We have had lunch with him. We have walked the halls of Congress. We recently have heard his wisdom. And all of us will agree his personality has uplifted us all. He will be sadly missed. And I know all of us will be speaking more about his death, but I share with my colleague from Massachusetts what an extraordinarily likeable, friendly, and uplifting individual this was. I give my best sentiments to his family and his friends.

ON THE PASSING OF THE HON. HERBERT H. BATEMAN, MEMBER OF CONGRESS

(Mr. HORN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BATEMAN) was a beloved person in this Chamber; and the tragedy, as he is retiring, we all felt that way, that it would be a real loss. Now it is a real loss generally to humanity.

But the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BATEMAN) was, without question, the most ethical Member of Congress one could ever find. He also was one who, when he got up to speak, people listened because they knew he had given great depth of thought to the matter at hand and they knew that he was generally doing the right thing. It is a real loss to the colleagues that he could not finish out this Congress.

Wherever he is, and I suspect he is in the right place up above, and if he is there, he will probably share the parliamentarian's role, also the role of being very thorough about whatever he does.

DEMAND ACCOUNTABILITY ON FIRESTONE/FORD TIRE RECALL

(Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, last week we had a hearing in Congress into the recent recall by Ford and Firestone of over 6 million tires. These tires have been attributed to hundreds of vehicle crashes and at least 88 fatalities.

Florida, my home State, is fourth in the number of crashes yet has the highest number of these fatalities, at 21.

Just recently, I received a letter from a constituent whose son and his fiance were killed when their Ford Explorer crashed as a result of the rear tire tread separation. This is what the constituent wrote to me.

''Their deaths could have been prevented had Ford and Firestone taken action when they knew the potential for injury.''

That is the purpose of our investigations here in Congress. When exactly did these companies know there was a problem, and why did they wait until this summer to initiate a recall?

My constituents demand accountability.

So, my colleagues, it is time to have additional hearings and to find out why these companies should stop the finger pointing at each other and give us the tough answers.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO CREATE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from California (Mr. HORN) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, next week I will be introducing legislation to create an Office of Management within the Executive Office of the President. This proposal complements and extends the efforts of recent Congresses to focus on one of the greatest challenges facing the Federal Government: finding an effective way to manage the complex collection of Government cabinet departments, independent agencies, and laws and regulations that exist to serve the public and provide for our national security.

Some might argue that this proposal is unnecessary or unimportant. Those arguments are profoundly misguided. The challenge of effectively managing our government is, in fact, one of the most vital issues before us.

If we hope to solve the long-term problems that threaten Social Security and Medicare, if we hope to strengthen our social safety net for children and other vulnerable members of our society, if we want to reduce the tax burden on American families, then we must start with a well-managed Federal Government.

As most Members of Congress know, each year we receive reports that billions of taxpayers dollars are lost to waste, fraud, or misuse.

A January 26, 1999, report by the General Accounting Office stated: ''We have identified several Government programs that are not managed effectively or that experience chronic waste and inefficiency.''

In fact, the General Accounting Office report identified 29 large programs and agencies that were at high risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.

Among the most significant problems, the report cited the inability of the Department of Defense to produce financial statements that could be audited.

Despite the General Accounting Office's recognition of this serious financial management program, which dates back to 1995, little has changed.

In May of this year, the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, which I chair, again examined the Defense Department's financial management. We found that the Department still cannot produce auditable and accurate financial statements.

In fact, the Department's inspector general reported that in 1999 the Defense Department had to make bookkeeping adjustments that totaled $7.6 trillion. Think of it, $7.6 trillion. Not millions, not billions, trillions. That is about what the national debt was. But they had to use that $7.6 billion to reconcile its books with the United States Treasury and other sources of financial records.

The General Accounting Office's examination of those adjustments found that at least $2.3 trillion of the adjustments were not supported by documentation, reliable information, or audit trails.

The Defense Department is not the only agency with such problems. It is just the biggest.

The subcommittee's examination of the 1999 financial audit of the Health Care Financing Administration found that the agency had paid out an estimated $13.5 billion in improper payments for its Medicare fee-for-service program, something that is very important to the constituents of every Member of this House. That is roughly 8 percent of the fee-for-service program's $170 billion budget.

As the General Accounting Office testified at a subcommittee hearing earlier this year, the Health Care Financing Administration accounting procedures are so inadequate that no one can estimate how much of this money was lost to fraud.

These are just two examples of the enormous cost of the Government's poor management, outmoded business practices, and insufficient financial controls.

At a subcommittee hearing on the government-wide consolidated financial statement that was held this year, the Comptroller General of the United States, David M. Walker, testified that serious financial management weaknesses also exist at the Internal Revenue Service, the Forest Service, and the Federal Aviation Administration.

These weaknesses, he said, place billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money at high risk of being lost to waste, fraud, and misuse.

There is only one way to find these abuses, and that is to ferret out each wasted dollar agency by agency, program by program, and line by line. To accomplish this goal, we must make management a clear and unequivocal priority across the entire executive branch of the Federal Government.

General Accounting Office investigators came to the same conclusion in a

January 2000 report: ''Fixing the underlying weaknesses in high-risk program management areas can significantly reduce Government costs and improve services.''

Congress must create a core of management experts who will not only have the ability and skill to address wasteful administration and program failures but who also have the power and mandate to force action and produce results.

□ 1215

The Office of Management and Budget in the Executive Office of the President was created in the 1970s for the very purposes I have just outlined. I supported its creation and the belief that the power of the budget process would strengthen support for stronger management practices.

I was wrong.

For years, management experts, whom I respect within and outside the government, have said to me that the ''M'' in OMB is not management. It is a mirage.

The unpleasant reality is that tying management to the power of the budget process was an excellent theory but one that never worked. The pressures and dynamics of the annual budget process have simply overwhelmed nearly every initiative aimed at improving management. In effect, the fledgling management trees could not survive among the tangled and gnarled limbs of the budgetary forest.

Since serving as chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology for the last 6 years, it has become very clear to me that the executive branch could no longer continue on the present course of muddling along, then papering over the fundamental management deficiencies with more tax dollars. This course has left us vulnerable to monetary waste and threatens to disrupt vital government programs that serve millions of Americans.

This very real problem seized my attention in April of 1996 when I learned that the Federal Government's computers were not prepared to deal with the year 2000 date change, or the so-called Y2K or millennium bug. In one case after another, we had evidence that the government was simply not up to meeting it. Overall, however, the government and the private sector did meet it after this committee asked the President to put somebody in charge in the executive branch. When the president did make an appointment, it was not to OMB. It was as Assistant to the President. He had the President's ear, and that is what is important if you are going to get something done in the executive branch of the Federal Government.

After our Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology began examining the year 2000 problem in 1996, we surveyed cabinet officers about their knowledge of the problem. The survey revealed that two cabinet officers had never heard of the Y2K or year 2000 problem, even though the Social Security Administration was doing it on their own with no guidance from any administration, be it Republican or Democratic, and a lot of the cabinet had done exactly nothing. So it was clear that the executive branch was not providing leadership. It was providing procrastination. When the executive branch finally awakened, it put the portfolio to handle Y2K on a desk occupied by an already overworked individual 16 hours a day, 7 days a week. In brief, the Office of Management and Budget provided no leadership.

One Federal agency was the exception to this serious lack of management foresight. The Social Security Administration recognized the year 2000 problem in 1989. That agency was steadfast in its commitment to solve this technological challenge, and it was one of the first agencies to announce in 1999 that its computer systems were Y2K compliant. It should be noted, however, that the agency had been working on the problem for a decade. So should the rest of the executive branch have been working on the problem.

The Federal Highway Administration had been alerted to the computer problem as early as 1987. That was even earlier than Social Security. The problem was, however, that nobody would listen to those who warned them about Y2K in the Department of Transportation. The Federal Highway Administration did not care. So the issue was never brought to the attention of the Secretary of Transportation. If it had been, one would hope that the Secretary would have been especially concerned about one of the Department's most critical agencies, the Federal Aviation Administration. Worse yet, the issue was never submitted to the President.

That would never have happened under President Eisenhower.

He had a cabinet who brought the issues up the system. He made a decision, initialed it 30 days later, said ''six months from now I want to see you before the cabinet again.'' But in 1987 that was not the kind of government we had at that time.

In July of 1997, the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. MALONEY), my ranking minority member on the subcommittee, and I wrote the President stating that there was an urgent need for him to designate a senior administration official to oversee the Federal Y2K effort and to encourage private sector initiatives to fix the problem.

The President did not act until February 1998 and then instead of relying on a budget-dominated OMB, the President brought out of retirement and appointed John Koskinen as an Assistant to the President. As I noted earlier, the President gave the authority to Mr. Koskinen to pull together the relevant officials who were responsible for computing systems in the various Federal agencies.

Mr. Koskinen had served the President as deputy director of OMB for management from 1993 to 1997. He retired in 1997. Yet, despite Mr. Koskinen's able leadership at some management matters at OMB, very few steps had been taken to address the year 2000 problem during the years when he was in charge of management.

Because of this stunning and inexcusable management failure, executive branch agencies were forced into a belated and unnecessary state of emergency action that added billions of dollars to the total cost of fixing government computers.

The year 2000 crisis provides powerful evidence of the need for an Office of Management with a Director reporting to the President. Our government must have one office that is focused solely on finding, deciphering, and solving this kind of problem before it occurs, not afterwards. We need one group of management-oriented professionals who are available to monitor and to help find solutions to management problems before they become costly burdens to the taxpayers.

President Franklin Roosevelt had professionals who were capable of sorting out common problems, whether it was the Tennessee Valley Authority, or the beginning of the Marshall Plan.

President Truman used the management experts to develop the Marshall Plan, which would rebuild the war-torn countries in Europe.

President Eisenhower, as I noted, had also a similar group of about 15 to 20 management personnel in the then Bureau of the Budget. Those professionals did not change when Presidents changed. They served the Presidency. After the Eisenhower administration, the then Bureau of the Budget became more and more politicized.

Unfortunately, Y2K is only a small piece of the larger management problem as the Federal Government attempts to update its information technology. We have asked the Comptroller General of the United States to have the General Accounting Office survey the adequacy of hardware and software in the executive branch.

In recent years, five major Federal agencies have launched computer modernization efforts that sunk from very lofty goals to abject failures. These efforts, by the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Defense, the National Weather Service, and the Medicare program can best be summed up as an ongoing series of repetitive disasters that at the highest possible cost failed to produce useful computer systems needed to serve the public.

The Internal Revenue Service finally realized that its project had failed when it hit the $4 billion mark. The Federal Aviation Administration, which as a freshman member I was taken out to look at that project, along with the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MICA), and when we walked into the room and knew something was wrong. What was wrong? The place was not being managed.

The FAA had a similar disaster and that was it, and it cost over $3 billion when somebody finally pulled the plug. Both were costly examples of abysmal management.

The American taxpayer deserves a lot more from the executive branch than it has received. Three years ago, the General Accounting Office reported that, quote, ''these efforts are having serious trouble meeting cost, schedule and/or performance goals. Such problems are all too common in Federal automation projects,'' unquote.

In short, good management could have saved the taxpayers billions of dollars and given the government and its citizens modern, efficient, productive, and effective technology.

What is needed is not just to strengthen the President's staff in the area of information technology, but to have an integrated approach to management improvement.

The desperate need for improvement in financial management systems, to which I have already referred, can be pursued only in concert with information technology. Moreover, many of the failures in upgrading these computer systems can be traced to inadequacies in the procurement process.

At present, these three specialized areas of management which are in three separate statutory offices within the Office of Management and Budget essentially involve procurement and the review of regulations, all of which is very important, and it can be tools to move an agency into being much more effective than without that kind of leadership. We must remove all of the people that are in OMB from the shackles of the budget process and insist that they work together to eliminate the further loss of billions of dollars in wasteful and unsuccessful systems development. Those offices should be part of the Office of Management.

Many other management challenges lie ahead. We need an organized and comprehensive government-wide plan to protect government computers from invasion, such as the Melissa and ''I love you'' viruses. Over the next few years, the Federal workforce will suffer massive attrition. We need an executive branch agency-wide strategy to train new workers and to retain veteran employees.

An Office of Management would produce enormous dividends in these areas simply by the early identification of problems such as these and pointing the way toward the most effective solutions. Presidents need help. An Office of Management would provide that help.

Mr. Speaker, there are other vital areas that need the same kind of scrutiny and guidance that I believe would flow from an Office of Management. Beginning with the Debt Collection Improvement Act, which became law in 1996, Congress has attempted to provide Federal departments and agencies with the tools they need to collect the billions in dollars in debts that are owed to the government. Whose money is it? It is the taxpayers' money. Yet so far, their collection efforts have been sluggish and ineffective.

Good financial management practices and systems should be in place throughout the Federal Government. However, recent subcommittee hearings have again shown that too many agencies have neither financial managements and up-to-date systems. Property management, procurement and personnel policies continue, on and on.

Most White House staffers are interested in policy development, not managing policy implementation, and that is true of most administrations. They come out of the very best colleges and universities of America and they want to make policy. Most of these policies fail because nobody has an understanding of management and the implementation of policies, and the cooperative needs between the various executive branch agencies if you are going to be truly effective.

Policy involves hope, excitement, and media coverage. Management, on the other hand, appears dull and dreary, whether it is program management or financial management. Yet good policies that are not translated through management into action have no value and those policies will never go anywhere.

Removing the management problems from the current Office of Management and Budget would provide the President with a rational division of labor that would place a new and necessary emphasis on managing what is currently unmanageable. Those now engaged in budget analysis fulfill different roles than those who work in financial and program management. Both management and budget staffs would participate in annual budget reviews of executive branch departments and agencies. We do not need to create a new bureaucracy, or require a major reorganization of the Executive Office of the President.

We do, however, need to create a separate Office of Management whose director has clear and direct access to the President, similar to the relationship of the director of an Office of the Budget. If we are to create government-wide accountability, the President needs an Office of Management. It is essential, it is long overdue reform that taxpayers deserve and that good government demands.

An Office of Management could work with departments and agencies in measuring the value of program effectiveness. There is very little evaluation of program effectiveness.

In a bipartisan basis, in the first few years I was a member of Congress, the performance and results law of 1994 has worked and is starting to work more effectively. In the beginning, it was setting goals. Those achievements have seldom been reached. The agencies need to look at how efficient and how effective they are? And if they are not effective or efficient, then change it or get rid of it.

The cities and counties of America have had great improvements in the delivery of these programs over the last few years.

□ 1230

If Oregon can do it, why cannot the Executive Branch of the Federal Government?

If New Zealand can do it, why cannot the Executive Branch of the Federal Government?

If Australia can do it, why cannot the Executive Branch of the Federal Government?

In August 1910, former President Theodore Roosevelt spoke to this very issue: ''No matter how honest and decent we are in our private lives, if we do not have the right kind of law and the right kind of administration of the law, we cannot go forward as a Nation.''

Mr. Speaker, I think it is time to move forward and to create an Office of Management.

Mr. Speaker, for the RECORD I include the text of a draft bill to establish an Office of Management as follows:

H.R. —

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is hereby established in the Executive Office of the President the Office of Management, the purpose of which shall be to improve Federal management and organization and to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the operation of the Federal Government.

(b) DIRECTOR; DEPUTY DIRECTOR.—(1) There shall be at the head of the Office of Management a Director, who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall be compensated at the annual rate of basic pay for Executive level I as provided in section 5312 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) There shall be a Deputy Director of the Office of Management, who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Deputy Director shall be compensated at the annual rate of basic pay for Executive level II as provided in section 5313 of title 5, United States Code.

(c) TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY AND FUNCTIONS.—(1) The following offices in the Office of Management and Budget are abolished; and the functions and authorities of the heads of such offices are hereby transferred to the Director of the Office of Management:

(1) The Office of Federal Procurement Policy.

(2) The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.

(3) The Office of Federal Financial Management.

(4) The Office of the Deputy Director for Management.

(5) The Office of the Chief Financial Officer.

SEC. 2. REDESIGNATION OF OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.

The Office of Management and Budget is hereby redesignated as the Office of the Budget. Any authorities of, and functions performed by, the Director and other officers and appointees of the Office of Management and Budget before the date of the enactment of this Act and not transferred under section 1 shall remain the authorities and functions of the Director as the head of the Office of the Budget and such other officers and appointees as appropriate.

SEC. 3. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO OTHER LAWS.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress recommendations for conforming amendments necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. VENTO (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today and the balance of the week on account of health reasons.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. STEARNS) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. WOLF, for 5 minutes, today and September 12.

Mr. THUNE, for 5 minutes, September 13.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 30 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, September 12, 2000, at 12:30 p.m., for morning hour debates.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 8 of rule XII, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

9909. A letter from the Congressional Review Coordinator, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, Deaprtment of Agriculture, transmitting the Department's final rule—Mediterranean Fruit Fly; Quarantined Areas, Regulated Articles, Treatments [Docket No. 97–056–18] received September 6, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

9910. A letter from the Administrator, Farm Service Agency, Department of Agriculture, transmitting the Department's final rule—Streamling of the Emergency Farm Loan Program Loan Regulations (RIN:0560–AF72) received September 6, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

9911. A letter from the Under Secretary, Acquisition and Technology, Department of Defense, transmitting the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARS) for the quarter ending June 30, 2000, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2432; to the Committee on Armed Services.

9912. A letter from the Secretary, Department of Defense, transmitting the approved retirement and advancement to the grade of Vice Admiral on the retired list of Vice Admiral CONRAD C. Lautenbacher, Jr., United States Navy; to the Committee on Armed Services.

9913. A letter from the Director, Regulations Policy and Management Staff, FDA, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting the Department's final rule—Revision of Requirements Applicable to Albumin (Human), Plasma Protein Fraction (Human), and Immune Globulin (Human) [Docket No. 98N–0608] received September 1, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce.

9914. A letter from the Attorney Advisor, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule—Agency Policy and Public Participation in the Implementation of the 1998 Agreement on Global Technical Regulations; Statement of Policy [Docket No. NHTSA–00–7817] (RIN: 2127–AH29) received August 25, 2000; to the Committee on Commerce.

9915. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule—Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Revised Format for Materials Being Incorporated by Reference for Vermont [VT–19–1222a; A–1–FRL–6854–8] received September 6, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce.

9916. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule—Revisions to the California State Implementation Plan, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Bay Area Air Quality Management District [CA 238–0246a; FRL–6851–8] received September 7, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce.

9917. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule—Revisions to the California State Implementation Plan, San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District [CA 217–0258; FRL–6865–9] received September 7, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce.

9918. A letter from the Lieutenant General, USAF, Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, transmitting notification concerning the Department of the Army's Proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Finland for defense articles and services (Transmittal No. 00–65), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on International Relations.

9919. A letter from the Lieutenant General, USAF, Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, transmitting notification concerning the Department of the Air Force's Proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Saudi Arabia for defense articles and services (Transmittal No. 00–62), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on International Relations.

9920. A letter from the Lieutenant General, USAF, Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, transmitting notification concerning the Department of the Air Force's Proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Saudi Arabia for defense articles and services (Transmittal No. 00–63), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on International Relations.

9921. A letter from the Lieutenant General, USAF, Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, transmitting notification concerning the Department of the Air Force's Proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Singapore for defense articles and services (Transmittal No. 00–64), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on International Relations.

9922. A letter from the Lieutenant General, USAF, Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, transmitting notification concerning the Department of the Army's Proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Saudi Arabia for defense articles and services (Transmittal No. 00–66), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on International Relations.

9923. A letter from the Lieutenant General, USAF, Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, transmitting notification concerning the Department of the Army's Proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Egypt for defense articles and services (Transmittal No. 00–67), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on International Relations.

9924. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a report to Congress on the People's Republic of China's status as an adherent to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2797e—2; to the Committee on International Relations.

9925. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting copies of the certification and justification of reports pursuant to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993, Section 1412 (d) of the Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 and Section 502 of the Freedom Suport Act; to the Committee on International Relations.

9926. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a report on military expenditures for countries receiving U.S. assistance; to the Committee on International Relations.

9927. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 13–405, ''Surplus Note Amendment Act of 2000'' received September 07, 2000, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1—233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform.

9928. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 13–426, ''Driving Under the Influence Repeat Offenders Temporary Amendment Act of 2000'' received September 07, 2000, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1—233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform.