Mrs. BENNETT. Mr. President, I rise to call for a suspension of the bombing in Kosovo, not because of anything Milosevic has done, such as the release of three American servicemen; not because of differing opinions within NATO, such as those currently being expressed by the Italians and the Germans; not because of the inadvertent damage done to accidental targets, such as the Chinese Embassy; and not because of any personal animus or distrust of any individuals in this administration. No; I oppose continuation of the bombing in Kosovo because it has not worked. It is not working and shows no signs of working in the future.

The bombing has been of no help to the Kosovars, hundreds of thousands of whom have lost their homes, their neighbors, their children and perhaps even their lives while the bombing has gone on. It has been of no help to the Albanians or the Macedonians who have seen hundreds of thousands of refugees flood cross the borders into their ill-equipped countries. It has been of no help to NATO, an alliance that has already fragile economies. But because he was still an officer in the British Army, he agreed, indeed sought for, the opportunity to go to the front in France. And so, as Major Churchill, he went to the front, and unlike most British officers of the time, he really went to the front. He went all the way to the front lines and saw for himself over a period of time the horrors and the futility of trench warfare. He saw it firsthand, and he came away convinced that it was not working.

When he returned to England, he became Minister of Munitions and put his full support and strength behind the military. If you will, he put aside the patriotic rhetoric of his time and sought for a policy that would work. William Manchester, in his biography of Churchill called the "Last Line," refers to Churchill as the "father of the modern tank," a Churchill who caught the vision of the fact that you could do something different and created the modern tank, or the prototype of what became the modern tank, and revolutionized warfare, eliminating the failures of trench warfare.

If at first you don't succeed, try something else. The legacy of Winston Churchill was that he was willing to try something else when he saw the reality of the failure on the ground. I think, frankly, that is the Churchillian example we should seek to follow now: Suspend the bombing and try something else.

There are many suggestions on the table. The one, of course, we hear the most these days is send in the ground troops. To those who urge this, I ask, as I asked when the bombing was proposed in the first place: Will it work? Will it accomplish our goals? And with that question, I think, that is the next obvious question: What are our goals?

When Secretary Madeleine Albright made the case for the bombing to the Senators in the Capitol, she told us if we did not bomb, the following would happen: First, there would be brutal acts of ethnic cleansing throughout all of Kosovo with tens of thousands of people being slaughtered and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes.

Second, she said there will be a flood of refugees across the borders into neighboring countries, swamping their already fragile economies.

Third, she said there will be splits within NATO. This alliance will be torn apart by disagreements.

And finally, she said Milosevic will strengthen his hand on his local political situation.

That was 8 weeks ago. Now, 8 weeks later, the bombing has failed to prevent any of those results. All four of those goals—the ethnic cleansing and the brutality and the atrocities have gone on; the refugees have appeared across the borders; NATO is split with arguments going on among its top leaders; and Milosevic has been strengthened as the leader, martyr, hero, if you will, of the Yugoslavs. We have not achieved a single goal that the bombing set out to accomplish. I come back to the same question: What are our new goals?

As best I can understand them, from the various statements that have been made, one list of the new goals would be as follows: No. 1, removal of all Serbian influence in Kosovo; No. 2, a return of the Kosovars physically to their land; No. 3, a rebuilding of their homes and villages; and No. 4, an international police force in there for an indefinitely long period of time to guarantee that their homes will always be protected.

And finally, let us accept those goals for just a moment. I ask the same fundamental question I asked in the beginning with respect to bombing. Will it work? Will continuation of the bombing achieve these four new goals when it did not achieve the four old ones? And what about ground troops? Will ground troops achieve these new goals?

On the first question, as to whether the continuation of the bombing will achieve these new goals, there is disagreement from the experts. In this morning's Washington Post, General Short says: "Yes, we will see the achievement of these goals within a matter of months." Last Friday, the Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon said, "No, there was no indication that bombing would achieve the goals."

I ask this fundamental humanitarian question: Do we have to continue to destroy the economy of Yugoslavia, depriving the civilian population of power and water, as we did over the weekend, raising the specter of the epidemic spread of typhoid while we decide who is right, while we decide which opinion is the correct one? Can
we not suspend the bombing while that debate goes on?

With regards to ground troops, and those who say ground troops are the only answer, those who are calling for an invasion and an indefinitely long occupation of part of Serbia, that part known as Kosovo, to them I would refer the words of Daniel Ellsberg that appeared in The New York Times last Friday. I find them chilling. I would like to read them now at some length. I cannot paraphrase them and put them in any better form than Mr. Ellsberg himself. He says, referring to a ground invasion in Kosovo:

I believe, it would be a death sentence for most Albanians remaining in Kosovo.

By all accounts, it would take weeks to months to deploy an invasion force to the region of Kosovo where the action is. And Slobodan Milosevic already has troops there fortifying the borders. Wouldn’t the prospect of an invasion lead him to order his forces to attack and all the military-age male Albanians and hold the rest of the population as hostages rather than continuing to deport them?

A very, very important question.

Daniel Ellsberg goes on:

We don’t know how many male Kosovars of military age—broadly, (those) from 15 to 60 years old—have been killed already.

He says:

But even if the number is in the tens of thousands . . . that would mean that most of the men were still alive. Facing invasion, would Mr. Milosevic allow any more men to leave Kosovo to be recruited by the K.L.A., or to live to support the invasion? The Serbs could quickly slaughter 100,000 to 200,000 male Kosovars. (In Rwanda five years ago, an average of 8,000 civilians a day were killed for 100 days, mostly with machetes.)

Obrovac and his subordinates are brutal enough to do that. If they haven’t done it already (and there is no testimony [to suggest] that they have on that scale) because they believe such an annihilation would make an invasion inevitable. A commitment now to ground invasion would remove that deterrent.

A very important commitment in March to begin bombing in support of an ultimatum and the consequent withdrawal of international monitors removed an implicit deterrent against sweeping ethnic cleansing and expulsion.

As for to the remaining civilians in Kosovo—women, children and old people—tens of thousands of them could be used against the invasion as human shields, in a way never before seen in warfare. Fighting in built-up areas, NATO troops would probably be fighting in buildings that were packed on every floor with Kosovar women and children. Using the traditional means—explosives, artillery and rockets—to destroy those buildings would make NATO forces the mass executioners of the people we were fighting to protect.

The column goes on. I shall not continue with it except to summarize the grim conclusion. Mr. Ellsberg says:

We bombed Vietnam for seven and a half years in pursuit of goals we refused to compromise and never secured.

I find that a chilling summary in terms of some of the language we are hearing now: We must never compromise until our goals are secured. The first goals laid out were not secured. We now have a new set of goals and we are determined once again not to give in.

When I first went into the briefing room to hear Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, National Security Adviser Berger, and General Shelton give us the justification for proceeding in this area, I went in with no preconceptions one way or the other. Contrary to assumptions that have been made in the press about those of us who voted against the bombing, I did not carry any impeachment baggage into that briefing.

I have a history of backing President Clinton when I think he is right. I supported him on the recognition of Viet Nam, on the invasion status for China, on the Mexican peso bailout, on NATO expansion, on NAFTA and GATT and fast track, all to the discomfort of some of my constituents. I did so because I thought the President was right. And I went into that briefing very much capable of being convinced.

But during the briefing, as I became more and more uneasy about what I was hearing, when it came my turn to speak, I said to Secretary Albright: Let me give you a little bit of history. I did that because she had quoted history to us, talking about the Balkans being the beginning of World War I and the battleground of World War II. And she said: If we don’t act quickly enough, this will be the spark that sets off World War III.

I did not choose to argue with her history. World War II did not begin because of a fight over the Balkans. While there were battles in World War II which occurred there, to be sure, the United States was involved in places like North Africa, Stalingrad, Normandy, and Bastogne, not to mention, of course, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Leyte Gulf.

No. I said to her: Madam Secretary, let me give you a little piece of history. This comes out of the Eisenhower administration, presided over by a military general who had achieved international fame for his strategic vision. This is when he was President.

I said, “A group of his advisers came to him to describe an international situation and to recommend a military solution. They laid out all of the military actions they wanted to take and then said, Mr. President, it will achieve these results.”

President Eisenhower listened very carefully and then asked: “Are you willing to take the next step?” They replied, “What do you mean, Mr. President?”

He said, “If this doesn’t work, this first step that you have outlined, are you willing to take the next step?” “Oh, Mr. President,” they said, “the next step won’t be necessary. There won’t need to be any next steps. This first step will work.”

President Eisenhower then, President Clinton, was asked, “What will you do if the bombing does not work?” He was asked by the Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Blair, “Mr. President, you should have told us what will you do in this case.”

Mr. President, in the next step, is you say to people, “Mr. President, you should have told us what will you do in this case.”

Ultimately, an announcement was made that we will take the next step if that one does not work. And if the answer is ‘no’, then we don’t take the first step.” I asked, “Madam Secretary, my question to you is, ‘Are you willing to take the next step?’”

I got conversation, but I did not get an answer to my question. I came out of that briefing saying, unless I can get an answer to that question, I will vote against the bombing. I was not satisfied and I did vote against the bombing.

I did not prevail in this Chamber. A majority of the Members voted in favor of the bombing, and so we have now had 8 weeks of it.

That date has an interesting meaning for me, because in this conversation, in the briefing, they were asked, “How long will it take for us to find out if this is going to work?” We were told repeatedly, “We can’t tell you that. We don’t know.”

Finally, in some frustration, I spoke out of turn and said to the briefed, “How long would you be surprised if it were more than?” I got kind of a dirty look and then grumpily the fellow said: “8 weeks.”

Well, it has now been 8 weeks, and it has worked, which is why I am here saying let’s suspend the bombing while we talk about something that might. Let us stop destroying the economy of Yugoslavia we talk about what might work in Kosovo, because our destruction of water works and television stations and power-generating plants in Belgrade has had no effect on the killing in Kosovo. Can’t we stop killing civilians who are not involved in this while we talk about what our options might be?

I think one of the most trenchant and insightful analyses of what happened to this country in Vietnam was written by Barbara Tuchman in a book called “The March of Folly.” In that book she described how people persist in going after solutions that do not work, because they do not want to admit that it won’t work, and they are sure that if we just keep bombing a little bit longer, somehow something will work out.

Shortly after I had my exchange with Secretary Albright, the President, President Clinton, was asked, “What will you do if the bombing does not work?” He was asked by the Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Blair, “Mr. President, you should have told us what will you do in this case.”

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Mr. HAGEL. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Nebraska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.

Mr. HAGEL. I am happy to yield to my colleague from North Dakota.