

LoBiondo	Pelosi	Smith (MI)
Lofgren	Peterson (MN)	Smith (NJ)
Lowey	Peterson (PA)	Smith (TX)
Lucas (KY)	Petri	Smith (WA)
Lucas (OK)	Phelps	Snyder
Luther	Pickering	Souder
Maloney (CT)	Pickett	Spence
Maloney (NY)	Pitts	Stabenow
Manzullo	Pombo	Stark
Markey	Pomeroy	Stearns
Martinez	Porter	Stenholm
Mascara	Portman	Strickland
Matsui	Price (NC)	Stump
McCarthy (MO)	Pryce (OH)	Stupak
McCarthy (NY)	Quinn	Sununu
McCollum	Radanovich	Sweeney
McCrery	Rahall	Talent
McDermott	Ramstad	Tancredo
McGovern	Rangel	Tanner
McHugh	Regula	Tauscher
McInnis	Reyes	Tauzin
McIntosh	Reynolds	Taylor (MS)
McIntyre	Riley	Taylor (NC)
McKeon	Rivers	Terry
McKinney	Rodriguez	Thomas
McNulty	Roemer	Thompson (CA)
Meehan	Rogan	Thompson (MS)
Meek (FL)	Rogers	Thornberry
Meeks (NY)	Rohrabacher	Thune
Menendez	Ros-Lehtinen	Thurman
Metcalfe	Rothman	Tiahrt
Miller (FL)	Roukema	Tierney
Miller, Gary	Roybal-Allard	Toomey
Miller, George	Royce	Towns
Minge	Rush	Traficant
Mink	Ryan (WI)	Turner
Moakley	Ryun (KS)	Udall (CO)
Mollohan	Sabo	Udall (NM)
Moore	Salmon	Upton
Moran (KS)	Sanchez	Velázquez
Moran (VA)	Sanders	Visclosky
Morella	Sandlin	Vitter
Murtha	Sanford	Walden
Myrick	Sawyer	Walsh
Nadler	Saxton	Wamp
Napolitano	Scarborough	Watkins
Neal	Schaffer	Watt (NC)
Nethercutt	Schakowsky	Watts (OK)
Ney	Scott	Waxman
Northup	Sensenbrenner	Weiner
Nussle	Serrano	Weldon (FL)
Oberstar	Sessions	Weldon (PA)
Obey	Shadegg	Weller
Olver	Shaw	Wexler
Ortiz	Shays	Weygand
Ose	Sherman	Whitfield
Owens	Sherwood	Wicker
Oxley	Shimkus	Wilson
Packard	Shows	Wise
Pallone	Shuster	Wolf
Pascrell	Simpson	Woolsey
Pastor	Sisisky	Wu
Paul	Skeen	Wynn
Payne	Skelton	Young (AK)
Pease	Slaughter	Young (FL)

NOT VOTING—13

Bliley	Horn	Norwood
Brady (TX)	Kilpatrick	Spratt
Brown (OH)	Mica	Vento
Campbell	Millender-	Waters
Cook	McDonald	

□ 1316

Mr. DIXON changed his vote from "nay" to "yea."

So the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated for:

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I did not hear the bells on rollcall 27. I spoke in support of the bill, H.R. 5, and I would have voted in favor of the bill had I been present.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 27, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted "yes."

Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 27, the Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act, on which I addressed the House, I was regretfully delayed on official business with a visiting delegation from the German Bundestag. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 27, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 27, I was inadvertently detained. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 27, had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to clause 8, rule XX, the pending business is the question of the Chair's approval of the Journal of the last day's proceedings.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1999

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order at any time today to take from the Speaker's table H.R. 1883, with Senate amendments thereto, and to consider in the House a motion offered by the Chairman of the Committee on International Relations or his designee that the House concur in the Senate amendments; that the Senate amendments and the motion be considered as read; that the motion be debatable for 1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on International Relations, or their designees; and that the previous question be considered as ordered on the motion to final adoption without intervening motion or demand for division of the question.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the motion offered by the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the unanimous consent request just agreed to, I call up the bill (H.R. 1883) to provide for the application of measures to foreign persons who transfer to Iran certain goods, services, or technology, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. GILMAN

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will designate the motion.

The text of the motion is as follows:

Mr. GILMAN moves to concur in the Senate amendments to H.R. 1883.

The text of the Senate amendments is as follows:

Senate Amendments: Page 2, line 3, strike out "1999" and insert "2000".

Page 5, line 7, strike out all after "Order" down to and including "person." in line 8 and insert "No. 12938."

Page 5, Line 9, strike out all after "prohibition.—" down to and including "termi-

nate" in line 12 and insert "Prohibition on United States Government sales to that foreign person of any item on the United States Munitions List as in effect on August 8, 1995, and termination of".

Page 5, Lines 16 and 17, strike out "The President shall deny licenses and suspend" and insert "Denial of licenses and suspension of".

Page 8, after line 23, insert:

"(b) Opportunity To Provide Information.—Congress urges the President—

"(1) in every appropriate case, to contact in a timely fashion each foreign person identified in each report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or the government with primary jurisdiction over such person, in order to afford such person, or governments, the opportunity to provide explanatory, exculpatory, or other additional information with respect to the transfer that caused such person to be identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a); and

"(2) to exercise the authority in subsection (a) in all cases where information obtained from a foreign person identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or from the government with primary jurisdiction over such person, establishes that the exercise of such authority is warranted."

Page 8, line 24, strike out "(b)" and insert "(c)".

Page 9, line 11, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 9, lines 12 and 13, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 10, Lines 11 and 12, strike out "through the implementation of concrete steps".

Page 10, Line 16, strike out all after "systems" down to and including "transfers" in line 18.

Page 10, Line 19, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 10, Line 21, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 11, Line 25, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 12, Line 2, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 13, Line 6, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 13, Line 8, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 13, Line 10, after "Module" insert ", and for the purchase (at a total cost not to exceed \$14,000,000) of the pressure dome for the Interim Control Module and the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Adapter and related hardware for the United States propulsion module."

Page 13, line 15, after "no" insert "credible".

Page 17, lines 15 and 16, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 17, lines 17 and 18, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 18, lines 1 and 2, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency".

Page 18, line 6, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency".

Page 18, line 10, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency".

Page 18, lines 13 and 14, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency".

Page 18, line 15, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency".

Page 18, Line 16, strike out "Russian Space Agency" and insert "Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency".

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the order of the House today, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.R. 1883.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LATOURETTE). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, we have before us H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. This measure was introduced by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. SENSENBRENNER), the gentleman from California (Mr. BERMAN), and myself on May 20 of last year. There are almost 230 cosponsors on this measure.

When it came to a vote in the House last September, it was approved by a vote of 419 to 0. This vote was even more remarkable when one considers that the administration sent us a letter just before the House voted stating that the President's senior advisors would recommend that he veto the bill. Obviously, the administration's plea that we not approve the bill, that we instead allow more time for diplomacy, was rejected unanimously by the House.

Just last week, the measure came up in the Senate, and the Senate brushed aside the administration's objection and approved the bill by a significant vote of 98 to 0.

The unanimity of both chambers of Congress and the strong bipartisan support for this measure should send a powerful signal to would-be proliferators to Iran. Our Nation will not accept the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to Iran.

Mr. Speaker, this situation is true today, and it will remain true even if the encouraging political developments we are beginning to observe in Iran lead eventually to major improvements in Iranian foreign policy. The fact is a

democratic Iran at peace with itself and with the rest of the world will not need or want weapons of mass destruction, nor will they need any missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

Political change in Iran may ultimately eliminate the need for this kind of legislation. But such change will never make us regret enacting it. Indeed, we fully expect that the leaders of a democratic and a peaceful Iran would have no complaints about this legislation because it would be wholly consistent with the policies that they would pursue.

For now, however, Iran is continuing its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, and this poses a great threat to our Nation, to our military personnel in the Persian Gulf, and to our friends and allies throughout the region. This legislation states to those nations and entities that are helping Iran's weapons programs that they must stop or face severe consequences.

I am confident that the unanimous vote in both houses of Congress will compel the President to reconsider the administration's threat to veto this legislation.

I want to clarify for the record that no major substantive changes in the legislation were made by the Senate amendment that was adopted last week. Due to the courtesy of the chief sponsors of the Senate companion measure to H.R. 1838, most notably Senators LOTT and LIEBERMAN, I was fully involved in developing the Senate amendment. Indeed, two of the most significant changes it made was suggested by me to the sponsors of the Senate amendment. I can assure our colleagues the changes suggested were intended to strengthen, not weaken, this measure.

Most importantly, Mr. Speaker, the Senate amendment did not convert the bill from a mandatory sanctions bill into a bill merely authorizing the imposition of sanctions, as has been reported by the press. This bill always afforded the President discretion, discretion with regard to the imposition of sanctions, except in the case of the proliferation by entities under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency. The Senate amendment preserved that structure.

In order to underscore that the Senate amendment was almost entirely cosmetic in nature, I prepared a summary of the changes made by that amendment. This summary makes clear that the bill was not weakened in any way by the Senate amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I include the summary for the RECORD as follows:

SUMMARY OF SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1883, IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000

During the Senate's consideration of the Iran Nonproliferation Act on February 24, 2000, a manager's amendment was adopted making a number of minor changes in the

bill. These changes were largely technical or cosmetic in nature. They include.

The name of the bill was changed from the "Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999" to the "Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000".

The word "shall" was deleted at several places in the bill dealing with the possible imposition of sanctions on entities that transfer weapons technology to Iran. This was done to emphasize the fact (which is explicit elsewhere in the House-passed bill) that the imposition of such sanctions is discretionary rather than mandatory.

Language was inserted to emphasize that the president may contact entities suspected of transferring weapons technology to Iran in order to afford them an opportunity to demonstrate that they did not make such transfers. Again, this concept was already contained in the House-passed bill.

The name "Russian Space Agency" was changed to "Russian Aviation and Space Agency" most places that it appears in the bill in order to reflect the fact that the name of the agency has been officially changed by the Russian Government.

One element of the certification that the President would have to make in order to provide Russian "extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station" was revised to eliminate a requirement that Russia demonstrate its commitment to stop proliferation to Iran by implementing "concrete steps". The key element of this certification was not changed, however. The President would still have to certify that there is no credible information that any entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency has proliferated to Iran during the previous year in order to provide such extraordinary payments to Russia.

The Senate amendment expanded the exception to the bill's restriction on providing Russia "extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station". In addition to extraordinary payments related to the Russian Service Module (which were permitted under the House bill), the amendment permits a total of no more than \$14 million in extraordinary payments by the United States in order to buy from Russia two docking adaptors that will facilitate the attachment of two U.S. modules to the International Space Station. The conditions on making extraordinary payments pursuant to the exception (e.g., no credible information that a recipient of such payments has proliferated to Iran) remain unchanged.

Mr. Speaker, finally, I want to elaborate on one point that came up in the Senate debate on the measure. Senators LEVIN, LOTT, and LIEBERMAN agreed that, in deciding whether information is "credible," and I put that in quotes, for purposes of the reporting requirement of this bill, the President is entitled to judge the credibility of information on the basis of all information available to him.

This observation is unassailable so far as it goes. Obviously, one piece of information can be out of sync with all of the other available information that it is not believable. But this does not mean that incriminating information that is novel or surprising must be corroborated before it can be deemed credible.

The Senators certainly did not mean to suggest that the President is entitled to judge one piece of specific information against the absence of other information, and on that basis conclude that one piece of information is not credible. Such will, in my estimation, be the typical case arising under this legislation, a piece of specific incriminating information will be found about a possible transfer, and there will be no other specific information pointing one way or another about that particular transfer. In this context, there really is no other available information against which the incriminating information can be judged. If the incriminating information is, on its face, believable, then the President will be required to report that situation to us pursuant to section 2(a) of the bill.

The real point in here, Mr. Speaker, is the one emphasized in the report of the Committee on International Relations on the bill. The purpose of the credible information standard is to get away from the preponderance of the evidence standard the administration has applied under previous nonproliferation laws.

□ 1330

We do not want there to be any weighing of evidence or any burden of proof under the credible information standard. The test is whether the information is believable, not whether the President thinks it is likely true.

I want to thank my colleagues for the support they provided to H.R. 1883. And I urge them to once, again, cast a favorable vote on this measure.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in strong support for this motion. While I have somewhat different interpretations than the chairman of the full committee, on some of the intent, the basic legislation does the job that we all sought to achieve in this nonproliferation act.

What is clear is that the timing is somewhat unfortunate, as I think the chairman referenced so aptly in his remarks, because for the first time in many years, we are seeing within Iran the development of an opposition that seems to want to moderate the policies of that country.

I certainly hope that no one would take that as a signal in this legislation that we have not recognized this great step forward, which is really a function, not of everything we have done or anything else, but a function of what the Iranians want for their country.

No matter what happens around the globe, it is an important goal of this administration, and I think in the interests of the entire world, to restrict access to nuclear weapons, chemical, biological and missile technology. This is clearly a case where the world is not safer by more people having access to this technology.

I think it is critically important for the Congress and the administration to work together to make sure that we do everything in our power, using Nunn-Lugar resources to reduce the availability of fissionable material and the technology expertise in the Soviet Union to further develop nuclear weapons and to proliferate.

There are tremendous pressures in the Soviet Union, former Soviet Union, Russia, both from their own kind of old pride of having once been a major superpower; and I think, additionally, the pressures for economic advancement to sell some of these technologies. But it is not in the Russian's best interests. It is clearly not in the world's best interests. It is not in our best interests.

I want to commend the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. SENSENBRENNER) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and others who have participated in this legislation. It is an important piece of legislation. I am very excited to have it here on the floor, only somewhat distressed that it comes by accident of the Senate schedule today so close to what was a positive development in Iran.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time and I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my time be controlled by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. HOEFFEL).

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LATOURETTE.) Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

There was no objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. SENSENBRENNER).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 and urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this important message.

In 1993, the administration invited Russia to join the International Space Station project. At the time the White House made it clear to Congress that Russian participation in the International Space Station was a key component of the administration's efforts to encourage Russia to adhere to a variety of nonproliferation norms and agreements.

Many Members, myself included, expressed concerns about transforming the space station into a foreign policy program, but accepted the administration's argument that Russian involvement was important to halting the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Since then, we have seen repeated reports in the Western and Russian media that a variety of Russian aerospace enterprises are assisting Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The CIA's 721 report of February 2, 2000 confirms these reports.

Russia's aerospace enterprises are not private firms in the way U.S. companies are. In fact, most Russian aerospace enterprises are owned and operated by the Russian government.

In 1998 and 1999, the Russian government clarified its control of its aerospace industry by putting many of these Russian enterprises under the legal and economic jurisdiction of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency.

Having paid the Russians some \$800 million between 1994 and 1998, the administration announced in late 1999 its intention to make additional payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency.

The administration's reliance on Russia has put the American taxpayer in the unacceptable position of possibly subsidizing the very Russian aerospace enterprises that are helping Iran develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The administration's current policy creates an unhealthy situation for both our space program and our nonproliferation efforts. H.R. 1883 addresses these concerns by requiring the President to make a determination about the extent of Russian assistance to Iran before NASA can make additional payments to the Russian aviation and space agency.

Moreover, the bill holds the Russian government accountable by preventing payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency if it or any of the entities for which it is legally responsible are involved in inappropriate technical assistance to Iran. Certainly nobody in this body wants to see U.S. tax dollars inadvertently subsidizing the proliferation of ballistic missiles. H.R. 1883 helps prevent just such a prospect.

While helping curb proliferation, the bill does not jeopardize the safety of our astronauts about the ISS or delay the delivery of the Russian hardware that NASA claims it requires in order to reduce U.S. dependence upon Russia in the space station program. Both of these issues are addressed in narrow and specific exceptions to the bill.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1883 is a sound step to prevent the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. It passed the House by a vote of 419 to 0 and the Senate by a vote of 98 to 0. I am proud to have joined the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the ranking minority member, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), and the gentleman from California (Mr. BERMAN) as an original cosponsor of this bill and look forward to the day when the President signs it into law.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4½ minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. BERMAN).

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I want to associate myself with the remarks of the previous speakers on this legislation.

I rise in strong support of H.R. 1883. It gives the President authority to impose sanctions on foreign entities that supply Iran with technologies related to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles.

Two weeks ago we saw dramatic evidence of the yearning for change among the Iranian people. Despite efforts by the Council of Guardians to limit the pool of eligible candidates, reformers won an overwhelming majority in the Iranian parliament.

Regrettably, this election landslide will not automatically translate into moderate Iranian policies. Supreme Leader Khomeini and other conservative elements retain control over many institutions, including the securities services. And the intentions of President Khatemi and his reformist allies still are not completely clear.

I would welcome an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations, but a constructive and peaceful bilateral relationship must be based on Iran's willingness to abandon its quest for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, to drop its efforts to disrupt the Middle East peace process, and to improve its dismal human rights record. This legislation focuses on the first of these areas of concern. It goes without saying that an Iran armed with these fearsome weapons would be a serious threat to our allies in the Middle East and eventually the United States itself.

Placing additional sanctions on Iran would have little if any effect, given that the U.S. has maintained a trade embargo on the Islamic Republic since the 1979 revolution. This legislation attempts to get at the problem by authorizing sanctions against foreign entities that continue to supply Iran with advanced technologies.

According to a recent unclassified CIA report covering the first half of 1999, Iran remains, "One of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of weapons, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Iran focused its efforts to acquire WMD-related equipment, materials and technology primarily on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Western Europe."

The report goes on to say that "entities in Russia and China continue to supply a considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technology to Iran. Tehran is using these goods and technologies to support current production programs and to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles."

It has additional comments on Iran's program with respect to nuclear weapons, which I will assert in my full statement. But, Mr. Speaker, these facts paint a very troubling picture.

They reinforced my view that this legislation and other measures are absolutely necessary to prevent or at a minimum slow down Iranian acquisition of WMD and ballistic missiles.

As the CIA report indicates, Russian entities have been among the worst proliferators to Iran. Some steps have been taken to prevent this technology transfer. Last year Russia passed a new export control law and placed monitors in key aerospace entities. Unfortunately, these modest efforts have not stopped the proliferation.

I find it somewhat ironic that Russia objects so strenuously to U.S. deployment of a limited national missile defense system designed specifically to knock down missiles fired by countries like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, given that the Russian entities are some of the primary suppliers of missile and WMD technology to those very governments and given that Russia may also be a target of those regimes.

I am not under any illusions that this legislation will solve once and for all the problem of proliferation to Iran, but it is a step in the right direction, and more needs to be done. For example, we should initiate an intensive effort with our allies to develop a more effective multilateral export control regime to keep dangerous technologies out of the hands of anti-western regimes. The current Wassenaar arrangement simply is not up to doing the job.

Last year we passed the Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act by a vote of 419 to 0, the Senate passed it by 98 to 0. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the Senate amendments today and sending the legislation on to the President.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BRADY), a senior member of our committee.

Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I thank him for his leadership on this important issue.

There is no question the Senate has weakened in effect the strengths of this bill, but it is still very important that we go forward with it. It is still an important piece of legislation.

Here is why. In this legislation we are giving Russia a clear choice. Russia can choose to continue to sell and arm America's deadliest enemies and to sell and arm Israel's deadliest enemies, or they can choose to be a partner in peace and prosperity and democracy with the United States. That is a fair choice for Russia to make.

It is important to make the right decision because we all have a stake in their transition to democracy and to free enterprise as a nation. But it has been disappointing, and I think their conduct has been dangerous for America.

Each year, in effect, Russia erects a tent, and to all within listening dis-

tance they proclaim, "Come see the show on improving democracy and freedom in our nation." And each year America is the first in line with billions of dollars to help them make that transition. But each year when we walk inside the tent, it is empty, while out back, behind that tent, Russia is actively and aggressively selling technology and equipment to nations that simply are hateful to the United States and will disrupt the peace process in the Middle East.

I think it is important that no American taxpayer have to finance our deadliest enemies. No veteran ought to be paying tax dollars so that Russia can arm our enemies. No single mom struggling to make ends meet ought to have her tax dollars going to damage our security. No service members, or members of our military, ought to ever have their dollars be used against them. But, in effect, today they are.

I support this legislation. I support Russia making the right choice, and this choice is long overdue. As a member of the Committee on Science, I appreciate the leadership of the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. SENSENBRENNER) in adopting an amendment that I offered preserving the existing relationship with Russia on the space station. That was a very key part of this legislation, and overall this bill deserves our support.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BRADY) for his supportive remarks, and I reserve the balance of my time.

□ 1345

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to compliment the Chair of the Committee on International Relations for his leadership on this important issue. I want to thank the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), the ranking member, as well, and compliment both gentlemen for working together in a bipartisan fashion on this and so many other issues that bipartisanship serves our committee and this Congress well.

The legislation before us, Mr. Speaker, is an attempt to stem the flow of weapons technology into Iran by authorizing the President to impose sanctions on nations and individuals that provide this weapons technology to Iran.

The sanctions would include the denial of munitions, licenses, arms export, and dual-use licenses, and a halt to any United States foreign assistance.

The bill requires the President to report to Congress when credible information exists of a transfer of dangerous weapons technology to Iran. The President must also report to Congress about whether he has imposed certain penalties on foreign persons as a result of such transfers.

If the penalties are not imposed, the President must expose why those steps were not taken. The bill will also encourage the Russian Space Agency to cooperate with the United States in efforts to halt the proliferation of weapons technology to Iran by cutting off payments to that agency and to the International Space Station if those under its jurisdiction and control engage in such activities.

We are all pleased by the initial reforms that are being made within Iran. Their recent elections give the world some hope that changes are coming. Unfortunately, while there are some encouraging signs, Iran's current policies continue to be a threat to the security of the world.

There are four areas where Iran continues to threaten world peace. In the area of ballistic missiles, with their development of the Shahab missiles, at least one expert has testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Iranians are working on a missile now with a range of 2,600 miles. We know that they have missiles with a range of 1,200 miles and they are pushing ahead with this development.

With nuclear issues, Iran is proceeding with plans to complete the 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr. While these nuclear plants probably are not able to be used for nuclear weapons purposes, the fear is that Iran will continue to obtain valuable expertise while building these plants that could be transferable to a nuclear weapons program.

In the area of chemical and biological programs, while Iran signed and ratified the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the CIA reports that Iran continues to pursue purchasing dual-use biotechnical equipment from Russia and other countries ostensibly for civilian uses. Press reports indicate that they are also hiring Russian scientists.

United States officials have publicly stated that Iran has a large chemical weapons program that has been made possible with the help of China; and Iran and North Korea reportedly have a relationship of exchanging missile technology.

For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems continues to be one of the most significant threats to American national security.

Rogue states like North Korea and Iran are actively pursuing ambitious ballistic missile programs and the technology needed to threaten our country and our allies. Iran's progress in this effort is being helped by the relationships with North Korea, with China, and with Russia.

This legislation is a good first step that will send a signal to those who are aiding Iran that this aid will not be tolerated.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to emphasize again why we are sending this bill on to the President.

Proliferation to Iran is a very serious threat to our Nation. It is one of the biggest threats we face today. Regrettably, entities in Russia and elsewhere have been actively engaged in this kind of proliferation. The bill sends a message, loud and clear, that our Nation cannot and will not do business as usual with such entities.

We hope this legislation will inspire the governments of Russia, of China, and of other countries to do more to stop proliferation to Iran.

North Korea is also a major concern when it comes to proliferation to the Middle East, and we need to take a good close look at that situation, as well.

I want to assure my colleagues that our committee is going to remain vigilant.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Any transfer of technology to Iran that would allow that country to develop weapons of mass destruction would represent a threat to Israel and other allies in the region.

Passage of this measure sends a strong message to the international community. The United States will not be silent or inactive if any nation decides to aid Iran in production of weapons of mass destruction. By making it clear that we will impose sanctions on any authority that fuels Iran's dangerous motives, I hope we will be more successful in our efforts to prevent Iran's development of nuclear weapons.

While the recent strong showing for reformers in Iran's parliamentary elections is encouraging, we still need to be extremely cautious and firm in our dealings with Iran. We must never allow any nation to develop weapons of mass destruction if we believe they may be targeted on our allies or on Americans. It is important to remember that Iran has been the world's largest exporter of terror for some time now and is an ardent opponent of the Middle East peace process. I am pleased to join my colleagues in supporting H.R. 1883 and sending the right message on behalf of all Americans, that we will not allow back-door maneuvers that aid Iran's dangerous plans for terror and destruction.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I speak today in strong support for the amended version of H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.

Everyone in Congress is aware that Iran has continually threatened the peace and security of the Middle East. Iran is still committed to the destruction of Israel, opposes the Middle East peace process and supports terrorist groups such as Hamas. In fact, Iran remains the world's leading sponsor of international terrorism.

Despite these very real security concerns, cash strapped Russia has supported the \$800 million Bushehr project, a 1000-megawatt

light-water reactor, in southern Iran. Why Iran needs such a reactor remains an open question because Iran has one of the world's largest oil and natural gas reserves. However, many security experts believe that such projects provide good cover to a nuclear weapons program and provide Iranian technicians with expertise in the development of nuclear weapons.

Iran has successfully tested the Shabah-3 missile, which has a range of 800 miles, and has supplied Fajr rockets to Lebanon. These rockets are capable of hitting Haifa, and other parts of Israel. In fact, Iranian weapons supplied to Hamas are used against the Southern Lebanese Army, the Israeli Defense Forces and severely jeopardize the security of communities in Northern Israel.

Iran's support of international terrorism poses a great risk to the Middle East and shows very clearly that Iran remains a threat to U.S. interests in the region. The results of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons are almost too horrifying to imagine. But, if current trends continue, it may become an all too real nightmare for the United States and our Middle Eastern allies.

While I welcome the results of the recent parliamentary elections in Iran, I believe that we must wait and see if the victory of the reformists will translate into any real change. Before we start to re-evaluate our policy, Iran needs to drastically change theirs, especially in areas of major concern to the U.S., such as non-conventional weaponry and the support of terrorism. H.R. 1883 reinforces those Congressional concerns and sends a clear message to countries that assist Iran's weapons program.

I was proud to be an original cosponsor of the Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1999, and I am proud to be a cosponsor of the Iran Nonproliferation Act.

Mr. Speaker, the Senate passed the amended Iran Nonproliferation Act, 98-0, last week and I urge my fellow Members to give this legislation the same overwhelming support on the floor today.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Speaker, I want to express my strong support for passage of the Senate amendments to the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Last week, this important legislation was approved by the Senate by 98 to 0. H.R. 1883 was originally approved by the House in September 1999.

This important legislation gives the President the authority to impose sanctions against Russia or any other nation for supplying Iran with the technology to build missiles and chemical and biological weapons. The Iran Nonproliferation Act also provides for biannual reports on who around the world is transferring prohibited technology or information to Iran, and allows the President to take action against persons or entities found to be engaged in such activity.

This bill also includes new steps to ensure the Russian Space Agency, which is a partner with NASA in the International Space Station project, is complying with Russia's official Iran anti-proliferation policy. If needed, the President is granted the authority to cut-off funds for the remaining payment of \$590 million to the Russian Space Agency for helping the U.S. build the International Space Station. As

much as we want to continue to work with Russia on joint efforts in space, we will not do so if they are contributing to this grave threat to our security. That said, the language as amended is much more workable in ensuring that the ISS moves forward.

The threat is a very real and serious security concern for the United States and Israel, our nation's most-trusted ally in the Middle East. The CIA has reported Iran has the capability to launch a missile that will reach Israel, and it is well known that Iran is pursuing development of nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry. This legislation provides the Administration with useful tools to combat the spread of dangerous weapons technology and to discourage nuclear proliferation. H.R. 1883 also demonstrates our commitment to prevent the proliferation of dangerous nuclear weapons to countries that threaten our national security as well as the security of allies—such as Israel and Europe.

The U.S. support for Israel must go beyond economic and military aid to Israel—it must meet the very real challenges that will face Israel and the United States in this new century, such as limiting the threats of weapons of mass destruction. It is well documented that technology provided to Iran increases its ability to develop its own intermediate range ballistic missile that is capable of reaching Israel as well as our European allies. By limiting Iran's access to such technology we can better protect these countries as well as our own troops in the Middle East and Europe.

The people of Iran demonstrated in their recent elections an overriding desire to move toward reform and moderation in the future—but it is too early to tell what this change will mean in practice. I hope that it is a sign that Iran will end its missile program and its support for international terrorism. This legislation also sends a strong message to Russia that U.S. aid and scientific collaboration will be limited if Russia doesn't stop missile proliferation to Iran. U.S. funding will be substantially limited unless the President certifies that the Russian Space Agency is not transferring technology to Iran. Acting Russian President Vladimir Putin has been receptive to restricting companies that sell missile technology and equipment to Iran. I hope his intentions are translated into action. Otherwise, our cooperation with Russia—both in space and elsewhere—may end.

We live in a dangerous world—where terrorists and rogue nations are developing deadly weapons of mass destruction. Our action today will send a clear message to our allies and to our adversaries. By supporting this bipartisan legislation, we will demonstrate our commitment to limit nuclear proliferation and to create a safer, more stable world.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HOFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LATOURETTE). Pursuant to the order of the House today, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 420, nays 0, not voting 14, as follows:

[Roll No. 28]

YEAS—420

Abercrombie	Condit	Graham
Ackerman	Conyers	Granger
Aderholt	Cooksey	Green (TX)
Allen	Costello	Green (WI)
Andrews	Cox	Greenwood
Archer	Coyne	Gutierrez
Armye	Cramer	Gutknecht
Baca	Crane	Hall (OH)
Bachus	Crowley	Hansen
Baird	Cubin	Hastings (FL)
Baker	Cummings	Hastings (WA)
Baldacci	Cunningham	Hayes
Baldwin	Danner	Hayworth
Ballenger	Davis (FL)	Hefley
Barcia	Davis (IL)	Herger
Barr	Davis (VA)	Hill (IN)
Barrett (NE)	Deal	Hill (MT)
Barrett (WI)	DeFazio	Hilleary
Bartlett	DeGette	Hilliard
Barton	Delahunt	Hinchee
Bass	DeLauro	Hinojosa
Bateman	DeLay	Hobson
Becerra	DeMint	Hoefel
Bentsen	Deutsch	Hoekstra
Bereuter	Diaz-Balart	Holden
Berkley	Dickey	Holt
Berman	Dicks	Hooley
Berry	Dixon	Horn
Biggert	Doggett	Hostettler
Bilbray	Dooley	Houghton
Bilirakis	Doolittle	Hoyer
Bishop	Doyle	Hulshof
Blagojevich	Dreier	Hunter
Bliley	Duncan	Hutchinson
Blumenauer	Dunn	Hyde
Blunt	Edwards	Insee
Boehler	Ehlers	Isakson
Boehner	Ehrlich	Istook
Bonilla	Emerson	Jackson (IL)
Bonior	Engel	Jackson-Lee
Bono	English	(TX)
Borski	Eshoo	Jefferson
Boswell	Etheridge	Jenkins
Boucher	Evans	John
Boyd	Everett	Johnson (CT)
Brady (PA)	Ewing	Johnson, E.B.
Brady (TX)	Farr	Johnson, Sam
Brown (FL)	Fattah	Jones (NC)
Bryant	Filner	Jones (OH)
Burr	Fletcher	Kanjorski
Burton	Foley	Kaptur
Buyer	Forbes	Kasich
Callahan	Ford	Kelly
Calvert	Fossella	Kennedy
Camp	Frank (MA)	Kildee
Canady	Franks (NJ)	Kind (WI)
Cannon	Frelinghuysen	King (NY)
Capps	Frost	Kingston
Capuano	Gallegly	Klink
Cardin	Ganske	Knollenberg
Carson	Gejdenson	Kolbe
Castle	Gekas	Kucinich
Chabot	Gephardt	Kuykendall
Chambliss	Gibbons	LaFalce
Chenoweth-Hage	Gilchrest	LaHood
Clay	Gillmor	Lampson
Clayton	Gilman	Lantos
Clement	Gonzalez	Largent
Clyburn	Goode	Latham
Coble	Goodlatte	LaTourette
Coburn	Goodling	Lazio
Collins	Gordon	Leach
Combest	Goss	Lee

Levin	Pastor	Smith (MI)
Lewis (CA)	Payne	Smith (NJ)
Lewis (GA)	Pease	Smith (TX)
Lewis (KY)	Pelosi	Smith (WA)
Linder	Peterson (MN)	Snyder
Lipinski	Peterson (PA)	Souder
LoBiondo	Petri	Spence
Lofgren	Phelps	Spratt
Lowey	Pickering	Stabenow
Lucas (KY)	Pickett	Stark
Lucas (OK)	Pitts	Stearns
Luther	Pombo	Stenholm
Maloney (CT)	Pomeroy	Strickland
Maloney (NY)	Porter	Stump
Manzullo	Portman	Stupak
Markey	Price (NC)	Sununu
Martinez	Pryce (OH)	Sweeney
Mascara	Quinn	Talent
Matsui	Radanovich	Tancred
McCarthy (MO)	Rahall	Tanner
McCarthy (NY)	Ramstad	Tauscher
McCullum	Rangel	Tauzin
McCrery	Regula	Taylor (MS)
McDermott	Reyes	Taylor (NC)
McGovern	Reynolds	Terry
McHugh	Riley	Thomas
McInnis	Rivers	Thompson (CA)
McIntosh	Rodriguez	Thompson (MS)
McIntyre	Roemer	Thornberry
McKeon	Rogan	Thune
McKinney	Rogers	Thurman
McNulty	Rohrabacher	Tiaht
Meehan	Ros-Lehtinen	Tierney
Meek (FL)	Rothman	Toomey
Meeks (NY)	Roukema	Towns
Menendez	Roybal-Allard	Traficant
Metcalfe	Royce	Turner
Mica	Rush	Udall (CO)
Miller (FL)	Ryan (WI)	Udall (NM)
Miller, Gary	Ryun (KS)	Upton
Miller, George	Sabo	Velázquez
Minge	Salmon	Visclosky
Mink	Sanchez	Vitter
Moakley	Sanders	Walden
Mollohan	Sandlin	Walsh
Moore	Sanford	Wamp
Moran (KS)	Sawyer	Watkins
Moran (VA)	Saxton	Watt (NC)
Morella	Scarborough	Watts (OK)
Murtha	Schaffer	Waxman
Myrick	Schakowsky	Weiner
Nadler	Scott	Weldon (FL)
Napolitano	Sensenbrenner	Weldon (PA)
Neal	Serrano	Weller
Nethercutt	Sessions	Wexler
Ney	Shadegg	Weygand
Northup	Shaw	Whitfield
Nussle	Shays	Wicker
Oberstar	Sherman	Wilson
Obey	Sherwood	Wise
Olver	Shimkus	Wolf
Ortiz	Shows	Woolsey
Ose	Shuster	Wu
Owens	Simpson	Wynn
Oxley	Sisisky	Young (AK)
Packard	Skeen	Young (FL)
Pallone	Skelton	
Pascarella	Slaughter	

NOT VOTING—14

Brown (OH)	Kilpatrick	Paul
Campbell	Klecza	Vento
Cook	Larson	Waters
Dingell	Millender-	
Fowler	McDonald	
Hall (TX)	Norwood	

□ 1413

So the motion was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated for:

Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 28, I was unavoidably detained and, had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I regret that I was not present for rollcall votes No. 27 and