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that many of us have known all along: The Honorable Mr. Justice Clarence Thomas is one of the brightest, most principled, and intellectually engaging members of the United States Supreme Court in a generation.

An article in Monday’s The Washington Post headed “After a Quiet Spell, Justice Finds Voice” drew a profile of a Justice who refuses to subvert to his own personal views the plain meaning of statutes passed by Congress; a Justice who is committed to protecting our basic American political structure by respecting state sovereignty; and who exercises the patience to undertake the exhaustive historical research needed to ascertain the original intent of the Founding Fathers in framing our Constitution.

Clearly, Mr. President, Mr. Justice Thomas is this term’s Thomas—American—one who bears no resemblance to the often cruel and totally false caricatures his critics have attempted to create. I shall not catalogue or dwell upon the many injustices Mr. Justice Thomas has suffered at the hands of those who—for their own petty political purposes—have heaped abuse upon this fine man except to make this simple observation: Clarence Thomas has found the strength to serve his country and remain true to his principles in the face of viciously unfair personal criticism and his courage speaks volumes about the strength of his character.

Mr. President, I ask that the article from The Washington Post be printed in the Record.

The article follows:

[From the Washington Post, May 24, 1999]

AFTER A QUIET SPELL, JUSTICE FINDS VOICE—CONSERVATIVE THOMAS EMERGES FROM THE SHADOW OF SCALIA (By Joan Biskupic)

He’s been known by the company he’s kept.

For the past eight years, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has walked in the shadow of Justice Antonin Scalia. The pair have voted together more than any other two justices, staking out the court’s conservative flank but also inspiring criticism that they believe labor relations ought not to be under the rule of tooth and claw.

Ms. Klaus briefly worked in the Kennedy Administration in 1961 as a consultant for the first labor relations task force for Federal employees.

She returned to New York in 1962 as director of staff relations for the Board of Education, where she negotiated a new contract for the teachers.

She left in 1975 to become a private arbitrator. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter appointed her one of the three negotiators in the Long Island Railroad strike.

Ms. Klaus was born on Jan. 8, 1905, received Columbia Law School’s Medal for excellence in 1906, and an honorary doctorate in 1994 from the Jewish Theological Seminary.

No close relatives survive.

JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS: A GENTLEMAN OF PRINCIPLE

Mr. HELMS, Mr. President, Monday morning I was delighted—and highly gratified—to find that the national media are finally catching up to a fact that many of us have known all along: The Honorable Mr. Justice Clarence Thomas is one of the brightest, most principled, and intellectually engaging members of the United States Supreme Court in a generation.

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[From the Washington Post, May 24, 1999]
in overturning past court rulings that he believed like the majority, I would look to history predating the writing of the Constitution in 1787 and more inclined to reject recent cases.

In last week’s welfare case, for example, Thomas began by tracing a core constitutional provision from the 1806 Charter of Virginia: “the consent of the people of each individual State, and of the unrepresented people of the nation as a whole.”

This accent on states’ rights was evident in a case earlier this term when only Thomas fully concurred from a separate opinion that he believed too broadly interpreted a federal law targeting discrimination at the polls. “The section’s interference with state sovereignty is quite drastic,” he complained.

In another example of Thomas’s narrower reading of federal law, he and Scalia were on opposite sides when the court interpreted a statute that guarantees equal educational opportunities for disabled schoolchildren. Scalia voted with the majority in the March case to find that the federal disabilities law requires public schools to provide a wide variety of medical care for children with severe handicaps.

Thomas dissented with Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who wrote that the law is “beyond dramatic,” he complained. In another example of Thomas’s narrower reading of federal law, he and Scalia were on opposite sides when the court interpreted a statute that guarantees equal educational opportunities for disabled schoolchildren. Scalia voted with the majority in the March case to find that the federal disabilities law requires public schools to provide a wide variety of medical care for children with severe handicaps.

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