

I am not talking about a federalized health care system. We are talking about using private health insurance, making sure older people have a variety of choices and offerings. As a result of those choices and offerings, they can have some big bargaining power.

What happens right now is the health plans, the HMOs, big buyers, go out and negotiate a discount. If you are an older person in rural Nebraska or rural Oregon and you don't have prescription drug coverage, you walk into the Rite Aid or a Fred Meyer or one of your drugstores and you, in effect, have to subsidize the big buyers who are in a position to negotiate discounts. We can use private marketplace forces, the way the Snowe-Wyden legislation does, and the way several of the other bills do, to make sure older people have the kind of bargaining power that makes these prescription drugs more affordable.

I am very pleased that this issue has become a bigger priority in the Congress in the last few weeks. I think now is going to be a test of whether we can, as Senator DASCHLE and others have suggested, reconcile the various bills that have been introduced on this issue. I do not expect to have the last word on this matter.

Senator SNOWE and I are very proud the financing of our legislation received 54 votes in the Senate when it came up last year. On the Snowe-Wyden amendment, we saw Senator WELLSTONE vote for it, Senator SANTORUM vote for it, Senator KENNEDY vote for it, and Senator ABRAHAM vote for it. That is a pretty good coalition. That is the kind of coalition we can build if we pick up on the counsel of Senator DASCHLE, and I know a number of Republican leaders, to come together and reconcile these various bills.

I intend to keep coming to the floor and reading these cases. Our friend, Senator KERREY, is here. I know he is going to be speaking on an important issue, and I do not want to detain him. I think in this country we are now seeing older people break their pills in half because they cannot afford to pick up the cost of medicine when we have, as we saw in Tillamook, OR, 80-year-old women being taken to emergency rooms and not able to afford their medicine. It is wrong. It is just wrong for this Congress to not address this issue in a bipartisan way this year.

This is not one we ought to put off until after the election and see it used as a political football. It should not be used as fodder for the campaign trail because if it is, too many older people who cannot afford their medicine are going to suffer.

We have a chance to move on a bipartisan basis to reconcile these various bills. I intend to keep coming to the floor of this body again and again to describe these cases, to show how ur-

gent the need is. The President at the State of the Union Address made it clear he was extending the olive branch to both political parties to work with him on this issue. We ought to seize, on a bipartisan basis, the opportunity to use private health insurance, not some federalized Government program, to make sure we meet the needs of older people for prescription medicine.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Nebraska is recognized.

CONFRONTING NUCLEAR THREATS

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, a few weeks ago, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger joined what has become a chorus of distinguished citizens and representatives who are suggesting the decision to deploy the national missile defense system be postponed until after the November 7 Presidential election. Although it may be that a delay is necessitated for other reasons, I hope we do not allow the approach of a Presidential election to prevent us from making important foreign policy decisions.

Not only do I believe this to be a precedent which would hamper future Presidential decisionmaking, but it also ignores the fact that this is a tough decision for any President to make anytime, regardless of the circumstances. It also ignores that it takes time for a new Commander in Chief at the helm of the ship to get his or her foreign policy sea legs. Such a delay could jeopardize our capacity to deploy NMD in a timely fashion.

In his argument, Secretary Kissinger referred to "congressionally imposed deadline." This is a commonly made mistake about what Congress did last year. All we called for was deployment of national missile defense "as soon as it is technologically possible." The administration has said this decision could be made as early as June and has recently indicated this could slip to late summer.

Of the four criteria that will be used by President Clinton to make his decision, the most difficult to quantify is the impact on other arms control agreements. Specifically, the impact most feared is that deployment of this missile defense system would be regarded by the Russians as a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

While I can make a very strong argument that deployment of NMD is permitted under the terms of this treaty, this argument will diminish in importance if the Russian Government abrogates other treaties by modifying their strategic nuclear weapons. This includes the very real and destabilizing prospect of re-MIRVing their missiles or converting single-warhead missiles to multiwarhead missiles. This is why

the United States is attempting, and thus far without success, to persuade Russia to allow a modification of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to build NMD and avoid potentially serious conflict between the United States and the Russian Government. We have met considerable resistance, not only from the Russians but also from allies who regard our analysis of the ballistic missile threat to be flawed.

To be clear, the new threat is real. We cannot afford to ignore the real threat that an accidental or rogue nation launch of ballistic missiles carrying nuclear weapons poses to the survival of our Nation. The need to build this defensive system, which is still being tested for feasibility and reliability, derives from the national intelligence estimate and an external panel headed by Donald Rumsfeld. Both have concluded that the threat of rogue nation or unauthorized launch of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon at the United States of America is real.

As a consequence, we have begun testing a system which would protect Americans against this threat. A test schedule for May will be critically important to demonstrate feasibility and reliability, one of the four Presidential conditions needed for deployment. Given the risk/reward ratio of defending against nuclear weapons, the current cost estimates over 10 years of an amount that is less than 1 percent of our national defense budget and the unlikely reassessment of this threat, all that would stand in the way of a Presidential decision to deploy would be the potential adverse impact on other agreements.

The President will face this question: Will a decision to deploy NMD result in other nations, especially Russia, reacting in a manner that would produce a net increase in proliferation activity and thus increase the potential for rogue or unauthorized launch of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons?

We are more likely to resolve this potential conflict in a way that increases the safety and security of Americans if President Clinton does not delay the decision until after the November 7 election. This is a decision that should be made on the basis of the current facts and the four criteria for deployment previously outlined by the administration.

To be successful, we should also consider an alternative negotiating strategy that would pose a win-win for both the United States and Russia. It would reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. It would improve the relations between the United States and Russia. And it would enable the United States to redirect money from maintaining our current nuclear weapons stockpile to our conventional forces, where a real strain can be seen in recruitment, readiness, and capability.

To spur constructive action, we must force ourselves to remember this grim truth: The only thing capable of killing every man, woman, and child in the United States of America is the Russian nuclear stockpile. We must remember the threat no longer comes from a deliberate attack. Instead, these weapons now present two new and very dangerous threats.

The first is the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a Russian nuclear weapon. During the cold war, we worried about the military might of the Soviet Union, but today we worry about the military weakness of Russia and her ever-decreasing ability to control the over 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads in her arsenal. There are numerous stories that have emerged out of Russia over the past few years highlighting the vulnerability of these weapons. There are stories of major security breaches at sensitive nuclear facilities. There are stories of unpaid Russian soldiers attempting to sell nuclear-related material in order to feed their families. And there are stories of the continuing decay of the command and control infrastructure needed to maintain the nuclear arsenal of Russia. Each of these demonstrates the vulnerability of the Russian arsenal to an accidental launch based on a technical error or miscalculation or the unauthorized use of a weapon by a rogue group or disgruntled individual.

The second threat posed by the nuclear legacy of the cold war is the danger of the proliferation of material, technology, or expertise. Consider just the case of North Korea. Last summer, North Korea held the world's attention as a result of indications that they were preparing to test a long-range Taepo Dong ballistic missile. Through skillful diplomacy, the United States was able to convince the North Koreans to halt their missile testing program.

However, the stability of the entire east Asian region was in jeopardy as a result of the possibility of such a test. North Korea is one of the most backward countries in the world. It is a country where millions of its own citizens have starved to death. Yet this country was able to affect the actions of the United States, Japan, and China as a result of their ability to modify what is, in truth, outdated Soviet missile technology. As has been indicated publicly, the Taepo Dong is little more than a longer range version of the 1950s Soviet Scud missile. One can only imagine the consequences to our security if North Korea had a nuclear capability and the means to deliver it. But this illustrates the threat posed by proliferation. Without real management of these materials and technology—much of it Russian in origin—it will become easier for third and fourth rate powers to drastically affect our own security decisions.

Both of these threats—accidental or unauthorized launch and proliferation of these weapons to rogue nations—present a new challenge to the United States. It is a challenge very different from the cold war standoff of two nuclear superpowers. Classic deterrence, better known as mutual assured destruction, was the bedrock of our policy to confront nuclear threats during the cold war. Mutual assured destruction was based on the premise that our enemies would not dare to attack the United States as long as they knew that such an attack would be met with an overwhelming, deadly response by the United States. This theory, however, provides no safety from an accidental launch caused by the failure of outdated technology. It provides no safety net from the use of these weapons by a terrorist state whose only objective is the death of as many Americans as possible.

We need to develop a completely new and comprehensive approach to confront these threats. National missile defense will not add to our security if it is built as a stand alone venture. As part of a comprehensive approach it most assuredly can. To succeed, we should work with Russia to develop a new strategic partnership. We need a partnership based on cooperation, not confrontation—a partnership that builds on the many areas of mutual concern, not those that divide—a partnership that recognizes the nuclear legacy of the cold war threatens all of us, and that only by working together can we truly reduce this threat.

The possibility of a new approach where our interests intersect with those of Russia can be seen in a proposal made by Russia to our arms control negotiators in Geneva. The Russians offered to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,500 on each side. We rejected the offer based on an assessment of minimum deterrence levels that are 500 to 1,000 strategic warheads higher. But this assessment has been overtaken by events in Russia which now make it likely the Russians will be unable to safely maintain more than a few hundred of their own nuclear weapons.

As the Russian capability to maintain their stockpile dwindles, it is natural to assume our threshold for deterrence will also significantly decrease. Thus, by keeping more weapons than we need to defend our national interests, we are encouraging the Russians to maintain more weapons than they are able to control. The net effect is to increase the danger of the proliferation or accidental use of these deadly weapons which decreases the effectiveness of national missile defense.

So, here is the outline of a win-win proposal to the Russians. We jointly agree to make dramatic reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenal. We jointly agree that national missile

defense is an essential part of a strategy to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. And, we jointly agree that parallel reductions in our nuclear forces must include arrangements—and a Congressional commitment to provide funding—to secure and manage the resultant nuclear material.

We are fortunate that we will not begin from scratch on this problem. We can build upon one of the greatest acts of post-cold war statesmanship: the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. To facilitate these dramatic reductions, we must look for ways to expand upon the success of this program, to enlist new international partners, and to work with the Russians to find new solutions to the problems of securing nuclear material. Additionally, we should continue our lab-to-lab efforts that are assisting the transition of Russian nuclear facilities and workers from military to civilian purposes. These are the practical, on the ground programs that will help us reduce the chance of the proliferation of nuclear materials and know-how.

In exchange for deep nuclear reductions and technical assistance, the Russians would agree to changes in the ABM Treaty. With this alternative, the President would not have to choose between national missile defense and future cooperation with Russia. Instead, by working in cooperation with Russia on a comprehensive basis, we will be able to deploy a limited NMD system designed to protect the United States from accidental or rogue state ballistic missile launches.

We can reach such an agreement with Russia because the Russian people now know they are not immune from the threats of extremism. Their security is also endangered by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and rogue states. This now presents us with an opportunity to begin to work with Russia diplomatically to confront this emerging threat from countries like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry's success in halting North Korea's missile testing program highlights the potential power of diplomacy to reduce these threats. But by developing a strategic partnership with Russia, and working cooperatively to bring change in North Korea, to end Saddam Hussein's brutal regime, or to foster real reform in Iran, we will reduce nuclear dangers and create a safer world.

So as President Clinton considers his decision about NMD, I hope he considers an alternative strategy that embraces a comprehensive approach to the threats we face in today's world. Now is the time to reach out to Russia and to create a partnership that will build the basis for securing the post-cold war peace for our children.

Mr. President, in the aftermath of the administration's rejection of the offer to substantially reduce strategic

weapons, the issue of a previous analysis of the minimum deterrence done by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, was raised. I say to my colleagues, I intend to read carefully that report and re-visit the floor with an opportunity to discuss what I believe is a rational minimum deterrence level necessary to protect the people of the United States of America. Obviously, that must be a concern of ours as well.

But I believe there is a historic opportunity. It will be difficult for us to seize that opportunity if Republicans and Democrats do not agree that still the most important thing for all of us to do is to make certain the safety and security of the American people are secured through not only our policies but our active efforts.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Iowa is recognized.

MONITORING DRUG POLICY

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, while we were away for the winter break, the annual high school survey on drug use trends among 8th, 10th, and 12th graders came out. This annual Monitoring the Future study, released on December 17, revealed little change in trends of illicit drug use among our young people. The administration has tried to put a happy face on the results. But there is little to be happy about.

Although the Monitoring the Future study found that the increase in drug use among teens has slowed down, what the data show is that use and experimentation remain at high levels. You can see from this chart that we still face the discouraging fact that nearly 50 percent of our high school seniors reported use of marijuana, not only in 1999, but in the 2 previous years as well. In fact, 12th grader use of marijuana is at its highest since 1992. In addition, 23 percent of the high school seniors questioned in the past 3 years, reported that they had used marijuana in the past 30 days. Sadly, the study also found that the percentage of 10th graders who reported use of marijuana increased from 39.6 percent in 1998 to nearly 41 percent in 1999. Hardly news to find comfort in.

Marijuana remains a gateway drug for even worse substances and this next chart shows overall illicit drug use among high school seniors. You can see in this second chart that, in 1999, nearly 55 percent of 12th graders reported using an illicit drug in their lifetime. What that "lifetime" means is that 55 percent of 17-year-olds have at least tried marijuana or other dangerous, illicit drugs. That's an appalling figure. You can also see that this number is the highest it's been since 1992. With the Office of National Drug Control Policy's recent blitz of ads through the

National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, these high numbers are truly disappointing. It seems though, as the news gets worse, the press releases get happier. But it's still double-speak.

Another upsetting finding was the increase in the use of the "club drug," Ecstasy. Use of Ecstasy among 10th graders increased from 3.3 percent in 1998 to 4.4 percent in 1999. In addition, use among 12th graders increased from 1.5 percent in 1998 to 2.5 percent in 1999. The increase in the use of these so called club drugs, such as Ecstasy, is particularly disturbing. This is so, because club drugs are frequently referred to as recreational drugs and are perceived by many young people as harmless. On December 23 of this past year, we were given a glimpse of the sheer magnitude and severity of the market for Ecstasy, when Customs officials seized 700 pounds of Ecstasy. These 700 pounds would have been enough to provide 1 million kids each with a single dose. Unfortunately, Ecstasy is quickly becoming the drug of choice among our young people. And it too is a gateway to wider drug use. Parents need to take a harder look at what their children are being exposed to.

Last session I gave a floor statement on one particular club drug, that is frequently used in sexual assault cases, called GHB. I am pleased to learn from this year Monitoring the Future study that in next year's survey, young people will be questioned about use of GHB. But the issue is not this drug or that drug but the climate that encourages use and recruits kids into the drug scene. We must work to reverse the trend to normalize and glamorize drug use that has taken root in recent years.

There is an encouraging decline in the use of inhalants among 8th and 10th graders. And, use of crack cocaine among 8th and 10th graders is down slightly. In addition, 12th graders reported a significant decrease in the use of crystal meth from 3 percent in 1998 to about 2 percent in 1999.

As we begin not only a new year but a new millennium, we are faced with the difficult challenge of making the 21st century safe for our young people. Although we have made some progress, these study results leave our young people facing an uncertain future. We cannot be satisfied with unchanging trends in teenage drug use. We have not seen a significant decline in drug use among our country's young people since 1992. In fact, what we have seen are dramatic increases. This fact makes me pause and wonder what we have been doing for the past 8 years. Whatever it is, it has failed to make the difference we need to be seeing. We need to move toward significant decreases in use. We need coherent, sound, accountable efforts. We must not neglect our duties in keeping our young people drug free. We are not in

any position to let our guard down. We need policies and strategies that make a difference.

WHY CHINA SHOULD JOIN THE WTO

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, the Senate will soon make a very important and historic decision about whether to grant permanent normal trade relations status to China. This decision would pave the way for China's accession to the WTO. China's likely accession to the WTO is one of the most pivotal trade developments of the last 150 years. It is also perhaps the single most significant application of the most-favored-nation principle, or non-discrimination principle, in modern trade history.

I believe we should approve permanent normal trade relations for China. I also strongly believe China should be admitted to the World Trade Organization. Because this is such an important matter, I would like to address this issue today in a careful and thorough way.

I have two main points. First, The Core principle of the WTO, the principle of nondiscrimination, or most-favored-nation treatment, is the only way we have to keep markets open to everybody.

We should seek the broadest possible acceptance of this basic principle of non-discrimination in trade. History shows that when countries trade with each other on a nondiscriminatory basis, everyone wins. History also shows that free and open trade is one of the most effective ways to keep the peace.

Second and lastly I also support China's entry into the WTO because it is in our national self-interest to have a rules-based world trading system that includes China.

Mr. President, I would like to say a few words about my first point, that everyone wins when we have non-discriminatory trade, which gives us a better chance to keep the peace.

Most-favored-nation treatment, or what we now call normal trade relations, started with Britain and France in the 1860s. These two nations negotiated free trade agreements based on the most-favored-nation principle of nondiscrimination, which later became the cornerstone of the GATT, and, in 1993, the WTO.

The results of these early international trade treaties was spectacular. It began a new era of free trade that led to a great increase in wealth around the world. Unfortunately, this hey-day of free trade didn't last long. It ended in about 1885, when Europe turned inward, and retreated from the free-trade principle.

Just 30 years after Europe abandoned the nondiscrimination principle in