Many seniors, and especially senior women, struggle to meet the rising cost of filling their prescriptions. Why do I say women? Because, according to the Older Women's League, total prescription drug spending for women on Medicare averages about $1,200 a year, 20 percent more than that for men. In many cases, seniors simply do not take the drugs their doctors prescribe because they cannot afford them.

You do not have to be a doctor to understand this is bad medicine. Without access to important medication, seniors run the risk of developing complications that require expensive treatments and hospital stays. While some seniors enroll in Medicare managed care plans because they provide some drug coverage, we cannot depend on this option, and many of these plans are no longer around. The Medicare managed care plans have found they cannot afford them, so they are dropping seniors. This is an unstable source of coverage because many Medicare managed care plans have decreased their drug coverage. The number of beneficiaries enrolling in these Medicare plans is declining because the promises are not what they are supposed to be.

Prescription drugs are the largest out-of-pocket health costs for seniors. On average, seniors fill 18 prescriptions a year and take 4 to 6 prescription drugs a day. Because of the high cost and lack of coverage, one study shows that one in eight seniors is forced to choose between buying food and buying medicine. That is drastic. One in eight seniors is forced to choose between buying food or medicine. Every day this takes place in America. To make matters worse, studies show that seniors without drug coverage pay more for drugs than those who have insurance.

Prescription drugs are a necessary component of modern medicine, and our seniors are dependent on them to maintain a healthy, active lifestyle. This is something that has come about in the last 35 years. The special health needs of our seniors are often those that respond best to treatment by prescription drugs. For millions of seniors, prescription medicines are lifesavers. It is time to show our seniors we are serious about creating a Medicare prescription drug benefit, and I hope we can work together to do that as quickly as possible. We need Medicare to include prescription drugs.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum for one moment, and then I will call up the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1999—Continued

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement, I call up amendment No. 2820, which is already at the desk. This is the so-called managers' amendment. I understand the amendment will be agreed to and the motion to reconsider will be laid on the table.

AMENDMENT NO. 2820

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. LOTT], for himself, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. LEVIN, and Mr. HELMS, proposes an amendment numbered 2820.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 2, line 3, strike ''1999'' and insert ''2000''.

On page 5, beginning on line 7, strike ''No. 12938'' and all that follows through the period and insert ''No. 12938.''.

On page 5, beginning on line 9, strike ''The United States'' and all that follows through ''shall terminate'' and insert ''Prohibition on United States Government sales to that foreign person of any item on the United States Munitions List as in effect on August 8, 1995, and termination of''.

On page 5, beginning on line 16, strike ''The President shall deny licenses and suspend'' and insert ''Denial of licenses and suspension of''.

On page 8 between lines 23 and 24, insert the following:

(b) OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION.—Congress urges the President—

(1) in every appropriate case, to contact in a timely fashion each foreign person identified in each report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or the government with primary jurisdiction over such person, in order to afford such person, or governments, the opportunity to provide explanatory, exculpatory, or other additional information with respect to the transfer that caused such person to be identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a); and

(2) to exercise the authority in subsection (a) in all cases where information obtained from a foreign person identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or from the government with primary jurisdiction over such person, establishes that the exercise of such authority is warranted.

On page 8, line 24, strike ''(b)'' and insert ''(c)''.

On page 9, line 11, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.

On page 9, beginning on line 12, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.

On page 10, beginning on line 11, strike ''through the implementation of concrete steps''.

On page 10, beginning on line 16, strike '', including through the imposition of meaningful penalties on persons who make such transfers''.

On page 10, line 19, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.

On page 10, line 21, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.

On page 11, line 25, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.

On page 12, line 2, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.

On page 13, line 6, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.

On page 13, line 8, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.

On page 13, line 10, insert after ''Service Module'' the following: '', and for the purchase (at a total cost not to exceed $14,000,000) of the pressure dome for the Interim Control Module and the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Adapter and related hardware for the United States propulsion module,''.

On page 13, line 15, insert ''credible'' before ''information''.

On page 17, beginning on line 15, strike ''RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY'' and insert ''RUSSIAN AVIATION AND SPACE AGENCY''.

On page 17, beginning on line 17, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.

On page 18, beginning on line 1, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency''.

On page 18, line 6, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency''.

On page 18, line 10, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.

On page 18, beginning on line 13, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency''.

On page 18, line 15, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency''.

On page 18, line 16, strike ''Russian Space Agency'' and insert ''Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency''.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to and the motion to reconsider is laid on the table.

The amendment (No. 2820) was agreed to.

Mr. LOTT. As a reminder to all Members, passage of this bill either by roll-call vote or voice vote is to occur in the 4 p.m. timeframe. We are trying to accommodate Senators who have a number of other meetings they need to attend, but it will be either at 4 or 4:30 at the very latest. Members will be notified, via hotline, as soon as the exact time has been determined.

Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this very important legislation, H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.

Let me say at the beginning, this legislation has always had strong bipartisan support. It passed overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives last year by a vote of 419–0, and it has always had strong support in the Senate from Senators LIEBERMAN, FEINSTEIN, and HELMS—a very broad, bipartisan group.

I also have to acknowledge the cooperation of Senator LEVIN, who has been working with me on the managers' amendment. I think it is important, we now go forward with this legislation.

I am pleased I have been joined in this effort by Senator LIEBERMAN, who is on the floor to participate in the discussion of this legislation. Senator LIEBERMAN is a long-time expert in nonproliferation and Middle East matters, and he certainly deserves a lot of the credit for making this legislation possible.

The purpose of the bill is to express once again our deep concern regarding the transfer to Iran of dangerous technology, principally from Russia, China, and North Korea, as well as from other foreign entities, and to recommend additional steps to halt this deadly trade.

Again, let me go into a little history. This legislation passed the House and the Senate in 1998. The President vetoed it, but, at the request of the administration, efforts were ongoing to work with Russia. That veto was not overridden. We did not vote on it. But the hope that progress would be made has not paid off; we have not achieved the results we hoped for. You can say it was because they had changes in the leadership positions in Russia. They are trying to make progress, but the fact is, they are not making progress and this dangerous transfer of the technology that could lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons continues.

This bill requires the President to report to Congress when credible information exists of a transfer of dangerous technology to Iran. The President must also inform Congress whether he has imposed certain penalties on foreign persons as a result of such transfers. If such penalties are not imposed, the President must report the reasons why he decided against taking this step.

The bill will also create new incentives for the Russian aviation and space agency to cooperate with the United States in efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons technology to Iran by precluding certain payments to that agency if entities under its jurisdiction and control engage in such transfers.

Think about that. The United States is assisting the Russian aviation and space agency at a time when entities under its jurisdiction may, as a matter of fact, be involved in transferring this dangerous technology to Iran. It is absurd, and the American people would rightly be horrified to find that is the case.

As I noted, this bill passed the House last September by a unanimous vote, and that vote occurred despite an explicit veto threat by the President. The overwhelming bipartisan vote in the House and the strong bipartisan support the bill enjoys in the Senate underscores the seriousness with which the Congress views Iran's continued quest for long-range missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.

I can think of few international developments that would be as damaging to U.S. national security and to stability and security in the Middle East as the acquisition by Iran of long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles.

We know already Iran has been the most notorious state sponsor of terrorism, including attacks on Americans, and we know Iran remains a steadfast opponent of peace between Israel and her neighbors, and Iran supports those whose violence is aimed at undermining prospects for a genuine lasting peace.

Some of our colleagues might observe that they had elections in Iran last week, and I believe those elections continue now. It appears reformers have been making some gains. That may be the situation in Iran, and the relations with Iran will change as a result of that. Let me assure my colleagues that the danger is still there. Those who are in charge of this nuclear proliferation in Iran have a very strong grip on what is being done, and there is very little likelihood they are going to let go of it anytime soon, in spite of what appears to be encouraging election returns. In fact, one can argue that to continue to send a strong signal against Iran's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction actually bolsters the reformers in their efforts to change the approach of Iran, both internally and externally.

While we are pleased to see what appears to be encouraging results—and I think the Senate should express itself on that, and I will suggest to the Democratic leadership we perhaps have a resolution acknowledging what has happened there and are hopeful about what that may mean—I do not think by any stretch of the imagination that should lead us to think everything is going to change immediately and we should not go forward with this very important legislation.

If my colleagues think about it, it is quite scary: Iran's leaders, now and in the future, will be in possession of nuclear-tipped ICBMs capable of reaching Washington or Los Angeles or New York. America's security and that of our friends and allies in the region will be unalterably affected by such a horrific development.

Yet that day of reckoning is coming and much sooner than we prefer, unless something is done to stop the transfer of this technology and other forms of assistance to Iran by Russia, in particular, but also by China and North Korea.

My colleagues will recall we have been working on this for 3 or 4 years. We have tried mightily to be of help to the administration in trying to put pressure on Russia in particular, but that strategy has failed to slow the flow of this dangerous technology.

Let me point out what CIA Director George Tenet said recently in a report to Congress on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction over the previous 6-month period. In that report, Director Tenet wrote:

> Entities in Russia and China continued to supply a considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technology to Iran.

The report also stated:

> Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian companies accelerated Iranian [missile] development.

Director Tenet also noted:

> Russian entities continued to interact with Iranian research centers on various [nuclear] activities. These projects will help Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development.

The report also highlighted China's development in their programs. For example, the report stated:

> Firms in China provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to . . . Iran.

I had occasion to meet personally with Director Tenet recently because I wanted to hear what information he had that he could provide to me and other Senators who wished to have a private briefing about what is going on in this area, and also to discuss the recent U.S. counterterrorism activities.

Director Tenet reaffirmed that the flow of dangerous technology to Iran from Russia and China is, in fact, continuing and on a significant scale. It has not dropped. If anything, it has become worse. I urge those Senators who have not had a chance to review this classified record to go up to room S–407 to get this briefing. It is a sobering reminder that despite the end of the cold war, serious threats to U.S. security and our critical allies around the world remain.

I commend Director Tenet and the entire U.S. intelligence community for their heroic efforts to uncover the truth about these dangerous transfers. What makes the intelligence community's successes so much more astounding is that they come in spite of significant denial and deception by Russia, China, and others.

Director Tenet's report underscores the administration's current strategy for dealing with this growing problem. I know they worked at it. I discussed this with National Security Adviser Sandy Berger. They have tried. They acknowledged it has been difficult. They have had to deal with changing people and the laws in Russia, of while their intentions, as they provide them to us verbally, appear to be in the right direction, the results are just not there.

The administration had hoped that by engaging Russia, China, and North Korea in a dialog, they could persuade those nations to cease and desist from their provocative behavior. The administration, I understand, did get the Russian Government to take some steps, such as adoption of export control law and regulations, but despite

this fact, not a single Russian has been successfully prosecuted for transferring weapons of mass destruction or missile technology to Iran. Not one. I repeat, the intelligence we get is it is probably growing worse. So action against an individual, action against companies or academicians and professors, if there is anything in that nature going on, we do not see any results.

Thus, it appears the Russian Government either supports this clandestine transfer of dangerous technology to Iran or is unwilling to take strong necessary steps to halt it.

The same can be said for the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea; therefore, I join with many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in believing that it is time to send a strong signal to the administration but, more importantly, to Russia, China, and North Korea, and to other countries that may be contemplating the transfer of this dangerous technology to Iran, or to Iraq, for that matter.

The message is simple: The Congress and the American people are not content with the status quo. We are not content with the dialog that produces even more promises on the one hand and scant or no real reduction in the flow of technology on the other. Some might say this bill is not strong enough, and I would be hard pressed to disagree with that. I would prefer it to be even stronger. After all, the bill provides the President with the authority to impose sanctions, but it does not require them. We may want to look at doing that if we do not see some changes. If we do not see some actions by the administration, if we do not see some actions being taken to impose sanctions, then we may want to go that next step.

I believe bolder action is going to be needed, that this will not be enough. It is a signal that is worth providing at this time. Because of its strong bipartisan support and because I believe it will become law, I am willing to go forward with it in this fashion at this time.

The bill before us now reflects a continuing commitment in both parties to take a tough stand in the fight against nuclear proliferation.

With this in mind, I urge the President not to veto this bipartisan bill but instead to sign it into law as soon as it lands on his desk.

Again, I thank Senator LIEBERMAN, Senator HELMS, and the many other Senators who are involved in the process of crafting this important legislation. I strongly urge a ''yes'' vote on H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. REID addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.

Mr. REID. Before the leader leaves the floor, I say it is important that we, on matters relating to foreign policy, do as much as we can on a bipartisan basis. I think moving this legislation along speaks well of that. I am confident that the legislation will be signed.

I also extend my congratulations to the Senator from Connecticut, who has worked on this for a long time, well more than a year. It is because of him, working with the full committee, that we have been able to move this measure along.

I also say to the leader, I think when the votes are counted in Iran, we should consider a resolution congratulating the people of Iran for what appears to be the moderate tone of the election results. I think that is very important. That is a positive sign, as it is a positive sign today that there appears to be developing in Russia a stable government.

I extend my appreciation to the leader for the manner in which this measure is moving along. On an issue such as this, we should not have acrimonious debate. We have been able to avoid that with the work that has been done behind the scenes. That is very important.

Mr. LOTT. If the Senator will yield, I think it is important the Senate take note of the fact that for the first time in 20 years reformers may have been making some gains and that maybe internally and the way they deal with the rest of the world things may change in Iran. We hope that is the case.

I ask that you join me in talking to Senator DASCHLE to see if we can craft some legislation that would express the resolution's views on this. Hopefully, we can also take that up, if not today, maybe later this week.

I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support this legislation. I particularly wish to thank the majority leader for his steadfast and very strong support for this important piece of legislation. The majority leader has recognized the serious threat that the proliferation of ballistic missile capacity and weapons of mass destruction to rogue nations, such as Iran, represents to our forces in the Middle East, to our allies in the Middle East, and in the not-too-distant future—maybe real soon—to our allies in Europe, and, heaven protect us, to the United States of America, to our homeland.

We have talked a lot in this Chamber, and outside, about national missile defense. We crossed a bridge on this issue last year, I think, with the bipartisan legislation sponsored initially by the majority leader's colleague from Mississippi, Senator COCHRAN.

But if we are now involved in an effort to develop a national missile defense, does it not make sense to use whatever authority we have to deter, to retard, and, if possible, to prevent a rogue nation, such as Iran, from developing the capacity to strike us and our allies?

This is to me the other side of the American effort to protect us and our people and our allies from what, in the years ahead, I am afraid will be the single most serious threat to our security, which is, the proliferation of ballistic missile capacity and weapons of mass destruction.

The majority leader has been the leader on the bill we are considering today, and I have been privileged to work with him on it. I appreciate the broad bipartisan support we have on this measure. As the majority leader said, this legislation could have been stronger. It started out stronger when we introduced the initial legislation, but in the process of trying to get something done, we modified it.

It still makes an important statement to the world about the steadfast commitment of the Congress of the United States to do everything we can to diminish the threat of weapons of mass destruction carried by ballistic missiles. It sends a message to our friends in Russia about the intensity of our concern about their part in helping Iran develop weapons of mass destruction. I believe it sends a message to the Administration of the United States about the broad bipartisan support in Congress for tougher actions against any nation, including Russia—with whom we have a developing relationship—if they are supporting Iran in the development of this destructive capacity.

A reporter stopped me earlier today on the way to the Chamber and asked: Aren't you worried about the effect that passage of the Iran Nonproliferation Act will have on the Government of Russia or in the Presidential elections coming in Russia? My answer, directly, is no. But, obviously, we are all concerned and hopeful that the forces of reform will take hold in Russia and bring stability and progress to that country. But our first concern has to be not what happens in Russia, but what we can do to protect the security of the American people in this country and our forces abroad from the threat of weapons of mass destruction carried by ballistic missiles. If the Russian Government will be true to its own statements about working against proliferation, then there will be no problem for Russia as a result of the passage of this legislation.

My colleagues have talked about changes in Iran. The developments are most remarkable in Iran. There is a whole new generation of Iranians and, if I am not mistaken, more than half of it was not of age when the extreme Islamic revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, occurred in the late 1970s. It

is a generation that appears to want reform, better lives for themselves, freedom, better relations with the West, and better relations with the United States of America.

Remarkably, in the midst of the very authoritarian government that came into power in the late 1970s and has been there since, the Iranians have continued to have elections.

Here is the power of the people at work again. Last Friday, apparently, more than four out of five eligible voters came out to vote in Iran. I say, parenthetically, what an embarrassment it should be to us to recall that in 1998, the last time we had a congressional election—our own, if you will, parliamentary election—36 percent of the eligible voters came out to vote; only one-third, as compared to more than four-fifths in Iran. They are apparently expressing very broad support for the forces of reform.

Does that diminish the concern we have about what Iran is doing? Not immediately, unfortunately. Because the power is still exercised by a small group of leaders at the top. Not by the reform-oriented, moderate President Khatami, but by the religious leaders at the top who still exercise and control the agencies of foreign policy, defense policy, and intelligence policy, who still have the power to override and veto any of the acts, even of this new reform Parliament.

The focus of our concern about Iran is that it has been our most implacable foe in the recent past and that it has been the single most intransigent supporter of terrorism against this Nation and our allies, a reality that remains unchanged.

The thought that weapons of mass destruction, carried by ballistic missiles, would be in the possession of this nation, effectively still controlled by this small group of enemies of the United States, should fill us with the most profound fear and anxiety.

It is from that fear and anxiety that this bill emerges. It is not the first time we have expressed our concerns about these developments in Iran. In previous enactments we have given the Administration the tools to try to address this problem, specifically in the Arms Export Control Act and in the Iran-Iraq Sanctions Act. But we were not satisfied with those measures and the way they were being used, so we passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act in 1997, a measure similar to this legislation we are considering today.

Unfortunately, the President chose to veto that legislation. That is why H.R. 1883 was introduced and why it passed the House overwhelmingly, 419–0, with every Member of both parties who voted supporting it.

Since 1997, our concern about the problem has not diminished. It is widely and reliably reported—this is why we are back with this legislation—that entities and people in Russia continue to provide both technology and assistance to Iran to build these dangerous weapons. Iran has made worrying progress on its missile program, as the majority leader indicated and as the intelligence reports, classified as they are, which are available to our colleagues, clearly state.

I cite also an unclassified source. According to the Congressional Research Service, with help from Russians and others, notably North Koreans and Chinese, Iran has produced a Shahab 3 ballistic missile with a range of 800 miles and tested it; on July 22, 1998, to be exact. Although the first test was apparently unsuccessful, the Congressional Research Service reports that the Shahab 3 is now thought to be operational and in production. There also have been credible reports that Iran is in the process of developing yet another, more advanced missile, the Shahab 4, which would have a range of up to 2,000 miles, more than double the range of the Shahab 3. We have some basis for believing the Iranians are now working on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

If combined with weapons of mass destruction, these existing Iranian missiles can threaten American forces and our allies and friends in the Middle East and, soon after that, as indicated, our forces and allies throughout Europe and, of course, eventually, the American homeland itself. This is a frightening prospect, given Iran's large chemical weapons program and aggressive attempt to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. The American Government has made it clear that Iran is attempting—in this case largely with China's help—to reach self-sufficiency in the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons, though Iran continues to deny that charge. Concerns have also been expressed by authorities in our country that Iran is seeking to become a nuclear arms state by attempting to buy material for such weapons or by using nonmilitary nuclear assistance to build up its knowledge about nuclear weapons.

These programs in Iran can profoundly change the balance of power in the region and strike a very serious blow to our efforts to contain Iran until it becomes a responsible member of the community of nations, until the forces of change which are blowing so hopefully through Iran, even as we speak today, reach fruition and a change of policy.

I am sure most everyone in this Chamber will look forward to a day when sanctions of this kind will not be necessary because a new government, representing what seems to be the clear will of the Iranian people, would be in power in Tehran; a government with which the United States of America and our allies could have constructive and peaceful relations. But until that time, the kinds of weapons capabilities that are being developed allow Iran to threaten, for instance, friendly Arab States, making it harder for them to cooperate with the United States. These weapons capabilities would raise the risks to U.S. military forces in the region and could threaten the free flow of oil out of this critical region which could, of course, create crises in the United States, in Europe, Asia, and in any other place in the world that depends on fuel from the Middle East to power their economies.

It is self-evident and axiomatic that we have to do whatever we can to try to deter this dangerous capability, to delay it, to retard it as best we can, given the Iranian Government that now exists. Part of that is making clear, as I believe this legislation does, to our friends in Russia in no uncertain terms that we are serious about this. The time for hit and miss, slower, bob-and-weave progress toward shutting off Russian assistance to Iran for the development of these dangerous programs is over.

In addition to other sanctions, we have focused in this bill on holding up extraordinary, as we call it, American funding for the international space station to the Russian space agency, unless Russia takes sufficient action to halt any part it is playing in proliferation to Iran. This is our attempt to demonstrate the seriousness of our concern about this matter, even to the extent of stopping the funding of a program that is not only important to us—that is, space cooperation—but important to the Russians.

While we cannot expect to prevent all technology transfers to rogue states, we do have the ability to check the flow of some of it by adopting the kinds of sanctions in this legislation that are aimed at persons engaged in such activity. We are able and therefore must act to take measures against those governments that condone such activity, whether or not they are organizing and abetting the transfer, or merely looking the other way when their citizens engage in these activities.

Senator LOTT quoted CIA Director George Tenet. Director Tenet has made quite clear that despite the noticeable shifts within Iran, it remains ''the most active state sponsor of terrorism.'' Iran's support for dangerous terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, through training, money, and weapons, has just not ended. There are people in our country, people whom I respect, who continue to sustain the belief, based on evidence they have gathered, that Iran was involved in the 1996 attack on American service personnel at Khobar in Saudi Arabia, though no definitive conclusion has been reached on that matter.

We have been engaged in a dialog across a wide spectrum with our friends and allies in trying to address the issue of proliferation to Iran. The prospect of a nuclear-capable, militarily powerful Iran armed with ballistic missiles is clearly a threat to our national interests and to those of our allies; therefore, we must act to stop it. The sanctions we are proposing will further stop the diffusion of this technology and lead to a more stable Middle East.

I echo the words of the majority leader: The passage of this measure may actually encourage the forces of reform in Iran which are now so boldly and inspiringly expressing themselves. It certainly does seem that those forces of reform want to have better relations with the West, with the United States. Part of what we are saying to them is, this matters to us. You must stop your support of terrorism. Stop your development of these weapons of mass destruction, and we can develop a much better relationship.

The bill itself is simple and direct. It requires the President to submit reports to Congress on foreign entities where there is credible information that these entities have transferred certain goods, services, or technologies to Iran. That part of the bill would apply to any entities anywhere in the world, not just the Russians. It authorizes the President to impose measures against these entities, but does not mandate him to do so. It allows him to consider exculpatory material, material that argues against the guilt of the entities.

And with an amendment that will be adopted, submitted by the Senator from Michigan, Mr. LEVIN, those entities will be given an opportunity to respond to those allegations before any sanctions are considered.

Finally, the bill prohibits these extraordinary American payments to the Russian space agency until certain conditions enumerated in the bill are met. The purpose is to say to the Russians specifically that we keep seeing compelling evidence that entities in Russia are supporting the development of these dangerous programs within Iran.

As much as we want to continue to work with Russia on joint efforts in space, we will not do so if they are contributing to this grave threat to our security.

Finally, I thank Senator LOTT, Senator BIDEN, Senator HELMS, and others on both sides who have worked together to bring this bill to the floor, where I have reason to believe it will achieve strong support. I was pleased to hear representatives of the Administration indicate to some of us a short while ago that, though they may not specifically support the bill, they would not recommend that, in its current form, the President veto it. I think we are on the way to making a unified statement, which is a constructive one, and which takes a small but significant step toward protecting us, our children, and grandchildren from the threat of weapons of mass destruction carried by ballistic missiles.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRAPO). The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, before the Senator from Connecticut leaves the floor, I wish to thank him and acknowledge all the work he has done over the past year or more on this issue. He has, in a sense, exercised some forbearance in the past when he thought it might have been more appropriate to make a stronger move, but because of circumstances within Russia and our bilateral relations and the hope—not expectation—that there may be a way to get this done, he has cooperated. I think everybody should understand the reason this issue has stayed so much on the forefront is because of his vigilance and his effort. I thank him for that. I thank him as well, along with other colleagues, for entertaining some of the changes that Senator LEVIN proposed. I think this is a much better bill. I agree with him; I think enough time has passed to demonstrate that this may be the only course left open, and hopefully it will work.

In a strange sense, the Senator and I have had occasion separately and individually, as the Presiding Officer has, to meet with members of the Russian Duma, members of the Russian Government, and members of the leadership of the various Arab states. I find it counterintuitive that they don't understand, quite frankly, that what is happening in Iran and their quest for this missile technology is literally a greater threat to them than it is to us. It is no greater threat to anyone than Israel; nonetheless, it is an incredibly significant threat to our friends in Europe, as well as our Arab friends. What is going on in North Korea is a threat to China and Russia in the long term, not only Japan and South Korea. What is going on in Iraq is a greater threat to our French friends—who seem to support Iraq against their own interests—than it is to us.

I am wondering when reason will take hold. I am a little bit dismayed, and more than a little bit miffed, by the ability of our friends, as well as those who are not viewed as our close friends, to dismiss reality. What do they think? If Russia is worried about the radicalization of the Moslem populations within the former Soviet Union, the Trans-Caucasus, and other places, why in the devil do they not understand that what is going on in Iraq, as well as in Iran—if it does not take a drastic change in course—is inimical to their interests? Ironically, the second largest former Communist state—the former Soviet Union—seems to be the ultimate capitalist in this regard; but they can't add very well. This is, I think, more about money than anything else. Hopefully, as I will lay out in my statement—and I don't want to delay the Senator any longer—they will see the virtues of looking to the West and not to Iran and Iraq for the source of their economic survival. At any rate, I thank the Senator very much for his leadership.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from Delaware for his kind words and the spirit of cooperation in which we have worked on this and on so many other matters over the years. I could not agree with him more on what he said. There is an irony here. It is as if folks in places such as Russia are still doing what we sometimes criticize people in our country for doing—going by a cold-war mentality. But it is a cold-war mentality heavily not only affected by communism, but what the Senator has said, capitalism. So they are selling for short-term gains that, before very long, will endanger them more than us. This is our attempt to say: We are in this together. We are threatened by what you are doing, but watch out, friends, you are going to be threatened soon yourselves.

I thank the Senator for his characteristically straight talk—although he is not on the Straight Talk Express. He is a straight talker in the Senate Chamber. I thank him for his support.

Mr. BIDEN. I wish the driver of that express a lot of luck.

Maybe what Mr. Putin, who is the Acting President and likely soon to be elected President, it appears—maybe we should send my mom over to see him. My mom had an expression, from the time we were kids, when you would do something against your own interest out of anger, or out of pique, or misunderstanding. My mother would say, ''Don't bite your nose off to spite your face.'' Well, we have a whole lot of Russians seeming to bite their noses off to spite their faces. I find it absolutely astounding what they appear to continue to do.

The bill before us is called the Iran Nonproliferation Act. That is the context in which we should talk about this, and I think we should understand this. The purpose of this bill is not to punish, but rather to restrain. The goal that we pursue is not to invoke sanctions, but rather to make this a safer world for all of us, including the Russians. The means to that end is to make this a world with fewer weapons of mass destruction and with fewer delivery systems able to deliver weapons of mass destruction, notably long-range ballistic missiles.

Long-range ballistic missiles are a curious invention. They are awesome, frankly, but they don't amount to

much as a military weapon unless they are armed with a powerful warhead. Now, the sort of long-range missile that Third World countries might build—and that the countries I have mentioned are attempting to build, or have built—those missiles cannot carry big enough warheads to do much damage with a conventional high explosive, a plain old bomb; they are too heavy. The missile is not big enough, powerful enough, does not have enough throw weight to carry conventional weapons. So the irony is that a country which develops or buys long-range ballistic missiles is all too likely, therefore, to seek weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear warheads that are lighter and have much more—no pun intended—bang for the buck than a conventional weapon, or even potentially a lighter payload, with chemical weapons or biological weapons on top of these missiles. The irony is that as they develop a long-range ballistic missile capacity, they are led inextricably—if they are going to be of any ''value'' militarily—they move toward weapons of mass destruction with which to arm the missiles.

North Korea has been trying to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has built chemical and biological weapons and is seeking a nuclear capability. They were close to building a nuclear weapon a decade ago. Similarly, Iran has a covert nuclear weapons program. Even the Government of Russia admits that. Iran has also developed and used chemical weapons. Now, again, that is chemical weapons that, based on the missile technology they may have acquired, even if they have a range of 2,000 miles, as my friend from Connecticut indicated, doesn't get them to Washington, DC. It doesn't get them to any U.S. territory. But it does get them to a lot of areas of the world where our friends—in this case, the Russians—can be affected.

We have to stop this as best we can. The world must move toward fewer weapons of mass destruction, not more of them. We have to reduce the number of long-range ballistic missiles in the world, not increase them. Unfortunately, some foreign persons—and I say ''persons'' because that is the legal word in this legislation for officials or entities; by ''entities'' we mean the Russian agency comparable to our space agency, NASA, or the agency in Russia comparable to our Defense Department, or institutes, or companies. In Russia, institutes or companies cannot be separated very clearly from the Government.

Unfortunately, some of these foreign ''persons''—in Russia, China, and North Korea—are deaf to the world's call for nonproliferation and apparently tone deaf to their own interests. The countries or entities are so desperate for cash or so angry at the West that they will risk Armageddon by helping Iran build long-range ballistic missiles or even nuclear weapons.

As ironic as this sounds, this legislation is designed in part to save them from their own destructive impulses. The United States has imposed sanctions at times on entities from all three of these supplier countries. Again, by the ''supplier'' countries I mean North Korea, China, and Russia. The United States has imposed sanctions on entities from these countries and is continuing negotiations with all of these countries to secure an end to their assistance to Iran. While we may hope for success in the months or years to come, however, there has been little success so far.

Today the Senate will vote to make the President list the offending ''persons;'' to increase his powers to impose sanctions against them; and to limit United States support for Russian work on the international space station if any entities under the Russian Aviation and Space Agency continue to assist Iran, which we have reason to believe they have.

It is important to understand that H.R. 1883, which we will shortly pass, is not an anti-Russian bill. Rather, it is simply and overwhelmingly a nonproliferation bill. Both I and the Senate sponsors of this bill would like nothing better than to have this bill result in no sanctions whatever against Russia.

While we try to crack down on entities that assist Iran's long-range ballistic missile programs, we also support nonproliferation of assistance to Russia. We continue to help Russia reduce its unneeded strategic weapons through the Nunn-Lugar program, protect its sensitive nuclear materials, help it find new careers for excess weapon scientists, and improve its export control laws. Those are the laws that are on the books, and should be enforced, which would prevent any agency or company within Russia from transferring usable information to aid and abet Iran in their long-range missile programs.

We are helping Russia in other ways, as well, so this should not be taken in isolation. This is part of a continuum of efforts on our part to deal with the interests of our country as well as Russia. The United States Government, with the support of many in this body, also continues to work with Russia on many other vital issues. We seek continued strategic arms reductions, through the so-called START process. We support the sharing of missile warning data. We are working to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the ABM Treaty, with an amendment that allows for—again, in Russia's interests—a limited ballistic missile defense. Again, we pointed out that North Korea and Iran present a greater danger to them than they do to the United States.

The United States and other Western countries also offer the investment on which Russia's economic development depends. United States companies even buy ballistic missile engines from Russia's top design bureaus. Our American companies are purchasing directly from Russian design entities. We are buying engines that they are producing, from which they are making substantial money. Iran cannot begin to match the power of the United States to sustain and transform Russian industry. In other words, they will make a heck of a lot more money doing the right thing, dealing with the United States and with the Western Europeans and Japan, than they will ever make from selling technology to Iran. I urge Russian leaders to think about that.

I wonder, with all the chaos that is in place in Russia, whether anybody at the top has ever really focused on this. In pure unadulterated dollars and cents, what is in Russia's economic interest is to sell to the West rather than to sell to Iran. If the choice is starkly made, which we are about to do, I hope they will focus more logically on their alternatives.

This bill and the Senate are not anti-Russian, but we are manifestly anti-proliferation. We will not tolerate vicious and venal persons plunging the world into a new cold war, let alone a hot one in which weapons of mass destruction would be a freely traded currency of death. If Russia or China or North Korea should choose the path of proliferation—and they have to some degree already done that—we will show that there are better paths to power and prestige than proliferating ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to Third World countries with unstable regimes. There is still time to stamp out proliferation and to put the world on a more peaceful path, but we must not and we will not collaborate in sowing the seeds of global destruction through proliferation.

It is unfortunate that the Senate action occurs only weeks before next month's Presidential elections in Russia. The need to pass this legislation is not our fault, that is Russia's fault. Some in that country between now and those elections may try to use our action to stir up a nationalistic reaction for their own political purposes in the upcoming Russian election. That would be both unwise and ill founded. It is also unfortunate that the House authors of this bill insisted upon triggering Presidential reporting and possible sanctions based upon a very low standard of evidence. In practice, however, no President will impose sanctions unless he is convinced that wrongdoing has occurred, notwithstanding the fact that the House standard of evidence is too low a threshold.

Finally, I regret that this bill does not permit the President to authorize

extraordinary payments for work on the international space station, if those payments should be needed, to protect sensitive intelligence information. Neither does it permit payments to a sanctioned entity if such payments are needed to prevent significant dangers to the crew of the space station. I do not think either of those are wise restrictions, and I hope these concerns can be addressed in conference between the House and Senate.

The important fact is, however, that the Senate action today is a measure not of anti-Russian sentiment, nor of any impulse to bully. Rather, it reflects the depth of our concern and also our frustration over the increasing risk that Russian and other entities will recklessly open Pandora's box, against their own interest as well as ours.

I earnestly hope that in the coming weeks, our President and the newly elected President of Russia can put us back on the track of peaceful cooperation to make this a safer and more prosperous world. That is a real prospect for both countries, if Russia would only accept that its profit and its destiny lies in the West, not in the East.

Perhaps passage of this bill will help to bring about such a reevaluation. If so, then prospects for the new century on which we have just embarked would truly be improved. If not, it puts us on a perilous slope to more proliferation and colder, not warmer, relations.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.

As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am in a privileged position to have access to the volumes of intelligence information gathered at great expense and even risk of life by our intelligence community.

Sadly, this intelligence leads me to the conclusion that our efforts thus far to stem proliferation have failed. As the Director of Central Intelligence told me in an open Hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee just this month:

> Mr. Chairman, on proliferation, the picture that I drew last year has become even more stark and worrisome. Transfers of enabling technologies to countries of proliferation concern have not abated.

Particularly in the case of Iran, the intelligence indicates that the proliferation of missile technologies as well as the technologies and expertise to enable their development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, continues unabated.

Our nonproliferation efforts haven't failed because we haven't tried other things. They have failed because the tools we have used thus far have not been up to the task.

The task is indeed formidable.

Iran desperately wants these weapons. We wish they didn't. We wish the problem would go away on its own. But the evidence indicates that it won't. In the unclassified version of a report submitted to me on January 21st pursuant to a mandate in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997—a report available to all Members—the Director of Central Intelligence stated:

> Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD [weapons of mass destruction] . . . from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of weapons—nuclear, chemical, and biological—and their delivery systems.

With regard to missile proliferation, in his testimony to me this month, the DCI reported that:

> Most analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean pattern, could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to the United States in the next few years.

And, he added, Iran could become not just a recipient, but a proliferator:

> While Russia, China, and North Korea continue to be the main suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technology, long-standing recipients—such as Iran—might become suppliers in their own right as they develop domestic production capabilities.

Iran is not just seeking missiles, but also biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Iran is seeking dual-use technologies to further the biological warfare program it began during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran also wants to maintain a prohibited chemical weapons capability. According to the January DCI report I just mentioned, Iran, despite its commitment to give up chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, ''has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them.'' They have continued to ''seek production technology, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare program from entities in Russia and China.'' Finally, Iran wants a nuclear weapons capability. According to the DCI: ''Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially in Russia, during the first half of 1999.''

Importantly, Iran is seeking an indigenous capability. Their pursuit of WMD and delivery systems has lead to a maturing indigenous capability. This means that the window in which we can stop significant proliferation to Iran is closing rapidly. This means that the time to intervene is now.

Some have suggested that the recent elections in Iran should lead us to pause our consideration of this bill. I disagree. First, to the degree that the newly elected Iranian legislators seek to constrain efforts to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction, I believe that this legislation will strengthen such an effort. It demonstrates the seriousness with which the United States Congress views proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, existing evidence indicates that we cannot count on the elections to bring an end to Iran's national policy of developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It is important to underscore that former President Rafsanjani, considered a moderate in Iranian political circles, was the very leader who initiated Iran's pursuit of those weapons. Indeed it was Rafsanjani who said that ''Chemical and biological weapons are poor man's atomic bombs . . .'' After he became Iran's President, he is quoted as saying: ''We should fully equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons.'' We cannot expect that Iran will therefore give up its pursuit of these weapons on their own. This bill will provide additional incentive for them to do so, and we will watch carefully for evidence of such a decision, but at this point, absent strong policy on our part, we must conclude that the policy of acquiring these weapons and their means of delivery will continue.

The task of stemming proliferation to Iran is made more difficult because individuals and the nations from which they proliferate have their own strong motives for aiding Iran. For some individuals, the motive is money. But why can't we simply rely on the governments in which they operate to stop them? In some cases, governments are too week to intervene. In others, the government looks the other way or even promotes proliferation to Iran because their leaders welcome the challenge an Iran with missiles and weapons of mass destruction poses to the United States.

We need the tools to offset the benefits of aiding Iran. We must ensure that there are financial and other costs associated with supplying the assistance Iran still needs in its drive for weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

H.R. 1883 gives the United States tools to attack proliferation on the supply side.

The first tool is the light of exposure to scrutiny. H.R. 1883 requires the President to submit annual reports identifying every person that, on or after January 1, 1999, transfers to Iran goods, services or technology on existing control lists or items with the potential to make a material contribution to Iran's development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or ballistic or cruise missile systems. As a result, the Congress, the American people, and the community of nations will know who is supporting Iran's efforts to threaten peace and stability. We will shine a light on those lining their bank accounts by selling the tools of hideous death and unimaginable destruction to Iran. The threat of public exposure should serve as a significant deterrent to those who contemplate proliferation to Iran.

The second tool offered by H.R. 1883 is the authorization for the President to deny perpetrators of proliferation access to some U.S. trade. I highlight the word ''authorization.'' The sanctions provided by H.R. 1883 are not mandatory and exceptions are granted.

These tools, properly employed, will help stem the tide of proliferation to Iran. Are there costs? Yes. Some U.S. businesses may be called upon by the President to refrain from commerce with individuals that are shown to be materially aiding Iran's weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. But such a potential cost seems reasonable to me in light of the potentially far greater cost if we fail to act—the lives of American men, women, and children.

I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 1883 in a bipartisan way, as our House colleagues did when they voted to pass H.R. 1883 by a vote of 419-zero.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, there are few in this body who have worked harder on this issue than my friend from Connecticut, and it has been a real pleasure to work with him on this legislation and on this issue.

The Iran Nonproliferation Act is an important piece of legislation which seeks to halt the flow of ballistic missile technology and other weapons of mass destruction from Russia to Iran. I strongly support Senate passage of this legislation.

Indeed, even as much of the U.S. focus in the past year—and rightly so, in my mind—has been on the peace process and Israel's relations with Syria and the Palestinians, there may be no greater long term threat to Israel's security and Middle East peace than an Iran actively seeking ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.

That is why I believe that preventing the transfer of illegal nuclear and missile technology from Russia to Iran must be at the top of the U.S. policy agenda.

As my colleagues are aware, there have been numerous reports over the past several years of Russian missile technology reaching Iran, sometimes with a semi-official wink from government authorities in Moscow, sometimes by rogue operators.

Either way, the Russian government must put a stop to these transfers.

As much as we want good relations with Russia, cooperation in this area is crucial. In some ways, I believe it is a litmus test of what sort of player Russia wants to be in the post-Cold War international system.

Although Russia has denied that any illegal transfers have taken place, it has taken some tangible steps in response to American concerns—such as the cancellation of a 1997 contract between a Russian missile factory (NPO Trud) and Iran in which rocket engine components were to have been shipped under the guise of gas pipeline compressors.

Unfortunately, despite such progress as cooperation with the NPO Trud contract, since issuing an Executive Order in 1998, the United States has been forced to sanction ten Russian entities for continuing to transfer technology for the development of advanced ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and the Central Intelligence Agency reports that Russian entities continue to provide Iran with assistance. Indeed, there are reportedly over 10,000 Russians in Iran helping Iran with these programs.

For its part, and despite some positive signs of moderation in Iran's politics—the recent elections notwithstanding—Iran has not yet moderated any of its policies with regard to the support of international terrorism or the pursuit of advanced ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Iran has flight-tested the Shihab-3, a missile that can hit Israel and U.S. forces in the Middle East, and is continuing to work on other advanced missile designs, including those capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

Because of Russia's mixed record—and Iran's outright dangerous record—I believe that although we should try to build on Russia's record of cooperation, we must also be prepared to take tough action when the situation warrants. In other words, we must be prepared to work with Russia on this issue and offer them a carrot, but, if our interests and those of our friends and allies are threatened, we must also be prepared to use a stick.

To that end, last year I offered an amendment on the Department of Defense authorization bill, passed by the Senate, which stated that it is the sense of Congress that the U.S. should increase the quota on commercial space launch services provided by Russia if the Russian government demonstrates a sustained commitment to prevent the transfer from Russia to Iran, or other countries, of nuclear and missile technology.

I continue to believe that pending Russian cooperation this quota can be raised to 20 and, if Russia continues to cooperate, incrementally raised again in the coming years. Each launch provides Russia with approximately $100 million in hard currency. A $100 million carrot is a good incentive to cooperate.

The bill we consider before us today recognizes that in addition to such carrots, we must also be prepared to take tough action when necessary. The Iran Nonproliferation Act has two parts.

First, it requires the President to report credible information about any foreign entity providing dangerous technologies to Iran and authorize the President to sanction these entities in accordance with the President's own Executive Order.

Second, it requires that the President must certify that the Russian government opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to Iran and is taking steps to oppose such proliferation before the Russian Space Agency is provided with any additional U.S. taxpayer money beyond what has contracted for the International Space Station. These are funds which the U.S. is providing to Russia so that Russia can meet its own obligations to the International Space Station. If Russia and the Russian Space Agency cooperates with the U.S. on proliferation, then cooperation between Russia and Iran on the proliferation of advanced ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction must stop. If Russia and the Russian Space Agency cooperates with the U.S. on proliferation, then I believe we can work in partnership with them to increase commercial space launch and to provide funding for the International Space Station.

But there are few things more dangerous or destabilizing to U.S. interests and peace and security in the Middle East than a nuclear armed Iran which continues to support international terrorism. And if Russia does not recognize this and is not willing to work with the United States to build a more stable and more secure Middle East, then we must not shy away from taking the tough action necessary to get results.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, for the past three years the Clinton administration has fought tooth-and-nail against the legislation now before the Senate. The White House repeatedly claimed, in its attempted defense, that the Lott-Lieberman initiative would undermine U.S. nonproliferation efforts, repeatedly asserting that they had Russia's behavior in check, and that progress was being made.

Well, Mr. President, we now confront an Iran that has been armed to the gills with technology for ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. According to the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, (who testified before the Foreign Relations Committee this past September), Iran is in a position to test, within the latter half of this decade, an ICBM that ''could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to many parts of the United States . . . using Russian technology and assistance.''

Moreover, according to the Director of Central Intelligence, Iran ''probably has achieved 'emergency operational capability' '' with its medium range Shahab-3 missile. In other words, under President Clinton's watch, Iran has acquired from Russia and China the ability to strike Israel and Turkey with ballistic missiles carrying chemical or biological warheads. And the mullahs are working overtime to develop the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 in order to menace U.S. citizens at home.

In conclude now, in the absence of fierce opposition to this bill from the White House this time around, that reality has finally sunk in at the National Security Council. The Clinton administration's nonproliferation policy has been an abject failure. Bill Clinton and AL GORE will leave office having subordinated nonproliferation concerns to business interests, the wishes to foreign campaign donors, and their ''touchy-feely'' personal politicking in Russia, China and elsewhere.

The result has been an all-out fire-sale of deadly technologies by Russia, China, and others. Delegations from Iran, Syria, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Sudan, Egypt, India, and Pakistan are virtually tripping over one another on their way in and out of various Russian and Chinese firms.

The Clinton-Gore Administration will leave office:

1. having allowed Russia and China to sell dangerous commodities around the globe with no fear of sanctions or consequences;

2. having presided over the development of a North Korean ICBM capable of dropping biological weapons on U.S. soil (according to the intelligence community, a Taepo Dong-2 ICBM could be tested any day now);

3. having presided over the arming of Iran, Syria, and others with nuclear, chemical, and biological missiles;

4. having squandered its inheritance regarding Iraq by interfering with, and ultimately abandoning, UNSCOM;

5. having prompted India and Pakistan into an all-out nuclear arms race by trying to ''strong-arm'' the two countries into the Test Ban Treaty (which merely prompted the nations to test);

6. having lost all hope of getting the START II Treaty ratified, which would have banned MIRVed ICBMs in Russia;

7. having imperiled the IAEA by tying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to the poorly-conceived, poorly-drafted CTBT, which the Senate rightly rejected;

8. having destroyed the Missile Technology Control Regime by allowing Russia (a missile proliferator) to come in as a member; and

9. having wasted half a decade of precious time in deploying a national missile defense to protect the United States from the consequences of their failed nonproliferation policy.

We must all remember that the Clinton-Gore administration voted the DoD authorization bill in 1995 because it required deployment of a national missile defense by 2001, with additional protection by 2003. Because of the President's reckless disregard for the nation's security, the U.S. will not ''break ground'' on a missile defense site in Alaska until this summer, at the earliest.

At the same time, this administration taught Russia and China how to evade U.S. sanctions laws while simultaneously putting the U.S. sanctions determination process into a deep freeze. Not a single MTCR sanction has been imposed for Russia's arming of Iran or China's assistance to Pakistan. The enormity of this blatant disregard for the law is stunning, Mr. President.

What is worse, by promoting U.S. commercial interests at the expense of national security, the Clinton-Gore administration has become part of the problem.

China's nuclear proliferation has been swept under the rug by Mr. Clinton in order to clear the way for the nuclear lobby to sell reactors to the PRC. We must recall that, in 1998, President Clinton made a legally binding certification which no other President could, in good faith, bring himself to make. But the Clinton-Gore administration was happy to oblige industry and the Communist Chinese.

In 1996 the Clinton administration pulled controls on commercial satellites because millionaire campaign donors wanted it. Unsupervised, unscrupulous U.S. companies engaged in the transfer of very sensitive ballistic missile information to the PRC, including information relating to the MIRVing of ICBMs. The Congress tried to shore up this fiasco by recontrolling satellites, but the Commerce Department is at it again, having recently declared—despite the law—that it wants reduced controls on extremely sensitive items such as radiation hardened chips and kick motors.

From 1993 until 1999, willful disregard for security at the White House and the Department of Energy permitted continued acquisition of the nation's most sensitive nuclear warhead designs by China. This was exacerbated by the foolhardy declassification of thousands of documents by Hazel O'Leary, which undoubtedly has contributed to nuclear weapons capabilities around the globe. Even now, the Clinton-Gore administration is contemplating sharing nuclear weapons secrets with Russia in an effort to bribe them into submission on the ABM Treaty.

Lately, the Department of Defense—once the bulwark against the foolhardy weakening of export controls—has been working ''hand-in-glove'' with the defense industry and the Gore campaign. The Pentagon is now looking for ways to undermine the Arms Export Control Act. Again, this is happening because industry lobbying groups want these changes. There is an effort underway to avoid congressional notification of arms sales and to create license-free zones. The result, if unchecked, will be unfettered and unregulated trade in weaponry, which cannot be seen as a positive development under any circumstance.

Finally, the administration has decided to support passively an Export Administration Act which would effectively undermine all existing U.S. export controls and which would undercut what is left of the nonproliferation policy which this administration inherited eight years ago. Enormous sums of money are being spent all over Washington by various industry groups because they know how loose export controls will be under this bill.

Ronald Reagan's nonproliferation policy is in shambles, Mr. President. At best, this administration has been inept in managing such important issues. At worst, the administration has co-opted and corrupted nonproliferation policy on the basis of fund-raising schemes being run out of the Oval Office. The damage to U.S. nonproliferation policy is so severe and far-reaching, and the global results to date have been so catastrophic, that the next administration is going to spend the first four years just picking up the pieces.

Mr. President, history will do worse than recording this administration as having fiddled while Rome burned. It will record these people as having set many of the fires themselves.

I support the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Its reporting requirements will shed light on the fact that numerous Russian entities have sold their souls to the Mullahs in Tehran by offering that bunch of terrorists everything they want for their ballistic and cruise missile programs, including nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare technology. It will also prove that this administration has accomplished nothing in the past several years of ''talking.''

That said, however much it might help, this bill will not solve the problem. It is much too late to prevent Iran from capitalizing upon the capabilities it has acquired.

While it is not too late to defend ourselves, or to assist Israel, Turkey, and others in defending themselves, it will fall to the next administration to reconstruct a comprehensive nonproliferation policy and reverse the fearful effects of the past eight years.

Thank you, Mr. President; I yield the floor.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems continues to be one of the most significant threats to America's national security. States like North Korea and Iran are actively pursuing ambitious programs and the technology needed to threaten the United States. Unclassified reports from our intelligence agencies indicate that these efforts have intensified.

Iranian ballistic missile progress is largely the result of substantial assistance from North Korea, China, and especially, Russia. There is no doubt that foreign technology and assistance are essential to Iran's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs. The U.S. intelligence community's

most recent unclassified Semiannual Report to Congress on Proliferation states, ''Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and ACW [advanced conventional weapons] technology from abroad.''

The type of foreign assistance that is the subject of this legislation serves to increase the sophistication and rate of development of Iran's ballistic missiles. We must do more than we are doing now to impede its progress and, at the same time, prepare defenses against the use of such weapons.

The rapid development of the Shahab-3 demonstrates how foreign assistance accelerated Iran's ballistic missile programs. The Shahab-3 is based on the North Korean Nodong ballistic missile. But instead of simply purchasing the missile as Pakistan did, Iran chose to modify the design of the missile with Russian and Chinese assistance and produce the missile on its own. In February 1997, George Tenet, then Acting Director of the CIA, testified that with North Korean assistance, Iran could develop the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, ''in less than ten years.'' Less than a year later, in January 1998, Director Tenet testified, ''Iran's success in gaining technology and material from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian advances, means that [Iran] could have a medium-range ballistic missile much sooner than I assessed last year.'' Six months later, in July 1998, Iran flight-tested the Shahab-3. An unclassified Intelligence Community report released in January of this year assessed that Iran has achieved an ''emergency operational capability'' with the Shahab-3.

Proliferation to Iran continues. According to the U.S. intelligence community's most recent unclassified Semiannual Report on Proliferation, summarizing proliferation that occurred in the first half of 1999,

> Russian entities during the first six months of 1999 have provided substantial missile-related technology, training, and expertise to Iran that almost certainly will continue to accelerate Iranian efforts to build new indigenous ballistic missiles.
>
> * * * * *
>
> During the reporting period, firms in China provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran.
>
> * * * * *
>
> Throughout the first half of 1999, North Korea continued to export ballistic missiles-related equipment and missile components, materials and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East . . .

This report to Congress also states, ''. . . economic conditions in Russia continued to deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian entities to circumvent export controls. Despite some examples of restraint, Russian businesses continue to be major suppliers of WMD equipment, materials, and technology to Iran.''

Because Russian government officials continue to show an unwillingness or inability to stop this dangerous assistance to Iran, the legislation we are considering should be passed to authorize and direct more effective sanctions.

North Korea's continuing relationship with Iran is also of great concern. Iran has already received sufficient technology from North Korea to build a copycat three-stage Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile on its own. Moreover, senior Intelligence Community officials have testified that they expect North Korea to continue to sell ballistic missiles to Iran. Therefore, we must expect Iran to acquire the technology for the longer-range Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile when North Korea begins its export. It is too optimistic, given the North Korea-Iran ballistic missile relationship, to expect Iran's capabilities to lag North Korea's for very long.

There are several significant consequences of the continued proliferation of ballistic missile technology to Iran. I'll mention two.

First, this assistance will allow Iran to develop more advanced ballistic missiles faster, cheaper, and easier than it otherwise would have on its own. Iran's defense minister has announced that it is working on the more advanced Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 missiles, and the Iranians even claim that they are going to launch a satellite into orbit by the second half of 2001. According to press reports, Iran's Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 ballistic missiles will use Russian engine technology, leading to an Iranian ICBM based in large part on Russian technology. Diminishing this proliferation is essential to slowing Iran's long-range ballistic missile program.

Second, Iran is bound to become a supplier of ballistic missile technology and expertise as its own program proceeds. CIA Director Tenet recently made this point, testifying that, ''Iran's existence as a secondary supplier of this technology to other countries is the trend that worries me the most.'' We are already seeing indications that Iran is no longer merely a recipient of ballistic missile technology. According to unclassified intelligence community reports, Iran is assisting Libya's ballistic missile programs. Press reports also indicate Iran is helping Syria and others develop or acquire ballistic missiles.

The legislation before the Senate will improve our efforts to restrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology to Iran. I urge its approval.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I had a number of concerns with this bill, as it was approved by the House. I am pleased that we have been able to reach agreement on an amendment that addresses many of these concerns. The managers' amendment would make it clear that the application of sanctions under section 3 of the bill is discretionary, not mandatory. It would also urge the executive branch to provide notice to persons who may be subject to sanctions under this provision, giving them an opportunity to provide explanatory or exculpatory information before such sanctions are provided.

I had planned on offering several amendments to this bill when it came to the floor, but because of the adoption of this amendment, I shall not do so. I would also like to clarify a few points with the chief Senate sponsors of the bill.

First, the bill requires reporting of foreign persons when there is ''credible information'' indicating that the person transferred specified goods, services, or technologies to Iran. I understand that it is the intent of the sponsors that the President judge the credibility of information on the basis of all information available to him, including both information that supports and information that undermines the conclusion that a covered transfer may have taken places. In other words, ''credible information'' is information that would lead a reasonable person to conlcude—after consideration of all the available evidence—that there is a substantial possibility that a covered transfer took place. Is that correct?

Mr. LOTT. I agree. That understanding is consistent with the intent of the House, which defined ''credible information'' as such in its report.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree.

Mr. LEVIN. The second point that I would like to address is the use of the word ''timely'' in the managers' amendment. It is my understanding that the intent is that, whenever appropriate, the President provide notice to foreign persons, or to the government with primarily jurisdiction over such persons, in a manner that provides them a reasonable opportunity to provide explanatory or exculpatory information before sanctions are imposed. Do the lead sponsors agree with this view?

Mr. LOTT. I agree.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree.

Mr. LEVIN. Finally, I would like to address section 6 of the bill, which requires a determination by the President that, among other things, the Government of Russia has demonstrated a sustained commitment to seek out and prevent the transfer to Iran of goods, services and technology that ''could'' make a material contribution to the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems. It is my understanding that the use of the word ''could'' in this provision is not intended to go beyond other nonproliferation requirements or require the President to consider remote or absurdly hypothetical circumstances. Is that correct?

Mr. LOTT. That is correct. The use of the term ''could'' is meant to convey an expectation that commodities should be controlled and monitored because of their potential for contributing to nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare programs, or to ballistic or cruise missile development. That is to say, this section covers commodities which should be controlled because of their physical or technological properties. This standard is consistent with current United States export control practice and with various statutory nonproliferation reporting requirements.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Iran Nonproliferation Act. For the past few years, I have been concerned about Iran's efforts to acquire the technology for ballistic missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons from Russia and China.

When reports began to surface in 1997 about Russian missile assistance to Iran, I met twice with Russia's Ambassador to the U.S. and the administration's special envoy on this issue to express my concern about this dangerous trade and to urge the Russian government and the Clinton Administration to take steps to stop it.

I also gathered together a group of 99 Members of the House and Senate, who wrote to the President to urge him to invoke sanctions to halt this trade. The President refused.

Along with a bipartisan group of House and Senate Members, I went to the White House to meet with Vice President GORE to urge the administration to take concrete actions to end Russian transfers to Iran. Again the administration refused, citing the need to let diplomacy work.

That summer, I successfully offered an amendment that was adopted by unanimous consent to the fiscal year 1998 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill barring U.S. aid to Russia if missile assistance to Iran continued. In conference, the amendment was changed to give the President the ability to waive this prohibition on aid to Russia, which he subsequently did.

In November 1997, the Senate unanimously passed a concurrent resolution that I sponsored, expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should sanction the Russian organizations involved in selling missile technology to Iran. The House also passed this resolution overwhelmingly by a vote of 414 to 8. Again the President refused to impose sanctions.

The Congress tried again to spur the administration to action 6 months later when we passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act mandating sanctions on any organization involved in assisting Iran's missile or weapons of mass destruction programs. This bill passed the Senate by a vote of 90 to 4. Yet, when it reached the President's desk, he vetoed it.

Instead of voting to override this veto, the Congress acceded to the President's request for more time to let diplomacy work. The verdict is in on that decision. Transfers of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile technology to Iran persist demonstrating the Congress erred in deciding not to override the veto. While the administration has imposed so-called administrative sanctions against a handful of Russian entities, it cooperated with the Russian government to identify the target organizations such that the sanctions would have no meaningful effect, completely undermining the value of the action.

While I will not go into the same detail here, let me simply say the administration has a similar record on Chinese proliferation to Iran, where it has failed to enforce U.S. laws calling for sanctions, again noting the need to let diplomacy work.

Since the administration would not take steps to halt proliferation to Iran, I offered an amendment to a supplemental appropriations bill that the President signed into law in May 1998. The amendment appropriated $179 million to accelerate the development of U.S. theater missile defenses, including $45 million for Israel to begin purchasing equipment for a third battery of its Arrow missile defense system in order to counter the increased Iranian missile threat.

As these examples show, the Clinton Administration is simply not willing to take the tough actions necessary to prevent proliferation. As a result, intelligence assessments indicate the problem is growing worse all the time. In an unclassified report to Congress last month, CIA Director George Tenet stated;

> Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons technology from abroad. . . . For the first half of 1999, entities in Russia and China continued to supply a considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technology to Iran. . . . Iran already is producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles and has built and publicly displayed prototypes for the [1,300 kilometer-range] Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, which had its initial flight test in July 1998 and probably achieved ''emergency operational capability''—i.e., Tehran could deploy a limited number of the Shahab-3 prototype missiles in an operational mode during a perceived crisis situation. In addition, Iran's Defense Minister last year publicly acknowledged the development of the [2,000 kilometer range] Shahab-4 . . . [and] publicly mentioned plans for a ''Shahab-5.''

In the report, Director Tenet went on to note that Iran continues to seek biological warfare technology from Russia and Europe and despite being a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention has ''already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons . . . and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them.'' He also said that ''Tehran continues to seek production technology, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare program from entities in Russia and China.''

Finally, the report indicated that despite promising never to acquire nuclear weapons, when it ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has a nuclear weapons program, stating:

> Iran is attempting to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle for its civilian energy program. In that guise, it seeks to obtain whole facilities . . . that in fact could be used in any number of ways in support of efforts to produce fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite international efforts to curtail the flow of critical technologies and equipment, Tehran continues to seek fissile material and technology for weapons development and has set up an elaborate system of military and civilian organization to support its effort.

In fact, according to the Washington Post, the CIA recently concluded that it could no longer rule out the possibility that Iran is already capable of producing a nuclear weapon. This is terribly troubling in light of the progress Iran has made in its missile program. Earlier this month, Director Tenet testified to the Intelligence Committee that:

> Most [intelligence] analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean pattern, could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to the United States in the next few years. . . . As alarming as the long-range missile threat is, it should not overshadow the immediacy and seriousness of the threat that U.S. forces, interests, and allies already face overseas from short and medium range missiles. The proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles [to nations like Iran] is significantly altering strategic balances in the Middle East and Asia.

Finally, Director Tenet outlined a new type of proliferation threat from Iran in his testimony, warning that:

> . . . long-standing recipients—such as Iran—might become suppliers in their own right as they develop domestic production capabilities. . . . Iran in the next few years may be able to supply not only complete Scuds, but also Shahab-3s and related technology, and perhaps more advanced technologies if Tehran continues to receive assistance from Russia, China, and North Korea.

It is clear that meaningful measures, and not simply another round of feckless diplomacy or a flawed international treaty such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT, is needed to combat this growing threat. Last Fall, the Administration accused the Congress of undermining U.S. nonproliferation efforts in rejecting the CTBT. But that treaty was unverifiable, would have undermined America's nuclear deterrent, and would have done nothing meaningful to combat proliferation.

As I mentioned earlier, Iran along with 191 other nations has ratified the

NPT, and thereby promised never to acquire nuclear weapons. It is violating this treaty. It is also violating the Chemical Weapons Convention and is acquiring missile technology. All of these actions should trigger U.S. sanctions, but the Clinton Administration has refused to take action.

If arms control treaties like the NPT and other nonproliferation efforts are to be useful, they must be enforced. I urge the administration to finally get serious about this matter and for my colleagues to vote for the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Iran's possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the missiles used to deliver them poses a clear and present danger to the United States and our forces and friends in the region. It is long past time that we address this threat.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE REGULATION

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I want to read portions of a proposed regulation found on page 173 of the January 3, 2000, issue of the Federal Register:

> ''[I]t is important that individuals alter their daily behaviors,'' ''and for governmental entities to seek programmatic incentives, public education, regulatory changes, or other approaches.''
>
> ''Daily behaviors'' are further defined as ''Individual decisions about energy consumption for heating, travel, and other purposes;'' and ''individual maintenance of residences or gardens.''

Those passages come directly from a ''4(d)'' Endangered Species Act regulation for the Pacific Northwest proposed by the National Marine Fisheries Service. The rule states flatly these are examples of activities that could kill salmon or steelhead through water, air, and ocean pollution, and that NMFS ''might or might not'' seek to regulate them as such under the rule.

Taken literally, if these rules are enacted as written, National Marine Fisheries Service could regulate how often individuals drive their cars, where and how property owners could plant or fertilize their lawns, gardens, or farm crops. They could dictate the content of county zoning, public works, building, and road ordinances, and possibly even suggest limits on the setting of thermostats in homes or public school classrooms, or the operation of public transit buses—all to protect salmon.

Washington citizens, and those in other Northwest States, would be asked to make a host of changes in their daily lives, but unfortunately, could be assured of nothing except for the certainty that a greater portion of their tax dollars would fund the salaries of even more Federal bureaucrats to draft more rules and regulations of this nature. This year, the National Marine Fisheries Service is asking Congress to fund 41 new employees just to implement its West Coast salmon recovery plan.

Those proposals would represent a striking power grab by unelected bureaucrats if they were absolutely necessary to save whole species of salmon. But they are not. As I said in a letter to President Clinton 2 weeks ago, the Federal Government should be seeking to encourage and promote incentives for States, tribes, and local entities and private groups to come up with creative solutions to save salmon, not make it more difficult for them.

And that is exactly what these rules do. The rules go far beyond telling hundreds of farmers in the Methow Valley that they cannot exercise their water rights to irrigate their crops until they have National Marine Fisheries Service-approved fish screens installed at their own expense, as the agency told my constituents in north central Washington last year.

They would go beyond holding up the construction of bridges in Columbia County or cities' efforts to install stop lights, as the National Marine Fisheries Service's salmon regulatory process has already done.

In short, these rules, if enacted as proposed, would be likely to slow down local salmon recovery efforts, rather than ''increasing people's flexibility in complying with the Endangered Species Act,'' as the National Marine Fisheries Service publicly claimed in mid-December. More Federal bureaucracy simply will not help local communities and private groups protect salmon and steelhead.

I also notice that the National Marine Fisheries Service has proposed a narrow set of exemptions within the rules, which could make the enforcement of the rule arbitrary and unfair against those who don't meet their stated criteria. The Oregon Department of Transportation, for example, would be in compliance with the rule in carrying out its road maintenance activities on roads abutting streams, because that agency agreed to implement special National Marine Fisheries Service-approved training for its road maintenance crews. No such exemption exists in the rule for private land owners anywhere or the Washington Department of Transportation to carry on the same activities.

The people of Washington State realized the importance of not allowing endangered salmon and steelhead runs to go extinct long before any Federal agency told them they should modify their own ''daily behavior'' as part of the effort. The only ''daily behavior'' that local salmon enhancement groups are concerned with in Washington right now is to restore salmon and steelhead runs right in the streams and rivers near where they live and work. And they are doing it.

Look, for example, at the successful efforts of the variety of agricultural, business, and tribal groups who formed the Skagit Watershed Council to produce an on-the-ground science-based strategy for prioritizing local habitat recovery projects. They came together, often disagreeing on other issues, but to work together on the most productive salmon recovery efforts—without the Federal Government telling them to do so.

Then there are the successful efforts of Long Live the Kings on the Wishkah River on Grays Harbor County, where low-tech, inexpensive habitat restoration methods helped double the returns of natural spawning salmon there in 1 year.

A captive brook stock facility was built with $1 million in private funds on Lilliwaup Creek on Hood Canal, and already the State of Washington has looked to that success in restoring the very most threatened local wild salmon runs. I can cite several more examples, but suffice it to say that local efforts are underway, and we should congratulate their efforts to proactively and successfully preserve salmon.

Proposing regulations of this sort, at the very least, would be putting the ''cart before the horse.'' The National Marine Fisheries Service must come forward with concrete goals of how many fish they intend to recover throughout the Northwest in areas they call ''evolutionary significant units.'' This is something that Congress asked the National Marine Fisheries Service to do in an appropriations conference report last year. The National Marine Fisheries Service was directed to determine and set numerical goals for Puget Sound areas by July 1 of this year, and, by then, to set a schedule for establishing numerical goals for all other areas in Washington State.

Why is this important? Well, very simply put: How can you mandate means, mandate lifestyle changes, before you know what you are trying to accomplish? In my view, having these numerical goals is critical to guiding the agency in any effort it makes to enforce 4(d) rules to protect threatened species.

Unfortunately, not only has the National Marine Fisheries Service failed to provide the required numerical goals for salmon species, it has yet to deliver