

reflects a debt increase of more than \$5 trillion—\$5,112,987,850,171.61 (Five trillion, one hundred twelve billion, nine hundred eighty-seven million, eight hundred fifty thousand, one hundred seventy-one dollars and sixty-one cents) during the past 25 years.

GENERAL HAWLEY'S COMMENTS ON READINESS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, last week the Air Force General in charge of the Air Combat Command provided some valuable observations for the Senate to consider as we contemplate funding another protracted military operation.

General Richard Hawley observed that the current build up in Europe has weakened our ability to meet our other global commitments. General Hawley added that the air operation in Kosovo would require a reconstitution period of up to five months.

The General will be retiring in June, and has spoken out on how this war in Kosovo will weaken the readiness of the Air Force. I hope Senators will consider his concerns, and I ask unanimous consent that the General's remarks on military readiness reported in the April 30th Washington Post be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 30, 1999]
GENERAL SAYS U.S. READINESS IS AILING
(By Bradley Graham)

The general who oversees U.S. combat aircraft said yesterday the Air Force has been sorely strained by the Kosovo conflict and would be hard-pressed to handle a second war in the Middle East or Korea.

Gen. Richard Hawley, who heads the Air Combat Command, told reporters that five weeks of bombing Yugoslavia have left U.S. munition stocks critically short, not just of air-launched cruise missiles as previously reported, but also of another precision weapon, the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) dropped by B-2 bombers. So low is the inventory of the new satellite-guided weapons, Hawley said, that as the bombing campaign accelerates, the Air Force risks exhausting its prewar supply of more than 900 JDAMs before the next scheduled delivery in May.

"It's going to be really touch-and-go as to whether we'll go Winchester on JDAMs," the four-star general said, using a pilot's term for running out of bullets.

On a day the Pentagon announced deployment of an additional 10 giant B-52 bombers to NATO's air battle, Hawley said the continuing buildup of U.S. aircraft means more air crew shortages in the United States. And because the Air Force tends to send its most experienced crews, Hawley said, the experience level of units left behind also is falling. With NATO's latest request for another 300 U.S. aircraft—on top of 600 already committed—Hawley said the readiness rating of the remaining fleet will drop quickly and significantly.

His grim assessment underscored questions about the U.S. military's ability to manage a conflict such as the assault on Yugoslavia after reducing and reshaping forces since the

Cold War. U.S. military strategy no longer calls for battling another superpower, but it does require the Pentagon to be prepared to fight two major regional wars at about the same time.

As the number of U.S. planes involved in the conflict over Kosovo approaches the level of a major regional war, the operation is exposing weaknesses in the availability and structure of Air Force as well as Army units, engendering fresh doubts about the military's overall preparedness for the world it now confronts. If another military crisis were to erupt in the Middle East or Asia, Hawley said reinforcements are still available, but he added: "I'd be hard-pressed to give them everything that they would probably ask for. There would be some compromises made."

The Army's ability to respond nimbly to foreign hot spots also has been put in question by the month it has taken to deploy two dozen AH-64 Apache helicopters to Albania. While Army officials insist the helicopter taskforce moved faster than any other country could have managed, the experience appeared to highlight a gap between the Pentagon's talk about becoming a more expeditionary force and the reality of deploying soldiers.

Massing forces for a ground invasion of Yugoslavia, officials said, would require two or three months. Because U.S. military planners never figured on fighting a ground war in Europe following the Soviet Union's demise, little Army heavy equipment is prepositioned near the Balkans. Nor are there Army units that would seem especially designed for the job of getting to the Balkans quickly with enough firepower and armor to attack dug-in Yugoslav forces over mountainous terrain.

"What we need is something between our light and heavy forces, that can get somewhere fast but with more punch," a senior Army official said.

Yugoslav forces have shown themselves more of a match for U.S. and allied air power than NATO commanders had anticipated. The Serb-led Yugoslav army has adopted a duck-and-hide strategy, husbanding air defense radars and squirreling away tanks, confounding NATO's attempts to gain the freedom for low-level attacks to whittle down field units. Yugoslav units also have shown considerable resourcefulness, reconstituting damaged communication links and finding alternative routes around destroyed bridges, roads and rail links.

"They've employed a rope-a-dope strategy," said Barry Posen, a political science professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Conserve assets, hang back, take the punches and hope over time that NATO makes some kind of mistake that can be exploited."

Hawley disputed suggestions that the assault on Yugoslavia has represented an air power failure, saying the full potential of airstrikes has been constrained by political limits on targeting.

"In our Air Force doctrine, air power works best when it is used decisively," the general said. "Clearly, because of the constraints, we haven't been able to see that at this point."

NATO's decision not to employ ground forces, he added, also has served to undercut the air campaign. He noted that combat planes such as the A-10 Warthog tank killer often rely on forward ground controllers to call in strikes.

"When you don't have that synergy, things take longer and they're harder, and that's

what you're seeing in this conflict," the general said.

At the same time, Hawley, who is due to retire in June, insisted the course of the battle so far has not prompted any rethinking about U.S. military doctrine or tactics, nor has it caused any second thoughts about plans for the costly development of two new fighter jets, the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter. Despite the apparent success U.S. planes have demonstrated in overcoming Yugoslavia's air defense network, Hawley said the next generation of warplanes is necessary because future adversaries would be equipped with more advanced anti-aircraft missiles and combat aircraft than the Yugoslavs.

If the air operation has highlighted any weaknesses in U.S. combat strength, Hawley said, it has been in what he termed a desperate shortage of aircraft for intelligence-gathering, radar suppression and search-and-rescue missions. While additional planes and unmanned aircraft to meet this shortfall are on order or under development, Hawley said it will take "a long time" to field them.

In the meantime, he argued, the United States must start reducing overseas military commitments. He suggested some foreign operations have been allowed to go on too long, noting that the U.S. military presence in Korea has lasted more than 50 years, and U.S. warplanes have remained stationed in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, flying patrols over Iraq, for more than eight years.

"I would argue we cannot continue to accumulate contingencies," he said. "At some point you've got to figure out how to get out of something."

The Air Force blames a four-fold jump in overseas operations this decade, coming after years of budget cuts and troop reductions, for contributing to an erosion of military morale, equipment and training. The Air Force has tried various fixes in recent years to stanch an exodus of pilots and other airmen in some critical specialties.

It has boosted bonuses, cut back on time-consuming training exercises and tried to limit deployment periods. It also has requested and received hundreds of millions of dollars in extra funds for spare parts.

Additionally, it announced plans last August to reorganize more than 2,000 warplanes and support aircraft into 10 "expeditionary" groups that would rotate responsibility for deployments to such longstanding trouble zones as Iraq and Bosnia.

But Hawley's remarks suggested that the growing scale and uncertain duration of the air operation against Yugoslavia threaten to undo whatever progress the Air Force has made in shoring up readiness. Whenever the airstrikes end, he said, the Air Force will require "a reconstitution period" to put many of its units back in order.

"We are going to be in desperate need, in my command, of a significant retrenchment in commitments for a significant period of time," he said. "I think we have a real problem facing us three, four, five months down the road in the readiness of the stateside units."

ON NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, a month ago, April 7, as the war in Yugoslavia began to assume its present form, President Clinton spoke to the U.S. Institute for Peace. It was an important statement about the nature of conflict in the years to come. "Clearly," he stated, "our first challenge is

to build a more peaceful world, one that will apparently be dominated by ethnic and religious conflicts we once thought of primitive, but which Senator MOYNIHAN, for example, has referred to now as post-modern." I am scarcely alone in this; it has become, I believe, a widely held view. A recent article in *The Wall Street Journal* began by asking: "Does Kosovo represent the future or the past." The distinguished Dean of the John F. Kennedy School had an emphatic answer.

... Joseph Nye, a Clinton Pentagon alumnus, forecasts a brave new world dominated by ethnic conflicts. There are thousands of ethnic groups that could plausibly argue they deserve independence, he estimates, making it imperative for the U.S. to decide where it should intervene. "There's potential for enormous violence," he says.

In this spirit, just yesterday, *The Times* spoke of "The Logic of Kosovo."

With the cold war over, the country needs to devise a new calculus for determining when its security is threatened and the use of force is warranted. Kosovo is a test case. If the United States and its NATO allies are prepared to let a tyrant in the Balkans slaughter his countrymen and overrun his neighbors with hundreds of thousands of refugees, other combustible regions of Europe may face similar upheavals.

Almost a decade ago the eminent scientist E. O. Wilson offered a perspective from the field of sociobiology. Once "the overwhelmingly suppressive force of supranational ideology was lifted," ethnicity would strike. "It was the unintended experiment in the natural science mode: cancel one factor at a time, and see what happens." For "coiled and ready ethnicity is to be expected from a consideration of biological evolutionary theory."

Throw in television and the like, and surely we are in a new situation. Just as surely, it is time to think anew.

The first matter has to do with the number of such potential conflicts. Here it is perhaps the case that the United States bears a special responsibility. For it is we, in the person of President Woodrow Wilson, and the setting of the Versailles Peace Conference who brought to world politics the term "self-determination." It is not sufficiently known that Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, of Jefferson County, New York, had the greatest foreboding. Hence this entry in his diary written in Paris on December 30, 1918.

"SELF-DETERMINATION" AND THE DANGERS
DECEMBER 30, 1918

The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of "self-determination", the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress, and create trouble in many lands The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize

the danger until too late to check those who attempt to put the principle into force. What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause! Think of the feelings of the author when he counts the dead who dies because he coined a phrase! A man, who is a leader of public thought, should beware of intemperate or undigested declarations. He is responsible for the consequences.

There have to be limits, and it should be a task of American statecraft to seek to define them. It is not that 185 members of the United Nations are enough. There is room for more. But surely there needs to be a limit to the horrors we have witnessed in the Balkans in this decade, and in Kosovo this past month. From the Caucuses to the Punjab, from Palestine to the Pyrenees, violence beckons. It is not difficult to get started. At least one American diplomat holds a direct view of the origin of the present horror. I cannot speak for every detail of his account, but some are well known, and his view is not, to my knowledge, contested.

The current phase of the Kosovo crisis can be traced back to 1996, when financial collapse in Albania (small investors lost their meager life savings in a classic Ponzi scheme condoned by the then government) led to political and social chaos. President Berisha (a Geg from the misnamed Democratic Party) was forced out amidst massive rioting in which the army disappeared as its armories were emptied. Arms found their way into the armed gangs and eventually to an incipient Kosovo Albanian guerrilla movement that called itself the Kosovo Liberation Army. The new government of Socialist Fatos Nan (a Southerner, a Tosk, and a former Communist) was unable to establish effective control over the north and Berisha made a conspicuous point of not only supporting the KLA, but actually turning his personal property in the north over to the KLA as a training base. Supporting fellow Glegs apparently makes for good politics among the northerners.

The KLA's strategy was very simple: Target Serbian policemen and thus provoke the inevitable brutal Serb retaliation against Kosovo Albanian civilians, all in the hopes of bringing NATO into the conflict. They have succeeded brilliantly in this goal, but have not proved to be much a fighting force themselves.

These are not arguments new to the Senate. A year ago, April 30, 1998, my eminent colleague JOHN W. WARNER and I offered cautionary amendments concerning NATO expansion eastward. I went first with a proposal that new NATO members should first belong to the European Union. I received, as I recall, 17 votes. My colleague then proposed to postpone any further enlargement of NATO for a period of at least three years. That proposal, again if I recall, received 41 votes. We felt, on the whole, somewhat lonely. Now, however, we learn that Defense Secretary William Perry and his top arms-control aide, Ashton Carter, as related by Thomas L. Friedman in *The Times* of March 16, 1999.

Mr. Perry and Mr. Carter reveal that when they were running the Pentagon they argued

to Mr. Clinton that NATO expansion "should be deferred until later in the decade." Mr. Perry details how he insisted at a top-level meeting with the President, on December 21, 1994, that "early expansion was a mistake," because it would provoke "distrust" in Russia and undermine cooperation on arms control and other issues, and because "prematurely adding untried militaries" at a time when NATO itself was reassessing its role would not be helpful.

The Secretary of Defense lost the argument; in Friedman's view domestic politics overrode strategic concerns. But who won? The various pronouncements that issued from the recent NATO summit come close to a telephone directory of prospective new NATO members. Before we get carried away, might we ask just how many of them have the kind of internal ethnic tension so easily turned on? Which will be invaded by neighbors siding with the insurgents? Must NATO then go to war in the Caucuses?

The second matter of which I would speak is that of international law. The United States and its NATO allies have gone to war, put their men and women in harm's way for the clearest of humanitarian purposes. They have even so attacked a sovereign state in what would seem a clear avoidance of the terms of the U.N. Charter, specifically Article 2(4). The State Department has issued no statement as to the legality of our actions. An undated internal State Department document cites Security Council Resolution 1199 affirming that the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to the peace in the region, and demanding that the parties cease hostilities and maintain peace in Kosovo. The Department paper concludes: "FRY actions in Kosovo cannot be deemed an internal matter, as the Council has condemned Serbian action in Kosovo as a threat to regional peace and security."

A valid point. But of course the point is weakened, at very least, by the fact of our not having gone back to the Security Council to get authorization to act as we have done. We have not done this, of course, because the Russians and/or the Chinese would block any such resolution. Even so, it remains the case that the present state of international law is in significant ways a limitation on our freedom to pursue humanitarian purposes. Again, a matter that calls for attention, indeed, demands attention.

In sum, limits and law.

CLINTON HIGH SCHOOL'S ATTACHÉ SHOW CHOIR

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, today I want to honor the premiere high school show choir in the Nation—Mississippi's own Clinton High School's Attaché. Forty-two singers/dancers, sixteen instrumentalists, and seventeen crew members make up the outstanding group of young adults from a high