''(ii) a law applicable to facilities owned or operated by a Commission licensee or certificate holder that are designated by the Commission under section 161k.;

''(iii) a law applicable to property of significance to the common defense and security that is in the custody of a licensee or certificate holder or a contractor of a licensee or certificate holder of the Commission; or

''(iv) any provision of this Act that subjects an offender to a fine, imprisonment, or both.

''(3) OTHER AUTHORITY.—The arrest authority conferred by this section is in addition to any arrest authority under other law.

''(4) GUIDELINES.—The Secretary and the Commission, with the approval of the Attorney General, shall issue guidelines to implement section 161k. and this subsection.''.

(b) CONFORMING AND TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.—The table of contents of chapter 14 of title I of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. prec. 2011) (as amended by section 204(b)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

''Sec. 170D. Carrying of firearms.''.

SEC. 206. UNAUTHORIZED INTRODUCTION OF DANGEROUS WEAPONS.

Section 229a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2278a(a)) is amended in the first sentence by inserting ''or subject to the licensing authority of the Commission or to certification by the Commission under this Act or any other Act'' before the period at the end.

SEC. 207. SABOTAGE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES OR FUEL.

Section 236a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284(a)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ''storage facility'' and inserting ''storage, treatment, or disposal facility'';

(2) in paragraph (3)—

(A) by striking ''such a utilization facility'' and inserting ''a utilization facility licensed under this Act''; and

(B) by striking ''or'' at the end;

(3) in paragraph (4)—

(A) by striking ''facility licensed'' and inserting ''or nuclear fuel fabrication facility licensed or certified''; and

(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting ''; or''; and

(4) by adding at the end the following:

''(5) any production, utilization, waste storage, waste treatment, waste disposal, uranium enrichment, or nuclear fuel fabrication facility subject to licensing or certification under this Act during construction of the facility, if the person knows or reasonably should know that there is a significant possibility that the destruction or damage caused or attempted to be caused could adversely affect public health and safety during the operation of the facility.''.

ORDERS FOR WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2000

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until the hour of 10 a.m. on Wednesday, April 26. I further ask unanimous consent that on Wednesday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, and the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, tomorrow morning when the Senate convenes, it is expected that the veto message on the nuclear waste bill will arrive. Under the rule, when the Senate receives the veto message, the Senate will immediately begin debate on overriding the President's veto. It is hoped that an agreement can be made with regard to debate time on this important legislation.

The cloture motion on the substitute amendment to the marriage penalty tax bill is still pending. That vote will occur immediately following the adoption of the motion to proceed to the victims' rights resolution. Therefore, a few votes could occur tomorrow afternoon or evening.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. THOMPSON. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order following the remarks of Senator DORGAN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.

ARMS CONTROL

Mr. DORGAN. Today, in the Washington Post, there was a story headlined ''U.S. Arms Policy is Criticized at the United Nations.'' The occasion of the criticism comes at the beginning of the conference to review the status of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which opened yesterday at the United Nations in New York. This conference occurs once every 5 years. It is a conference on the status of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. I would like to read the first paragraph of the story in the Washington Post because it is really quite a sad day when our country is described in the following way:

> After years of championing international attempts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, the United States found itself on the defensive today as a broad alliance of arms control advocates, senior United Nations officials, and diplomats from nonnuclear countries charged that Washington is blocking progress toward disarmament.

Well, that is not something any of us aspires to hear. I hope and I believe that many of my colleagues want the United States to be seen as a leader in trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and in trying to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in this world. Regrettably, others view the actions of the United States—especially in the last few years—as actions that are not actions of a leader in trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

We have made some progress over recent years in reducing the number of nuclear weapons. I want to describe how because I think it is important to understand it.

I ask unanimous consent to show two items on the floor of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this is a piece of metal that comes from the wing strut of a Russian TU–160 Backfire bomber. This bomber carried nuclear weapons during the height of the cold war. This bomber was a threat to the United States of America.

How is it that I stand on the floor of the Senate holding a piece of a wing strut from a Russian bomber? Did we shoot it down? No. It was actually sawed off the wing. Giant, rotating metal saws cut the wings off this bomber. Why? Because we negotiated an agreement with the Russians to reduce the number of bombers and missiles and nuclear warheads in Russia. We reduced our stockpile and our delivery mechanisms, and they reduced theirs. So without shooting down a bomber that carried nuclear bombs that threatened America, I now have in my hand a piece of a wing from a Russian bomber—because arms control works. We know it works.

This chart shows what arms control has done in recent years. In the 1980s we ratified the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and in the 1990s we ratified the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START I. When we started the process in the mid-1980s, the Russians—or then the Soviet Union—had about 11,000 nuclear weapons on long range missiles. Today Russia has about 5,000. That means that 6,000 warheads are now gone. Many of those warheads were probably carried in the Russian Backfire bomber this piece comes from. So 6,000 warheads no longer threaten the United States of America.

Do you know what that represents—6,000 warheads with the kind of strength and power of the nuclear warheads the Russians used to build? That is equal to 175,000 Hiroshima bombs. Let me say that again. We have actually negotiated the reduction of nuclear warheads in the Russian arsenal, and 6,000 warheads are gone. Those 6,000 warheads represented the equivalent of 175,000 atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima. That is quite remarkable.

This is a small container of ground-up copper wire. This copper wire used to run through a Russian ballistic missile submarine. This type of submarine, a Typhoon class submarine that snaked under the waters throughout the world carrying 20 missiles, with 10 nuclear warheads on the tip of each of those missiles, aimed at the United States of America. This copper wire, before it was ground up, used to course through this Typhoon submarine. But now I