

July 19, 2000

Jeanne Mileti of Cachagua; his step-son John Penney of Los Angeles; and his sister, Cynthia Williams of Carmel Highlands.

REMEMBERING MR. C. WAYNE
KEITH

HON. SCOTT McINNIS

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 18, 2000

Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, it is with great sadness that I wish to take this moment to recognize the remarkable life and significant achievements of one of Colorado's leading public servants, former Chief of the Colorado State Patrol, C. Wayne Keith. Sadly, Mr. Keith recently passed away. As family, friends, students and colleagues mourn his passing, I would like to honor this great American.

For the better half of a decade Mr. Keith served well and faithfully in the Colorado State Patrol as Chief until his retirement. As a member of the State Patrol, his sense of humor was apparent. His daughter remembered that "He always wanted to razz people just to make life more fun, he always wanted to help everyone and just make people laugh". Even after his retirement Mr. Keith remained active in several organizations including the International Association for Chiefs of Police, the American Lung Association and Easter Seals. Even when Mr. Keith was ailing his spirit did not fail. His sister commented that "the pranks did not stop just because he was sick." She said that "they had these wires across the roof and he would tie strings to them and attach fake spiders, then when nurses would come in he would dangle it in front of them. They would get so scared and the pills would go flying. He thought it was fun".

Full of life, with so much to give, Mr. Keith was taken all too soon. But his memory will live on in all those he has touched. I am confident, Mr. Speaker, that in the face of this profound loss, the family, friends, and the Colorado community can take comfort in the knowledge that each is a better person for having known him.

The people of the state of Colorado have lost a dedicated public servant and an outstanding citizen. He was a model of American ideals, embodying patriotism and service throughout his lifetime. For the life of service that he led will benefit Colorado for many generations to come.

INTRODUCTION OF THE FEDERAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT PAY EQUITY
ACT OF 2000

HON. CONSTANCE A. MORELLA

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 18, 2000

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, today, I am introducing the Federal Law Enforcement Pay Equity Act of 2000. The purpose of this legislation is to correct the serious recruitment and retention problem facing the United States Park Police and the United States Secret Service Uniformed Division.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

The United States Park Police is America's oldest federal uniformed law enforcement agency with origins dating to the establishment of the seat of government in the District of Columbia. In 1791, President George Washington called for "Park Watchmen" to be provided by the United States Government for services in and around the public squares and reservations in the new Federal city. They were given the same powers and duties as the Metropolitan Police in the District of Columbia in 1882. In 1919, Congress renamed the Park Watchmen "the United States Park Police." The Park Police also provide law enforcement and ensure public safety in various localities in the National Park system.

Safeguarding our national treasures here in DC and elsewhere, and providing support to the Metropolitan Police, the men and women of the Park Police put themselves on the line every day. They conduct investigations into crimes committed in their jurisdiction and put officers on the beat. They secure such national landmarks as the Washington Monument from terrorist threats. They provide air support for law enforcement and search and rescue in DC and in surrounding areas. They even escort Marine Corps 1 and provide air support for Presidential protection.

However, authorized to operate with 806 officers, the Park Police are short more than 165 people from a full compliment. A recent Booz-Allen report indicates that this shortage poses a severe security threat at national monuments and also creates an unsafe working environment for the members of the Park Police. This shortage worsens monthly, and every year, more officers leave than the Park Police are able to recruit. The number one reason given by officers for their departure is pay.

The United States Secret Service Uniformed Division faces a similar situation. Established as the White House Police in 1922, they operate under the oversight of the Secret Service, protecting the White House grounds and the immediate vicinity and provide protection to foreign diplomatic missions in the Washington metropolitan area. They currently employ 1038 officers, but they too have suffered a drastic loss of personnel in recent years. As it currently stands, roughly 56% of the officers of the Uniformed Division have less than 7 years experience on the job. As is the case with the Park Police, the drastic reduction in available personnel has created a situation of forced overtimes and low morale among the officers.

The Federal Law Enforcement Pay Equity Act will rectify this situation. This legislation equalizes and simplifies the pay scales and benefits structures of the Park Police and the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service and increases the salaries for the rank and file officers significantly, making their salaries competitive with local jurisdictions. Additionally, this legislation was crafted to include a bonus for longevity built into the pay scale. This bill also increases the pay of officers engaged in technical duties. Bolstered with competitive salaries and benefits, these two agencies will be able to more effectively recruit and retain diverse and capable officers. This legislation is urgently needed to rectify the inequity in the current system.

15525

RECOGNIZING TANTASQUA REGIONAL JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL NATIONAL SERVICE-LEARNING LEADER SCHOOL

HON. RICHARD E. NEAL

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 18, 2000

Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the achievement of Tantasqua Regional Junior High School. This school in my district was one of sixty-six schools to be named a National Service-Learning Leader School, and was honored by this Presidential award this past June.

I want to congratulate Tantasqua Junior High School for being recognized on such a national level. Their programs concerning service-learning have not only had a positive affect on the students of the school, but the community as well.

Service-learning is a way of teaching that involves a combination of academics and community service, and is based on a joint effort from both teachers and students to improve the learning process. This style of education is on the rise in the United States and is increasingly being incorporated into both the standard and core courses taught in our nation's schools. This allows schools like Tantasqua Junior High to infuse standard courses with a sense of responsibility to community service, which in turn strengthens and bonds our communities by instilling in these teenagers a sense of commitment to giving to the community through volunteer work.

Tantasqua Regional Junior High School is one of only three schools recognized in the State of Massachusetts and its faculty, students and principal, Daniel Durgin, have every right to be proud of this momentous achievement. The school's faculty was invited to Washington on June 15 for a reception attended by congressmen and congresswomen where they received even further training in service-learning techniques. These schools were acknowledged and recognized as models for other schools. The intent is that these selected institutions will lead other schools in their area towards a better education for our children.

As recipients of this award, the students and faculty of Tantasqua Regional Junior High School should again be applauded and congratulated. Their efforts have produced a school of which both the state and country can be proud.

NORTH KOREA
NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000

HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 18, 2000

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to introduce H.R. 4860, the "North Korea Non-proliferation Act of 2000".

I am offering this bipartisan legislation in response to North Korea's ongoing proliferation

of missile and other dangerous weapons technologies to terrorist and other rogue states. The United States and our allies have worked hard to rein in North Korea's dangerous missile program. There have, from time to time, been signs of progress. But a recent headline in New York Times accurately summarizes North Korea's current policy: "North Korea Vows to Continue Missile Program".

This New York Times story described North Korea's reaction to the latest round of diplomacy between the United States and North Korea in which the North Koreans were asked once again to stop proliferating missile technology to rogue states. North Korea deigned to participate in this latest round of diplomacy with the United States following the Clinton Administration's termination of the 50-year old U.S. embargo of North Korea on June 19, 2000.

The process leading up to the Clinton Administration's termination of the embargo on June 19th is worth recounting, because it speaks volumes about North Korea's ability to wear down and outflank U.S. negotiators.

For years it was the Clinton Administration's policy that it would end the U.S. embargo of North Korea only in connection with a binding agreement in which North Korea promised to end missile proliferation. The prospect of ending the embargo was the principal inducement that the U.S. negotiators had to offer the North Koreans for such a deal.

But on August 31, 1998, North Korea test fired a three-stage long range Taepo Dong missile across Japan, and the Japanese became very angry. So angry, in fact that they threatened to end their financial support of the Agreed Framework with North Korea—the 1994 agreement in which the Clinton Administration promised to give North Korea two advanced nuclear reactors worth approximately \$5 billion in exchange for a "freeze" of North Korea's nuclear program.

The Clinton Administration became so alarmed about the risk of Japanese withdrawal from the Agreed Framework that it made the prevention of any more missile tests by North Korea its highest priority. Over the next year, the Administration negotiated diligently, and on September 12, 1999, it announced that North Korea had agreed to a temporary moratorium on further missile tests. In exchange for the moratorium, the Clinton Administration pledged that it would end the U.S. embargo of North Korea.

The Administration had, in other words, given away its leverage on the issue of missile proliferation for a temporary deal on missile testing. The U.S. negotiators charged with getting an agreement ending North Korean proliferation were left with no meaningful inducements to offer the North Koreans.

The Clinton Administration did not immediately end the embargo. For nine months, it held off doing so in the hope that a promised "high level visitor" from North Korea would come to the United States to formalize the moratorium on missile testing. No such visitor ever materialized, and the moratorium was never formalized, but on June 19, 2000, the Administration relented and ended the embargo anyway. In exchange, the North Koreans agreed to participate in another round of talks about missile proliferation.

The U.S. negotiators went to the talks with no meaningful inducements to offer, so the North Koreans boldly requested one: they offered to stop missile proliferation in exchange for \$1 billion per year in cash from the United States.

The U.S. negotiators rejected this offer out of hand, but the North Korean request illustrates a broader truth: now that the Clinton Administration has effectively normalized economic relations with North Korea, it will have to come up with some other massive bribe in order to make progress on missile proliferation. Such a bribe can only help shore up the North Korean regime and strengthen its grip on power.

The North Korea Nonproliferation Act tries to overcome this dilemma by restoring the linkage between normalized economic relations with the United States and good behavior by North Korea with regard to proliferation. The bill does not reverse the Administration's decision to end the embargo, but it would require reimposition of the embargo in two circumstances: (1) if North Korea violates the missile testing moratorium, or (2) if it proliferates to a state sponsor of terrorism or a country that has tested long range missiles built with North Korean goods or technology.

The legislation provides the President a national interest waiver that he may exercise to promptly terminate the embargo of North Korea if it is reimposed pursuant to this legislation.

The effect of the legislation, therefore, is to underscore to the North Koreans that they cannot continue to proliferate dangerous weapons technologies to the world's most odious governments without paying a price in their relationship with the United States.

I am pleased to be joined in offering this legislation by some of the leaders within the Congress on the issue of proliferation: Congressman ED MARKEY (D-MA), co-chair of the House Nonproliferation Task Force, Congressman JOE KNOLLENBERG (R-MI), and Congressman FRANK PALLONE (D-NJ).

SUMMARY OF H.R. 4860

NORTH KOREA NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000

1. Reports to Congress.—The President shall submit a report to Congress every six months identifying all instances in which there is credible information that North Korea has—

(a) taken an action inconsistent with North Korea's obligations under—

(1) the agreement with the United States of September 12, 1999, to suspend launches of long range missiles, or

(2) any future international agreement in which North Korea agreed to limits on its testing, deployment, or proliferation of missiles or missile technology; and

(b) transferred to a foreign country, on or after the date of enactment, goods, services, or technology listed on a nonproliferation control list (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control lists).

2. Discretionary Reimposition of Sanctions.—The President is authorized to reimpose any or all of the restrictions on commerce with North Korea that were in place under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations prior to September 12, 1999, if a semi-annual report to Congress under this Act indicates that there is credible information

that, on or after the date of enactment, North Korea transferred to a foreign country goods, services, or technology listed on a nonproliferation control list (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control lists).

3. Mandatory Reimposition of Sanctions.—In addition, the president shall reimpose all of the restrictions on commerce with North Korea that were in place under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations prior to September 12, 1999, within 10 days of submitting a semiannual report to Congress under this Act indicating that there is credible information that North Korea has—

(a) taken an action inconsistent with North Korea's obligations under—

(1) the agreement with the United States of September 12, 1999, to suspend launches of long range missiles, or

(2) any future international agreement in which North Korea agreed to limits on its testing, deployment, or proliferation of missiles or missile technology; or

(b) transferred, on or after the date of enactment, goods, services, or technology listed on a nonproliferation control list (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control lists) to—

(1) any country listed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, or

(2) any country that has tested a long-range missile incorporating goods or technology knowingly transferred to such government by North Korea.

4. Determination that North Korea Did Not Knowingly Act.—In the case of any action by North Korea that otherwise would require the President to reimpose restrictions on commerce with North Korea, that requirement shall cease to apply if the President determines and reports to Congress that there is substantial doubt that North Korea knowingly took that action.

5. National Interest Waiver.—In any instance in which the President was required by this Act to reimpose restrictions on commerce with North Korea, he may, not less than 30 days after reimposing such restrictions, and following consultation with Congress, waive the continued imposition of such restrictions if he determines and reports to Congress that such waiver is important to U.S. national security interests of the United States.

6. Authorities of the President if North Korea Enters A Binding International Agreement Regarding Missile Proliferation.—If North Korea enters a binding international agreement that satisfies United States concerns regarding the transfer by North Korea to other countries of missiles and missile technology, the President is authorized to—

(a) support the commercial launch in the United States or other countries of satellites for North Korea; and

(b) waive sanctions that are in place against North Korea pursuant to U.S. missile technology and other nonproliferation legislation.

TRIBUTE TO DR. PATRICIA GABOW
ON RECEIVING THE 2000 DR. NA-
THAN DAVIS AWARD

HON. SCOTT McINNIS

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 18, 2000

Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, it is a privilege and an honor to have this opportunity to pay