

This award was established to honor extraordinary individuals for their successful professional and philanthropic achievements. It recognizes people who have truly made a difference in the lives of Arizonans through their strength, courage, creativity, individuality and motivation, whether professionally or in their personal pursuits.

I can attest that Danny is one of the most revered individuals in Phoenix when it comes to community. He has been a dauntless voice, particularly for the Latino community, when no other voice was there to champion their causes. Whether he is fighting for the rights of migrant farm workers, advising elected officials on community issues, or advocating for his clients, he has guided decision-making with wisdom and moral purpose.

An attorney by profession, Danny has served on the board of directors of numerous national organizations. He sits on the boards of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, National Council of La Raza, and the Los Abogados Hispanic Bar Association. He also serves on the disciplinary Commission of the Arizona Supreme Court, and is a member of the Stewardship Board for the Roman Catholic Church of Phoenix. He is a member of the Arizona State Bar, American Trial Lawyers Association as well as the American and Maricopa County Bar Associations.

Previously, he was a member of the Board of Directors of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Arizona Trial Lawyers Association, Valley of the Sun United Way, Arizona State Alumni Association and Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. He also served on the Arizona Industrial Commission, the Phoenix Aviation Advisory Board, the Maricopa County Commission on Trial Court Appointments and Arizona State Bar Peer Review Committee.

Danny is a 1974 graduate of Arizona State University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science. He received his Juris Doctor degree in 1977 from ASU's College of Law. Before going into private practice, he was an attorney with Community Legal Services in Phoenix. Currently, as a partner with the law offices of Ortega & Associates, P.C., he provides legal services in the area of civil litigation, personal injury law, employment law, and government and non-profit agency representation. Mr. Ortega primarily concentrates in the litigation of personal injury and employment matters.

Danny is the oldest of eight children born to Elvira and Daniel Ortega Sr., both of whom ingrained a deep sense of family and community into their children. He has served as a volunteer in many campaign positions including field operations, fund-raising, finance and campaign chair.

Mr. Speaker, as you can surmise, Danny Ortega is an exemplary leader and a profoundly committed individual who is a true role model for the nation. He has effected change that has improved the lives of and broken down barriers for many Arizonans. Therefore, I am pleased to pay tribute to my friend Danny Ortega, and I know my colleagues will join me in thanking him and wishing him great success.

IN RECOGNITION OF VIRGINIA K. GRIFFIN

**HON. ROB PORTMAN**

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 6, 1999

Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to thank and recognize my friend, Virginia Griffin, for her 32 years of gracious public service to the city of Cincinnati, especially to the children of Cincinnati. After 32 years as an elected member of the Cincinnati school board, Mrs. Griffin had decided to retire so she can devote more time to her family. Although her decision to step down is understandable, her departure will create a void that will be very difficult to fill.

A product of the Cincinnati public schools herself, Mrs. Griffin was first elected to the school board in 1967. She led the district through many tumultuous issues, including a contentious desegregation lawsuit shortly after her election, countless curriculum changes, and numerous levy campaigns.

In the early 1980's, she played a key role in the development of the magnet school program to promote both racial balance and innovative, high-quality educational programming. She also is rightfully proud of the district's first alternative school—the German language academy. She has been a staunch protector of the district's magnificent art collection. She led the changes to keep this historic and unique resource intact. In fact, one of her last acts as a member of the school board was to make the Cincinnati Art Club in Mount Adams the caretaker of the collection.

Her expertise in legislative and financial matters over the years made Mrs. Griffin an invaluable member of the Board, and it is in these areas that her departure will be most felt.

Mr. Speaker, Virginia Griffin represents the best of public service. She served the city, especially its schoolchildren, with dignity during her 32 years of service. She deserves our thanks for a lifetime of work well done.

CRISIS IN KOSOVO—REMARKS BY ADM. EUGENE CARROLL

**HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH**

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 6, 1999

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, on April 21, 1999, I convened the first in a series of Congressional Teach-In sessions on the Crisis in Kosovo. If a peaceful resolution to this conflict is to be found in the coming weeks, it is essential that we cultivate a consciousness of peace and actively search for creative solutions. We must construct a foundation for peace through negotiation and mediation, and through honest diplomacy.

Part of the dynamic of peace is a willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue, to listen to one another openly and to share our views in a constructive manner. I hope that these Teach-In sessions will contribute to this process by providing a forum for Members of

Congress and the public to explore alternatives to the bombing and options for a peaceful resolution. We will hear from a variety of speakers on different sides of the Kosovo situation. I will be introducing into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD transcripts of their remarks and essays that shed light on the many dimensions of the crisis.

First is a presentation by Admiral Eugene Carroll, USN (Ret) who now serves as the Deputy Director of the Center for Defense Information (CDI). Adm. Carroll analyzes the stated objectives of the bombing of Serbia and whether the exercise of military power is capable of realizing those objectives. He also discusses the fundamental character of the Rombouillet plan that was presented to Mr. Milosevic, and the importance of Russian intervention in achieving a durable resolution to the crisis. I commend this excellent presentation to my colleagues.

PRESENTATION BY ADMIRAL EUGENE CARROLL, USN (RET) TO CONGRESSIONAL TEACH-IN ON KOSOVO—APRIL 21, 1999

The conventional wisdom is that war is much too important to be left to generals and admirals. As a result, in a democratic society, the question of going to war and the objectives to be sought in a war are political responsibilities. The objectives are defined in political terms. It is very important at this point that the objectives be attainable by military force. The two must match. And the objective must merit the use of this blunt, destructive, indiscriminate process we call war. The outcome, the achievements, must outweigh the damage and destruction and loss occasioned by the war.

Looking at Kosovo we find that the objectives have been a little hard to nail down. But two of them stand out. Deter and degrade the ability of Serbian forces to effect ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. And, to compel Serbian compliance with the Rombouillet plan. The first objective, the protection of the Kosovars, was never obtainable by the means employed. The air war cannot protect these abused people. It is impossible to control military and political conditions on the ground with air power alone. The power, the authority, on the ground will control the situation. There is so much evidence of this that it is simply undeniable. We have the ability to punish, we can destroy, we can kill. But to control the situation, and protect the Kosovars? No. The means of air warfare alone did not match the objective. What does the destruction of the Socialist Party headquarters in Belgrade do to mitigate the conditions of Kosovars in Kosovo?

The second objective, namely compelling compliance with the Rombouillet plans, was also unattainable by air power. Rombouillet was a demand for total capitulation by the Milosevic government. The capitulation did not just apply in Kosovo. I don't think this is entirely understood. It was far broader than that. Appendix B of the Rombouillet plan spelled out the problem this way. "NATO personnel shall enjoy together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment free and unrestricted passage, and unimpeded access, throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including associated air space and territorial waters." So NATO is to have access to and control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails and ports without payment of fees. This goes on and on. NATO will exercise police power. It will have full use of the electronic spectrum

in the region. It will have immunity from all FRY jurisdiction related to criminal offenses. The plan required total surrender of sovereignty by the FRY.

The terms were presented to the Milosevic government in non-negotiable form—here is the plan, you sign here or we bomb. Obviously, no government could accept such a usurpation of its sovereignty. In human terms, it would have been the end of Milosevic. If someone had designed a plan to be certain that it was going to be refused, they could not have done better than the Rambouillet plan. Thus the second objective fails until military force produces an unconditional surrender, the total collapse of the power and authority of the central government. And that cannot be achieved from the air.

NATO can clearly defeat Serbia on the ground. I don't think that was ever in doubt. But before you make the decision to proceed that way, you have to figure the time required and what will happen during that time. The bombing will go on. The Kosovars will be eliminated because we are talking about a matter of months. The cost in terms of the total destruction in the Serbian-Kosovo region is immeasurable.

We have been bombing for about a month. We've done a lot damage. But we will go a lot further, in terms of wiping out the Serbian economy, if we push troops forward. The cost and difficulties of invading with ground forces, of going to the point of effecting an unconditional surrender by the Serbian government, simply are incalculable. This would constitute total defeat for Milosevic. But does that constitute a NATO victory?

I think it is very important that we distinguish between a Milosevic defeat and a NATO victory. Certainly the Kosovars have already lost. The Serbs have lost already. They have lost lives, property, much of their economy and this will only intensify. In terms of its own stated objectives, even with unconditional surrender, NATO loses. NATO becomes responsible for restoration of a devastated nation and this is a task which will take years and billions of dollars. And a continuing military presence because none of the fundamental problems that produced the violence in the beginning have been addressed or resolved. If anything, many of the factors have been exacerbated. We have inherited a tragedy. We are responsible for it. We cannot call that victory.

Will it bring peace to the Balkans? That's the word being bandied about Washington. We're going to pacify the Balkans and bring stability to Europe. Will it bring peace to the Balkans? No. We can stay there on guard over them with guns and tanks, but we can-

not pacify the Balkans when we don't treat the fundamental issues that guide the conflict there.

The solution must ultimately be political and it must be based upon negotiations, not ultimata. You are going to have to come to understandings and agreements and accommodations which have merit and benefit for both sides if you hope to produce any enduring quality to the solution. NATO has to get out of the way. The United Nations must live up to its responsibilities—with American support for a change—financial and otherwise, and the OSCE must step in and play a leading role in attempting to separate the military element of NATO from the people of Serbia. NATO cannot, I believe, be the honest broker in the final resolution of this.

The last point. This is the time and opportunity to bring Russia back into the European security equation. If anyone thinks there can be peace in the Balkans, or peace in Europe indefinitely—stable, cooperative security arrangements—without Russia being part of it, they are very mistaken. Yet what we have done so far in the Balkans is to isolate Russia, to denigrate them, to humiliate them, by ignoring their interests and their concerns. I believe that Russia, under the UN Security Council, can play a leading role as a mediator in bringing about an end to violence in Serbia.

As much as I oppose the bombing as being irrelevant to solving the Balkan situation, I do not at this moment favor a moratorium on the part of NATO. I favor negotiations going forward with the understanding that when there is an unequivocal commitment on both sides—the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the end of bombing—then is when the cease fire would go into effect. There would have to be positive evidence and good faith on both sides to bring about the end of violence in Kosovo.

My message to you: There is no military solution in Kosovo or Serbia.

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