep troops overseas simply because we do not know what else to do.

The President said that if we did nothing, there would be instability in the region, there would be a flood of refugees, Kosovars would die and the credibility of NATO would be undermined. Well, Clinton's bombing campaign has caused all of these problems to explode; in addition, has made the Russians jittery, and has harmed NATO's standing in the world.

In Lebanon, Ronald Reagan cut his losses and withdrew our troops. We should do the same thing before the body bags start coming home. After all, what good has been accomplished so far? Absolutely nothing. What long-term good will be accomplished by keeping our troops there? None, unless you are willing to occupy all of Yugoslavia.

Mr. Speaker, I do not think we should send ground troops to Kosovo, and I do not think we should be bombing in the Balkans, and I do not think that NATO should be destroyed by changing its mission into a humanitarian invasion force. I support the Campbell resolution.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Let me be really clear. This is not a civil war that has been raging. This is nothing more than state violence and state terrorism against a class of citizens who are unarmed, for the purpose of forming a pure enclave, a mini-state, if you will. I daresay the statement that this is a civil war does a disservice to what occurred before the ascendancy of Milosevic. There were 1.9 million Albanians and about 200,000 Serbs. As again Senator Dole testified before the House Committee on International Re-

lations, they had been living peacefully together until Milosevic stirred things up.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Mr. HOFFFEL), a respected member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. HOFFFEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, I oppose the unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Yugoslavia. This is a wrong idea at a wrong time. This effort represents a modern day isolationism that would be wrong for America, just as wrong as isolationism was at the First World War and the time of the Second World War.

A unilateral withdrawal of our troops would devastate NATO just at a time when it is showing great resolve and great unity. The role for NATO in the future is to keep the peace in Europe. No one else will be able to do that. This is not the time to destroy NATO's resolve.

A unilateral withdrawal would also reward Milosevic for his barbaric activity. It would allow him to win this conflict. He is engaging in genocide. Genocide is systematic barbarity and murder of innocent, defenseless civilians because of ethnic and religious differences. That is what is happening in Yugoslavia and Kosovo today. That is what we must stop. To withdraw our troops today would undercut everything this country stands for and would remove America as one of the leaders, perhaps the only great leader, in this world today. We should oppose this resolution.

□ 1545

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. HANSEN).

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I stand in support of the resolution.

When American troops are deployed on the field of battle it is the duty of every American offer them our clear support and prayers for their safe return home. That is why I will vote for a supplemental appropriations bill that not only pays today's bills in Kosovo, but also begins to meet the national security emergency caused by 7 years of neglect of our military forces by this administration.

It is an emergency that we have troops fighting in Bosnia whose families are asked to survive on food stamps. It is an emergency the Air Force now has less cruise missiles than they have bombers to fire them. It is an emergency that as we call up 2,000 Air Force reservists for Kosovo, the Air Force still faces a shortage of over 2,000 pilots. And it is a grave emergency, that while we have gotten bogged down in a tiny country on the periphery of our vital interests, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have now confirmed that we face a "very high risk" of not being able to respond to our vital national interests in major theaters such as the Persian Gulf or the Korean Peninsula.

Support for our troops means more than a "photo op" for the Commander-in-Chief. It

means providing them all of the resources they need to safely and successfully complete their mission.

Support for our troops also means not putting them in harm's way without a clear goal, which can be achieved by military means, and which supports our vital national interests.

While all of our hearts and prayers go out to the innocent Kosovar civilians, it is painfully clear that 6 weeks of bombings have not prevented a single Kosovar from being raped, murdered or expelled from their home. Simply put, our military strategy of degrading and diminishing the Serbian military infrastructure can never achieve our stated political goal of peacefully reintegrating the Kosovar Albanians into Serbia.

Replacing Vietnam era "body counts" with high technology "bomb damage assessments" of empty Serbian barracks will not make this war a success.

If this tiny and troubled region truly were a threat to our vital interests, the only proper strategy would be full scale invasion of Kosovo, defeat of the Yugoslav Army, unconditional surrender of the war criminal, Slobodon Milosovic, and the occupation of Kosovo for the decades it will likely take to rebuild this region. This strategy, of full scale war, and the deployment of thousands of U.S. ground troops, surely must have the support of the American people as expressed through the approval of the Congress. For this reason, I support the resolution by the gentlewoman from Florida.

But if our security interests are not at stake, however deep the humanitarian crisis, we must consider more appropriate means of response than our current round of "therapeutic airstrikes."

When American service men and women know that what they are fighting for is important to their fellow Americans, and achievable through military means, they would do it for free.

We owe them an answer to these fundamental questions. Are we fighting for the independence of Kosovo? Not according to the President. Are we fighting to defeat Milosovic and bring him to justice as a war criminal? Not according to the Secretary of State. Are we fighting to defeat the Yugoslav army? Not according to the Secretary of Defense. So far it appears we are fighting because we can. We have replaced "power projection" with "sympathy projection." Blind support for this non-policy of wishful thinking must never become the measure of our support for American troops.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. CUNNINGHAM).

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, there is a strange dichotomy at play in this event. Those from the left attempt to use a vehicle they neither support, understand or even loathe at times. They attempt to spin the White House language that we attempt to stop ethnic cleansing, when the issue has actually exacerbated the problem that the Pentagon predicted, and warned and told the President not to get involved in.

The actual killing and removal of over 1 million refugees would not have

happened, not to the degree if NATO had not intervened.

The Jane Fondas, the Ramsey Clarks, the Strobe Talbotts of this world find themselves inept in attempting to conduct military operations or even foreign policy.

Take a look at NATO today: France, Socialist/Communist coalition; Italy, former Communist.

It is not somebody that we trust.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS), a member of the House Committee on International Relations.

Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, during the past few days I have asked myself, because I was against the conflict in Kosovo, I asked myself why, and I kept coming up with the answer that I was upset with the administration because it did not do the right thing in regards to the genocide that took place in Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone and the Sudan. And then I thought again, and I said, and came to the conclusion that 1, 2, 3 or even 4 wrongs do not equal a right. Therefore, I changed my opinion and said we should stay the course in Kosovo and correct our policy in Africa, for genocide is, indeed, genocide wherever we may find it.

I believe we should follow the lead of the administration and NATO in preserving humanity, for we cannot sit idly by as thousands of innocent people are raped, murdered, stripped of their identities and forced from their homelands like what occurred in Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone and the Sudan.

We must not allow evil to take over, and ethnic cleansing is indeed an evil. We should not sit on the fence between right and wrong. We should be firmly on the side of the fence that is right.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once said war can never be a positive or absolute good, but it could serve as a negative good in the sense of preventing the growth of an evil force. I believe that Mr. Milosovic is an evil force that must be stopped.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MCCOLLUM).

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, there is a tragic war unfolding in the Balkans. The United States military has been playing a significant role in this war for several weeks. There is every indication that the war will expand and so will the United States' role. And yet, it is an undeclared war bearing an eerie resemblance to the beginning of the Vietnam War albeit that this one involves our NATO allies.

As a part of a NATO policy, the United States military began bombing in Yugoslavia in response to that government's refusal to go along with a plan for NATO "peacekeeping" forces to occupy the Yugoslav province of Kosovo in an effort to stop a civil war and "ethnic cleansing." It appears that President

Clinton and other NATO leaders mistakenly thought that bombing specified military targets in Serbia and Kosovo would send a message to Yugoslav President Milosovic that would cause him to quickly embrace the NATO peace plan. It is obvious this was a gross miscalculation. Instead, Serbian forces immediately swept through Kosovo burning homes and driving out thousands and thousands of Kosovars who have become refugees in neighboring states. In the process, many human rights atrocities against the Kosovars in Kosovo have been reported.

The response of the United States and its allies has been to step up the bombing program. This has united the Serbian population behind President Milosovic, steeled their determination to prevail no matter what and alienated the general public in Russia who have a strong historical relationship with the Serbs. So far there is no sign that absent the introduction of ground forces, the intensified bombing campaign will cause President Milosovic and the Serbs to agree to the terms regarding Kosovo, demanded by NATO.

It is well known that the Yugoslav army has long prepared for a defensive struggle against any invading force by constructing underground facilities in rugged territory, by storing weapons and other supplies in these facilities and by training its military to engage in guerrilla tactics. While the extent of damage done by the bombing to date has been significant, it is probable that no amount of bombing will degrade the Yugoslav military sufficiently enough to prevent large numbers of casualties if U.S. ground troops are inserted or even if attack helicopters and other low flying aircraft are utilized to destroy Yugoslav ground forces because of the passion of the Serbian people to drive the Albanian Kosovars out of Kosovo and regain this territory which historically, several hundred years ago, was part of greater Serbia. It is unrealistic to expect the government of Yugoslavia to yield to NATO and its demands short of a total military defeat, and even then it appears likely that guerrilla warfare would continue to exist for a long, long time against any occupying force.

President Clinton has never asked Congress to declare war on Yugoslavia or Serbia. He has never even requested the type of resolution President Bush requested and was granted in advance of Desert Storm. Instead, he has made statements to the general public and conferred behind closed doors with congressional "leaders" putting forth a rationale for the bombings without a full explanation of what will likely be required to achieve the presumed NATO foreign policy objectives. At no time has he spelled out to the American public, let alone Congress, a consistent, coherent foreign policy that demonstrates a compelling United States national security interest in waging war against the forces of the government of Yugoslavia. Has the United States embraced a new NATO policy as described by British Prime Minister Tony Blair that NATO will not permit ever in the future human rights atrocities and "ethnic cleansing" or a dictatorship anywhere on the continent of Europe? If President Clinton embraces this policy, does this mean he is committing United States military forces to enforce such a policy not just in this instance in Yugoslavia, but at any point in

what the world defines as Europe? Does this mean that whatever force is necessary, including the use of ground troops of the United States military, will be engaged to ensure this policy? And if indeed this is a new policy of NATO to which the United States is in agreement, what is the national security interest rationale to support such a policy, and why specifically would we engage in such a policy with regard to Europe and nowhere else in the world? If it is not the United States policy, then the President needs to say so and come before Congress requesting some authority for engaging in the war that we're now undertaking together with a detailed rationale for it and an explanation of what we're prepared to do to win it. If it is a new policy, then that too must be explained together with a request for Congress to formally support the ongoing war as well as whatever treaty alterations within NATO need to be made and approved by the U.S. Senate.

I'm just as moved as anyone else by the atrocities being reported in Kosovo. There is no doubt in my mind that Albanian Kosovars have been brutally mistreated. No doubt, an appropriate response by the United States and its NATO allies to this action is justified. But I am deeply troubled by our engagement in an undeclared war that appears to be incrementally deepening with each passing day. It reminds me a great deal of how we got engaged in Vietnam and allowed that engagement to progress to a major war with a no-win policy that lost the support of the American public and cost thousands of American lives. If the United States is going to engage in war, the commitment must be made to let the military use the force necessary to win the war which means paying whatever price in lives of American soldiers is required to do this. And if America's national security interests are not great enough to justify such a price, then there should be no war.

To date, President Clinton has not demonstrated to my satisfaction that America's national security interest in the Kosovo matter is great enough to justify paying the price that I foresee will be necessary to win the undeclared war in which we are now engaged. For this reason, I am voting today for Mr. CAMPBELL's resolution to withdraw American forces from this war effort and for the Fowler/Goodling bill which would require a vote of Congress before the introduction of United States ground forces in Kosovo or Serbia. In doing so I keep an open mind to any presentation the President may make in the future to Congress seeking a declaration of war for this cause or a resolution similar to the one that was sought and given to President Bush. However, I will not be a party to sending American men and women in uniform to die in an ill conceived, ill planned and undeclared war.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. CANNON).

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I am a hawk. I believe in a military so strong that we never have to use it. When we use our military might, it should be with clear objectives after considering our national interests and the limits of our influence.

Mr. Speaker, imagine Serbia before we started bombing. The threat of ethnic cleansing clearly existed. About 2,000 innocent people have been killed, and more ominously, 40,000, a manned force, has been built up in Kosovo. Imagine again the White House seeing this threat, recalling the glory of the 1-day wars in Grenada and Panama and, without considering the ramifications, decided to go to war against Yugoslavia.

But Mr. Milosevic does not play by our rules. He does not turn on his anti-aircraft radar so that we can detect it and destroy it. He uses the bombings as a cover to really do ethnic cleansing and to suppress local domestic opposition.

The war drags on. The President and his advisers plead for patience, all the while hoping a cruel, cold winter without electricity and fuel oil will force guilty and innocent Serbs to their knees.

Mr. Speaker, I urge support of this.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. CROWLEY), another Member of the House Committee on International Relations.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to H. Con. Res. 82 which would direct the President to remove our armed forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Mr. Speaker, a congressional vote to withdraw U.S. forces from the mission in Kosovo would severely undermine the entire NATO effort to stem President Milosevic's brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar Albanian population.

Mr. Speaker, the withdrawal of U.S. troops right now would also undermine our other stated objectives in the conflict.

One of the reasons we decided to act in the first place was to prevent a wider conflict in the region from erupting. That was and still remains our goal. A withdrawal right now would greatly undermine that objective by putting the stability of the Balkans in grave jeopardy and, more broadly, the security of southern Europe.

We would also leave hundreds of thousands of refugees homeless and over 1.2 million displaced persons exposed to continued ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, a situation we will not tolerate. Just last weekend, leaders of the NATO alliance meeting here in Washington reaffirmed their commitment and resolve to maintain the air campaign against Yugoslavia until several key conditions were met. A vote now for unilateral U.S. withdrawal flies in the face of the NATO show of resolve.

Mr. Speaker, over the years many voices in this Chamber have called for greater burden-sharing by our allies. Our allies now are shouldering a great

deal of the responsibility in this conflict. A unilateral troop withdrawal at this time would send the wrong signal to them that we are not willing to hold up our fair share of the burden. Mr. Milosevic must not doubt our resolve to achieve the objective of a multi-ethnic, democratic Kosovo in which all can live in peace and security. Mr. Milosevic alone has the power to end this conflict by immediately stopping the violence and bloodshed, withdrawing his military police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo and allowing all refugees to return under an international security presence.

Mr. Speaker, make no mistake. A vote withdrawing our troops is a vote against our troops and the vital mission they are currently undertaking. I strongly urge my colleagues to vote against this resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GANSKE).

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, I urge a yes vote on H. Con. Res. 82.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Illinois (Mrs. BIGGERT).

Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution. Almost 7 weeks ago I voted to authorize the President to deploy American military forces as part of a peacekeeping force in Kosovo if the peace talks then underway produced a settlement.

Mr. Speaker, no peace agreement was reached, no vital U.S. interest in Kosovo was articulated, no mission defined, no exit strategy put forward. Without a vote of this House, the planes were launched and air strikes began. Never before have I been as concerned about the lack of definition and direction in our Nation's foreign policy. We are in where we should not be, and no one seems to know the way out.

It appears that the President hoped that the threat of air strikes would force a peace agreement. It did not. He hoped that the air strikes alone would detour Mr. Milosevic from continuing his attacks on Kosovo. They did not. He hopes that the American people are willing to risk the lives of their sons and daughters in Kosovo. They are not.

Mr. Speaker, hope is not a method. The President has yet to make a case for our involvement in Kosovo.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2¾ minutes to the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. SANDERS).

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Speaker, the Constitution is very clear. It is the United States Congress which has the power to determine issues of war and peace and to decide whether our young men and women are put in harm's way. It is the President who is the Commander in Chief of the military; it is the Congress which determines whether we use that military.

I have heard today that some people think that the U.S. participation in Kosovo now is unconstitutional. They are right. But the U.S. participation in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama and many other conflicts which took place without congressional authorization were also unconstitutional.

The time is now for this Congress to stop abrogating its constitutional responsibility to the White House and to start seriously addressing the issues of war and peace.

Frankly, I am extremely concerned about the process that has taken place today on an issue of such enormous consequence and at a time when Congress has an inactive schedule. It is an outrage that we only have a few hours to discuss the issues of war, the expenditure of billions, and the potential loss of life of American military personnel, and I hope we rectify this situation in the coming days and weeks. This should not be the last debate on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, my assessment of this situation at the present moment is that Mr. Milosevic is a war criminal and that ethnic cleansing, mass murder, rape and the forced evacuation of hundreds of thousands of innocent people from their homes is unacceptable and cannot be ignored. Sadly, because Mr. Milosevic has negotiated agreements which he has then ignored, I have supported the NATO bombings of military targets. I believe that the Serb military and police must be withdrawn from Kosovo, that the hundreds of thousands of people uprooted from their homes must be allowed to return, that Kosovo must be given some kind of self-rule and that an international peacekeeping force should be established to maintain order.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that we must strive as hard as we possibly can to find an alternative between doing nothing and allowing ethnic cleansing and mass murder to continue and the continuation of a war which will certainly result in terrible destruction, large numbers of casualties and the expenditure of great sums of money. I believe that the United States must be as active as we possibly can in finding a road to peace.

I believe that Germany and the United Nations have brought forth proposals which might be able to form the basis of a negotiated peace. I believe that Russia, a long-term ally of Serbia, should be asked to play a more active role in the process and to supply troops for an international peacekeeping force.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CHABOT), a member of our committee.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I have believed from the outset that our involvement in this European conflict is wrong. It has become painfully appar-

ent that the Clinton administration committed American air power without a clearly-defined mission and without a credible exit strategy.

Make no mistake about it. Slobodan Milosevic is a war criminal. His treatment of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has been deplorable, and his prosecution as a international war criminal could not come fast enough. But I do not believe that the commitment of American military forces to a potentially long, expensive and perhaps tragic effort can be the proper means to achieve that end.

Mr. Speaker, our military involvement in the Balkans is unwise. This administration's miscues have led to a disjointed strategy of gradual escalation that puts the lives of American men and women at risk.

Let us work for peace. Let us help the Kosovar refugees with humanitarian aid. But let us take our service men and women out of harm's way.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. COYNE).

Mr. COYNE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address the difficult issues that are before us relative to U.S. involvement in the ongoing NATO military action in Yugoslavia. The United States, in consultation with its NATO allies, has determined that the instability caused by the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is a threat to the security of Europe.

□ 1600

Governments of NATO agreed unanimously on joint military action over a month ago, with the intention of forcing the government of Slobodan Milosevic to end its policy of ethnic cleansing and to allow safe restoration of the refugees to their homes. The one thing that I think Americans have learned is that it is wrong to stand idly by while such atrocities take place before our eyes. History has also taught us that it is better to head off a problem than to wait until the problem has spread. Today NATO remains committed to continuing its military operations until its three objectives, safe return and self-government of the refugees, withdrawal of the Yugoslavian troops from Kosovo and the insertion of peacekeeping troops to protect the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are met. I support these objectives, and I support U.S. military action in order to achieve them.

How long this action will last, I do not know, but I do know two things: First, the power to end hostilities lies today with Slobodan Milosevic. All he has to do is stop the killing and pull his troops back.

Second, the chances that Mr. Milosevic will meet NATO's demand are dramatically reduced if Congress enacts legislation that requires the

withdrawal of U.S. forces or ties the administration's hands regarding NATO's military options.

This is no time to go weak-kneed on our troops in Europe.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MANZULLO), a member of our committee.

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, I have four questions to ask my colleagues and the American public: Is a ground war in Kosovo imminent? We are being pushed towards a ground war that is not in our national interests. Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of Britain, the Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, and our own President with his recent headlines, "Clinton edges closer to backing the use of ground troops," and the President has called up 33,000 reservists.

The second question, what does a ground war mean? It means between 150,000 and 300,000 troops, with American forces making up 65 percent of the troops in rugged terrain that 25 German divisions in World War II could barely occupy, with expected casualties of between 7 and 12 percent, thousands of Americans wounded and killed.

Three, is it worth it? Every Member of Congress must ask himself or herself this question: Is it worth the life of my child, and, if you cannot answer that in the affirmative, then why should you force others' children to go to war, while the Clinton Administration refuses to allow the Kosovars to arm themselves and fight their own civil war.

The fourth question, why vote for the Campbell bill to halt U.S. combat mission in Yugoslavia? Because this is the only way to keep ground troops from savage guerrilla warfare, and this is the only way to stop thousands of U.S. soldiers from being killed in battle.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DAVIS).

Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the Campbell resolution. As I stand here today, it pains me deeply to know that right now there are over 500,000 innocent victims from Kosovo who are running for their lives. These men, women and children have been driven out of their homes and villages, have been subjected to organized assaults, brutal rapes, and even assassinations. Some are living in makeshift camps, sheltered only by blankets and plastic covering. Some even hide and wait in the forests. Many of their villages have been burned.

These victims have been terrorized and seen death in the worst extreme. They are experiencing hunger, sickness, cold temperatures and terror on many fronts. Some have seen their loved ones viciously executed. We cannot allow this horror to continue for

these innocent people, without trying to stop it.

Let me be clear: I strongly believe that any kind of physical confrontation is troublesome and undesirable. However, to simply stand by, after one has exhausted diplomatic solutions, is even more unbearable. We have been as reasonable as we can possibly be with the Milosevic regime, yet he continues these atrocities and continues to launch a well-executed ethnic cleansing campaign and continues to commit genocide upon the men and women and children of Kosovo.

I have been told that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere, and there can be no justice in America as long as there is injustice in Kosovo.

We have no alternative, we have no recourse, we have no choice, except to demonstrate that we believe in peace, and, not only do we believe in it, but we will work for it.

Therefore, I oppose the Campbell resolution, and urge that we vote against it.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. ISTOOK).

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, I rise not to declare war, but to support our Constitution.

Right now President Clinton is prosecuting a war he was never authorized to start. President Clinton asked many nations to agree to attack Yugoslavia, but he failed to get permission from one crucial country, America. Our Constitution requires that Congress must declare war, not the President. It also states that Congress, not the President, defines and punishes offenses against the law of nations. And the NATO treaty, approved 50 years ago, says nothing about launching an attack.

It is not the American way to let one man drag us into a bloody quagmire. I took an oath to honor our Constitution, and I will not stand idle while the President, again, runs rough-shod over that Constitution.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. OLVER), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. OLVER. Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor with an overwhelming sense of sadness that we be debating constraints on America's ability to lead in this world on a most profound issue of human rights. We are a people and a Nation whose very creation was to protect life and liberty against imperial sovereignty.

In my view, whatever constrains the 19 nations that comprise NATO from successfully prosecuting this war and successfully degrading the military capacity of the Milosevic regime to conduct ethnic cleansing and successfully

returning ethnic Albanian citizens of Kosova to the homes they've lived in for generations is bad policy. It is tough enough to achieve consensus among those 19 nations, from France, Britain, and Italy to Hungary, Luxembourg and Iceland. But a broad consensus exists, a remarkable agreement, that the consummate evil in Europe today is represented by the Milosevic regime's execution of his belief that it has every right to repress, to terrorize, to intimidate, to expel, and, if those fail, to massacre whoever is left, of nearly 2 million citizens of Kosovo, whose only crime is that their religion is Islam.

I believe that if NATO had said "no" when Milosevic attacked eastern Croatia in 1991, an attack that ended when the defenses of Vukovar were overrun and the people remaining in the hospital were taken from their beds and slaughtered, we would not have witnessed the agony of Bosnia, with 200,000 killed and 2 million—fully 50% of the population—displaced from their homes. That agony culminated at Srebrenica where 8,000 men and boys were separated out and slaughtered. And if NATO had said "no" when the Milosevic regime killed 200,000 Bosnians and sent 2 million more into exile and into displacement from their homes, then the agony of Kosovo would not have occurred.

I believe equally fervently that if NATO is not equally successful in its resolve on Kosovo, that the anti-Milosevic freely-elected government, and, in fact, the very republic status of Montenegro within the rump of federal Yugoslavia, is as good as dead, and that the Milosevic regime will then adopt the destabilization of Macedonia as its next expansionist project.

NATO must succeed in this effort, before all the Kosovar males between the ages of 15 and 50 are murdered by the Milosevic regime.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. SAM JOHNSON).

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, war is a serious undertaking. It should not be used for political reasons, ever. War is a last resort and only used to protect America, her citizens and our vital interests.

Despite the humanitarian atrocities in Kosovo, the loss of even one life for a cause that has yet to be articulated or defined for the people of the United States is one too many. The plight of the refugees is tragic, and America should help them. We are a country that can provide relief and direction, ease pain and suffering, and we should provide help.

Mr. Speaker, I fought in a war where politicians were afraid to win because of the political fallout. That fear caused me to spend nearly 7 years of my life as a prisoner of war. I would fight again tomorrow for America's

vital interests, but the answer in Kosovo is not to waste American lives. The answer is stop the bombing and provide relief for the refugees.

Mr. Speaker, there is a wall among the trees near the Lincoln Memorial that is engraved with the names of many brave soldiers, many of whom were my friends. Families go there to grieve and remember their fathers, their mothers, their sons and daughters. Stop the bombing. We do not need another wall.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Mrs. MINK).

Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Speaker, there is no doubt in my mind that Congress has the duty and responsibility to decide the question whether the United States of America uses its military power against another country. No matter how this Congress feels about the evil actions of the leaders of Yugoslavia against its own people, words of revulsion and opposition do not justify bombing without a declaration of war.

If the majority of this Congress feels that the air bombardment is justified, then it must vote to declare war. An explanation of why we are bombing Yugoslavia is not enough. We need to explicitly state that we do so in an act of war. Without that declaration of war, we make a mockery of the Constitution and of the War Powers Act.

Just because we are not acting alone and because the countries of NATO are in full support of the air attack does not absolve us of our responsibility to abide by our Constitution. If we believe that the President is correct in sending our military forces to bomb Yugoslavia, then it follows that we must vote to declare war.

I voted to allow troops into Yugoslavia to enforce the peace agreement. I did not vote to allow military intervention to force an agreement. I do not support the use of military power to beat the Yugoslavian government into submission to our will.

I fervently believe we should be debating a resolution to urge the President to declare a moratorium on the bombing while an all-out effort is made to reach a settlement. There are various proposals on the table. We could discuss the Russian proposal, the UN proposal, the German proposal. The Kosovar people have fled from their homes. Dangers to them now of a moratorium are very small compared to what has already been heaped upon them, so why not declare a halt on the bombing and let Russia, Germany and the UN broker a settlement? I want an end to the bombing. I want the Constitution of the United States to prevail.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. TANCREDO), a member of our committee.

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, there are many murky things about the situation we now face in Kosovo. One, however, is not murky. What is not even remotely unclear is the fact that we are not there for the often heard cause of stopping ethnic cleansing. That is the one thing about which I am absolutely sure. That is not the reason we are there.

We can debate, and we will debate at length, the variety of reasons we may be there. It may have something to do with legacies and all the rest of that, but it has nothing to do with ethnic cleansing, else we would be in at least a dozen countries around this world where the situation is 10 times worse. Certainly we can start naming them now. At the top of the list is the Sudan.

□ 1615

There were 2,000 people dead when we went into Kosovo to begin with, a third of them Serbs. We have already ruined too many lives there in Kosovo, we have done too much damage; too many people are dead as a result of the actions we have taken. It is time to withdraw our forces. When we have dug ourselves a pit, the best thing to do now is stop digging and get out.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I would remind my colleagues that as a result of the atrocities and the crimes against humanity committed by Slobodan Milosevic, there are over 300,000 men, women and children that are dead in the former Yugoslavia now.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH), my friend and colleague.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I believe we should withdraw our troops and resubmit this matter to the United Nations Security Council and make this tragedy the entire world's burden and not primarily that of the people of the United States of America.

It is understandable that this House should be conflicted here, because this mission is itself at conflict between the U.N. charter, which bans force, violating State sovereignty and the universal declaration of human rights, which guarantees the rights of individuals against oppressive States. NATO's action fails the test of humanitarian intervention, if only because of the damage NATO has inflicted on civilian populations. Humanitarian bombing is an Orwellian attack on logic.

If the United States continues as the chief sponsor of this war, we have, in effect, decided that the United Nations is no longer relevant. This places upon America the awesome responsibility of policing the entire world.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. COLLINS).

Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support for this resolution.

I share the concerns of many Third District residents regarding ethnic cleansing in Kosovo

and current North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attacks on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Having recently traveled to Tirana, Albania, and Skopje, Macedonia, I have witnessed firsthand the humanitarian crisis facing Europe—a crisis that has intensified since the beginning of the allied bombing campaign. There is no question that the situation is grim.

Slobodan Milosevic is a shrewd and experienced military commander who has used military power to expel Kosovar Albanians from their homes and to put extensive defenses in place in Kosovo, significantly enhancing his military position on the ground.

The President and the other 18 NATO leaders have, on the other hand, allowed political considerations to govern military decisions, resulting in NATO's failure to accomplish the goals established by the President at the outset of the air war. Ethnic cleansing has accelerated and the FRY military has now fortified its southern defenses, presenting a greater threat to a potential invasion force today than was present when NATO bombing began.

Because NATO air strikes have little chance of accomplishing their stated goals, and because the human and economic costs of launching a ground campaign far outweigh the potential benefits of such an action, I believe that the NATO air campaign must stop immediately. It is time for NATO to seek a negotiated settlement that will stop this expensive and counterproductive bombing campaign and allow the Kosovar Albanians to begin to rebuild their lives.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), a most distinguished member of the House Committee on International Relations and a long-term Member of this body.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, the voices of appeasement and isolationism are reverberating in these halls. For 40 years NATO stood against the Soviet Union, the mighty superpower, and NATO apparently, in the view of some of our colleagues, cannot stand up to Slobodan Milosevic.

This past weekend at the NATO summit, 19 nations stood together determined and united to see to it that the ethnic cleansing comes to an end, that the persecution, mass rape, mass murder of the Kosovars comes to a halt. And it is painful indeed to listen to some of my colleagues who forget that for the whole period since the end of the Second World War, NATO provided a shield behind which Europe could be safe and free and secure and prosperous.

This is a historic moment. For the first time, Hitler's first victims, the Czechs, the Poles, the Danes, the Norwegians, the Dutch and the Belgians stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the newly democratic Germany and 11 other nations, including Canada and ourselves, in saying "no" to the perpetrators of genocide. This is not the time to cut and run.

It is important for all of us to realize that when the dust settles, this will

prove to be NATO's finest hour. We are in it not for oil, not for glory, not for territory, but for the principles on which this country was founded, the principles that NATO has succeeded in taking root throughout western Europe and now throughout central Europe.

If anybody really believes that behind a new Iron Curtain in Yugoslavia there can be a dictatorship while the rest of Europe will be safe, stable and secure, it better wake up. We need to understand that if we allow Slobodan Milosevic to continue his evil deeds, he started the war against Slovenia, he lost it. He started the war against Croatia, he lost it. He started the war against Bosnia Herzegovina, he lost it. The last war he now starts, it is against the people of Kosovo. These people have done nothing, nothing to hurt the Yugoslav nation. They just want to live in peace and decency, and it is the responsibility of NATO to stand up as it has for half a century.

I strongly urge rejection of the resolution.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. CALLAHAN).

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, especially with the advances knowledge that I intend to vote against his resolution.

I must warn my colleagues that we should be very cautious about what we do and what we say here and the messages that we send. Just last weekend, the NATO nations were here; they were unanimous in every respect in saying that they are going to stop the atrocities that have been taking place in Yugoslavia.

At this time and place in history, when we are involved, whether we like it or not, in Kosovo and debating whether or not we should send American land troops, I think that the message of passing a resolution soon as this would be a serious mistake on the part of this Congress.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

To my colleagues on the other side, I just want to provide a statement made by the former Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, who testified and expressed his reservations about this policy. But now that we have initiated this policy, let me quote from Mr. Kissinger who made this statement this past Thursday:

"What we need to do now is maintain the principle that ethnic cleansing does not pay, and therefore, those refugees must be given the right to return. Secondly, if all of NATO is defeated by Serbia, and that is what occurs if you have unilateral withdrawal, what will this mean for the Gulf, for North Korea, and for any other area where rogue States are held in check by American and, in some cases, NATO military power? That is the issue now."

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Iowa (Mr. LEACH), the chairman of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

I am rising in support of this resolution, although I do it with great reluctance, because it is always difficult not to give the benefit of the doubt to the executive in foreign policy. But 7 weeks ago, I voted against authorizing U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia because I could discern no national interest in taking sides in a civil war, no approach that would lead to a diminution of violence, and no credible exit strategy.

I would like to stress, above all, one thing. Historical analogies are extremely difficult to derive. I personally believe there are a whole lot that apply in the Balkans, but many of them are contradictory. One that the majority side in support of the war falls back on is the Holocaust. I believe that there are Holocaust analogies. But I also believe that Milosevic is a sui generis war criminal, one for whom Holocaust acts are not unknown, but one where leadership is more analogous to, say, a Ho Chi Minh or possibly even a Pol Pot than to a Hitler.

I raise this because if we exclusively make Hitlerite analogies, we have no choice whatsoever than to follow a kind strategy that could lead in and of itself to greater losses of life to innocents than a negotiated settlement.

With each decision, it appears that this administration and NATO are moving into a circumstance where the problems are more difficult, not less; more likely to lead to outrageously violent results. Now is the time to stress negotiations, the time to recognize that we are not likely to have a great victory.

Senator Aiken once suggested in Vietnam in the late 1960s that we should declare victory and get out. That prescription does not fit the Balkans, but I would urge that we put in place a process of negotiations, and with that process recognize we have a greater chance for a successful resolution than any other possibility.

Little is more difficult than to apply perspective to the events of the day.

The Administration's Kosovo policy is open to question from two contrasting perspectives: should we militarily engage the government of Yugoslavia and, if so, what form should this engagement take? The first question involves fundamental Constitutional issues on war powers and the role of Congress in legitimizing military action and enhancing the participation of the American people in decisions related to war and peace. The second involves the unchallenged role of the President as commander-in-chief and doctrines of warfare.

Seven weeks ago, I voted against authorizing U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia because

I could discern no national interest in taking sides in a civil war in the Balkans, no approach that would lead to a diminution of violence and no credible exit strategy.

The Administration, through its acts and statements, has broken with the military doctrine of the last several Administrations, particularly the Reaganite reliance on peace-time military preparedness and the Bush espousal of the Powell Doctrine, which calls for the establishment and enunciation of clear objectives with the use of overwhelming force to achieve these objectives.

In this context, I recently reviewed a 1984 speech of the former Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger. Weinberger suggested that six major tests should be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad:

(1) First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . . .

(2) Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. . . .

(3) Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it." . . .

(4) Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: "Is this conflict in our national interest?" "Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?" If the answers are "Yes", then we must win. If the answers are "No", then we should not be in combat.

(5) Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. . . .

(6) Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

Americans are obligated to assess whether U.S. policy in Kosovo today meet the above tests.

In terms of implementation the Grenada intervention—as minor an issue as it may have been—and the Gulf War, which involved far greater geo-economic stakes than the Kosovo conflict, stand in stark contrast with the new Clinton military doctrine, which can be described as:

(1) Reliance on aircraft and missiles to rain destruction from thousands of feet and in some cases hundreds of miles in such far-flung parts of the globe as East Africa, Afghanistan and now Serbia. From an American

perspective this use of air power is star-wars like, but from the perspective of targeted populations such as in Belgrade the effect bears more resemblance to the bombings of World War II.

(2) The declared renunciation of the use of ground troops amounts to the articulation that the United States intends to engage in Kosovo with one hand tied behind its back.

(3) The determination that murderous potentes should be held in check through the destruction of significant civilian as well as military targets, including electric utilities, water systems, political headquarters, TV stations and residencies of heads of states.

(4) The use of a defensive alliance for intervention in a civil war.

(5) Placing the prestige and might of the United States on the line through the commitment of air power while multi-lateralizing the decision-making and control in the NATO structure, which functions by consensus.

The lessons of history have been widely invoked both to justify and to decry our military intervention in Kosovo. Unfortunately history does not provide easy answers, either with regard to the meaning of contemporary events or to what actions should be taken in response to them.

For instance, in the wake of World War I historians and political scientists rightly concluded the European system had been too inflexible in 1914. A misapplication of this lesson, however, led a generation later to Munich. Too much rigidity precipitated the First World War; too little backbone encouraged Hitler's aggression in the Second.

World War II involved a conflagration between nation states; it also involved a conflagration within—the Holocaust—and challenged civilized society not to allow a replication of such inhumanity to man.

The background of both World Wars bears on American decision-making today.

Clearly, the onslaught against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo that Milosevic has unleashed has Holocaust parallels. On the other hand, the ethnic cleansing the Serbs have undertaken also has analogs with what Croats, Bosnians and, to a much lesser extent, Kosovars have attempted in the region. Milosevic's barbarity would appear to lie somewhere between Ho Chi Minh's assault on South Vietnamese Catholics and Pol Pot's attempt to exterminate intellectuals.

The problem with equating Milosevic exclusively with Hitler, instead of recognizing him as a sui generis war criminal, is that it makes a negotiated settlement morally untenable and renders it impossible for the U.S. to consider anything less than unconditional victory. This is particularly dangerous when it is self-evident that a negotiated settlement is preferable to all sides over a protracted conflict. Hence, it is key to understand that at this point Kosovo is more a civil war with holocaustal elements than vice-versa. But if the war continues, a complicating factor for maintaining NATO unity in the face of Serbian atrocities will in all likelihood be the West's ability to stomach Kosovar counter-measures and the implications of ratcheting up air power. The line between a terrorist and a nationalist freedom fighter is narrow, as is the line between using force to stand up to atrocity and applying force in such a way that greater violence is precipitated.

Yet another lesson of history regards the effectiveness of air power and strategic bombing. As John Kenneth Galbraith, who led a team that assessed the impact of allied air power in World War II, has noted, bombing in coordination with the use of ground troops has generally proved effective, but strategic bombing of cities often causes populaces to rally to domestic leadership, no matter how malevolent.

Here it must be noted that air power is different from what it was earlier in the century. Our arsenal now includes nuclear weapons of enormous destructive power as well as so-called smart bombs and missiles that can strike with surgical accuracy, which greatly enhances our ability to limit danger to our armed forces and collateral damage to civilian areas.

The development of smart weapons, however, may have caused political leaders to be too tempted to use them without recognizing that the use of force anywhere at any time has ramifications which are not easily predictable and which not infrequently are counter-productive.

For instance, our goal in using force against Milosevic may be to undermine his political support, but it would appear that, to date, we have ensconced his political strength while weakening the democracy movement, which was profoundly pro-American in Serbia and damaging the lives and livelihoods of ordinary Serbs.

Much of the world is not enamored of America's ability to rain destruction from afar. We simply have no idea how deep and how long the effects of our air strikes and the targets we have chosen will last. What we do know is that Serbs point to a 14th century defeat as a rallying cry for their actions today. What we do know is that the Armenians believe that in 1919 they suffered the first holocaust of the century and Turkish embassies to this day are susceptible to terrorist attacks because of the atrocities of the now defunct Ottoman Empire.

In the background of the predicament we are in is failed diplomacy. Where Theodore Roosevelt invoked a doctrine of "speak softly, but carry a big stick," this Administration has propounded a policy of threatening vigorously while refusing to make timely military deployments that might have averted conflict. We have been backed into using air power, not out of considerations of national interest but to ensure that the credibility of U.S. political leadership was kept in tact. We told Milosevic we would use it if he did not agree to our preferred negotiating plan and he in effect called our hand.

In the background was a peace agreement which had the doubtful support of one side and no support from the more powerful party.

While the Rambouillet accord might have met standards of American sensibility, it clearly proved untenable for the activist parties in the region. This fact should give pause to NATO, America in particular.

In this regard I have become increasingly Frostian in my geopolitics. Good fences sometimes make good, or at least better, neighbors. It would appear that, despite the multi-heritage example of Sarajevo, the people of the Balkans will have to learn to live apart without war before they can live together in peace.

A century and three-quarters ago, an American President, James Monroe, asserted a

doctrine that carries his name which established that the United States would object to further European colonization in this hemisphere and give succor to independence movements in Latin America. Implicit in the Monroe Doctrine was the assumption, growing from the concerns of our first President, George Washington, a military man, that the United States should not become entangled in the quarrels of Europe.

With the exception of two World Wars in this century and a commitment made in the context of the Cold War of a defensive alliance, historical U.S. foreign policy has been governed by the precept that we would give umbrella protection to independence movements in the Americas but refrain from military intervention in the internal affairs of nation states on the continent. Our country was formed by dissidents and opportunity seekers reacting to the repression and civil wars in Europe. It now appears that our fore fathers better understood the Balkans and like European problems than the State Department does today.

At this point we are being asked to support NATO action for the sake of the viability and credibility of the alliance, rather than for the purposes for which the alliance was formed. We appear to be putting the alliance ahead of our objectives and allowing our mutual strategy to test the alliance itself, which it is doing. One poll has found that 95 percent of Greeks object to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and there are significant percentages, albeit smaller, opposed in every country of the alliance, including the United States.

A decade or so ago, I participated in a forum at the Library of Congress with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at which I asked him about an observation he made in one of his autobiographical works. Kissinger had written that between the 1968 election and the inauguration, he had sat down with President-elect Nixon and the two of them had decided to get the United States out of Vietnam. I asked why they had not just gone ahead and done that immediately upon taking office and Kissinger responded, "Congressman, we meant we would get out with honor." Asked if that meant further escalation of troop numbers and bombing, Kissinger responded, "Absolutely."

It is my sense that NATO is in a similar position today with regard to Belgrade. For the honor of NATO, it appears that we are about to escalate the war. The question is whether we are not better off seeking the earliest possible settlement.

History is a source of lessons and perspectives, but issues of the moment must also be approached in a manner which calculates their future implications.

NATO's strategic rationale appears to have broken down on the issue of numbers. There are 19 states versus one with that one being much smaller than most of the 19. But another way of looking at this strategic conundrum is that 19 countries are allied against the forces of nationalism and sub-nationalism in a part of the world where historical and ethnic tensions provide little basis for compromise.

Nationalism led to dramatic changes in the world's map in the 19th century and has been repeatedly underestimated as a force in the 20th century. The question is will NATO, de-

spite its might, find itself in the same position in the Balkans as the United States did in Vietnam and as the Soviet Union did in Afghanistan?

Returning to history, the first great chronicle of the Western World relates to a land mass adjoining the Balkans, ancient Greece. Thucydides wrote that early in the Peloponnesian Wars which pitted the quasi-democratic and enormously uplifting culture of ancient Athens against the more militaristic Sparta, the Athenian Assembly voted to send a naval fleet to conquer the neutral island of Melos. Several days later the decision was reconsidered and a faster ship was sent to overtake the fleet and call off the invasion.

Later in the war, however, the Athenian Assembly again decided to invade Melos and sent out a force which killed all the men and enslaved the women on the island. Thucydides' chronicles were intended to show how the world's most civilized city-state at the time had lost its way, and indeed from that point on Athens never again recovered its prior status.

An aspect of the bombing today is what targets are left in Serbia after so much damage has already been inflicted. Clearly at this point, the Serbs have lost virtually everything except the war, while the West has won nothing, particularly a peace.

A case can be made that whatever mistakes have been made to date, it is morally questionable to stand by and do nothing and an even greater mistake to pull the rug out from under the executive branch. The reason I cannot support America's continuing military role is that each of the choices for NATO in the future gets more untenable. There is the prospect of sending in troops with losses potentially equivalent to or greater than Vietnam. There is also the prospect of ratcheting up the air war. One can always strike again at military sites, but it appears that on the civilian side, Yugoslavia has already been bombed back to the 18th century.

Military historians counsel two principles when devising strategic doctrine: put on the shoes of opponents and do not back them hopelessly into a corner. In the case of Kosovo, we clearly have not put on the shoes of the Serbs and we have done everything to back Milosevic into a corner. We have made a martyr out of a murderer and allowed a war criminal to stand up to NATO, which includes Serbia's ancient enemy, Turkey. Milosevic's martyrdom increases with each degree of the suffering of his people.

Every society has an historian or philosopher who points out that the road to Hell is paved with good intentions. Despite the good intentions of the West, our policies appear to be counterproductive. Ratcheting up the war could well signify a ratcheting-down of the moral high ground of NATO.

The prerequisite of policy must always be good intentions, but good intentions are insufficient grounds for action. Policy must match intentions with practical capacities to carry out defined objectives. Just War doctrines, after all, require that responses be proportional and effective. The only alternatives to a bombs only policy are the introduction of ground troops or the isolation of Serbia, the reliance on a humanitarian response to a humanitarian

crisis. In either case the legal and moral imperative to indict Serb leadership for war crimes is overwhelming.

In the late 1960s Senator Aiken suggested we simply declare victory and get out of Vietnam. This prescription does not fit today's dilemma in the Balkans, but our first obligation should be to put in place a process of negotiations with the understanding that an imperfectly negotiated settlement may be the closest thing to victory that is likely to be possible without the loss of an incalculable number of innocents.

Escalating the war, on the other hand, puts U.S. interests at risk, in the Balkans and in other parts of the world. The earlier we reconsider the better.

The vote on this resolution and the others we will take today are necessitated by law. That law, the War Powers Resolution, may be unconstitutional and today's votes may serve as a basis for the courts to rule to this effect. Nonetheless, the War Powers Resolution is at this moment the law of the land. Ironically, we are finding, compliance may be more difficult for the legislative than, as has generally been perceived, for the executive branch because it forces congressional accountability for or against executive actions.

More importantly, the timing as well as the fact of consideration of these resolutions is awkward for the national interest because legislative decision-making is required by dates certain—i.e., within a prescribed period from the time troops are deployed in hostile circumstances.

The public interest may not be well served by such a review of executive action in such a timeframe, but it would be less well served if Congress avoided its legal and constitutional responsibilities. Hence, what in effect is a legislative/executive confrontation is legally, at this time, unavoidable, and as an individual Member of Congress I have no option except to take a stand. This stand is one of dissent to what I consider to be a foreign policy that lacks intellectual rigor and misserves the national interest.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is available on each side?

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LATOURETTE). The gentleman from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) has 10½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. DELAHUNT) has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, last week in the Committee on International Relations we listened to Secretary of State Albright explain the administration's policy. I expressed my concerns to the Secretary about the difficulty of our objectives, especially given the limited means we are committing.

Looking back over time at our Nation's wars, and this is a war, we have been successful when we have had as an objective the destruction of a regime or when we have had clearly-defined territorial objectives such as expelling Iraq from Kuwait. In both of these sce-

narios, though, in order to accomplish our goals, we used rather massive force, including ground troops. But in Kosovo we are committing American resources and prestige and risking American lives, employing what must be called a very calibrated use of force in order to achieve a very complex objective: restructuring Kosovo's society.

Given that, my question to the Secretary was: What precedent for success in our history are we looking at? Are we practicing a theory here in Kosovo without an historical basis for success? The response from her: no cases were cited from the real world. Instead, we heard that the air war is working, when most observers do not believe it to be the case, and that we need to be patient. Well, patience is what we had in Vietnam.

Another thing that struck me while listening to the Secretary was that when there was a difficult question, when our strategy was being challenged, we'd hear that she'd rather be answering such difficult questions than answering why we're doing nothing. This response is backwards. The Secretary of State and the President she works for are responsible for the resources of the United States of America, and the lives of our servicemen. I'd rather have the Administration struggle with answering questions about the tragedy in Kosovo than struggle, and that is what it's doing, with explaining why we're committing America's treasure and risking American lives there. Yesterday, and throughout this crisis, I've heard too much struggling with our basic strategy.

So, faced with this decision today, I cannot sanction the current policy. Good intentions, and the tragedy in Kosovo is great, cannot mask flawed policy.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. BASS).

Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution that is before us today. It is not an easy vote for me, but it is one that I must cast. I do so because failure to support this resolution, by failing to vote for this resolution, we are in effect saying that what has happened over the last 30 days in the Balkans is okay; that the administration's failure to define what we are trying to accomplish or to change that definition practically on a day-to-day basis, that that activity is okay; that the administration's failure to define the military means that we should use to achieve that as-of-yet undefined objective is okay.

We started in the air. We then went to close-in air. Now we are bombing civilian infrastructure, and unfortunately, I think that we are going to be looking at the introduction of ground troops in the near future.

Mr. Speaker, absent some control of Congress, I am certain that this war will escalate to a point where we will no longer be dealing with \$4 billion, \$6 billion or \$8 billion, but \$10 billion, \$20

billion, \$30 billion, \$40 billion or \$50 billion.

Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the pending resolution.

□ 1630

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. CANADY).

Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, and for his leadership on this important issue.

I do rise in support of the removal of the armed forces of the United States from the present hostilities against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Our forces should be removed from these hostilities because the vital national interests of the United States are not at stake in the Balkans.

I also want to state my great concern about the commencement of this war without the authorization of the Congress. The President does not have the constitutional authority unilaterally to decide that the United States will wage war on a sovereign Nation which has not attacked or threatened the United States. Absent truly exigent circumstances, the armed forces of the United States should be sent into conflict only when duly authorized by this Congress.

I would like to quote what James Wilson said in the debate over ratification of our constitution. He said, "This new system will not hurry us into war. It is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man or a single body of men to involve us in such distress, for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large." That power should be exercised as intended by the Constitution and not usurped by the President.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the removal of the Armed Forces of the United States from the present hostilities against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Our forces should be removed from these hostilities because the vital national interests of the United States are not at stake in the Balkans. Although our interests are not threatened by Yugoslavia, we are waging war against Yugoslavia in a conflict that is but the prelude to a protracted, costly, and dangerous entanglement in the Balkans.

Events to date sadly demonstrate that the Administration has not adequately assessed the consequences of its present policy and the costs of the course on which it has embarked. From the start, the policy has been ill-conceived. Stating the obvious, to persist in folly is not wisdom. The longer we follow the misguided and dangerous course set by the Administration, the greater the risk of serious harm to the real interests of the United States.

I also want to state my great concern about the commencement of this war without authorization by the Congress. As Commander-in-Chief, the President does, in my view, have the inherent Constitutional authority to use military force to respond to attacks on United States territory and interests. The President

does not, however, have the Constitutional authority unilaterally to decide that the United States will wage war on a sovereign nation which has not attacked or threatened the United States. Absent truly exigent circumstances, the Armed Forces of the United States should be sent into conflict only when duly authorized by the Congress. Otherwise, the power to declare war vested by the Constitution in the Congress is rendered meaningless.

In the debate over ratification of the Constitution, James Wilson summed up the meaning of the pertinent Constitutional provisions. Wilson said: This [new] system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large; . . . from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our national interests can draw us into war.

The decision of a single man has taken the United States into this war against Yugoslavia. That decision was neither wise nor constitutional.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. OSE).

Mr. OSE. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution today. In March the House passed a resolution that authorized the deployment of peacekeeping troops in Kosovo.

In that resolution we asked some very reasonable things of the President. We asked him to clarify the national security interests in Kosovo, to state the goal of the mission, to estimate its costs, to develop an exit strategy, and to report on the mission's impact on our ability elsewhere in the world to respond to threats to our national security. To date we have not received a satisfactory response on any of these. Yet, they remain precisely the questions we are dealing with today.

The mission in Kosovo is draining valuable military resources and limiting our ability to deal with rogue states elsewhere in the world. Kosovo detracts from our ability to be a superpower. I support this resolution because Kosovo is no more in our national interest than was Rwanda, Algeria, Congo, East Timor, or a host of other places.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. JOHNSON), our distinguished colleague who spent almost 7 years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam.

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I opposed the President when he pushed NATO to attack the sovereign Nation of Yugoslavia, and I oppose the deployment of ground troops in that region. The atrocities that Slobodan Milosevic has committed are heinous, but the President's decision to use military force was hastily decided and has been poorly implemented.

This war brings back strong and painful memories of another war, Vietnam, in which I was called to fight in and where I spent nearly 7 years as a prisoner of war. We might have succeeded in Vietnam except that what we did there we are doing here, we are allowing the politicians instead of the seasoned military officers to fight the war.

The President has never established a defined military objective. No one can tell us why we are there, what are we fighting for, and what is our end objective. Simply put, there is no defined mission. We must end this devastation. It is up to this Congress to save lives, not take them.

Mr. Speaker, I opposed the President when he pushed NATO to attack the sovereign nation of Yugoslavia. I also oppose the deployment of any U.S. ground troops in this region.

The atrocities that Slobodan Milosevic has committed are heinous. But the President's decision to use military force was hastily decided and has been poorly implemented.

This war brings back strong and painful memories of another war—Vietnam, which I was called to fight in and where I spent nearly 7 years of my life as a prisoner of war. There was a reason for fighting in Vietnam. It was to prevent the spread of communism. We might have succeeded, except that we did there, what we are doing here. We are allowing politicians instead of seasoned military officers, to fight the war.

The President has never established a defined military objective in Kosovo. No one can tell us why we are there, what we are fighting for, and what our end objective is. Simply put, there is no defined mission. We must end this devastation and save lives, not take them.

When waging war, the President should ask several questions—are you willing to win at any cost? Is this in America's best interest? Is there a goal, and is there a plan to achieve that goal? To all of these questions, the answer is a resounding no.

And what about NATO? We have seen over and over again, the President and his aides scrambling to defend NATO and NATO's credibility. What about our fighting men and women, who will be the ones to give their lives? Are their lives worth the credibility of NATO?

When I was flying bombing missions over North Vietnam, the politicians were picking my targets. Twenty-five years later, here we go again, we're in the same situation.

When our allied commander must submit every target to 18 other countries for permission to bomb, the only result is chaos. And what will we say if American soldiers start coming home in flag-draped coffins?

I have listened to the reasons the President, his administration, and Members of both houses of Congress have given for supporting this war.

But I keep asking the same question. Is this war worth the death of one single U.S. soldier? The answer keeps coming up no.

Let me tell you something, as an Air Force veteran, I can tell you that air power alone cannot win a war. And history confirms it.

Our pilots face many difficulties in the former Yugoslavia—difficult terrain, constant

bad weather, and a quickly disappearing arsenal of our own weapons.

Furthermore, we are pulling ships and planes from other spots around the globe to fight this war. We are even stripping our aircraft for spare parts to keep our combat planes in the air.

And, today, the President called up 33,000 reservists to help meet our current shortfalls.

War is a serious undertaking. It should not be used for political reasons—ever. War is a last resort and should only be used to protect America, her citizens and our vital interests.

Despite the humanitarian atrocities in Kosovo, the loss of even one life for a cause that has yet to be articulated or defined for the people of the United States, is one too many.

Everyone of you must ask yourselves this question—would you send your own son or your own daughter to die to resolve a centuries old civil war between two peoples in a sovereign nation? Would you send them to die when you yourself could not answer the question "why"?

The plight of the refugees is tragic and America should help them. We are a country that can provide relief and direction, ease pain and suffering. We should provide help to end the refugee crisis.

I fought in a war where politicians were afraid to win because of the political fallout. That fear caused me to spend nearly 7 years of my life in a prisoner of war camp. I would fight again tomorrow for America's vital interests, but the answer in Kosovo is not to waste American lives.

The answer is—stop the bombing and provide relief to the refugees.

Please think about your vote today.

You know, there is a wall among the trees near the Lincoln Memorial that is engraved with the names of brave soldiers. Many, of whom, were my friends. Families go there to grieve and remember their fathers, their mothers, their sons and daughters, sisters and brothers.

Stop the bombing today. America does not need another wall.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield one-half minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH).

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support. We are all repelled by the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, at the crimes against humanity. That is why we should take this crisis to the U.N. Security Council, instead of taking international law into our own hands and bombing without a declaration of war.

We should take the opportunity to go to the Russians, our brothers and sisters struggling to hold onto a democracy, and ask them to help negotiate peace. This would be true internationalism in search of peace, and a fitting beginning to a new millennium.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), the ranking member.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I am frankly somewhat astounded by the debate today.

One, Members may differ with the President's goals. Do not continue to fabricate that there are no defined goals. The goals are simple: Stop Mr. Milosevic from murdering civilians. It is not much more complicated than that.

We have just passed a proposal to pull the President's ability to engage ground forces. Half of the members on this side of the aisle in the last several weeks criticized the President for not leaving ground forces on the table. Now they are trying to put that in statute. Then we come here.

This is not academic discussion. If we pass this proposal, Mr. Milosevic will see a bright green light to continue the work of his role models, Hitler and Stalin. We can dream about lots of other options. The option before us is whether NATO, all 19 countries, continue on this campaign, or we sit back and wring our hands about victims of crime.

Mr. Milosevic knows his role models in history, Hitler and Stalin, did it bigger and better, but Mr. Milosevic has the same goal. He is not going to stop in Kosovo.

I do not know if this military program works. I do not know what works. I know that while we risk our young every day, we have been incredibly blessed, lucky, and well-trained that we have no casualties.

Do not pass this proposal. Do not send a message to a murderer that America will sit by as children are being murdered and people are chased from their homes. This is no place for academic discussions. We are here on a matter of life and death. Join with me, reject this proposal.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BARR).

Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from California on his resolution, and I am proud to be a cosponsor.

Mr. Speaker, we can go back even further than the several hundred years that these ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia go for guidance here. We can go back 2,500 years to Sun Tzu, who said 2,500 years ago that victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.

George Bush in Desert Storm understood it: First you prepare for victory, you win first, and then you go to war. Winston Churchill understood that in World War II: You prepare first, you win first, and then you defeat your enemy.

The philosophy, though, of the Clinton administration, which we must assert our responsibility and rectify as leaders of this country, is that defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win; or perhaps, as the Secretary of State might put it in her eloquence, let us mix it up and then see what happens.

That is a recipe for disaster, it is irresponsible, and I urge the adoption of this important constitutional resolution.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of our time.

Mr. Speaker, the moment we never had in Vietnam we now have. This is a remarkable moment for the history of our country and for the history of our Congress. We have the chance to say no. We have the chance to stop it before we get in too deep. We have a chance to say that we can do more good for those refugees who are at risk by helping them where they are now than by commencing a ground war.

Mr. Speaker, think about this, pause, reflect, I say to my colleagues. We do not have to do this war. We do not have to commit the United States to this war. How many of us wished we had some opportunity through some courage on the part of our colleagues who preceded us when Vietnam was the war!

Instead, we went in step-by-step, gradually, and then a number of us asked, how did we get here? Did no one have the courage to stand up and say, this is not a war in which we should be involved; this is a civil war in which we will be drawn deeper and deeper until, in that case, 58,000 Americans were dead?

This is the moment. We did not have it before. Seize this moment now.

As to the concern which motivated our entry into this war, I recognize the importance and the depth of feeling of compassion for those who have suffered so much in Kosovo and in Serbia. If we are concerned, we should show that concern by helping them where they are, in those refugee camps.

The alternative is a ground war, it is not simply bombing. The bombing will soon lead to a ground war. In that ground war, as United States and NATO troops go in, the Serbian forces will be resisting. It is the Albanian Kosovars who will be used as human shields, and what few are left who are not, will be driven out of Kosovo into the refugee camps so many of their brothers and sisters already populate. The choice really is a ground war or stopping the involvement now.

The President of the United States this day sent us a letter. He assures us that, indeed, he would ask for congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a "non-permissive environment." That is not saying he will not introduce ground troops. He is saying he will not introduce them into a nonpermissive environment, without asking some members of Congress. He does not say he will ask for a vote.

By "permissive environment," he might mean if we have bombed enough so that he believes it is no longer a nonpermissive environment, he will then put ground troops in. Secretary

Albright and Secretary Cohen said on this same day, in their letter, that the President has authority to authorize the use of force in the national interest, without the approval of Congress.

So those are our choices: Shall we commence a ground war, at risk of the very people we are attempting to save, or shall we stop the war? This is our moment. Let us not let it pass.

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this concurrent resolution. This resolution would direct the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Adopting this resolution, Mr. Speaker, would certainly not be in America's best interest.

My opposition to this resolution is threefold. First, I understand that several of my colleagues oppose the use of United States Armed Forces in the Balkans. My colleagues refer to terms like mission creep and quagmire when discussing this region and our current involvement. I understand their reluctance for we all can remember Vietnam and the pain that our nation endured. In fact it was in part because of Korea and Vietnam that in 1973 Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution.

The War Powers Resolution is a remnant of the Vietnam War and of the cold war era. This resolution is not suited for the new-world situation in which U.S. involvement in hostilities may often be part of a multilateral effort. As examples of the post cold war era, we saw in the Persian Gulf War and now in Yugoslavia the need for greater flexibility. The time in which we now live the President must have the ability to make rapid decisions that may entail the use of force in new and varied ways.

Second, I object to this resolution because I am wary of beginning a constitutional struggle between the Office of the President and Congress when our troops are currently involved in an armed conflict. With military operations underway we cannot afford to send mixed signals about our commitment to the region. We cannot afford to risk that one American soldier, sailor, or airman would doubt that this nation fully supports their mission nor can we risk that Slobodan Milosevic or any future adversary doubts our resolve.

I am mindful that the Constitution, the life-line of our Republic, grants Congress the power to declare war and to make all laws necessary for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government. However, I am also mindful that the War Powers Resolution as well as H. Con. Res 82 take from the President authority that the President has exercised for nearly 200 years. This resolution would remove from the President's arsenal flexibility and decisiveness in times of crisis.

If this resolution were to pass today, it would certainly begin a constitutional struggle. The constitutionality of the War Powers Act has been debated since 1973. As a concurrent resolution does not require presentation to the President for his signature, then it is almost certain that this legislative veto will trigger a quagmire of its own. In *INS v. Chadha*,

the Supreme Court declared legislative vetoes to be unconstitutional.

American foreign policy cannot be micro-managed by this body nor dictated by the President, it instead requires a balance based on consultation and cooperation. If we are to establish NATO's goal for the Balkans, of a durable peace that prevents further repression and provides for democratic self-government for the Kosovar people, then this Body must work with the President.

Finally, I oppose this resolution because in my judgment America has an important interest in the stability of Europe. I would hope that if nothing else we would have learned that to ignore European instability is in fact a mistake. Within this century we have twice ignored instability in Europe, counting on their political savvy and experience to restore peace. And twice within this century we have sent young men and women to restore the peace that Europeans could not capture.

Kosovo shows us that the Europeans by themselves are incapable of restoring this peace. However, we are fortunate that NATO provides us with a vehicle to restore peace to the Balkans. After fifty years of investment in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization we are finally enjoying the rewards of our collective investment.

Our commitment to NATO and to Kosovo is the best means to achieve a lasting peace. I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill and let us proceed together with the President and our NATO allies with the business of providing stability and peace in Europe.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Speaker, I support the resolution by Representative CAMPBELL to remove our troops from action in the Balkans. I'm opposed to applying American military force on behalf of Kosovo because our goals are unclear and the risks are too great without any fundamental strategic American interest.

Introduction of ground forces onto what we still recognize as Yugoslavian soil is a muddled policy. Are we joining a Kosovar war of liberation, or are we demanding the Yugoslavian national government delegate an arbitrary level of power to the provincial Kosovo government?

It is difficult to imagine Kosovars and the Serbs reconciling and co-existing peacefully and on equal terms after such massive intervention by the United States. Alternatively if Kosovo or a part of Kosovo were indeed to gain independence, we don't have any assurance that they wouldn't try to join a Greater Albania.

I am wary of the side we picked in this Yugoslavian civil war. I do feel the United States should be a friend to freedom movements throughout the world. But our support for the Kosovars doesn't seem to be rooted in any affinity of theirs for freedom or for the United States. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has links to drug suspect groups, among them heroin smugglers and Middle East terrorists. Should we be strengthening a group that is supported by Osama bin Laden and other very dangerous people who hate America?

A strengthened radical Muslim presence in Europe would pose a serious threat to the interests of the United States and our allies. A predominately Muslim country is not always

hostile to American interests. Turkey is a long-time and solid ally of the United States. Several other predominately Muslim countries have also been friends of the United States. And that is precisely because they have rejected radical anti-Western elements. The KLA hasn't done that to my satisfaction.

For these reasons, I urge adoption of the Campbell resolution.

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, the Constitution is very clear. It is the United States Congress, which has the power to determine issues of war and peace and to decide whether our young men and women are asked to put their lives in harms way. It is the President who is the Commander and Chief of the military. It is the Congress who determines whether we use the military. I have heard today that some people think that the U.S. participation in Kosovo is unconstitutional. They are right—but the U.S. participation in Vietnam, Granada, Panama, and many other conflicts which took place without congressional authorization were also unconstitutional.

The time is now for this Congress, which represents the American people, to stop abrogating its Constitutional responsibility to the White House and start seriously addressing the issues of war and peace.

Frankly, I am extremely concerned about the process that has taken place today. On an issue of such enormous consequence, and at a time when Congress has a very inactive schedule, it is an outrage that we have only a few hours to discuss the issue of war, the expenditure of billions, and the potential loss of life of American military personnel—and I hope we rectify this situation in the coming days and weeks. This should not be the last debate on this issue.

Frankly, at a time when American pilots have been undertaking massive air attacks in Yugoslavia, when three members of the United States military are being held prisoner, and when we have spent billions of taxpayer dollars it is an outrage that the President of the United States has not come before the Congress to tell us and the nation what the goals of his policy are—and to ask this institution for support of those proposals.

It is an outrage that a terrible rule passed this afternoon on an almost totally partisan basis limiting the time of debate, limiting amendments and severely limiting the role that Congress should be playing in determining this country's course of action. We should not be acting in a partisan way on issues like this.

Mr. Speaker, my assessment of the situation at the present moment is that Mr. Milosevic is a war criminal, and that ethnic cleansing, mass murder, rape and the forced evacuation of hundreds of thousands of innocent people from their homes is unacceptable and cannot be ignored. Sadly, because Mr. Milosevic has negotiated agreements which he has then ignored, I have supported the NATO bombing of military targets—not civilian targets. I believe that the Serb military and police must be withdrawn from Kosovo, that the hundreds of thousands of people uprooted from their homes must be allowed to return, that Kosovo must be given some kind of self-rule, and that an international peace keeping force should be established to maintain order.

I believe that we must strive as hard as we possibly can to find an alternative between

doing nothing, and allowing ethnic cleansing and mass murder to continue, and the continuation of a war which will certainly result in terrible destruction, large numbers of casualties, and the expenditure of great sums of money.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the United States must be as active as we possibly can in finding a road to peace. I believe that Germany and the United Nations have brought forth proposals which might be able to form the basis of a negotiated peace. I believe that Russia, a long time ally of Serbia, should be asked to play a more active role in the process and to supply troops for an international peace keeping force.

And finally, I believe that Congress must not duck its constitutional responsibilities—about developing a short and long policy with regard to Kosovo. Let's not just blame the President. That's too easy. Let us have the courage to seriously confront this issue.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I am a hawk. I believe in a military so strong that we never have to use it. When we use our military might, it should be with clear objectives, after considering our national interests and the limits of our influence.

Mr. Speaker, imagine Serbia before we started bombing. The threat of ethnic cleansing clearly existed. About 2,000 innocent people had been killed and, more ominously, a 40,000-man force had been built up in Kosovo. Again, imagine the White House, seeing this threat, recalling the glory of the one-day wars in Granada and Panama, and without considering the ramifications, decides to wage war against Yugoslavia.

In the process, they demonize a man, Mr. Milosevic, who likely deserves the characterization, to give a face to the American people. But, Milosevic doesn't play by our rules. He doesn't turn on his anti-aircraft radar so we can detect and destroy it; He uses the bombing as cover to really carry out ethnic cleansing and suppress his domestic opposition.

The war drags on. The President and his advisors plead for patience all the while hoping that a cruel winter, without electricity and fuel-oil, will force guilty and innocent Serbians to their knees. And we continue to deplete what remains of our military capability.

We see the difficulty of integrating our moral sensibilities, the relations between nations, the use of military force and politics. The argument is made that our failure to support this sentimental adventure would undermine NATO and U.S. credibility. That is: Our enemies, petty dictators, and terrorists, will see our weakness and be tempted to exploit it. We have already made our weakness clear with indecisive leadership. Our enemies now see the limits of our strength which we have unwisely used. Their intelligence services have evaluated our actions. They will weigh their options. We must deter them from wrongful action by showing the strength our Constitutional system.

This body should constrain the fatuous thinking and unconsidered actions by the Executive Branch, requiring the President to unleash the dogs of war only in extremity and without artificial political constraints. When we make war it should be quick, efficient, brutal, and to be avoided at all costs by the

Milosevics of this world. This still leaves the President with wide latitude as he deals with new threats. In fact, eliminating this drain on our resources, will dramatically strengthen our ability to face our enemies.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LATOURETTE). All time has expired.

Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 151, the concurrent resolution is considered as read for amendment and the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the concurrent resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the yeas appeared to have it.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 139, nays 290, not voting 4, as follows:

[Roll No. 101]

YEAS—139

Archer	Goode	Packard
Bachus	Goodlatte	Paul
Baker	Gooding	Pease
Baldwin	Gutknecht	Peterson (MN)
Barr	Hall (TX)	Peterson (PA)
Bartlett	Hansen	Petri
Barton	Hastings (WA)	Pickering
Bass	Hayworth	Pitts
Biggert	Hefley	Pombo
Bilbray	Herger	Radanovich
Billirakis	Hill (MT)	Ramstad
Blunt	Hilleary	Rivers
Bonilla	Horn	Rogan
Brady (TX)	Hostettler	Rogers
Bryant	Hulshof	Rohrabacher
Burr	Istook	Ros-Lehtinen
Burton	Jenkins	Royce
Camp	Johnson, Sam	Salmon
Campbell	Jones (NC)	Sanford
Canady	Kingston	Scarborough
Cannon	Kucinich	Schaffer
Chabot	Kuykendall	Sensenbrenner
Chenoweth	LaHood	Serrano
Coble	Largent	Sessions
Coburn	Latham	Shadegg
Collins	Leach	Shimkus
Combest	Lee	Shuster
Cook	Lewis (KY)	Simpson
Cooksey	Linder	Skeen
Crane	Lucas (OK)	Smith (TX)
Cubin	Manzullo	Souder
Cunningham	McColum	Stark
Danner	McCrery	Stearns
Deal	McInnis	Stump
DeLay	McKeon	Sununu
DeMint	McKinney	Sweeney
Dickey	Metcalf	Tancredo
Doolittle	Mica	Terry
Duncan	Miller (FL)	Thomas
English	Mink	Thune
Everett	Moran (KS)	Upton
Ewing	Myrick	Wamp
Foley	Nethercutt	Weldon (FL)
Fowler	Ney	Wilson
Gallegly	Norwood	Young (AK)
Ganske	Nussle	
Gibbons	Ose	

NAYS—290

Abercrombie	Berkley	Brady (PA)
Ackerman	Berman	Brown (CA)
Allen	Berry	Brown (FL)
Andrews	Bishop	Brown (OH)
Armey	Blagojevich	Buyer
Baird	Bliley	Callahan
Baldacci	Blumenauer	Calvert
Ballenger	Boehler	Capps
Barcia	Boehner	Capuano
Barrett (NE)	Bonior	Cardin
Barrett (WI)	Bono	Carson
Bateman	Borski	Castle
Becerra	Boswell	Chambliss
Bentsen	Boucher	Clay
Bereuter	Boyd	Clayton

Jackson-Lee	Portman
(TX)	Price (NC)
Jefferson	Pryce (OH)
John	Quinn
Johnson (CT)	Rahall
Johnson, E. B.	Rangel
Jones (OH)	Regula
Kanjorski	Reyes
Kaptur	Reynolds
Kasich	Riley
Kelly	Rodriguez
Kennedy	Roemer
Kildee	Rothman
Kilpatrick	Roukema
Kind (WI)	Roybal-Allard
King (NY)	Rush
Kleczka	Ryan (WI)
Klink	Ryun (KS)
Knollenberg	Sabo
Kolbe	Sanchez
LaFalce	Sanders
Lampson	Sandlin
Lantos	Sawyer
Larson	Saxton
LaTourette	Schakowsky
Lazio	Scott
Levin	Shaw
Lewis (CA)	Shays
Lewis (GA)	Sherman
Lipinski	Sherwood
LoBiondo	Shows
Lofgren	Sisisky
Lowey	Skelton
Lucas (KY)	Smith (MI)
Luther	Smith (NJ)
Maloney (CT)	Smith (WA)
Maloney (NY)	Snyder
Markey	Spence
Martinez	Spratt
Mascara	Stabenow
Matsui	Stenholm
McCarthy (MO)	Strickland
McCarthy (NY)	Stupak
McDermott	Talent
McGovern	Tanner
McHugh	Tauscher
McIntosh	Taylor (MS)
McIntyre	Taylor (NC)
McNulty	Thompson (CA)
Meehan	Thompson (MS)
Meek (FL)	Thornberry
Meeke (NY)	Thurman
Menendez	Tiahrt
Millender	Tierney
McDonald	Toomey
Miller, Gary	Towns
Miller, George	Traficant
Minge	Turner
Moakley	Udall (CO)
Mollohan	Udall (NM)
Moore	Velázquez
Moran (VA)	Vento
Morella	Visclosky
Murtha	Walden
Nader	Walsh
Napolitano	Waters
Neal	Watkins
Northup	Watt (NC)
Oberstar	Watts (OK)
Obey	Waxman
Olver	Weiner
Ortiz	Weldon (PA)
Owens	Weller
Oxley	Wexler
Pallone	Weygand
Pascrell	Whitfield
Pastor	Wicker
Payne	Wise
Pelosi	Wolf
Phelps	Woolsey
Pickett	Wu
Pomeroy	Young (FL)
Porter	

NOT VOTING—4

Tauzin
Wynn

□ 1703

Messrs. KLINK, WALSH, CONDIT, and GARY MILLER of California changed their vote from "yea" to "nay."

So the concurrent resolution was not agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

DECLARING STATE OF WAR BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GOVERNMENT OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 151, I call up the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 44) declaring a state of war between the United States and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The text of H.J. Res. 44 is as follows:

H. J. RES. 44

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That pursuant to section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)), and article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution, a state of war is declared to exist between the United States and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LATOURETTE). Pursuant to section 4 of House Resolution 151, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.J. Res. 44.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, when our Committee on International Relations considered this measure yesterday, I was sorely tempted to vote for this resolution. This is not because I am eager for a fight and a war with Yugoslavia, because I am not. But I am eager for our Nation and the NATO alliance to avoid a humiliating defeat in the Balkans, which is where we could end up if we continue down the path of halfway measures.

After the successful conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, many of us were relieved that our Nation finally appeared to have learned from the bitter experiences in Vietnam how not to fight a war. But everything we have seen to date in Operation Allied Force suggests that the lessons of Desert Storm may have been forgotten and that we are at risk of repeating in the