

The Wall Street Journal on February 29 of this year wrote, "Sharpton insisted that Brawley, a 15-year-old black girl, had been raped by a band of white men practicing Irish Republican Army rituals."

And as The Washington Post reported in July of 1998, "Sharpton and lawyers Alton Maddox and Vernon Mason were found guilty of defamation, with Sharpton guilty on 7 of 22 counts."

Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, this brand of racism that attacks not only whites, but especially Jews, is the lowest form of anti-Semitism, and it is a form of anti-Semitism that has been practiced over the past 15, 20 years by Mr. Sharpton.

How respectable Presidential candidates in the Democratic Party can openly embrace such a man and, in fact today, how many Members of the Democratic side of this House, who are asking the American people to take control of this institution, which is the people's House, after all, how they can continue to embrace a man who has made violently anti-Semitic statements, who has bent over backwards over the past 15 years to stir up racial hatred, not only in New York State but across this country, how can they embrace such a man? How Mr. GORE can go to New York City and embrace such a man and then defend that action last night is beyond me, and it is beneath contempt for this House.

#### RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 12 of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Accordingly (at 10 o'clock and 10 minutes a.m.), the House stood in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

□ 1050

#### AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. PEASE) at 10 o'clock and 50 minutes a.m.

#### CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 376, OPEN-MARKET REORGANIZATION FOR THE BETTERMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT

Mr. BLILEY submitted the following conference report and statement on the Senate bill (S. 376) to amend the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 to promote competition and privatization in satellite communications, and for other purposes:

CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. 106-509)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 376),

to amend the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 to promote competition and privatization in satellite communications, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amendment, insert the following:

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Open-market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act" or the "ORBIT Act".

#### SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this Act to promote a fully competitive global market for satellite communication services for the benefit of consumers and providers of satellite services and equipment by fully privatizing the intergovernmental satellite organizations, INTELSAT and Inmarsat.

#### SEC. 3. REVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT OF 1962.

The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (47 U.S.C. 701) is amended by adding at the end the following new title:

#### "TITLE VI—COMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION AND PRIVATIZATION

##### "Subtitle A—Actions To Ensure Pro-Competitive Privatization

#### "SEC. 601. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION LICENSING.

"(a) LICENSING FOR SEPARATED ENTITIES.—

"(1) COMPETITION TEST.—The Commission may not issue a license or construction permit to any separated entity, or renew or permit the assignment or use of any such license or permit, or authorize the use by any entity subject to United States jurisdiction of any space segment owned, leased, or operated by any separated entity, unless the Commission determines that such issuance, renewal, assignment, or use will not harm competition in the telecommunications market of the United States. If the Commission does not make such a determination, it shall deny or revoke authority to use space segment owned, leased, or operated by the separated entity to provide services to, from, or within the United States.

"(2) CRITERIA FOR COMPETITION TEST.—In making the determination required by paragraph (1), the Commission shall use the licensing criteria in sections 621 and 623, and shall not make such a determination unless the Commission determines that the privatization of any separated entity is consistent with such criteria.

"(b) LICENSING FOR INTELSAT, INMARSAT, AND SUCCESSOR ENTITIES.—

"(1) COMPETITION TEST.—

"(A) IN GENERAL.—In considering the application of INTELSAT, Inmarsat, or their successor entities for a license or construction permit, or for the renewal or assignment or use of any such license or permit, or in considering the request of any entity subject to United States jurisdiction for authorization to use any space segment owned, leased, or operated by INTELSAT, Inmarsat, or their successor entities, to provide non-core services to, from, or within the United States, the Commission shall determine whether—

"(i) after April 1, 2001, in the case of INTELSAT and its successor entities, INTELSAT and any successor entities have been privatized in a manner that will harm competition in the telecommunications markets of the United States; or

"(ii) after April 1, 2000, in the case of Inmarsat and its successor entities, Inmarsat

and any successor entities have been privatized in a manner that will harm competition in the telecommunications markets of the United States.

"(B) CONSEQUENCES OF DETERMINATION.—If the Commission determines that such competition will be harmed or that grant of such application or request for authority is not otherwise in the public interest, the Commission shall limit through conditions or deny such application or request, and limit or revoke previous authorizations to provide non-core services to, from, or within the United States. After due notice and opportunity for comment, the Commission shall apply the same limitations, restrictions, and conditions to all entities subject to United States jurisdiction using space segment owned, leased, or operated by INTELSAT, Inmarsat, or their successor entities.

"(C) NATIONAL SECURITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND PUBLIC SAFETY.—The Commission shall not impose any limitation, condition, or restriction under subparagraph (B) in a manner that will, or is reasonably likely to, result in limitation, denial, or revocation of authority for non-core services that are used by and required for a national security agency or law enforcement department or agency of the United States, or used by and required for, and otherwise in the public interest, any other Department or Agency of the United States to protect the health and safety of the public. Such services may be obtained by the United States directly from INTELSAT, Inmarsat, or a successor entity, or indirectly through COMSAT, or authorized carriers or distributors of the successor entity.

"(D) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection is intended to preclude the Commission from acting upon applications of INTELSAT, Inmarsat, or their successor entities prior to the latest date set out in section 621(5)(A), including such actions as may be necessary for the United States to become the licensing jurisdiction for INTELSAT, but the Commission shall condition a grant of authority pursuant to this subsection upon compliance with sections 621 and 622.

"(2) CRITERIA FOR COMPETITION TEST.—In making the determination required by paragraph (1), the Commission shall use the licensing criteria in sections 621, 622, and 624, and shall determine that competition in the telecommunications markets of the United States will be harmed unless the Commission finds that the privatization referred to in paragraph (1) is consistent with such criteria.

"(3) CLARIFICATION: COMPETITIVE SAFEGUARDS.—In making its licensing decisions under this subsection, the Commission shall consider whether users of non-core services provided by INTELSAT or Inmarsat or successor or separated entities are able to obtain non-core services from providers offering services other than through INTELSAT or Inmarsat or successor or separated entities, at competitive rates, terms, or conditions. Such consideration shall also include whether such licensing decisions would require users to replace equipment at substantial costs prior to the termination of its design life. In making its licensing decisions, the Commission shall also consider whether competitive alternatives in individual markets do not exist because they have been foreclosed due to anticompetitive actions undertaken by or resulting from the INTELSAT or Inmarsat systems. Such licensing decisions shall be made in a manner which facilitates achieving the purposes and goals in this title and shall be subject to notice and comment.

"(c) ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINATIONS.—In making its determinations and licensing decisions under subsections (a) and (b), the Commission shall construe such subsections in a manner consistent with the United