

the POWs out, perhaps two of the POWs, as well as to meet with Milosevic and to get him to accept the report that we were working on.

Mr. Speaker, at 1 o'clock on Saturday, this past Saturday, we reached agreement with the Russians; an historical agreement. The Russians agreed to a multinational peacekeeping force that had weapons. The Russians agreed to have Milosevic remove the Serbs from Kosovo. The Russians agreed that we use the term ethnic cleansing. And even though the Russians agreed, and we still did not have the support of Milosevic, they took the document we signed and faxed it to Milosevic at 1:30 on Saturday afternoon.

Milosevic responded if we were to go to Belgrade he would publicly embrace the framework of our agreement and would, in fact, support what we and the Russians came up with. We then called the State Department. I talked to the head of NIS Affairs, Russian Affairs, Steve Sestanovich, told him about the offer that was being made to us, he had Tom Pickering, the Under Secretary of State, call me back. I read our document to each of them.

Pickering told me that he did not think it was advisable that we go to Belgrade, even though I told him that Milosevic's representative and the Russians were telling us that if we went we would bring out all three of our POWs; and if we went, Milosevic would publicly embrace the document that we had agreed to.

Mr. Speaker, that was 2 p.m. on Saturday. When we told the Russians and Milosevic's rep that we could not go because our government did not trust Milosevic, and after one of our Democrat Members had talked to Podesta in the White House, I told the Russians and I told the representative of Milosevic that we would not travel to Belgrade. That was at 2 p.m., Mr. Speaker.

In fact, in that telephone conversation from Pickering, he said this to me: "Why do you think that Milosevic would be open and candid with you and live up to what he is telling you about giving you the three POWs and agreeing to the document that you have in fact signed with the Russians?" He said, "After all, there have been other attempts to free the hostages. In fact, the mission being held by Jesse Jackson right now has been a failure. Milosevic has decided he will not give the POWs to Jesse Jackson's mission."

That was at 2 p.m., Mr. Speaker. We told them we would not go. And 2½ hours later the Milosevic government announced on CNN that they would release the hostages to the Jackson delegation within a matter of 3 or 4 hours.

Mr. Speaker, those are the facts and the time lines. We have reached agreement with Russia, and that agreement with Russia is very close to what Milosevic will accept. Now we must

push this document, as we are doing. We sent copies to the Pope, the head of the Muslim faith, the head of the Orthodox religion, the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, the parliamentary leaders of every other country, as well as Ukraine and Russia, and tomorrow, Mr. Speaker, there will be an announcement.

The announcement that I predict will occur tomorrow, Mr. Speaker, is that Russia and NATO will announce that they have reached agreement on a multinational force; the beginning of the end of the conflict, partly because of the work of this Congress and people like my colleague and people on the other side like the gentleman who is going to speak next, who have been talking about the need to end this bombing, to end this hostility that is causing us problems with Russia and look for a way to solve this crisis peacefully.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the document signed by the members of the Russian Duma and by the Members of Congress who were in attendance at the meetings I referred to earlier.

REPORT OF THE MEETINGS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS AND RUSSIAN DUMA, VIENNA, AUSTRIA, 30 APRIL-1 MAY, 1999

All sessions centered on the Balkan crisis. Agreement was found on the following points:

I. The Balkan crisis, including ethnic cleansing and terrorism, is one of the most serious challenges to international security since World War II.

II. Both sides agree that this crisis creates serious threats to global and regional security and may undermine efforts against non-proliferation.

III. This crisis increases the threat of further human and ecological catastrophes, as evidenced by the growing refugee problem, and creates obstacles to further development of constructive Russian-American relations.

IV. The humanitarian crisis will not be solved by bombing. A diplomatic solution to the problem is preferable to the alternative of military escalation.

Taking the above into account, the sides consider it necessary to implement the following emergency measures as soon as possible, preferably within the next week. Implementation of these emergency measures will create the climate necessary to settle the political questions.

1. We call on the interested parties to find practical measures for a parallel solution to three tasks, without regard to sequence: the stopping of NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, withdrawal of Serbian armed forces from Kosovo, and the cessation of the military activities of the KLA. This should be accomplished through a series of confidence building measures, which should include but should not be limited to:

- a. The release of all prisoners of war.
- b. The voluntary repatriation of all refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations. NATO would be responsible for policing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's borders with Albania and Macedonia to ensure that weapons do not enter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the returning refugees or at a later time.

c. Agreement on the composition of the armed international forces which would administer Kosovo after the Serbian withdraw. The composition of the group should be decided by a consensus agreement of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in consultation with Macedonia, Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the recognized leadership of Kosovo.

d. The above group would be supplemented by the monitoring activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

e. The Russian Duma and U.S. Congress will use all possibilities at their disposal in order to successfully move ahead the process of resolving the situation in Yugoslavia on the basis of stopping the violence and atrocities.

2. We recognize the basic principles of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which include:

- a. wide autonomy for Kosovo
- b. a multi-ethnic population
- c. treatment of all Yugoslavia peoples in accordance with international norms

3. We support efforts to provide international assistance to rebuild destroyed homes of refugees and other humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, to victims in Kosovo.

4. We, as members of the Duma and Congress, commit to active participation as follows:

Issue a Joint U.S. Congress-Russian Duma report of our meetings in Vienna. Concrete suggestions for future action will be issued as soon as possible.

Delegations will agree on timelines for accomplishment of above tasks.

Delegations will brief their respective legislatures and governments on outcome of the Vienna meetings and agreed upon proposals.

Delegations will prepare a joint resolution, based on their report, to be considered simultaneously in the Congress and Duma.

Delegations agree to continue a working group dialogue between Congress and the Duma in agreed upon places.

Delegations agree that Duma deputies will visit refugee camps and Members of Congress will visit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

- Members of Congress:
- \_\_\_\_\_, Neil Abercombie, Jim Saxton, Bernie Sanders, Roscoe Bartlett, Corrine Brown, Jim Gibbons, Maurice Hinchey, Joseph R. Pitts, Don Sherwood, Dennis J. Kucinich.

- Duma Deputies:
- \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_.

□ 2300

KOSOVO

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. OSE). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON) for his hard work. It did not just start recently. He has been building bridges between the United States Congress and the Russian Duma for many years. And I think he speaks well of the need for us to break out of this stranglehold that our policy is in where it seems like not

only are we reluctant to compromise, we may even be reluctant to take "yes" for an answer.

I would like to focus my remarks on my recent trip, along with a delegation from this Congress, to the Balkans. Putting it into context, there were three different groups from this House that went to the Balkans over the weekend.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON) reported from his group. A second group, a group of only one Member of this House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. BLAGOJEVICH), our colleague from Chicago, went with Reverend Jesse Jackson with a delegation that included Rabbi Steven Jacobs of my district in the San Fernando Valley in California; and they, as everyone knows, secured the release of the three American soldiers.

The delegation that was the largest of the three visiting the Balkans has received the least coverage, perhaps because we were kind of the most establishment oriented trip. Our itinerary was put together with the full involvement of the administration and the Department of Defense. But given the importance of what is going on in Kosovo, I would like to take the next 40 minutes, perhaps even an hour, to report on my observations on that trip.

Our delegation was led by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARMEY) the majority leader and included, I believe, 17 or more Members of this House. I want to point out that this speech will not only be a description of what we saw in some of my observations but will also act as a convenient pretext for me to once again address this House about our policy in Kosovo and some of the steps I think that we ought to be taking in order to bring this conflict to a conclusion.

Mr. Speaker, our trip began here in Washington at 6 a.m. at the Rayburn House Office Building just across the street from this House. And we proceeded to Ramstein, Germany, the site of our large Air Force base there, in fact, the largest group of Americans living anywhere outside the United States.

There we were briefed by General John Jumper and his professional staff, and we were indeed impressed by every part of that plan and operation, from the intelligence to weather. And in fact, I came out of that briefing believing, as I did not believe when I went into it, that perhaps there is some chance that bombing alone will bring Milosevic to his knees.

But we should not kid ourselves. That is still only a chance. And furthermore, bringing Milosevic to his knees and bringing Serbia to its knees, and I will talk about this a little later, is itself not a total victory for what we set out to do. Because this is not a war to acquire territory or secure strategic position. This is a war that we engaged

in to achieve a humanitarian result. And clearly, looking at the carnage in the Balkans, it is hard to call this, even if it were to end tomorrow, a victorious humanitarian effort.

I should point out that certainly those of us at that meeting came away with the belief, I think most of us did at least, that the interference or delay involved in NATO being involved in selecting targets has been reduced substantially and that our military is now carrying out the air war in a manner very close to the manner that they would carry it out if there was no political involvement or diplomatic involvement in their decisions at all.

We then, after a night's sleep, proceeded that morning to Tirana, Albania. We landed at the international airport, the only significant airport in that country. But to give my colleagues an idea of how poor and undeveloped Albania was and is, Tirana International Airport prior to this war was dealing with an average of seven flights a week, one flight on the average day for the entire country of Albania.

The Albanians have basically turned their country over to NATO and the United States both for our humanitarian efforts to provide refugee camps and military efforts to provide bases for us to carry the war to Serbia.

I want to first focus on discussions regarding the camps. We need to build more. Over half the Kosovars are still inside Kosovo, and every day thousands stream over that border. Yet it will be months before that stream necessarily comes to an end, even if it continues at the rate of 4,000 or 5,000 or even 10,000 every day.

Now, we will be passing from this House a supplemental appropriations bill, a bill which I am told by my colleague and friend the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH) who heads the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, on which I serve, that that bill may very well not contain the funds we need to build two more camps in Albania.

Well, we will need to build far more than two camps. And when I say, "we," I mean not only the United States but NATO and the other countries of goodwill. Japan has chipped in I think a modest insufficient amount, but even that amount will be helpful in building more refugee camps. And when we look at this supplemental, we should look forward to a conference committee which will hopefully add whatever funds are necessary to make a full American effort toward building camps now.

Because we clearly misjudged this effort at the beginning and we did not expect a large number of refugees. We were behind the curve in preparing to absorb those refugees. There is no reason for us to be behind the curve still.

We should be building camps as quickly as possible. We should not be over optimistic and assume that we will bring Milosevic to our terms in a few days, for it is that kind of optimism that has led to some of the difficulties we face now.

□ 2310

I should point out that one of the biggest problems as far as accommodating new refugees is the fact that humanitarian organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, both the private charities, often called NGOs have a tradition in dealing with refugee camps, that they never pay money to rent the land on which those camps will be constructed. This tradition is founded on the belief that when you build a refugee camp that is supposed to be there for weeks, it may be there for decades. But Albania is a mountainous country, there is very little flat land. What land is there is being farmed. And it is absurd to think that we will slow down the process of providing even basic tent shelter for the refugees that are still streaming across the border because of some tradition of not going to this farmer or that farmer and renting their farm so that a camp can be constructed. I should also point out that it is somewhat deceptive how the initial refugees were dealt with and might lead us to the conclusion that we can go at a moderate rate at building refugee facilities.

You see, Mr. Speaker, many of the refugees that came at the beginning of this conflict had close relatives to northern Albania who opened their homes and many of the towns in Albania took every available public building and opened it up to refugees. Mosques, local gymnasiums are now full. So every new refugee needs a place to stay that has to be provided through humanitarian effort. And so we need to move forward and recognize that we are going to have to build these camps more quickly than we have in the past.

One issue that has come up that I had a chance to discuss with the prime minister of Albania, Mr. Majko, is the idea of resettling refugees in western Europe and in the United States. Our hearts go out to these refugees. It would take a hard-hearted Member of this House to criticize the administration in opening up our country to 20,000 Albanian refugees from Kosovo. However, I do think that I should point out to this House my discussions with the prime minister of Albania in which he made it clear that he was willing to make available his country to provide refugee camps for all of the refugees. There is no shortage of land or space or political willingness to accommodate these refugees subject to the need to rent farmland to build the camps. Moreover, he actually opposed the resettling of these refugees in western

Europe and the United States, pointing out that as long as the Kosovars live close to Kosovo, the pressure will continue and the likelihood will continue that they will return to Kosovo. In contrast, we only have to look at Bosnia, where after years of terrible struggle, peace has been restored and the Bosnian Muslims can now live in security. But 70 percent of those Bosnian Muslims who left Bosnia have not returned, even though security has been provided, even though it is possible to live and to make a living, they have not returned and show no likelihood of returning. And so any Albanian nationalist, and the prime minister of Albania certainly fits in this category, would want to keep the Albanian Kosovars in the Balkans, a few miles or at least 50 or 100 miles from Kosovo rather than see these people relocated to far distant areas. Keep in mind that Milosevic's objective is to cleanse the Balkans of Albania or at least of the Kosovars and perhaps we make that easier if we absorb refugees or urge our western European allies to do likewise.

As far as the logistics, I think that if we put the same effort into building camps that we are going to have to put into absorbing refugees from other countries, that we could build the camps necessary. But whether we absorb another 20,000 refugees to the United States or not is a drop from one bucket into another bucket. For 20,000 Kosovars is but 1 percent of those who may become refugees if this matter continues as it has. And 20,000 refugees to the United States is but a small portion, perhaps only 20 percent of the refugees that we will absorb every year, not to mention that it is an infinitesimal fraction of our great country's population. So whether 20,000 Kosovars come here or not is but 1 percent of the Kosovars, and we have to focus on the other 99 percent.

While I am mentioning my discussions with the Albanian prime minister, I should mention one very interesting idea, and this is one idea to solve two problems. The first problem is that as winter arrives, it is possible that the Kosovars will still be refugees. If this is the case, we need more than simple tents to provide shelter. In addition, we would hope that perhaps before this winter, the Kosovars returned to Kosovo, where they will find decimated and burned-out villages and perhaps no place to stay. What the ambassador of Albania suggested, and this is a matter that I look forward to discussing with the Manufactured Housing Institute and other experts, is that we acquire portable housing, something more solid than a tent, that we erect it in Albania for the refugees, and that it be designed so that when peace comes to Kosovo or even part of Kosovo, that we can tear this housing down and reassemble it so the Kosovars will have a place to live even if their

particular village has been burned to the ground during this ethnic cleansing.

After our meeting with the Albanian prime minister, we went to visit the American Apache helicopters and more importantly the men and women of the United States who are there to man those helicopters. I was very much impressed with the quality of our military forces. The generals, the officers and even the enlisted men are well aware of their mission and of the complexities. Walking the streets of America, you hear people say, "Well, let's just get it over with right away." Or, "Let's pull out right away." Or, "What are we doing somewhere unless we can get our way all the way?"

These military men and women that I talk to understand the complexity of the world and understand the complexity of their mission. They recognize that whether it is the Balkans or perhaps some other crisis at some other time, they may be called upon to provide modulated levels of force, peacekeeping, warmaking, retaliatory strikes or humanitarian efforts as necessary to achieve our diplomatic and humanitarian purposes. And they do not insist that the world be made simple, for they recognize how complex it is.

We were briefed by Lieutenant General Hendrix and we learned some very interesting facts. The first is about the mountains that separate northern Albania from Kosovo. The general assured us that the Apache helicopters under his command could go over those mountains, many of them over 9,000 feet high, and into Kosovo, and that he thought it was important that they be trained, that they go through some ground exercises before they were deployed. We questioned the general because there was some concern that in order to get these Apache helicopters into Kosovo, that they would need to fly through the two or three passes that are in these mountains that separate Albania from Kosovo.

□ 2320

Mr. Speaker, I think we all recognized that any force going through the passes is going to have a tough time since that is the easiest place for the Serbs to set up defense. He assured us that those Apache helicopters could indeed either go through the passes, if that was visible, or instead go over the mountains.

But keep in mind that just 2 days after we left, after we had a chance to talk to the brave men and women who pilot those helicopters and who serve the United States by operating those helicopters, that one of those helicopters crashed and two of them lost their lives, and when I began, right as of the time I began trying to put together my thoughts for this speech, the names of those two first casualties had

not yet been released, and so I do not know whether it was one of the young men that I spoke to who lost their lives and taught us what the ultimate, showed us what the ultimate sacrifice was and also showed us that this is not a casualty-free war.

Now it is true that this helicopter was not lost in combat, but it was lost in a training mission done on an accelerated basis under hazardous conditions, hazardous conditions that were necessary in order to prepare for imminent combat. These two soldiers are the first casualties of this war.

As I mentioned, there are mountains that we had a chance to see, albeit from a distance, on the Albania-Kosovo border. Now that is particularly important when we think of the possibility of deploying ground forces.

It is true that the KLA lightly-armed guerrilla fighters are slipping over that border now and carrying on operations, but we did not win Desert Storm by sending a few lightly-armed guerrilla fighters up against Saddam Hussein's Army. Even after that Army was subject to a level of bombardment that may be impossible in the terrain of the Balkans we sent in a very heavily armed armored force.

And those who talk about starting a ground war must explain to this Congress how that ground operation will operate.

Will it be airborne?

And what are the casualties of parachuting into hostile territory?

Will it be some lightly-armed force, and what are the casualties of sending a lightly-armed force against a heavily-armed adversary?

Will we be trying to put heavy armor through mountain passes, and if so, how easy will it be for the Serbs to set up defenses to that armor?

Or finally, is it possible that we will convince some country other than Albania to be the jumping-off point for any ground action?

As to that last point, as I said, Albania has turned its territory over to NATO, both for military and humanitarian operations, but I do not expect any other country that borders Yugoslavia to do the same thing. For no other country has all without complaint even accepted refugees. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has accepted refugees but has made it very clear that after accepting almost 200,000 they are not necessarily willing to accept more, and I think those who observe diplomatic affairs in the Balkans would have great doubts that American soldiers or NATO soldiers based in that republic or based in Hungary or Romania would ever be allowed to assemble and attack Serbia from those countries.

Mr. Speaker, I should point out that I put this speech together because I thought it was important to report on our trip, how that report would still be

current and worthy of the attention of our colleagues. I have not had the time I would have liked to make this speech as concise as possible.

But continuing with the description of our trip, we then, after visiting with General Hendrix and his men and women, we then went on to be briefed by Colonel Bray of Task Force Hope. Both of these generals and their forces are deployed there at Tirana International Airport where the first thing they have to do is provide security around the perimeter lest some sapper or commando or terrorist force seek to destroy them on the ground.

In any case Task Force Hope is America at its best using our helicopter and other logistical efforts to take humanitarian supplies from Tirana in central Albania to northern Albania where most of the refugees unfortunately still are, the part of Albania that borders Kosovo, and so the part that initially receives the refugees.

What was driven home to us by this Operation Task Force Hope, Mr. Speaker, is that this is a humanitarian effort. If you are waging a war against a country because of some strategic reason that if you beat the country and achieve your strategic objective you could call it a complete victory. If you are waging war for money and gold, then if you capture the money and gold you can call it a victory.

This war is not part of the Cold War or not fighting for some strategic advantage over a larger adversary. This war is not a war of imperialism. This war is a humanitarian effort, and that is why it is so important to end it as soon as possible.

An even total victory 3 months from now is less important than a reasonable outcome reached today because every day Kosovars are killed, every day they die of exposure before they are able to reach refuge on the other side of the border, and while the Serbs are our adversaries in this conflict, humanitarianism is not served by their destruction.

We are unfortunately treated to the videos of the collateral damage, and I will discuss later whether we can believe all those videos, but clearly there are civilian Serbs being killed every day by our bombing, and if not every day, then every second or every third day.

And over \$100 billion is the estimate of the damage that we have done to Serbia, and clearly that country's ability to provide for its people and to cure its sick will be diminished and lives will be lost as a result of the huge scale of the economic destruction.

Mr. Speaker, that was our visit to Albania. We then boarded military transport for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with its capital at Skopje. When we landed at Skopje Airport, it became apparent immediately

that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or FYRO Macedonia, was a much more developed country than Albania with, for example, a much larger airport.

□ 2330

We visit almost immediately from that airport, we went by bus just a few miles and after that trip we were a few miles away from the Kosovo border, which gives you an idea how close that airport and the capital of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is to the Serbian border, just a few miles away.

When the buses stopped, they took us to the Stenkovec refugee camp, Stenkovec 1, and that is a camp that is visited by many of those dignitaries or visitors who visit refugee camps. In fact, just 2 days after we left, Tony Blair was at the same camp.

What we saw at that refugee camp was, if anything, heartening. We went there expecting to see the worst. We saw, I think, the best we could have expected. The people there were well fed and there was a huge store of food visible for future consumption. There were smiles on the faces of almost everyone I talked to. Think of that. These people have lost everything and they smile and they joke, and there was even a little entertainment off to the side of the camp, not for our benefit but for theirs, where they sung, singing and smiling.

I have friends, I myself feel this way, the market goes down by 50 points and we are in a bad mood. These people have lost everything and they smile.

Perhaps the best symbolic moment was I visited one tent. They invited me in for some refreshment. This is a refugee camp where people have genuinely found refuge, but it is getting warm. They live in tents. They have been there for a month. There are more on the way. We have to recognize that while there may be smiles today, there could be the natural trouble of too many people and too little space with too little sanitation and too much heat in the coming weeks and months.

That is why, as I will say it again, we must go forward and build more camps as quickly as possible to prevent the current camps from becoming overcrowded.

Many of the families I visited, they had over 6, 7, sometimes 10 people in a single tent, 12 feet by 12 feet. The fact that this camp remains calm and the people smile is a testament to the goodwill of the Kosovars and to a level of resilience that is remarkable.

I could go on about the camp, but there is one other thing I want to mention and that is I went there looking for verification of the stories of atrocities. I spent two hours at that camp. My colleagues, about 18 of them, spread out throughout the camp. Each was assigned our own translator, and I would say one out of 20 or 1 out of 40 or 50 of

the residents of the camp spoke English at a sufficient level to communicate.

So I went around the camp asking whether they could put me in touch or introduce me to a refugee who had personally seen rape or murder. We were not able to find, at least I was unable to find, a refugee with such a story, either one who spoke English or one who could speak to me through the translator.

The story we heard instead, again and again and again, was that Serb paramilitary told people in this or that town or this or that neighborhood to get out and get out quickly, often on as little as 20 minutes notice, and the people decided to leave. Clearly, the stories of rape and murder from other towns and villages inspired such immediate compliance with such an outrageous order.

I should point out that the refugees we met came chiefly from eastern Kosovo, and it is quite possible that in the more rural parts of western Kosovo, where naturally rural people are even more tied to the land, more reluctant to accept an order to evacuate not just their homes but the farms, the soil that they have lived on for generations and centuries, perhaps in those areas there are greater levels of atrocity.

We then left Skopje for Aviano Air Force base in Italy, the most active base for our planes and other NATO planes to conduct this air campaign. There, we talked to more than one staff or general officer about the stories of collateral damage for just, I believe it was, 2 days ago a bus had allegedly been hit by U.S. bombs and scores of people, or a score of people, were killed allegedly.

I use the word allegedly. We never hear the word allegedly on CNN or on any of the news networks, because what the Serbs do is they take western reporters out to a site, there is a crater, there is a destroyed vehicle, there are dead individuals in civilian clothing. It is reported as uncontroverted fact that that crater was created by a NATO bomb, that that vehicle was destroyed by that particular bomb and that those bodies are people who were in the vehicle at the time when it was hit by such a bomb, none of which is verified by forensic experts. I will say that our people in the military are justifiably skeptical of the Serb propaganda effort.

While we are talking about a propaganda effort, I should say that we have been remiss in our own propaganda effort, and here I am simply echoing the views of my colleague and friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) who came with us on this trip. For years, the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) has been trying to get Radio Free Europe and similar outlets controlled by the U.S. Government to broadcast in Serb into Serbia.

Finally, finally, they have started broadcasting on radio only, but keep in mind over half the Serbs have television satellite dishes. We could, should, have not, and must listen to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) when he says that we need to be broadcasting our message on television, because this war is a war fought in the air but not just by military airplanes but also by television broadcast. This war may be decided by propaganda as much as it is decided by bombs.

Then having been in four countries already that day, we flew at the end of Saturday to Brussels, Belgium, where we stayed overnight. We then proceeded to NATO headquarters, where we heard from General Clark, who is NATO's chief commander, and Secretary General Javier Solano, who is the chief officer, in a way the President, of NATO.

□ 2340

There, every effort was made to convince us of three things:

First, that we are winning, and I remain unconvinced. The most I am convinced of is that there is a possibility that after more bombing we will eventually achieve our stated goals, though this is hardly a humanitarian victory, and that there is even a greater likelihood that we cannot achieve NATO's stated goals through bombing alone.

Second, each of the speakers tried to convince us that the European allies of NATO were doing their fair share. This is hardly the case. Eighty-five percent of the airplane flights, the sorties being put forward in this air war, are American.

If we stretch the numbers as hard as we can, and being a CPA I have seen them stretched, but I am almost willing to give an honorary CPA certificate to those in NATO who have worked these numbers over very hard, we can argue that 50 percent of the total effort, refugee, military plane strikes and support military effort, that somehow maybe 50 percent is being borne by the Europeans. Even that is an outrageously small percentage.

General Clark argued to us that, well, 50 percent of NATO's GDP is found in the United States, and 50 percent of the wealth of NATO is found in the other countries, the European countries of NATO. So if America is half of the economic strength of NATO, why should America do anything less than 50 percent of the total refugee and military effort?

By this logic, America, with an equal GDP to Europe, or at least the European members of NATO, should do half of all of what needs to be done in Europe; ninety-nine percent of everything that needs to be done in the Americas, like taking out General Noriega out of Panama. We should do the overwhelming work of what is necessary in

Asia, the vast majority of the work necessary in Africa, and bear virtually all the burden in the Middle East.

For us to do half of what needs to be done in Europe is absurd unless the Europeans are willing to do half of what needs to be done outside of Europe. But the ability of Europe to do its fair share is limited, limited by small defense budgets, in which America has acquiesced, or rather, our State Department has acquiesced; furthermore limited by how those budgets are spent.

In order to ensure that they have a large trade surplus with the United States, not as large as Japan and China, but a large one, nevertheless, European countries insist on not buying American military planes, not buying American electronic military technology, but building it in Europe, no matter how poorly it performs, no matter how little they will be able to do to defend our values, our shared values in Europe.

So a desire to spend less and to spend it less efficiently has hobbled Europe's ability to participate in this war, a war that we are carrying on to end ethnic cleansing in Europe.

Finally, at NATO they insisted upon reviewing again and again the five NATO points of negotiation. Basically, those points require the Serbs to completely surrender all of Kosovo to NATO. I think this is not exactly a compromise position.

But I will point out that the prime minister of Great Britain, Tony Blair, has made comments that can be interpreted as setting forth an even more extreme objective, as he has called, somewhat obliquely, for the arrest and trial of Milosevic. Now, if that could be done with the wave of a wand, I would wave that wand immediately. No one, very few people on this planet, deserve a trial for war crimes more than Mr. Milosevic.

The rhetoric gets so extreme that people say, how can we live in a world where murderers rule countries? It is time for America to get realistic in its rhetoric. Half the world is run by murderers. Let us recount just a few.

The government of Sudan, which has killed 1.9 million of its own people, and has probably killed more people in a genocidal war against its own citizens in southern Sudan than all of the Kosovars total, 1.9 million; not to mention the well-known genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda; the recent killings on Borneo.

But perhaps the best example of the fact that murderers run countries is the fact that we welcomed with open arms, not just as a negotiating partner but I think the administration called him a strategic partner, the prime minister of the People's Republic of China, pretending that that government does not include some old men still in power who played a role in the cultural revo-

lution that killed millions; who were there to order the deaths and executions at Tiananmen Square; who were ordering the continued oppression and were there to order the death of millions of people in Tibet.

The fact of the matter is that we are not powerful enough, and I do not have a magic wand, we are not powerful enough to arrest and try all of the murderers that run countries, so it is interesting to talk about some rambostyle effort to arrest Milosevic.

But in reality, arresting him would require deploying NATO troops and fighting all the way to Belgrade, and then fighting to whatever mountain hideout Milosevic sought shelter in. We are talking at that point of thousands and thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of dead and wounded American and NATO troops.

Those who talk glibly of arresting Milosevic should reflect on what is involved in that level of defeat, a level of defeat that we did not inflict upon Saddam Hussein.

We, instead of trying to increase our objectives in this war, should seek the minimum objectives consistent with the real reason we are there: to stop the killing of the Kosovars, and to make sure that Kosovars have a place in Kosovo to live in security where they can build lives. We should demand no more and we should demand no less.

This does not mean that Serbia has to surrender all of Kosovo to NATO. It does not mean that Milosevic must be turned over for trial, because, as wondrous as those results would be, the additional deaths not only of NATO troops, but every day this war goes on more people are killed, not in the refugee camps, where they are well taken care of, but in Kosovo itself.

We have to stop the killing and reach a peace agreement, consistent with the real objectives of this campaign, as quickly as possible.

In fact, the two sides' stated positions are not that far apart. We heard just before I began this long speech, and I apologize for its length, from our colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. CURT WELDON), who described a possible settlement to which Russian Duma members agreed and which we have reason to believe Milosevic will agree.

That agreement calls for a multilateral force that will be there to protect the Kosovars. We should explore that opening instead of saying no, no matter what Milosevic proposes; that he has to accept our five points unilaterally, unconditionally, or we keep the bombing continuing.

□ 2350

We ought to explore the possibility that there would be two separate peacekeeping forces. And I say that because the biggest sticking point between the parties is about who is going

to be in the peacekeeping force. The Serbs propose that it be under a U.N. flag. America has indicated maybe the U.N. flag is acceptable.

Both sides have agreed that the killing should stop. Both sides have even said the Kosovars should go home. The disagreement is over the makeup of the force. The Serbs want to see a lightly armed force of Russians, Greeks and others who have not waged war against them recently, and America and NATO insist on a NATO-led force that is heavily armed.

One possibility is to have two peacekeeping forces patrolling two different separate peacekeeping regions within Kosovo. One region could be patrolled by Russians, Greeks, and others acceptable to the Serbs. And it could be said that the Kosovars would be reluctant to return to that region, and I will get to that in a bit, but that first region could include the areas of Kosovo which are most sacred to the Serbs and are the reason or the stated reason they are fighting so hard to retain that territory.

That area, which I would think would be maybe 20 percent of Kosovo, could include the famous monasteries, or at least the most important famous monasteries. The City of Pec, where the Serbian Orthodox church began, could be included. We could negotiate, others could decide, whether the mines in northern Kosovo would be included, and of course the battlefield at Kosovo Polje, the famous battlefield where the Serbs were defeated by the Turks in the 14th Century, could all be included in an area where Serbs would feel they had not given up their rights, where the territory would be patrolled only by friends, or at least countries with whom they continue to have cordial relations.

The other 80 percent of Kosovo should be patrolled by heavily armed, NATO-led, perhaps U.N.-flag-flying troops where Kosovars could feel very safe. This would allow them to return to Kosovo and, with some American and European economic aid, to rebuild their lives.

If we insist on totally crushing all Serb claims to Kosovo, we insist that this war will go on until they are forced to give up. And I am not sure that is even 2 or 3 months away, and I am not sure that that does not involve ground troops over those Almadian mountains, and I am not sure that it can be done at a level of casualties that are acceptable to the NATO countries involved.

Because keep in mind, if a multilateral NATO military ground force is deployed, perhaps a British unit suffers casualties or a German unit or an Italian unit or an American unit, and the country that sent those particular soldiers demands an end to hostilities, then we will have the domino effect as each NATO nation says, well, if one

NATO nation is pulling out, the others must. So it is important that we try to set our objectives consistent with the real humanitarian reason for our being involved in the Balkans.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I would like to address an issue that has been addressed on this floor several times, and that is the role that Congress should play in making our foreign policy.

Now, Mr. Speaker, our constitution clearly provides that it is Congress that can declare war. And I believe that once and if we declare war, at that point all Americans should support that war, and Congress at that point has signed the blank check and should butt out and let the Commander in Chief proceed. But unless that happens, we have a decision-making process. If we are not at war, if we have not declared war, if it is not an all-out war, then there is a decision-making process as to what level of hostilities should exist and what we should demand for peace.

Mr. Speaker, I am told that dictatorship is efficient; that dictatorship is silent and secret and does not show its enemies what it is thinking. But, Mr. Speaker, that is not our government. Even decisions within the administration are subject to public input, public discussion and a press leak every day. But our Constitution does not vest all power in the administration. And contrary to popular belief, virtually every U.S. Supreme Court decision says that it is Congress, not the President, that has the primary role of determining what our foreign policy is, though not, of course, of determining how our troops should be deployed.

So, Mr. Speaker, I know that there are those who have come to this floor and said that our enemies would tremble in fear if they thought that one man could deploy 100,000 American soldiers without the consent of this Congress. But, Mr. Speaker, I would tremble in fear, the founders of this Republic would tremble in fear, if they thought that one man could send 100,000 or more men and women into battle without the approval of the United States Congress.

I call upon the President to modify his equivocal letter. There was a letter addressed to the Congress just a couple weeks ago saying, in essence, that ground troops would not be deployed without congressional approval. But those of us who looked very carefully at that letter realized that it did not say what it seemed to say at first reading, and that in fact the President had not promised what he should promise, and that is that before deploying American troops in a battle that may cost hundreds or thousands of lives, that he should come to this Congress and ask for approval.

Mr. Speaker, believe it or not, I have even other observations from my trip. This issue deserves a full debate. There

is, believe it or not, even more to be said, but I notice that it is nearly midnight, it is time for this House to adjourn, and so I will yield back.

#### LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Ms. CARSON (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today before 12:30 p.m. on account of official business.

Mr. LUTHER (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today after 4:00 p.m. on account of family matters.

Mr. BECERRA (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today on account of official business.

Mr. SIMPSON (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for May 4 and 5 on account of a death in the family.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for today on account of family medical reasons.

#### SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. PALLONE) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. LIPINSKI, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. PALLONE, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. BLUMENAUER, for 5 minutes, today.

Mrs. CAPPS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. BERRY, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. SANCHEZ, for 5 minutes, today.

Mrs. MINK of Hawaii, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. PAUL) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. BURTON of Indiana, for 5 minutes, on May 12.

Mr. PAUL, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ENGLISH, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. WHITFIELD, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. HULSHOF, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GOSS, for 5 minutes, on May 6.

Mr. TALENT, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. TANCREDO, for 5 minutes, today.

#### SENATE ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to enrolled bills of the Senate of the following titles:

S. 453. An act to designate the Federal building located at 79 West 9th Street in Juneau, Alaska, as the "Hurff A. Saunders Federal Building."

S. 460. An act to designate the United States courthouse located at 401 South Michigan Street in South Bend, Indiana, as the "Robert K. Rodibaugh United States Bankruptcy Courthouse."

#### ADJOURNMENT

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.