

other serious violations of human rights have occurred in the country, the extent to which the United States has taken or will take action to encourage an end to such practices in the country.”

SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY.

There are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State to carry out the National Endowment for Democracy Act, \$50,000,000 for fiscal year 2001, and \$50,000,000 for fiscal year 2002.

HONORING DONNA FERGANCHICK

HON. SCOTT McINNIS

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 18, 2000

Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this moment to recognize the Honorable Donna Ferganchick of Cedaredge, Colorado. Donna is stepping down as Delta County Commissioner after nearly a decade of public service.

Before moving to the position of Commissioner, Donna served for six years as County Assessor. She served half of her second term, enabling her to be elected the first woman County Commissioner in Delta County history. While Commissioner, Donna has served as Chairman and currently serves as Vice-Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners.

Donna's outstanding leadership abilities have not only benefited Delta County, but also a number of different organizations on which she serves. The Juvenile Diversion Board, the Grand Mesa Scenic By-ways Committee, as well as serving as an Alternative Sentencing Representative, are just a few of the ways in which Donna focuses her energy in order to ensure a better quality of life in Delta County.

Donna, you have served your community, State, and Nation proudly, and I wish you the very best in your future endeavors.

A TRIBUTE TO REIT

HON. PHIL ENGLISH

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 18, 2000

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to congratulate the real estate investment trust industry on the occasion of its 40th anniversary.

The REIT was created by this very body and signed into law by President Eisenhower on this date in 1960.

A committee report issued that year that through REITs, “small investors can secure advantages normally available only to those with large resources.”

Since then, REITs have lived up to the vision of this institution, making investment in large-scale commercial real estate accessible to people from all walks of life.

Last year, I joined several of my colleagues in co-sponsoring the REIT Modernization Act. The law, which will take effect in 2001, empowers REITs to offer the same range of serv-

ices as private competitors in the fast-changing real estate marketplace.

I also want to take this opportunity to commend the industry's trade association, the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, which also came into being four decades ago.

ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

HON. TOM BLILEY

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 18, 2000

Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, please permit me to share with my colleagues an Op/Ed piece from the Richmond Times Dispatch regarding the Arab-Israeli peace process by Ralph Nurnberger.

[From the Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 13, 2000]

FOR PEACE, ARABS ALSO MUST MAKE CONCESSIONS

(By Ralph Nurnberger)

The collapse of the Camp David summit is a direct result of what could be labeled the “Taba Syndrome.” This is the tendency of Arab leaders to insist that Israel turn over every inch of territory to which the Arabs might be able to make a claim, however nebulous that might be, and regardless of whether these demands ultimately undermine any chance for a peace agreement.

The tactic of holding out for every possible piece of land, which Egypt employed after the first Camp David summit to gain control over a tiny parcel of land called Taba, places “principle above peace,” with the result that often neither is achieved.

Yasser Arafat compounded the difficulties facing the negotiators at Camp David by never wavering from his public statements that he would not settle for anything less than Palestinian control of the West Bank and Gaza together with sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Through his public statements, he established expectations among his constituents that would have led them to accuse him of failure if he came away with only 98 percent of all his demands.

On the other hand, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak informed the Israeli populace that he would be willing to make compromises for peace. The debate on the extent of these compromises led to a number of his coalition partners leaving the government before the Camp David talks even began. This pre-summit debate enabled Barak to be far more forthcoming than Arafat at Camp David. Essentially, the Israelis were prepared to make compromises, however difficult, for peace, while Palestinian leaders had not prepared their people to do the same.

Arab refusal to make peace unless they achieved 100 percent of their demands is not new. Following the first Camp David agreements in 1978, Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai in exchange for peace with Egypt.

Israel pulled out by 1982, but refused to cede to Egypt a tiny parcel of land along the Gulf of Aqaba called Taba. Taba was a small strip of land along the beach that had no strategic importance, no population, and no natural resources. Its main attraction was a resort hotel and a pretty beach.

Israel claimed sovereignty over Taba, citing a 1906 British map delineating the land to be part of Turkish-controlled Palestine, not British-controlled Egypt. The Egyptians

based their claim to Taba on 1917 border demarcations.

The Egyptians responded that Israel's failure to turn over control of Taba was a violation of the Camp David accord requirement that the entire Sinai be returned. At times, control over these few meters of sand threatened to undermine the entire Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement. With U.S. encouragement, both nations agreed in 1986 to send the dispute to binding arbitration. Two years later, French, Swiss, and Swedish international lawyers ruled in favor of Egypt.

The Taba Syndrome has not been lost on other Arab leaders.

When the late Syrian President Hafez Assad met with President Bill Clinton in Geneva earlier this year, he had the opportunity to regain virtually the entire Golan Heights for Syria in exchange for peace with Israel. Rather than taking 99 percent of the land in dispute, he held out for a return to the 1967 borders instead of the internationally recognized 1923 lines. The difference between the two was only a few meters, yet Assad determined that principle was more important than Syrian control of the land—and peace.

Similarly, the recent Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was deemed insufficient. Once again, the border was arbitrarily drawn and did not reflect geographic characteristics. This border was drawn after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I by two lieutenant colonels—one from Britain and one from France—who trudged east from the Mediterranean leaving white-washed rocks to mark the new lines.

Needless to say, the location of the rocks has shifted since the lines were drawn in 1923, yet Lebanon risks future hostilities if its total demands are not accepted.

Similarly, Arafat and all top Palestinian leaders never have wavered from the demand that 100 percent of the West Bank and East Jerusalem be turned over to Palestinian control. Since agreeing to the Oslo accord in 1993, this rhetoric created unrealistic expectations among Palestinians and Muslims throughout the world.

Although Barak appeared willing to turn over substantial territory and even make compromises on Jerusalem in exchange for a secure peace and an end to the conflict, Arafat was unable to accept these. He could have had a recognized state comprising approximately 90 percent of the West Bank and governing authority over Palestinians in parts of Jerusalem. Most important, he could have had peace.

Arafat failed to take into account that every nationalist movement must ultimately embrace pragmatism instead of pursuing the maximum—and ultimately unobtainable—goals. By insisting on achieving 100 percent of his objectives, Arafat got caught up in the Taba Syndrome and doomed the Camp David talks to failure.

Unfortunately, this conference only served as another validation of Abba Eban's famous comment that Palestinian leaders “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity for peace.”